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RETHINKING NATIONALISM:
LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD

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FOREWORD

The 2018 International Conference on Political and Social Issues (ICSPI), organized by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of Universitas Indonesia (FISIP UI), on October 29 to 30 in Bali, is the second in a series of social science conferences, after the first was held in the same location in 2016. This event is held as a venue for scientific presentations of international scholars, both students and lecturers, to present the results of their latest research and studies according to the focus of their respective studies. The main purpose of the conference is to provide such a venue, as well as to encourage the scientific productivity of lecturers and students of the social sciences and humanities groups internationally.

In this current conference, the scope of the issues covers important issues that have become the center of attention in contemporary studies of social sciences and humanities, namely issues with "nationalism" as a keyword. Rapid global changes, as well as regional political reforms, make the concept of "nationalism" relevant to be revisited in various iterations. For this reason, the issue of "nationalism" is associated with 7 topics including:

Conflict, Terrorism and Nation Building
Identity Politics, Citizenship and Nationalism
Transnationalism, Globalization and Nationalism
Nationalism in the Digital Era
Social Justice and Social Well-Being
Nationalism and Social Movement
Gender and Nationalism

The papers presented are the results of field research and desk studies, done individually and collaboratively between lecturers or lecturers with students. Some of the papers are theses or dissertations or results of independent research by lecturers, which are planned to be published in international journals. All papers have been selected because of their relevance to the 7 topics above and the academic importance of the substance for further publication in indexed journals.

Through this rubric, I, as Deputy Dean for Education, Research and Student Affairs of FISIP UI, express the highest appreciation to all speakers who present their study results at 2018 ICSPI. The development of perspectives in the social sciences is no longer determined in a unipolar manner, but has developed on a polarized manner, closely related to the differentiation of changes in social phenomena it faces. Moreover, social science will develop if it can provide a solution for the society and the state. I hope that through the ICSPI activity, scientific productivity of social science scholars both in Indonesia and internationally continues to increase, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as well as its ability to provide solutions to social problems, and nationhood and statehood problems as well.

Regards,
Prof. Dr. Dody Prayogo MPSt.
Deputy Dean for Education, Research and Student Affairs
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia

TABLE OF CONTENT

The Committee 5

Foreward 6

Table of Content 7

Conflict, Terrorism, and Nation Building 14

The Effectivity of International Cooperation towards the Prevention of FTF Arrival in Indonesia ... 14
Arief Akbar Mohammad, Puspitasari, and Broto Wardoyo

Prevention of Uighur Terrorist Developments in Southeast Asia 15
Laila Indriyanti Fitria, Puspitasari, and Broto Wardoyo

Terrorist Prisoners and De-radicalization in Indonesia 16
Dadang Sudiadi

Pattern of Social Media Using in Terrorist Action of Bombastic Serves in Indonesia, 2016 17
Budi Prasetya, Benny J. Mamoto & Jerry M. Logahan

Terrorism Criminogenic Risk Factors 18
Zora A. Sukabdi

Transformation and De-ideologisation of Terrorist Ideology in Indonesia 20
Robertus Robet and Rusfadia Saktiyanti

Indonesian Returnees: Deconstruction of Terrorism Ideology 21
Didik Novi Rahmanto

Organized Crime and State Relationship in the Counterfeit Drugs Business 23
Bismo Teguh Prakoso

Women's Involvement in Terrorism: Case Study a Research on Indonesia 25
Idealisa Fitriana Aina and Siti Maryam Ibrahim

From A Terrorist to A Nationalist (A Study of a Terrorist Convict's Perception on Jihad within the Micro Communication Perspective) 26
Rosy Tri Pagiwati Istiadi

The Buton People in Taliabu: The Formation of Society and the Integration of the Nation 28
Haliadi Sadi, Susanto Zuhdi, and Didik Pradjoko

Disremembering Ethnic Conflict toward Peace Resolution: Sambas, Sampit and Poso Case 31
Bismo Teguh Prakoso

The Reproduction of Conflict in the Middle-up Class a Case Study: Five Majlis Taklim in Cibubur, East Jakarta 32
Aziz Fasya

The Downfall of a Common Enemy: Making Sense of the US's Policy Shift in Syria through the Perspective of Structural Realism 35
M. Rizky Prawira

Shift of Securitization Priorities of the French Government Concerning Migrants in 2015-2017 36
Rizky Aulia Zulkarnain

Strategies for Preventing the Role of Indonesian Women in Marawi Conflict 37
Bunga Anggia Prameswari, Puspitasari and BrotoWardoyo

Resiliency and Vulnerability of National Values Through Geo-Pancasila Mapping in the Community Borders and Coastals in Sangihe Island 42

Marlon S. C Kansil, Ringking Marina Korah, Eko Aditya Meinarno, and Yuslikha Kusuma Wardhani

Empathy, Fairness and Intergroup Bias ……,,,……. 43
Rizky Q. Fatria, Rasikhansa Kholda Brantakesuma, Irene Surya Dwi Roswita, and Muhammad Akhyar

Contemporary Terrorism and Indonesia's Future …….. 46
Meutia Irina Mukhlis

Comparison of National Values in Two Special Groups …….……. 48
Marlon S.C. Kansil, Yuslikha Kusuma Wardhani, Ringking Marina Korah, Sapto Priyanto and Eko Aditya Meinarno

Identity Politics, Citizenship and Nationalism 50

What's driving the 2016 Islamist-Mass Mobilization?
Aksi Bela Islam and the Limits of Islamic Right-Wing Populism in Indonesia ……..…..……. 52
Hurriyah Ahmad Suryani

Family Communication in Development of Child's National Identity ……..…..…… 57
Donna Asteria and Ken Reciana

Adaptive Structuration Process in the Education of Indonesian Migrant Workers' Children:
Case study in 9th Grade of Junior High School in CLC Kundasang, CLC Ribu Bonus, and
Sekolah Indonesia Kota Kinabalu Sabah Malaysia ……..……. 59
Asro Budi and Eriyanto

Contesting Nationalism with Freedom: The Strategy of the Government of Indonesia
in Controlling Radical Social Organizations ……...…….. 60
Sri Yunanto and Evi Satispi

The Irony of Penal Populism in Indonesia:
Southeast Asian Comparative Perspective on War on Drugs ……. 61
Yoseph Wihartono and Kuno Genta

Indonesia's Nationalism amid the Growing Islamist Campaign ……. 63
Bramantya Basuki

Don't Join Politic: Netizens Opinion about Today's Indonesia Politic Practice (Netnography Study
on Instagram Users Comments of Hotman Paris Hutapea Instagram Post) ……...…… 65
Christian Maxius Dotulong, Firman Kurniawan Sudono, and Billy Sarwono

Problematic of Political Representation at Local Level during Reformation Era …….…..….. 68
Sri Budi Eko Wardani

Dutch Colonial Government Arrangement, Forest Damar Exploitation,
and the Study of Kao and Galela Wars ……..…… 69
Abd. Rahman and Susanto Zuhdi

Rethinking Nationalism in Indonesia Amid the Emerging Challenges of Regional Autonomy,
Case Study: Loloda, North Maluku ……..…. 70
Tommy Christomy, L.G Saraswati Dewi, Susanto Zuhdi and Mustafa Mansur

Re-revealing the Presence of Afdeeling-B, 1919:
Is It Really an Organ of Religious Radicalism in Sarekat Islam's Body? ……..…… 72
Muhammad Wasith Albar

Self-Concept of National Identity: A Descriptive Study of Santri in Garut West Java ……...…….. 74
Ade Iva Murty, Charyna Ayu Rizkyanti, and Ilham Anugrah

Developing Social Resilience for Continuous Building of Nationalism in City of Batam, Indonesia ... 75
Sylvia Prisca Delima, Paulus Wirutomo, Abimanyu Takdir Alamsyah, and Setyo Sarwanto Moersidik

Synthesis of Islam and Democracy in the Context of Turkish Nationalism in the AKP Turkey Era …. 77
Fredy Buhama Lumban Tobing, and Agung Nurwijoyo

Formal Government is Under the Influence of the Strong Man:
Study on the Role of Zulkifli Nurdin Controlling Local Politics in Jambi Province …….. 80
Jafar Ahmad and Julian Aldrin Pasha Rasjid

Personalised Politics of the Middle Class in Neo-liberal Indonesia: The Tension between Religious and Nationalist Politics in Response to AHyper-globalized …… 81
Inaya Rakhmani

Corruption, Natural Disaster or Terrorism:
Which is the Most Impactful as a National Security Threat? ……..... 83
Sapto Waluyo

Negotiating Identity in Transition Time:
A Study case of Women Refugees in Roshan Learning Center in Industrialised Jakarta …….. 85
Nissa Cita Adina

Identity Politics in the Design of Indonesian Constitution ……. 86
Dwi Putra Nugraha and Satya Arinanto

Transnationalism, Globalization, and Nationalism 89

Nationalism and Globalization: Issues on the Sea Border between Indonesia and Australia in the Context of Maritime Sovereignty ……. 89
Susanto Zuhdi, Noor Fatia Lastika Sari, and Linda Sunarti

The Dynamic of Bilateral Relationship between the Republic of Indonesia-Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Field of Migrant Workers …….. 91
Muhammad Ibrahim Hamdani and Abdul Muta'ali

Nationalism and Integration: EU Narratives of Regionalism in Southeast Asia ……. 92
Laura Allison-Reumann

Shi'ite Islam, Nationalism and Transnationalism:
An Analysis on Twelver Shi'ite Islam in Indonesia …… 94
Naufal Syahrin Wibowo and Naupal

The Role of the Korean Ethnic Church in Diaspora Transnational Advocacy Networks …… 95
Hyunji Kang

Embracing Digital Economy on Millennial Society the Next Social Changing in Indonesia ……. 97
Ricardi S. Adnan

Millennials' Perspectives on Transnationalism, Globalization and Nationalism in the Jabodetabek Area ……..……. 99
Suzie S. Sudarman

The Validity of Press Freedom Index in Indonesia ……. 101
Eriyanto and Nina Mutmainnah

State of Exception of International Labor Rights and The Inequality of Labor Standards Among Asean Countries …… 103
Rizma Afian Azhiim and Asra Virgianita

Russia and Eurasian Economic Union in Regional Security Complex Theory ……..... 105
Joarn Viko Momongan and Henny Saptatia Drajati Nugrahani

National Identity Within Local-Global Interaction and Socio-Cultural Crisis in Industrial Cities:
Study on Worker in Jakarta and Makassar, Indonesia ……...…. 106
Drajat Tri Kartono, Ahmad Zuber, Atik Catur Budi and Panggio Restu Wilujeng

Empathy and Loneliness among youth in Globalization Era ……..... 108
Charyna Ayu Rizkyanti

Public Engagement among Young People: Leason from Public Diplomacy of South Korea …...…… 110
Afridho Aldana and Hendriyani

Coconut: Between a Global Commodity and Dusun Pusaka ……. 112
Ode Zulkarnain Sahji Tihurua and Tony Rudyansjah

China Controls Business Actors to Implement Belt and Road Initiative as Connectivity Project ……. 114
Aspin Nur Arifin Rivai and Asra Virgianita

Halal Food in Indonesian Food Self-Sufficiency: The Challenge of Globalization and Nationalism ... 118
Arin Fithriana

Defense and Security Manufacturing Industry In Visegrad Countries: The Shifted Ideology and Security Issues Post the Soviet Union and After Joining the European Union …… 119
Yulinar Amalia Masfufah and Henny Saptatia Drajati Nugrahani

Transnationalism and Globalization of Corruption: Impact to Asset Recovery and States as A Victim ……. 121
M. Idris F. Sihite

Foreign Policy in Command: The Role of ASEAN Centrality in Indonesia's Trade Policy ……..….. 125
Rakhmat Syarip

Pathways to Prosperity? Resource-Based Exports, Transnational Operations and the Welfare of Oil Palm Smallholders during the Boom Era …….. 126
Kusharianingsih C. Boediono

The Distortion of the Idea of Separation of Power in American Military History ……..……. 128
Rhesa Narola Sigarlaki

Papuan Nationalism and Indonesia: Making Sense of Contemporary Papua Transnational Advocacy Network …….. 130
Ani Widyani Soetjipto

Nationalism in the Digital Era ……... 132

Social Stability in *Taman Minggu Raya (TMR)*, Banjarbaru, South Kalimantan: An Ethnography of Social Network Analysis ……..…. 132
Rendy Ananta Prasetya

Discourse of Nationalism in film "Denias, Senandung di Atas Awan" ……. 133
Fadhillah Sri Meutia, and Raphaella Dewantari Dwianto

Improving Start-up Entrepreneur Decision Making Process during Crisis through Human Virtual Intelligence ……..… 135
Dani Miftahul Akhyar

The Role of Message Management Strategy by Public Relations in Building Image of Government Institution Through Twitter (Qualitative Studies in Directorate General of Taxes) …….. 137
Novita Arlika Rahmayanti and Henny S. Widyaningsih

Digital Information and Nationalism in the Post-Truth Perspective…….. 139
Wadyo Pandapotan Pasaribu

Strengthening the Indonesian National Identity in Digital Era through Citizen Journalism: A Case Study of the NET Citizen Journalist (NET CJ) Programme ……. 141
Asty Rastiya and Hendriyani

What Young Adults Think About #NKRIHargaMati in Digital Era: A Qualitative Study …… 143
D. Chandra Kirana

Nationalism in The Context of Political Polarization in Indonesia: Individual Response to Government Campaign "Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila" on Social Media Based on Generation Cohort …….. 145
Sudarto, Ibnu Hamad, and Hendriyani

Do Reading App Reviews and Trying Apps Predict the Use of Communication Apps? An Experimental Study of the Relationship between Behavior, Attitude and Intention to Use ……. 147
Niken Febrina Ernungtyas, Pinckey Triputra, and Billy Sarwono

Analysis of Public Disclosure Implementation
on Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service Office Website …… 149
Alya Naziihah and Wahyuni Pudjiastuti

Model of Source Credibility and Self-Advocacy on Vlog's Subscriber
in the Context of Nationalism ……. 150
Irwansyah

The Role of Public Information Disclosure in Strengthening Nationalism ……... 152
Henny Supriyati Widyaningsih

Social Contractual Utilitarianism in "Cibeusi" Digital Village …….. 160
Mazaya Rizy Safira and Irwansyah

Indonesian Youth and Social Media: A Study About Political Preferences in Digital Era ……..…….. 162
Aria Atyanto Satwiko

E-tourism of Indonesia's Tourism Ministry and MICE Destinations ……. 164
Anindita Lintangdesi Afriani and Firman Kurniawan Sujono

Indonesia, a Digital Nation: Problems and Initiatives ……... 166
Ummi Salamah and Muhammad Rahmat Yananda

NATO's Public Diplomacy in Europe on Digital Era ……. 168
Ibrahim Malik Nasserie, and Henny Saptatia Drajati Nugrahani

Motivation of Funder Participation in Digital Media
(Case Study Crowdfunding R80 BJ. Habibie Aircraft in Kitabisa.com) ……...…. 169
Amelia Debora Meliala and Reny Yuliati

Do the Laws in Indonesia Provide Sufficient Protection to the Domestic Industry
in Cross-border E-commerce Compared to the Laws inChina? ..……...…….. 171
Nabila Radityanti and Yetty Komalasari Dewi

Social Justice and Social Well-Being…… 174

Practices of the Police and Human Rights in Bali ……...…….. 174
Bhakti Eko Nugroho and Iqrak Sulhin

Social, Economic and Environmental Sustainability for Sustainable Community
in Brayut Tourism Village ……... 178
Triyanti Anugrahini

Obesity in Adolescents in Indonesia:
Threats to Demographic Bonus 2020-2035-Literature Review …..... 180
Annisah, Sofyan Cholid, Arif Wibowo, and Johanna Debora Imelda

Adaptation Strategy of Indigenous Peoples in facing the Social Change:
Case study on the Koroway Indigenous People, Mabul Village, Koroway Buluanop District,
Asmat Regency, Papua Province ……... 181
Arif Wibowo

Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET) in Indonesia:
Overcoming Social Injustice Among Youth ……. 183
Indera Ratna Irawati Pattinasarany

The Dilemma of the Fulfillment of the Right of the Child to the Education
of Child Prisoners in LAPAS: Constraints and Solutions ……. 185
Eko Hariyanto, Ferdinand T. Andi Lolo, and Elizar Ayu Putri

The Urgency of Community Asset in the Continuity of Corporate CSR Program ……...…… 187
Fitriyah Ishak and Cesario Argatama

"Mama Marind Su Hilang" Ecological Crisis in Kampong Zanige, West Papua, Indonesia …… 189
Sulastri Sardjo

Ecological Nationalism: Indonesian New Nationalism Towards a Social Justice (?)
(A Case Study of PLTU Construction in Batang – Central Java, Indonesia) …… 190

Nurul Isnaeni, Nur Asyraf Munif and Andreas Pramudianto

State, Society and Relations of Dependence over the Long Term in North Seram, Eastern Indonesia.. 193
Tony Rudyansjah

History of Connectivity: Initial Assessments on the Political Economy
of Indonesia's Infrastructure Development ……... 194
Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad

Family Resilience Who has A Celebral Palsy Child ……. 196
Dwi Amalia Chandra Sekar

Analysis of Ideas in River Management Policy regarding Pattern of Water Resource Management
in Ciliwung River Area in Jakarta ……. 197
Eisya Asshafina Eloksari and Ali Muhyidin

Constructing Typology and ProtocolAnalysis in Classifying White-collar Crimes Cases …….. 199
Muhammad Mustofa

Democratic Transition Matters: Explaining Transitional Justice in Indonesia ……. 202
Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem

Nation Building Through Social Safety …… 203
Paul Bijlsma

Reconciling Local Need and Global Concern for Rural Economic Development
in Peat Swamp Forest Ecosystem: A Preliminary Result from Perigi Talang Nangka,
South Sumatera, Indonesia ……. 205
Yanto Rochmayanto

Policing Model of Online Hate Crime: Cyber Policing Experience in Indonesia ……. 207
Mohammad Fadil Imran and Kisnu Widagso

Quo Vadis Ekonomi Rakyat?
An Explanation on The Ideological Deviation of Economic Legislature in Indonesia ……. 209
Aurora Jillena Meliala, Agus Sardjono, and Sri Edi Swasono

Moral Credential and the Symptom of Leniency of Public Punishment
toward Corruption Perpetrators in Indonesia ……. 213
Ni Made Martini Puteri, Hamdi Muluk, Amarina A. Aryanto, and Bagus Takwin

The Implementation of Community Policing in Preventing Vehicle Theft (Curanmor)
in Sawah Besar Police Sector, Jakarta …… 215
Monica Margaret, Christian Marito Simamora and Supriyono B. Sumbogo

Revisiting Empowerment: How Have the Rural Poor been Neglected
in Centralised Rural Development Policies in Indonesia Between 1967 and 2015 ……... 217
Ajie Saksono

The Raising of Fundamentalist Islam:
Identity Hatred and Deepening Neoliberalism in DKI Jakarta and Indonesia ……... 219
Petrus Putut Pradhopo Wening

Inheritance in Old Javanese Society (VIII – XV centuries CE): Based on Inscriptions …… 222
Intan Cahyanita and Andriyati Rahayu

Fighting for Sexuality and Gender Equality: Social Marketing Strategy of Nonprofit Organization … 223
Hilman Maulana and Hendriyani

The Phenomenon of Hate Crime Impacts on Chinese's Ethnic by Pariaman City Community
in West Sumatera …… 226
Sakti Emas Okta Wijaya and Monica Margaret

Genealogy of Indonesian Criminology …….. 227
Iqrak Sulhin

The Strategy of European Union in Human Security and Its Implementation in Three Northern
Europe Countries to Maintain Social Justice and Social Well-Being of the Societies:
Study on Finland, Denmark, and Sweden …….. 229

Ahmad Fiqhi Fadli and Henny Saptatia Drajati Nugrahani

Rethinking the Indonesia Nationalism through the Improvement of the Paddy Insurance …… 231
Puji Wisudya Rakhmawati and Nining I. Soesilo

Indigenous Repertoire in Contemporary East Borneo:
A case study of villages adjacent to forest and plantation industries in East Kalimantan, Indonesia … 232
Semiarto Aji Purwanto

Towards Demographic Dividend in Indonesia: Do Poor People Gain More from Education? ……. 234
Alexander Michael Tjahjadi, Muhammad Ivan Mahardika, and Ma'rifatul Amalia

Implementation of Restorative Justice in Traffic Accidents …….. 236
Rudi Antariksawan and Achmad Hisyam

Nationalism and Social Movements…….…… 238

The Nation and State Awareness of Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia ……. 238
Siti Rohmah Soekarba

The Dynamics between Jose Rizal's Ideas and the Philippines Revolutionary
Movement Group 1882 – 1898 …….. 240
Dita Putri Prameswari

Nationalism and Social Movement: The IKEA Way 242
Inten Dewi Anggraeni and Henny Saptatia Drajati Nugrahani

Ritual, Social Movement and State:
A Cultural study of Kampong Bustaman in the City of Semarang …… 243
Tony Rudyansjah and Ahmad Khairudin

Modernity and Its Christian Parallels:
Reflection from National Consciousness among Syrian Miaphysite Christians …… 244
Pradipa P. Rasidi and Tony Rudyansjah

The Emergence of Nationalist Movements in Footstep ……. 246
Ganda Upaya

Social Participation of Youth on Optimizing the Status & Role in Society
and Implications for Nationalism …… 248
Oki Anggara and Wulan Dwi Mentari

Curriculum System Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah, Cirebon, West Java ……. 249
Yon Machmudi, Ahmad Faisal and Apipudin Shihab

Fashioning the Nationalism: Study on Kebaya Community in Indonesia …….. 250
Nita Trismaya

Ethnographical Study of Crime: Merarik Tradition at Nusa Tenggara Barat ……. 252
Faidah Mardika and Arthur Josias Simon Runturambi

Gender and Nationalism 255

Is This Indonesian #MeToo? Women's Movement Against Sexual Harassment on Social Media
(Case Study of #MulaiBicara Campaign on Instagram) …… 255
Nicky Stephani and Billy K. Sarwono

Women in Nationalism Movement, Forgotten Subject in Post Secularism …….. 257
Widjajanti M. Santoso

Exclusive Imaginings: Adat Women and Nationalism in Post New Order Indonesia …….. 259
Mia Siscawati

Gender Social Wellbeing and Quality of Life …… 261
Lugina Setyawati, Francisia Seda, Joseph Pera, Kevin Kurniawan, and Muhammad Damm

CONFLICT, TERRORISM, AND NATION-BUILDING

Terrorism has developed to the point where it is seen as an isolated, stand-alone phenomenon having no ties with other issues. "Terror which is simply for terror" becomes an attitude heavily installed by state institutions to alienate terror from its sympathizers. However, despite its potential to create destruction and fear, terrorism is recognized as an effective wake-up call indicating the potential for conflict to develop to become full-scale intense conflict. The issue of nationalism can also be consistently attached to the situation whereby certain countries find it difficult to overcome the threat of terror due to its popularity among their publics.

This panel covered issues where terrorism is beyond the issue of technicalities, as well as the methods of producing fear among people. The capacity of terrorism to produce contestation toward the state, as well as to produce different ways of understanding nationalism will be intensively discussed.

The Effectivity of International Cooperation towards the Prevention of FTF Arrival in Indonesia

Arief Akbar Mohammad, Puspitasari, and Broto Wardoyo
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Indonesia could be described as a destination primadona for foreign terrorist fighters, due to the fact that Indonesia has the biggest Moslem population in the world and some Organizations such as JI and ISIS considers Indonesia as a battlefield of sort, on par with The Philippines. Of which is where they plan to firstly conquer as a footstep for the domination of Asia and Australia.

The reason of why Indonesia is constantly being targeted by Terror groups is the fact that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia values democracy despite the significant majority of its populations are moslem, thus the radicals view this as blasphemous because if Moslem is the majority then the Government should also implement Islamic Law in their view. Indonesia's position between mainland Asia and Australia also make Indonesia along with the Philippines as a strategic foothold toward the domination of Asia and Australia.

But, the Government of Indonesia is not oblivious on this fact, there has been efforts underway to mitigate terrorism by preventing the arrivals of FTF toward Indonesia, with the help of the International Community, mainly ASEAN as the counterpart.

This research will be based from the perspective of Indonesia as a country that is being targeted by terror groups due to its strategic position for the conquest of South East Asia, and its' goals are to show readers of how effective the International cooperation that is being undergone by Indonesia on the matters of the prevention of the movements of FTF toward Indonesia, also to give suggestions to the authorities on how to improve the effectiveness of the cooperation.

The Member States of ASEAN already have a framework for Cooperation amongst ASEAN Member States that has been started since 2001. This cooperation started after the 9/11 Attack in the United States, ASEAN members feel the need to cooperate to address this issue together and improve the stability of the region. In order to measure the success of this said cooperation, the author will see that whether the cooperation done by Indonesia has made the numbers of FTF coming to Indonesia dwindling compared to a few years back or has the government successfully stops FTF anymore from coming to Indonesia.

Findings indicate that the International cooperation that is being done by Indonesia and its' counterparts have been quite successful in its implementation, like on how Intelligence managed to track down a number of Uighur terrorists in hiding at Batam before they go deeper inside the Indonesian territory.

But, there are some difficulties being faced by Indonesia in this matter, such as the non-interference principal that prevents ASEAN to be closely knitted in the matter of National Security and also the lack of cooperativeness of the partner countries, like how Turkey sometimes refuse to give the information about the movement of returning FTF that departs from Turkey.

Hence, based on the findings with analysis. It seems that the cooperation itself has been giving some good results, but some partner countries sometimes reluctant to share the information about those FTF or potential FTF that is departing to Indonesia. That is why it is necessary for the government to be sterner toward partner countries in this cooperation, but in order to do that we must also put better surveillance on places where those FTF can possibly infiltrate Indonesia to prevent the said incursions.

Keywords: Foreign Terrorist Fighters, International Cooperation, Effectivity.

Prevention of Uighur Terrorist Developments in Southeast Asia

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Uighur terrorist are adding a new dimension to the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia. Based on the research done by Singh at 2016 and Soliev at 2017 the emergence of Uighur terrorists, which has its root deep from the radical movement of ideologically tied with Islamic State, gave a new challenge for the Southeast Asia (SEA) region. This challenge will also likely hamper the relation between Southeast Asia countries with China.

Geneva Convention in 1937 about Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism define acts of terrorism as a criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of a particular persons or a group of persons or the general public. In this case, the Uighurs are a minor Islamic ethnic from China, which began to emerge since 1992 because of extreme repression from the government. Transformation from a radical group into a terrorism group is a pattern that happens pretty often in Southeast Asia, as we can see from Abu Sayyaf group in Philippines, Rohingya immigrants terrorist group from Cambodia, and recent (2018) suicide bombings in Indonesia.

This research analyzes this issue using ethnographic methods based on observation to inmates of ethnic Uighur terrorism in Indonesia, and literature research with in depth interview from:

1. Inmates of ethnic Uighur terrorism, which currently captivated in Mako Brimob & Salemba Jail, regarding their motivation and the motive behind their network expansion to Southeast Asia region, especially Indonesia.
2. *Enze Han,* a senior researcher on the Uighur terrorists' issue,
3. Indonesian National Police, regarding information on Uighur terrorist network in Indonesia along with the number of total arrestments of Uighur ethnic terrorist in Indonesia from 2013 to 2018.

The purpose of this research is to examine and understand similarities from the militant pattern of the Uighur terrorists. This research also analyze the motive behind their network expansion to Indonesia, which leave us with important questions: Why the Uighur terrorists choose Southeast Asia region, especially Indonesia, and how did they do it.

The emergence of the Uighur terrorists is a form of escalation from repressive acts done by China's government at the Xinjiang area. To understand this concept, we are using Political Identity Theory to investigate the Uighurs. Political Identity Theory usually appear on people who are being marginalized from the majority of their group, and it will create a snowball effect which lead us to Political Process Theory, which justify series of terror acts done by Uighur terrorists.

Conclusively, in this research there are recurrences in the pattern of how terrorists group emerge because of repression from the government. We hope this research will contribute to the discussions about terrorism in Southeast Asia region, not just Indonesia.

Keywords: Uighur; East Turkestan Islam Movement (ETIM); Political Repression; Political Identity Theory; Political Process Theory; Southeast Asia Terrorism

Terrorist Prisoners and De-radicalization in Indonesia

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This paper describes the research findings on the process of rehabilitation on prisoners in Indonesia. Particularly, showing the forms of rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs in Indonesian prisons. Study of terrorist prisoner's rehabilitation in correctional institutions (prisons) is in today society's spotlight. Various maximum efforts have been intensified in order to handle terrorism and terrorist through terrorism judicial. Law enforcement becomes the foundation to overcome the problem of terrorism through harsh sentencing by the court decision, and expected to be deterrence effect against terrorism acts. But the reality of implementation of imprisonment is terrorist prisoners expand their networks and activities instead.

This raises debate about effectiveness of legal custody in prisons, because terrorist prisoners are different with other prisoners. Meanwhile, prison conditions enclosed by high walls and barbed wire, making it difficult for outsiders such as public to directly oversee things going on in the prison. As a result, opinion grows among society only highlights one side of prison. It creates a negative interpretation, though the rehabilitation of terrorist in prisons have other hidden problems.

This study aimed at describing the reality of terrorist prisoner's life in prisons, particularly examining the relations between prison's society, rehabilitation forms of terrorism prisoners, the effectiveness and outcomes of development programs and the implementation of counter-terrorism de- radicalization activities in prisons. In addition, this study focuses on the rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners. It cannot be seen as the same problems with other prisoners such as criminal, corruption or drugs offenders.

There is one of research main question: What are the forms of terrorist prisoner's rehabilitation in prisons ?

Related of this question. There are any researches objectives: 1. Providing description and explanation on the forms of rehabilitation program for terrorist prisoners, which have been running for a long time in prison; 2. Giving review and assessment on which factors that are impeding and encouraging terrorist prisoner's rehabilitation in prisons.

Type of this research methods is qualitative and descriptive. The methods used are literature review, direct observation, and in-depth interviews considering the difficulties of accessibility in the penitentiary or prison. Informants involved are terrorist prisoners and prison officers.

This research found that there are two problems due to the rehabilitation process, namely recruitment and radicalization. This research found as well that there are two main causes. *First*, there is no robust policy for terrorist prisoners' rehabilitation program in Indonesian prison.

Terrorist prisoner has obtained different treatment in each prison. Furthermore, treatment program for terrorist prisoner might be changed based on the policy of the officer in charge. Second, due to lack of Indonesian government's attention to the role of prison in Indonesia, overcrowded and violent environment has become major problem. Moreover, it can open the path to prison radicalization. Terrorism in Indonesia arose after a terrorist bomb at Paddy 's Pub and Sari Club Jalan Legian-Kuta, Bali, even though Indonesia itself has not escaped ups and downs of terrorism particularly since 1970s. The rise of terrorism then encouraged formation of new agencies, such as BNPT and Detachment 88. The result is approximately 840 terrorists were arrested and sent to prison to get rehabilitation. However, Indonesia has not actually had a special rehabilitation programme for terrorist prisoners until 2010.

Furthermore, de-radicalization is being one of the chosen modeling approach for addressing terrorist prisoners due to limit their risk of radicalization of others as well as to stop repeating radicalization. The treatment of terrorist prisoners was somewhat different when compared to the treatment of other prisoners. It is because

they are not regarded as a common criminal. Their actions were ideologically motivated and they have the status of political prisoner violence, not just a killer. However, the implementation of de-radicalization programmes in prisons is still partial and sporadic because there are no clear rules regarding rehabilitation programme itself.

Generally, de-radicalization of terrorist prisoners is very focused on former leadership of particular group. Law enforcement uses former members of terrorist group who had undergo the revision of their attitudes about violence, to be forwarded to other ex-militants members who had been serving a sentence in prison. This is done based on the assumption that ex-militants have a more lasting impact as a supporter of violent jihad when compared with moderate religious leaders. In addition, law enforcement officers also offer financial incentives for some individuals. In this approach, they also include elements of the counter-militant ideology program to ensure that violence is not part of religion.

But there is no doubt, these strategies are not immediately stopped terrorist group. In prison, they are still able to recruit even prison officers. Not only recruitment, they also refused to engage in joint activities that should be a means to counter-militant ideology programme. Some of the terrorist prisoners even openly expressed opposition against de-radicalization. Those who came out of prison were still likely to repeat acts of terror. Handling the problem of terrorism in Indonesia tend to ignore the prison's system. In fact, the handling of terrorism problems in Indonesia cannot be separated from the role of prison. It is because prison has an important role in the process of de-radicalization. Therefore, the role of prisons as part of the handling of terrorism needs attention and further scrutiny.

Keywords: prison, terrorist prisoner, de-radicalization, rehabilitation, Indonesia

Pattern of Social Media Using in Terrorist Action of Bombastic Serves in Indonesia, 2016

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Terrorism has become one of the most extraordinary forms of crime that are perceived as endangering humanity worldwide. By 2015, it was reported that 29,000 deaths have been caused by terrorism. Based on the calculations of the Institute of Economic and Peace, the average number of deaths for each terrorist attack reached 20 people. Dangers, losses, and deaths caused by terrorism cases are considerable. The calculation of losses on acts of terrorism will also be greater if we calculate the amount of other losses in terms of economic, social, and cultural. The purpose of this research is to understand the pattern of social media usage in the bomb terrorist action in Indonesia in 2016. Understanding the pattern of social media use in the terrorist action of bombing in Indonesia will also show how the radicalization process conducted by terror group in Indonesia. A thorough understanding of the process of radicalization and the use of social media in the act of terror bombing is expected to become the basis of policy making and prevention strategies of radicalization or even the prevention of future terrorist acts. The approach used in this study is qualitative to understand the social media usage patterns in bomb terror of 2016. The qualitative approach focuses strongly on meaning and meaning in a cultural symbol of the object under study

Data collection techniques in this study include: interviews, observation, literature study. Social science research has a technique called Trianggulasi to validate the truth and bias a data. The locations of this study are government offices and police that have access to information the author needs. Agencies such as the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) and the prison will be the author's reference to seek data other than the police. The result is Whereas based on data and analysis findings in 2016 the act of bombing is done by using social media. That there is a shift in the process of radicalization there is a difference that is before the development of social media and before the development of social media. If it is based on the General Guidelines of Al-Jamaah Al Islamiyah (PUPJI) Struggle the stage of radicalization is through a long process starting from the recruitment stage that must meet some requirements and long learning stages. Social media

used to deliver training on explosives for bombs such as TATP, HMTD and PETN is in the form of links and electronic books, as well as video content of instructions for making homemade bombs. The pattern of social media use by groups of terror in carrying out its action is to spread propaganda as much as possible on Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram and other social media with the aim of attracting sympathy and support from social media users followed by a more private recruitment process, setting up online logistics and training by sending tutorials on making homemade bombs through social media, forming small cells for action planning, setting targets and hiding places until funding is made through social media.

Keywords: the pattern of media social, bombastic server, terrorism action

Terrorism Criminogenic Risk Factors

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At present, valid criminogenic factors for identifying terrorist offenders at risk of recidivism are unidentified. There has been no systematic examination of individual risk factors for terrorism (Monahan, 2011), neither has there been adequate empirical investigation into how people disengage from terrorist organizations, and how professionals should seek to engage and treat those people involved with terrorism, or measure the effectiveness of terrorism rehabilitation efforts (Borum, 2011). These have implications to the unclarity of effective terrorism rehabilitation (often called as deradicalization or disengagement programs) (Istiqomah, 2011; Rabasa *et al.,* 2010). Moreover, there is also an increasing concern that the environments where terrorist offenders are detained and where attempts are made to rehabilitate may actually strengthen commitment to terrorism and lead to radicalization of other prisoners (George Washington University and the University of Virginia, 2006). In this regard, prisons are seen as incubators (Cilluffo *et al.,* 2007, Hannah *et al.,* 2008) or, more or less, "universities of terrorism" (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 562).

In Indonesia, there are numerous issues that impact rehabilitation, including the absence of effective rehabilitation programs and overcrowding (Bonnett, 2010; International Centre for Prison Studies, 2012; Jones, 2014; Noor & Hayat, 2009). More pointedly, there is a concern that extensive rehabilitation efforts are ineffective with a significant recidivism rate among terrorist offenders. For example, 23 out of the 291 offenders released in the past six years returned to terrorism activity (Jones, 2014). The analysis of this phenomenon by the International Crisis Group (2007) points to the absence of an effective overarching strategy in Indonesia for managing terrorist offenders. The absence of well-formulated intervention protocols is due, at least in part, to the absence of research into terrorism criminogenic risk factors, and a lack of empirical research into terrorism rehabilitation.

The deficiency of empirical researches on terrorism risk assessment and effective rehabilitation is caused by many factors; however, it is assumed to be primarily because of the difficulty in engagement with terrorists (O'Duffy, 2008) and confidentiality and the sensitivity of the issue (Bhui *et al.,* 2012), making research and publication very challenging. Furthermore, there is a potential that terrorism researchers may be subjected to close and critical observation and suspicion from both authorities and terrorism networks alike (Shepherd, 2007).

In terms of terrorism risk assessment, there is an increasing debate among scholars regarding whether general criminal risk assessment methods can be applied to the risk assessment of terrorist offenders (Dernevik, Beck, Grann, Hoge, & McGuire, 2009; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Rosenfeld, 2003). Responding to this, Monahan (2011) argued that valid individual risk factors of terrorist offenders must be identified before it can be determined whether existing approaches to general risk assessment (for non-terrorism related violence) can be applied to those people convicted of terrorist acts.

Against this background, 'MIKRA' *Motivation-Ideology-Capability* (MIC) Risk Assessment and Treatment Management have been developed to identify individual criminogenic risk factors and needs of terrorist

offenders. It is formulated to set up parameters of effective terrorism rehabilitation; based on forensic psychology, particularly Psychology of Criminal Conduct (PCC) which emphasizes the identification of Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) in treating offenders. PCC itself is holistic and multidisciplinary and open to the contributions of any discipline in explaining individual differences in the criminal behavior of individuals (Andrews & Bonta, 2010).

A series of studies was accomplished through semi-structured interviews and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with sixty-four eminent Indonesian counterterrorism experts (i.e. counterterrorism senior advisors, intelligence analysts, criminologists, and members of government think tanks), practitioners (i.e. deradicalization practitioners/terrorism rehabilitators and policy makers), and professionals (i.e. heads of government counterterrorism agencies and units) by using qualitative and quantitative data analysis. The participants were selected carefully based on their nationally-recognized counterterrorism products (i.e. terrorism investigations, policy, analysis, critical recommendations, and researches).

As a series of studies identifying Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) to terrorism, MIKRA identifies eighteen individual risk factors and needs of ideology-based terrorist offenders that were grouped into one of three higher order domains: *Motivation, Ideology,* and *Capability*. The *Motivation* risk factors are *Economic, Justice, Situational, Social, Superiority*, and *Actualization Motives*. Moreover, the *Ideology* risk factors are *Values* (i.e. doctrines)*, Beliefs about Objectives* (i.e. targets of missions)*, Attitudes, Militancy* (i.e. resistance to change)*, Layers in Ideological Groups* (i.e. leaders, managers, and followers), and *Understandings on Philosophy* which include several indicators such as understanding of local wisdom, nationalism, citizenship, national history and background (contextual insights), and the wisdom of religious teachings. Lastly, the six risk factors in *Capability* are skills in *Intelligence, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Mechanical and Electrical (M and E), Military, Language,* and *Social Domination Skills*.

MIKRA detects parameters of effective terrorism rehabilitation in the three domains of *Motivation, Ideology,* and *Capability*. The effective rehabilitation is indicated by the decrease of risk level in one or more of the three domains; that is, transforming offenders from being high-risk to lower risk in one or more terrorism criminogenic factors. MIKRA 3D-Model with a contour is illustrated as a U-shaped valley which describes individual profiling in the eighteen risk factors in which the concept of terrorism rehabilitation is moving the offender from the underground ('very high' risk) to the ground level ('low' risk). Nevertheless, the results of the studies show that all three domains are not considered as fully modifiable. The participants of the studies suggest that the offenders' terrorism *Motivation* and *Ideology* are modifiable domains, whereas *Capability* is unmodifiable. In other words, the offenders' terrorism motives (e.g. *Economic, Superiority, Social, Actualization, Situational,* and *Justice Motives*), *Values, Beliefs about Objectives, Attitudes, Militancy, Layers in Ideological Groups*, and *Understandings on Philosophy* could be adapted through intervention, while terrorism skills such as *Intelligence, Language, ICT, Military, Mechanical and Electrical,* and *Social Domination Skills* (risk factors of *Capability*) could not be diminished after the offenders have been mastering the skills.

In terms of Responsivity to terrorism (of RNR), the studies have found that there are several strategies in conducting effective terrorism rehabilitations. The strategies are described based on seven aspects: *Epicenter of rehabilitation, Intervention techniques, Routes of intervention, Approaches, Targets of intervention, Learning process,* and *Rehabilitation procedures*.

Keywords: Terrorism risk assessment, criminogenic risk factors, rehabilitation, deradicalization, motivation, ideology, capability

Transformation and De-ideologisation of Terrorist Ideology in Indonesia

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Introduction

"*Indonesia is a capital city of terrorist in the whole South East Asia region*", said Chief National Police Tito Karnavian (Jakarta Police Commander at that time). Tito statement was announced base on the fact of the in Indonesia terroirs get wider support and barely easy to recruit and get sympathy.

Since Bali Bombing, Indonesia has done determine effort to face terrorism. Since the Bali Bombing, Indonesia has already captured more than 700 convicted terrorists. More than 400 of them have been released, however around 10% of them has been reported repeating their crime. At this moment, Indonesia's prison jailed more than 300 convicted terrorists in 26 prisons.

Despite Indonesian success in law enforcement, the threat of terrorism has still overshadowed Indonesia. The threat could emerge from various factors such as: firstly, there are a lot of convicted terrorist whose are going to be released and potentially doing the same crime. Secondly, the emergence of the new generation of terrorist group. Thirdly, terrorist returnee from Syria, with new skill and new ideological strength. Fourthly, ISIS attack. The problem with ISIS is not merely comes from the people who are mobilized in to ISIS regions such as: Iraq, Syria and Philippine, but also from the returnee jihadi entering Indonesia with new field experienced, combat skill, bombing skill and organized as combatant fighter.

Conventional analyses on terrorism in Indonesia is dominated by criminology, psychological or security point of view. Criminology, psychological and security studies interpretation of terrorism may have given an understanding on motive, behavior and network of the terrorist. However, those interpretations have failed to give an understanding the basic nature of the violent act of usual citizen whose transformed themselves into terrorist.

Based on those arguments, this research will put focus more on the transformational process of the individual from common citizen into terrorist and how they are returning back from terrorism into common and good citizen. How does common citizen become a terrorist and how come they leave their ideological violence acts? What kind of societal process that been involved in those transformations?

Method

Our research is conducted in qualitative method. Data is collected by deep interview both with the convicted terrorist in jail and some ex convicted terrorist and their family members. For the analyses purposes this research also involved literature review.

Finding

Based on its social nature, terrorist has two modes of living: the first is they are good common people, loyal citizen and humble neighbor. The second is someone with destructive ideological mission. In this sense, terrorist is not a person that is totally wrapped by diabolic criminal intention. There are eventual aspect in their life that is 'good'.

Our research finds facts that first, most terrorists have a simple civil life pattern and they are socially good with the environment. As a person, they live as good citizens, they also do not have destructive aggressive nature to the surrounding environment. Second, terrorists have a double world of social world as citizens, normal individuals, and ideological world. The normal social world is general, normal and reasonable, while its ideological world is its real, singular world of action. Third, in his personal life, a terrorist is: a good father, a quiet and nice neighbour, an obedient citizen, a good child, often alone, and almost a harmless person. However, as a man of ideology, a terrorist is an actor who holds a destructive purpose against other people and against himself. In this case terrorists have two separate lives and they are foreign from one another. Fourth,

jail, punishment and resocialisation have not significant influential elements in the process of deradicalization. The transformation of the terrorist into good citizen come from their individual experience and individual touch with 'good man' and family. Our research reveals that personal intimacy, trust and family are the main causes of 'deideologisation' that turn terrorist ideological violence into good citizen.

Discussion

From Indonesia's experiences, terrorism has at least two layers: the first is the transformation of common people into the globalized citizen due to their attachment into the humanitarian problems in so many various part the world. The second is the transformation of the 'globalized common people' into the terrorist act. Political and doctrine of the global war play an important role in the transformation of the globalized common people into the terrorist.

The main aspect of the transformation of the common people into terrorist is the sense of 'meaningful cosmopolitan fighter'. For them, terrorist is a self-realization in holy duty to fight against a big bad state regime. Involving in the global war, facing the the great country as enemies have elevated common people in to new higher status in the society. It creating new identity, new self and new meaning in life. In this sense, the relations between globalization and terrorism could be explained in the terms of duality: the transformation of the common people into terrorist could only be happen in the globalization.

Deideologisation and deradicalisation must be defined as a process of turning back from globalization into 'private' sensibility. At this moment, the government model of deradicalisation put more focus on the idea to bring pluralistic and more soft liberal understanding of religious life is not, introducing state ideology (Pancasila). Deradicalisation by the government try to achieve ideological replacement. This kind of new ideologisation by the state is not relevance and is undermined by the terrorist. Empirical evidences show us that the transformation of returning back happen only in the private individual nature of the terrorist self that been touch by the goodness of human experience, love for the family.

Conclusion

The attempt to eradicate terrorism should be based on the different nature of the terrorist act. The first is the common people manipulated by the organized unconsciousness, the second is the organized unconsciousness operate to transform common people in to terrorist act. Deradicalization should be interpreted as a process to release common people from ideological intervention of the terrorist, to protect globalized citizen from the transformation into violent. The transformation and unlocking process of the terrorist into good citizen could only be achieved with humane direct experience. The nature of the terrorist ideological act is the total rejection of the ugly existing world. Deradilization could only be effective to change terrorist world view by entering them into real human-friendly situation that gives them a reference that society is still good and worth to be lived.

Keywords: Terrorism, ideology, transformation, globalization.

Indonesian Returnees: Deconstruction of Terrorism Ideology

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The declaration of a caliphate establishment in Syria by Abu Bakr Al- Baghdadi has marked a new age of terrorism. The newly declared caliphate was later known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS. ISIS, once a terminology merely referred to a place where the caliphate was born, later on refers a group who support and fight for the caliphate using terrorist attack throughout the world to reach their goals. Not only the rise of ISIS, the impact of this caliphate declaration also gave rise to a new phenomenon called Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

Foreign Terrorist Fighters are people from all parts of the globe who have gone to Syria to intentionally join the caliphate declared by ISIS. Those people who went to Syria came individually, in groups, or even with the whole family. Although several countries have tried restricting their citizens to travel to Syria with a ban, yet, those people insisted to go by using legal or even illegal means.

ISIS in Syria has been designated as a terrorist organization so physical encounters and crossfires between ISIS and other extremist group or ISIS against the government troop are frequent occurrence. Many countries have seen ISIS as common enemy because a lot of terrorist from around the world swore their loyalty to ISIS. That is why superpowers like USA and France decided to deploy their military power to eliminate ISIS in Syria.

Although ISIS has been declared as a terrorist organization and has been opposed by countries all over the world, apparently these doesn't discourage the foreigners terrorist fighters to join ISIS in Syria. They would have tried every way available to reach Syria, even if it meant going against the law. They are not afraid to cross through a conflict zone, even if it meant dying in the attempt, only to become a part of ISIS.

One of the attention stealer in this phenomenon is the amount flow of people who became Foreign Terrorist Fighter. An estimated 40,000 people from all over the world has travelled to Syria to join ISIS. These number has been the largest number of foreign terrorist fighter flow ever happened in a history of the world's conflict. These number are even bigger compared to the amount of Foreign Terrorist Fighter involved in 30 years' war in Afghanistan. At that time, the amount of Foreign Terrorist Fighter flow reached 25,000 people. The gap in numbers between foreign terrorist fighter who joined ISIS, that has been established for less than 10 years, and those who involved in Afghanistan war are massive.

Based on classification by the FTF Task Force of National Agency for Combating Terrorism (Satgas FTF Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme), foreign terrorist fighter in Indonesia could be classified into several groups. The first group is called the deportant. This group consists of Indonesian foreign terrorist fighter who successfully travelled to Syria but they were being deported back to Indonesia by the Syrian authorities. The second group is called the returnees. Returnees is an Indonesian foreign terrorist fighter who went to Syria but then choose to returned later voluntarily. The third group is called the blocked group. This group has the intention to go to Syria but thwarted by the Indonesian government before completing their goal.

Compared to other groups, the returnees are unique. They experienced a change of mindset which made them decide to return to Indonesia. Unlike the deportant, returnees choose to go back on their own accord. Deeper and more elaborate study about the returnees mindset changes are interesting and important to be done. The results could help creating countermeasures against terrorism in Indonesia. This research will be conducted qualitatively by using interviews as a technique of data collection. Interviews were conducted on 2 (two) foreign terrorist fighters who went to Syria once and now have willingly returned to Indonesia. To enrich the data being processed for research purpose, three foreign terrorist fighters chosen as interviewees all have three different backgrounds.

Returnees are chosen to be interviewed to analyze their thinking process from the moment they decided to travel to Syria until the time they have finally choose to return to Indonesia. From all the foreign terrorist fighters group, the returnees were chosen as participant in this research to get a better understanding of the deconstruction process of their terror ideology. The changes from a radical way of thinking to something completely the opposite becomes such an important insight to use in a countermeasure against terrorism.

Data obtained through interviews will be analyzed by using three theories: The Just World Theory to explain the motivation behind those foreign terrorist fighter's decisions to go to Syria, The Habitus theory to explain what happened while they were in Syria, and The Deconstruction theory to explain the changes in their thought of process which makes them decide to return to Indonesia

Results show the foreign fighters motivation for going to Syria varies. One of them is the illusion of living in a nation where its rules and behavior are in accordance with the Sharia (Islamic Law). In addition, they thought they would live a better, fairer, and happier life if they join ISIS. Those Foreign Fighters also believed that they were helping ISIS in establishing the caliphate in Syria. They believed helping ISIS equals to participating in jihad*;* thus, it will grant them a place in heaven in the afterlife. The promise of heaven turned to be a very strong motivator for these foreign fighters to travelled to Syria. Generally, they get these portrayal of ISIS from social media and group or individual discussion.

Unfortunately, what awaited them in Syria was totally different to what these foreign terrorist fighters had in mind. Those foreign terrorist fighters harbor the dream of a pure Islamic state run by rulers committed to the full implementation of sharia, but they did not find what they were dreaming for. The habituation to these realities in Syria has deconstruct the foreign terrorist fighters to become a returnee. Deconstruction process happened after disparity between hope and reality in Syria were found. Strong motivation to join ISIS, even to the length of doing risky attempts, could be weakened. Individual thoughts which were considered solid enough to support ISIS turned out could not be developed furthermore, even when the ideologization process was done directly by ISIS themselves. Habituation process which happened along the way surprisingly create a new way of thinking in the returnee's mind: they followed neither ISIS ideology or their own ideology. ISIS failed to develop the returnees' radical way of thinking into a bigger support for them. At the end, the returnees have chosen to return to Indonesia when they did not find what they were dreaming for and they're disillusioned by the fact that ISIS' values are not up to their expectations.

The changes in returnees thought of process could be the first step to help deradicalize a radical individual. More experienced returnees could also play an important part as a deradicalization agent because they have gone through the radicalization process and they could use those experience as an insight to help deradicalize an individual. These returnees can also undermine the appeal of ISIS by speaking with credibility and authority about its true nature, this important information could be a great weapon to counter ISIS propaganda. The understanding behind things like these remains of key importance to defeating terrorism in Indonesia.

Keywords: ideology, terrorism, foreign terrorist fighters, returnees, just world theory, habitus, deconstruction.

Organized Crime and State Relationship in the Counterfeit Drugs Business

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Introduction

Counterfeited drugs could be identified or found in the link of production, distribution, and consumption process. In Indonesia, counterfeit drugs business reaches 3,8% according to the data released by Indonesian Society Anti-counterfeiting or Masyarakat Indonesia Anti Pemalsuan (MIAP) in 2016. Counterfeit drugs in Indonesia covers 25% of drugs business in Indonesia, which is worth up to 2 billion USD in total. Counterfeited drugs is starting to be marketed online. Apart of the risk of receiving counterfeit drugs, online shopping for drugs gives various benefits, such as acquiring scarce drugs, and of course, getting cheaper price.

Allegedly, counterfeit drugs business is massively managed and organized. This indication is proven by the convenience of finding counterfeit drugs in small shops and traditional drugstores. For the regular users, they could easily go to some drugstores and ask the dealers about which drugs they should buy according to the symptoms they are having. The dealers will certainly offer several types of drugs, with relatively cheap price, even though in the pharmacy, drugs are categorized by over the counter medicine that could be sold freely and prescription medication which could not be given without the prescriptions from the doctors.

Methods

The approach of this research is qualitative approach. Since this research starts from the production and distribution phenomenon of counterfeit drugs, the writer abstracts it into the activity concept of organized crime, furthermore, gathers the relevant concepts then compiles them into an explanation about the relation of politico-criminal configurations.

Based on its function, this research is categorized as basic research because this research and its result will be useful to enhance the basic understanding or knowledge about a certain phenomenon.

The writer uses literature review and observation as the technique of collecting data. Moreover, literature review towards various texts about the phenomenon and the theories is also necessary to enrich the insight related to the subjects. The data analysis uses organized crime concept and politico-criminal configuration concept.

Findings

Hess and Orthmann, quoting Albanese, stated that organized crime orientations are in high profit and continued-profit crimes (Hess and Orthmann, 2010) or as refers to Gottschalk, organized crime chases profit and/or power (Gottschalk, 2010). This explanation is supported by Shvarts (2010) who stated that the efforts of gaining benefits and money, combined with corrupted police department, seem rational as the motive of organized crime, especially in order to increase the standard of living of its members (Shvarts, 2010).

In the drugs production and distribution policies, the state tends to neglect and sacrifice the interests and the needs of marginalized groups and lower class groups. This is characterized by oligopoly conducted by big capital pharmacy companies, expensive medicines, and tax for medicines. This condition encourages people to find the alternative drugs with affordable price, which later exposes people at risk of counterfeit drugs, and also opens the production and distribution market opportunity of counterfeit drugs by the organized crime. It has been emphasized by the argument that there is a high possibility that the root of organized crime is from the economic system, including as a backlash of neoliberalism in the society (Shvart, 2001).

When the state intentionally and actively, or by commission, cooperates or uses organized crime groups for certain interests, then this phenomenon is known as state-organized crime.

The relation between the state as political power proprietor and organized crime as illegitimate practitioners of power and intimidation is defined by Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues (2010) as politico-criminal configurations concept (Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues, 2010). This relation could be configured because of the different background of interests of the state and organized crime, but these interests could be fulfilled if both the state and organized crime facilitate each other.

Politico-criminal configurations relation creates the opportunity of organized crime to conduct monopoly, which could cover the whole economic decision making process that affects the flows of resources, products, income, and profits.

Discussion

The efforts of organized crime to conduct monopoly towards product market could be observed when the organized crime could influence state's policies in some ways that only their groups could conduct the sales and purchases of goods and services, including determine the prices. If there are other parties or groups who could provide the same goods or services, then organized crime will monopolize it by practicing racketeering or committing violent actions.

Politico-criminal configurations relation is volatile, which means it has the tendency to rapidly change (Gayer, 2014). In this condition, generally, organized crime is the one that has the opportunity to achieve its interests and even take the role and function of the state in giving political goods to the citizens.

This research is a basic research which limitary is in the relation between the state and organized crime that could affect and be affected by the applied policies. This includes the problems in the production and distribution of counterfeit drugs. However, hopefully, this research could be continued by other advanced researches in order to observe the interaction patterns and forms that happen among government institutions, state apparatus, and organized crime.

Conclusion

The data interpretation reveals the relation between the state and organized crime. The state intentionally provides facilities and supports to the activities of organized crime, from product market, household, firm, and resource market. This relation happens because the state basically needs certain circumstances in order to maintain its power and to conduct social control. Meanwhile, organized crime needs the circumstances that

enables it to maximize its profits in economic activity sector and to conduct monopoly. The relation that is known as politico-criminal configurations has symbiosis mutualism character. Politico-criminal configurations also have volatility character, which tend to rapidly change. Therefore, in this sense, organized crime becomes the one who could gain the opportunity to achieve its interests, even it could also take the role and function of the state in providing political goods to the citizens.

Keywords: counterfeit drugs, organized crime, state-organized crime, politico-criminal configurations

Women's Involvement in Terrorism: Case Study A Research on Indonesia

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Nowadays, each country is now facing any challenges regarding the non-military kind of threat. A way more huge consequence we should even deal with is asymmetrical threat. Asymmetrical threat right comes into forces as the unequal power does exist. In International Relations, "Balance of Power" was born as the political ties or Greek cooperation was formed right before the Westphalia treaty finally reached its goal in 1648. Its concept leads to particular view for non-state actors to take such action that emerges the irregular or asymmetrical threat. One of asymmetrical threats is radicalism by using violence or terrorism. On Defense White Book of Republic of Indonesia, it is explained that terrorism fundamentally changes the security concept. The concept concerning on conventional approaches is ended up applying the comprehensive one.

Terrorism plays the significant role on implementing comprehensive approach as a tool for governments in gaining their national interests, such as the people's safety. International agenda has recently shifted into contemporary era describing that this moment, the man behind is not merely "the men", but the women as well. Women always play roles as victims and as those who are abusively humiliated by religious and political purposes. But, as long the globalization merely develops, the women strived getting out of their limits on international political domain. Since 19th century, women had all participated and since 1960s, they had played much significant roles in committing act of terror, such as women participants in Algeria's campaign at the end of 1950s yet at the begin of 1960s, Germany terror committed by Baader-Meinhof and Italian Red Brigade in Italy in 1970s until 1980s, as well as attack on cyber of Palestine at the end of 1970s. Men's key roles are usually as combatants in terror attack (martyrdom and *armed civil*) and it seems that it has shifted, taken over by women. Women's involvements are expected to not only be put on combatant level but also on passive participants.

To be cited from National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), Iraq and Syria's Foreign Terrorism Fighters (FTF) reached up approximately around 200.000 within 100 countries, including Indonesia. Indonesian citizens turning into FTF are 196 in totals and those who were captured as well as being returned off to Indonesia are 76 in totals. The women's position in terror act necessarily becomes such alert for any respective countries to combat terrorists. Terrorists nowadays made a recruit of the women and drove them to be involved in terror act. They were recruited and assigned at strategic position in a war committed by IS (Islamic States).

We use descriptive analyses (qualitative method) including literatures and previous researches as the main resources. Respective terrorism and feminism (gender) theory would be the tools on analyzing how the women's involvements are, based on what gender actually described. Terrorism activity that associated with men's masculinities of nature is explored by these theories, as well as the transformation of women's social role through their involvements.

In this regards, Russia can be such suitable model. At the conflicts series of Russia and Chechen nationalists, suicide bomber groups were born within Chechen ethnics in Russia. In 2002, the attack was committed by Chechen terrorist in Dubrovka Moscow. In 2004, the attack was also committed at Beslan School in North Ossetia. Those two events killed hundreds of civilians. On motives of analysis, Speckhard and Akhmedova stated that suicide bombers experienced personal traumatic of state since they lost their beloved ones on ethnic

cleansing by Russian armies. Women suicide bombers so called Black Widows were noticed by international media for their revenge acts against government over losing their husbands, children, and their siblings.

In Indonesia, women's involvement in terror act has been viewed as newly emerged threat as Dian Yulia Novi (future suicide bomber and wife of Solihun, Bom Panci case suspect) and Puji, wife of Dita Oepriarto (a killed suicide bomber of church in Surabaya) buzzed into headlines. IS itself, as the mentioned on *iowiinstitute.org* in which Sidney Jones stated, has managed turning the concept of jihad into such family affair. Women are more likely a huge drive of their family to commit suicide bombing. They were also not so satisfied about role they usually play and intend to do more than the way they ever do. They also admired of the women getting involved in terror act, such as in Iraq and Chechnya, Russia. As we turn back the time, this sort of women's involvements in terrorism act has actually lasted long way ago than expected, such as Munfiatun (Noordin M. Top case) and Nurul Azmi (a wife of Cahya Fitrianta, terrorism suspect on financing case). Munfiatun was arrested on September 2004 in charge of hiding her husband who became a terrorism suspects. As for Nurul Azmi, she didn't even realize of what she ever did as Cahya made her being accused of for financing act. Cahya used that respective wife to deal with money he gained from hacking activities. These cases identically related to wife or the closest women of terror suspects.

In general, this research is aimed at analyzing women's involvements on terrorism in Indonesia by which the involvements itself previously committed in Russia and merely is our entry case. The objective itself is also to figure how women's involvements might be confirmed by the factors, motivations, level of commitments, as well as the radicalization process. These aspects indicated to lead the women into committing any terror acts in which Russia also dealt with when it comes to Black Widows. We would examine the shifted of women's social role on their involvement in committing terror by feminism (gender) perspectives. Feminism (gender) theory supposed to support this research to conclude that the femininities and women's role are misused to be involved in terrorism-based activity they ever conducted. The misused of women's role itself constitutes such main issue here shifting the emerging state of terror as the merely threat in Indonesia during this modernized era.

Keywords: Black Widows, Gender, Indonesia, Terrorism, Women's Involvement

From A Terrorist to A Nationalist (A Study of a Terrorist Convict's Perception on Jihad within the Micro Communication Perspective)

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Introduction

The very moments of radicalization or de-radicalization experienced by an individual are the critical points that, whether or not, determine someone's destiny to be a terrorist. Such moments, if scrutinized within various perspectives, shall result in analytical inferences that may become valuable information for those who strive for the de-radicalization movement in the country. The process of radicalization of an individual is unique as Laqueur (2007) purports that no all-embracing definition will ever be found for the simple reason that there is not one terrorism, but there have been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in motivation, and in manifestations and aims. Thus far, various models of radicalization have been generated to depict the radicalization process in different ways (Borum, 2003; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Moghaddam, 2005; Silber, 2007; Sageman, 2008).

This study examines how an individual perceived the meaning of *jihad* and then turned into a death-defying terrorist who has brought the death toll to more than 200 people in 2002 bombing action in Bali, a terrorist act

with the highest number of victims ever happened in Indonesia. Not only investigating about how the individual becomes a terrorist, this study also explores how and why the radical turned to a severe counter-terrorist.

In an attempt to understand how the subject perceives and constructs the meaning of *jihad*, the writer focuses on the micro level of communication context, i.e. interpersonal and intrapersonal communication. Interpersonal communication is a communication process that takes place between two people who are connected in a particular relationship (e.g. acquaintances, friends, colleagues, siblings, lovers, etc.). Whilst intrapersonal communication is understood as a communication process that occurs in one's mind (in one's self). An individual thinking process falls into this category of communication.

Using the Symbolic Interaction Theory (SIT) (Mead, 1967), analysis is made on how an individual perceives, constructs, and understands the term *jihad* through the symbols and signs (messages) he receives when interacting with others.

Methods

The subject of this research is Ali Imron (AI), a terrorist convict who has been sentenced for the whole life since 2003 for his lethal action of Bali Bombing I, the second biggest terror incident in the world (after September 11th attack) in terms of the number of casualties. Dwelling in Polda Metro Jaya penitentiary, AI was intensely interviewed and made recalling moments of his turning points; firstly from being a common figure to a perilous extremist, then from a radical to an anti-radical. Having been in prison for more than 14 years, AI is now actively involved in the de-radicalization movement behind the bars.

In order to obtain a comprehensive answer to the question of how and why an individual shifts his mind in perceiving *jihad*, this study applies the qualitative methodology with a phenomenological method. In depth interview and literature study are conducted to seek out the answers of the research questions in this study.

Findings

From the very early age, the subject of this research, Ali Imron (AI) has undergone an internalization process in understanding the term *jihad* through his close-knit siblings, family, and surroundings. Having been confirmed for several times, AI stated that it was his elder brother, Ali Ghufron, who has predominantly helped him construct the meaning of *jihad* in such a way that he became radical and was determined to join the violent act (Bali Bombing I). AI's experience in the Mujahidin Military Academy in Afghanistan (1991-1994) has also strengthened his desire to build an Islamic nation and pursue his *jihad* objectives through a warfare (Imron, 2007).

The organization like *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (JI), which AI became member in 1993, did not play a significant role in boosting his *jihad* spirit. AI's involvement in Bali Bombing 2002 was led more by a mutual agreement, sense of trustworthiness, and emotional attachment with his peers, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi, both happened to be AI's elder brothers.

Whereas AI's converting to become anti-terrorist was primarily due to his inner thought throughout a thorough and profound self-reflection of what has happened particularly after the Bali Bombing incident. Reflecting on the facts that the key perpetrators of Bali Bombing had been arrested and there was no uniformity of accomplishment from his peers following the bombing terror, AI became aware that something must have been wrong with the action. During his flee, AI found himself doubtful of what he and his brothers had believed about *jihad*.

Discussion

Results of this study show that the micro level of communication process has played a very significant role (or the most significant as in the case of AI) in bringing an individual to become radical. AI's close relationship with Ali Ghufron has made an easy way to help AI construct the meaning of *jihad* in accordance with what Ali Ghufron understood. Through a lengthy and intensive interpersonal communication process with Ali Ghufron, AI became firm on his *jihad* path of combat.

The construction of the meaning of *jihad* in AI's mind through his interaction with others is very much in line with SIT which is fundamental for the explanation of the phenomenon in this study. In AI's case, Ali Ghufron has apparently served as AI's *significant other* as well as *affective other*. This study, hence, supports the account that the mobilization of young people into the violent social movement is based on friendship and kinship (Sageman, 2008).

Moreover, SIT is very well incorporated in the findings (of this research) which indicate how self, mind, and society intertwine in the individual's thinking process of re-constructing meaning of *jihad* as something different from his previous perception and understanding. Thus, intrapersonal communication (communication within oneself) substantially matters in the endeavor to understand how a terrorist like AI converts to a counter -terrorist and even now becomes, say, a nationalist, who assists the Indonesian police and the National Counter Terrorism Agency in the de-radicalization movement.

Conclusion

Looking into the micro level of communication process is significant in the attempt to comprehend how and why an individual could turn to a terrorist. The same thing also applies when seeking the answer of how and why a terrorist becomes aware that he has committed a wrong deed.

This study shall promote subsequent researches to explore other communication aspects within the micro scope of communication interaction, including but not limited to:

(1) the content of messages communicated by a terrorist (text analysis),

(2) the media used in the communication process,

(3) the effect of the communication process.

Should interpersonal communication be crucial in the radicalization process, efforts must be made in order to break the flowing of radical ideology. enceforth, radical terrorists must no longer be given room to prolong a free communication with anyone. Meanwhile, the de-radicalization program must be open for the already-repentant ex-terrorists to widespread their *jihad* understanding to the public in general, and in particular to their peers, family, or any individual having a close-knit relationship with them.

The Buton People in Taliabu: the Formation of Society and the Integration of the Nation

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Introduction

Buton as a definition does not refer to a particular ethnic and language, but includes several ethnic (sub-ethnic) and dialect languages. The concept of Buton is generally associated with the history of a Buton Sultanate, whose territory is more or less the same as present-day Southeast Sulawesi Province. The Butonese refers to an area of the island called Buton. In addition, there are Muna people, inhabiting Muna Island. And so on, there is a group of small islands of Tiworo in the north of Muna Island. Then if we look to parts of the archipelago in the east and southeast of the island of Buton, there are islands: Wangi-Wangi, Kaledupa, Tomea, Binongko. The four islands were formerly known as the Tukang Besi Island, and are now known as the Wakatobi acronym, now a district. But if the inhabitants of this territory are outside their area, they will call themselves Butonese.

In its historical perspective, Buton is a political entity in the form of a sultanate dating back to the 14th century and ending in 1960. The characteristics of the sultanate of Buton and its people are maritime, and even the concept of a State built and developed based on the principle of a "ship state", which is conceptualized as a double-dipped boat with four bare balances: Muna, Tiworo, Kulisusu, and Kaledupa. In the hierarchy of positions in the sultanate as an example, after the successive sultan was *Sapati* (Prime Minister) *Kenepulu* (Judge), *Kapitalao* was admiral or sea captain; consisting of sea capitals for the eastern region (*kapitalau sukanayo*) and sea capitals for the western region (*kapitalau matanayo*).

The Buton Sultanate has a number of ports. Bau-Bau Port in the collecting-center category, plays a role in connecting the shipping lines from the western part of the archipelago to the Maluku Islands, and to the surrounding feeder-points. Borrowing a port categorization in Southeast Asia until the 1400s, made by Leong Sau Heng, the entrepot in this area is Makassar. The role of the sea is important to see the dynamics of the region that connects between the western and eastern parts of the archipelago.

The spread of the Butonese in the context of the diaspora is caused by natural violence and security. Due to the geographic conditions of the islands and agricultural land that are very minimal then the movement of the outgoing population is a long historical phenomenon. Buton migration is small in size and scattered in various parts of the Indonesian archipelago into facts that give Indonesian demographic configurations. In the security factor, Buton residents suffered the threat of pirates and due to wars between neighboring kingdoms or with the VOC. The Butonese experience of past events has shaped the traumatic structure of their diaspora.

Compared with the Bugis-Makassar diaspora in large groups and more due to political factors, the Diaspora of Buton people in small groups and more due to socio-economic factors. The geographical conditions are limited and generally infertile for agriculture or plantations, thus encouraging the inhabitants of the Buton Islands, especially the Wakatobi Islands, to go abroad. The spread of the Buton population during the time of the sultanate has long been taking place. In general, they spread to the Moluccas of Ambon, Taliabu, Seram, Obi and Ternate. The inhabitants of Buton who migrate to Ambon generally come from the areas of the Tukang Besi Island, especially Binongko. So it is not surprising that many people from here earn a living in Ambon to this day. While the Buton people who spread to Ternate (North Maluku, now) mostly come from Eastern Buton, especially from the region Koloncucu. This paper specifically discusses the Buton diaspora on Talibau Island, Sula Islands, North Maluku.

There is one history circulating on Taliabu Island that explains the origin of the name "Taliabu" which is derived from the words "ta", "lia", "and" bu. "Ta comes from Ternate, while lia comes from the word" rope "or "buffer", while bu from the word Buton, which means binding or integration of Ternate and Buton ie two large tribes in Eastern Indonesia who have become Indonesia on Taliabu Island.

Method

This paper will focus on how the integration of the Butonese with the Ternate or other tribes in Taliabu. Based on the problem, this research uses historical methodology with maritime history approach. The sources used are primary sources in the form of static archives in the National Archives and Archives of Ternate Region and secondary sources of published books including journals and theses on research objects. In addition, simultaneous interviews are divided into two stages namely first, interviews with individual informants. Second, group interviews in the form of Focus Group Discussion (FGD). This source is criticized internally seeking authenticity of data and external criticism to obtain validity of data. The next stage of historical methodology is the giving meaning to the data that has been criticized (interpretation) and subsequently assembled in the form of interesting writing (historiography).

Result and Discussion

The main discussion topics of this paper include: First, the formation of shipping networks and trade of Buton people in the Moluccas Sea and Taliabu and surrounding islands. The formation of this network is complemented by a boat technology consisting of four kinds, namely: Buton people especially Wakatobi people (Wanci, Kaledupa, Tomia, and Binongko) create boats ranging from Koli-koli, then Soppe Tobe-Tobe including jarangka, then nade or soppe, and finally created Bangka including Bangka panta bebe. Four systems of this boat technology can answer the ecological facts of the island Wanci, Kaledupa, Tomia, and Binongko

(Wakatobi). Koli-Koli is effective for fishing on the edge of the island, Soppe Tobe-Tobe and Jarangka are also effective in finding fish in reefs near the island, with nade or soppe also effectively performing livelihoods on the islands of Buton, and ultimately with Bangka they are very effective for to travel outside Indonesia or abroad.

This network was triggered by the search for trade commodities (laha te lea / cargo boat) especially copra in Maluku and East, Central and North Sulawesi areas including its marketing to several big cities in Sulawesi including Kendari, Luwuk, Manado and Ternate to Surabaya and Singapore since the colonial era until the 1950s. Commerce search line from Buton (wakatobi) -Tiabo Island-Buru Island-Tidore Island and Ternate-Gorontalo-Tolitoli-Up to West Sulawesi, then return to Buton. Furthermore, to build trade or commodity marketing from Buton-Bau-Bau-Kendari-Luwuk-Manado-to Tawau East Malaysia and Buton-Makassar-Surabaya-Singapore line.

Secondly, the Diaspora of Buton people on Taliabu Island (Sahu, Nggele, Salati and Lede villages) integrated with the local community was triggered by the philosophy of "*tara*, *turu*, *toro* and *taha*" (Haliadi, 2017: 50). Discussion of this principle of life, among others: View of life or the handle of life called the principle of *Tara* (strong build life), *Turu* (build togetherness), *Toro* (firm stand), and *Taha* (not afraid). (Haliadi, Presentation 10 November 2017 in Wakatobi). The Butonese in the Oceans built the life and life force for their future and participated in building solidarity, especially though different religions such as the Butonese relationship with the indigenous tribes of Taliabu. Furthermore, Buton people are also firmly established because they are not easily converted to religious principles even though they live in the minority because there is no story Butonese immigrants are influenced to convert to Islamic religious beliefs. Finally, the Buton people in opening the settlement has never feared such supernatural powers from any realm of evil beings because they have high Islamic principles.

This principle was later supplemented by Islamic principles applied to the bureaucrats of the Buton sultanate, namely: *sidiq*, *tabligh*, *amanah*, and *fathanah* (Rahim Yunus 1995: 51-80). *Sidiq* means being honest in words and deeds, *amanah* means trustworthy in keeping responsibility, *tabligh* means conveying all kinds of kindness to society and *fathanah* means smart in managing society. The advantages of the four philosophy became the basis of the diaspora process of the Buton people in the overseas who started from the Buton people's interest in the sea and coastal areas (becoming fishermen) to the Buton's fondness for trades settled in traditional markets to agriculture and plantations, especially coconut and clove plantations on Taliabu Island from the 1950s to the 1970s.

Conclusion

The findings of this paper can be summarized as two important points that trigger and spur the formation of the network and the diaspora of Buton's integration into Indonesia in the overseas lands: First, the shipping and trading networks were fueled by the Butonese understanding of beaches, corals, small islands and the big island. Second, Diasporan integration of the Buton with other tribes in the overseas sparked by the philosophical principles of "turu, tara, toro, and taha," the Buton survive overseas because of the strong build of life, to build togetherness with local communities, firmly established in principle religion of Islam, and not afraid wherever they are. This kind of integration is built by the Buton people everywhere, especially in Taliabu Island to build togetherness on behalf of Indonesia.

Keywords: Integration, Sailing Network, Diaspora, Butonese, Taliabu, North Maluku

Disremembering Ethnic Conflict toward Peace Resolution: Sambas, Sampit and Poso Case

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Introduction

Even if conflicts are inherent to every individual existence of human, the aftermath of conflict are not necessarily destructive. Conflict may manifest positively as we manage it well by seeing it as a challenge to pursue our deficiency. This paper will apply the above perspective to reveals the re-interpretation of conflict events (historiography of conflict) in three regions namely Sambas (1999), Sampit (2001-2006), and Poso (1998-2012). Sambas' and Sampit's conflicts have a tendency as socio-economical conflict, whilst Poso's conflict is more driven by religion issue. In the main, these three conflicts were named as SARA (ethnic/*suku*, race/*ras* and religion/*agama*) conflicts by governmental terms. An event which contains discrimination, racial harassment by violence, imposes one's own will individually, communally, or culturally. Variety of SARA conflict and its initiator(s) can be punished under Article 40, 2008 in Indonesian Law about the Eradication of Race and Ethnic Discrimination. Another legal basis to punish this action can be found in Criminal Law (KUHP) Article 156, 156a, and 157.

Methods

This paper discusses about some SARA-related conflicts in Indonesia which must be put to an end so there will be no sign of long-standing chaos will occur with continuous damages. This study wants to outlines some therapy models which have been done by variety of party to cool off the conflict, which temporarily seen as the most "proper" way to ends Sambas', Sampit's and Poso's conflicts.

Theoretical framework which will be used to reveals the factors of Sambas', Sampit's and Poso's conflicts is Neil J. Smelser's *Collective Behaviour* approach. The core of the conflict may not be eradicated for a hundred percent, but the conflict must always be taken care by decreasing its temperature as the resolution of peaceful coexistence by making and putting forward a *safety valve,* as Lewis Cooser mentioned, in the conflicting society (Poloma, 1994). The *safety valve* model, which character is Structural-Functional, is well suited as a solution to Poso's conflict (top-down). Meanwhile, the solution of Sambas' and Sampit's conflicts is more suited to Lloyd's Structurism approach (Lloyd, 1993, 93-95). Structurism methodology utilizes humanist causal-cycle namely the outcome creation of human interaction with their social structure. As the Structurism is loosely structured, it allows the society to take their role quickly and actively to defend the continuity of social structure (*reproduction*), or otherwise to change the society (*transformation*).

Result

Temporary findings of this study reveal that in the first phase, the parties involved were put to realize that conflict will draw them nowhere, even will bring them to their self-destruction. From those three conflicts in Sambas, Sampit, and Poso, evidently, the socio-economical conflicts (in Sambas and Sampit) are relatively easier to be surmounted considering that the overcoming-methods which is used is bottom-up (*Structurism*), the initiative to end the conflict born from the society itself with the intervention of Regional Government.

As we re-read the studies and historiographies of Sambas', Sampit's and Poso's conflicts, we found that there are some prevention and resolution models of the conflict, namely the studies of Suharno (2006; 2011), conflict resolution through identity recognition; Anis Maryudi Ardi (2017), about Pancasila as conflict resolution because Pancasila has a nation meta-narration and peaceful consensus role; Bend Abidin Santosa (2017) and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, *et. al.* (2009), explore the role of mass-media to prevent conflict occurrence. Wasisto Raharjo Jati (2013), writes that the local genius which holding the leading-role in reconciliation by re-

unifying the solidarity within the post-conflict society; Permana (2002), states the importance of *adat*-institutions revitalization to prevent conflict and as a channel of peaceful coexistence resolution.

The novelty of re-interpretation or re-reading of the conflict historiographies in Sambas, Sampit and Poso is that it will be best to consider Structurism method of Christopher Lloyd rather than Structural-Functional method of Talcott Parsons, Neil J. Smelser or Lewis Cooser in the phase of formulation, preparation and implementation of public policy.

Discussion

Conflict resolution, in essence, is the effort in the formulation, preparation and implementation process and there must also be parties (state and informal leader) who are brave enough to execute precisely and quickly the resolution of the ongoing conflict. From the variety of studies that have been conducted earlier, there is not a single one of them which talk about Structurism approach, considering that this approach highlighted more on the reproduction-creativity of the agencies in the conflicting society. The realization to end the Sambas's conflict more or less was "using this instrument". However, the determinant and the role of each agency in the local social-institution to keep the peaceful continuity are still unclear.

Conclusion

The need for a deep 'structural' study as a conflict resolution, this approach educates all of us to revive various contextual informal channels with the situation (the circumstances in which the conflict occurs). The results of the assessment should be followed up by the issue of the authority of the informal institution (there should be no sympathizers from a particular political party) by accommodating them in legislation at the local or higher level. If these two things can be realized, the impacts will be gained, regardless of the nature of the conflicts occurring in various regions, can be quickly identified by the agency of trust in the informal institutions of the conflict area. The agencies, both as perpetrators of conflict and the carrier of the mandate of informal institutions, bring the resolution to maintain the integrity of Indonesia with the most appropriate, fast, and measurable conflict solution. Since those involved in conflict resolution are local people, the state is only a facilitator. The Sambas case uses this pattern, only an in-depth study of the Sambas conflict, which uses a structural perspective has not existed until now.

Keywords: Resolution, conflict, Sampit, Sambas, Poso, SARA.

The Reproduction of Conflict in the Middle-up Class A Case Study: Five Majlis Taklim in Cibubur, East Jakarta

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Introduction

Islamic fundamentalism increasingly finds momentum after the fall of the New Order regime. The spirit of religious puritanism is increasingly implicated in the life of Indonesian Muslims today. Radicalization has made spaces and socio-religious activities a contestation area for radical groups. Kakar (1996) explains that religion and religiosity are often seen as a significant factor for the emergence of conflict, compared to other factors such as language, ethnicity, and geography. In this case, the house of worship, especially the mosque, often becomes a struggle for influence between radical and moderate groups. From the mosques radical Salaf groups also spread the influence to the wider community through lectures and teachings (Al-Makassary and Gaus, 2010).

This study is expected can be explained the massive emergence of urban puritans phenomenon, especially in urban area in Jakarta. This study also aims to describe how conflict can be producted by content from the mubaligh, as well as the role of the participants in internalizing conflict content in their family.

Methods

This study uses a qualitative research approach by using case studies in five majlis taklim. This approach is used to develop in-depth descriptions and explanations regarding reproduction of conflicts in majlis taklim, especially in five majis taklim in Cibubur, East Jakarta.

The data collected in this study consisted of primary and secondary data. Primary data is collected through in-depth interviews with several key informants as well as participatory observation in five majlis taklilm. While secondary data is collected through review number of scientific publications, such as journals and other scientific publications.

Content analysis is also used in this study, to examine content delivered by the mubaligh, to attempt the hidden meaning of the content of the lecture delivered, the contribution of content to the emergence of religious radicalism from the majlis taklim's participants, and also internalization of conflict content by majlis taklim participants to their family members.

Findings and Discussion

Propaganda's contents in the majlis taklim

Based on the observations results at the five majlis taklim in Cibubur, most of contents that delivered by a number of mubaligh is more relies on the normative values, such as individual godliness, family godliness and social relations among Muslim society. A way how Muslim appertain its relations with another religious groups only occupies a small portion. It cannot be denied that the content is also nuanced rejection of the existence of other religious groups, both at the level of religion as well as society. In this case, some examples that can be illustrated the situation is refusal for Shia and Ahmadiyah group as they are considered perverted from Islam. We cannot take one's mind off DKI Jakarta Regional Election in 2017, when many contents issued denial of non-Muslim leader candidate.

Internalization of Radicalism towards Majlis Taklim Participants

In understanding this phenomenon, this research is also tried to analyze how radicalism is internalizing among majlis taklim participants by using Blooms' (1956) human competencies phase, such as cognitive, affection and psychomotor.

Findings description is as follow, **1) Cognitive level**, participants in five majlis taklim believes that they currently have been able to obtain and digest the values obtained from the outside, and also believes that words explained by the mubaligh is true; **2) Affective level**, participants in five majlis taklim expressed that they identify themselves is different with each other's, both fellow Muslim as well as other religious groups; while **3) Psychomotor level**, the emergence of conflict manifestation has begun with participants acknowledgment that Islamic ways, such as Khilafah, must be enforced, and that understanding is drive participants take part in series of Islamic actions.

Internalization of Radical Values in the Family

Based on the interview results with some majlis taklim participants, especially a group of mothers, their parenting style is indicated that they use authoritarian parenting style. According to Bauminds (1967), authoritarian parenting style is a conservative, conformist and norm abiding style.

The authoritarian style is indicated from their explanation that their children is not allowed to be friends with those from non-Muslim, as they believe that it shows a sense of faith to God. Furthermore, the exclusivity of

these groups is shown when they said that there is an obligation to obtain child education in the Islamic school.

Conclusion

Puritanism of urban society increasingly shows its existence as a new social phenomenon that is present in the midst of Indonesian society today, especially from Jakarta middle-upper class. There are many factors that contributed to the phenomenon, including the role majlis taklim in producing conflict, as happened at five majlis taklim in Cibubur, East Jakarta.

Findings in this study, the conflict reproduction occurred through the propaganda content explained by the mubaligh, as the content was also immediately understood plainly by the participants, as it is also understandable as a process of internalization of conflict value. Another interesting finding in this study is that participants, especially a group of mothers, have an important role in internalizing the values of conflict in their families.

Keywords: Islamic Fundamentalism, Conflict Reproduction, Mubaligh, Internalisation Majlis Taklim, Family

The Downfall of a Common Enemy: Making Sense of the US's Policy Shift in Syria through the Perspective of Structural Realism

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Introduction

During the last couple of years, United States (US) has been dealing with the political conflicts in Syria. Living up to its role as a leading power in the international community, US undertook several measures as a means to end such a complicated disorder which involved so many contrasting sides. Moreover, one of the issues worth noticing is the US's involvement in a heat between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. the Turkish Government has performed numerous attacks and military raids toward The Popular Protection Unit (YPG), a Kurdish military wing it perceived as an enemy due to its affiliation with the separatist group, The Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) in Turkey. The situation, which has started since 2015 immediately triggered a reaction from the US. In this case, United States has been very critical against the Turkish actions and consistently backing the YPG's position. These US's actions are mostly seen as a form of support toward YPG as an ally in a battle against the most prominent terrorist group, The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

However, US's stance against Turkey-YPG conflict seemed to be changing recently. In this case, US and the other western powers seemed to be quite and passive to the recent aggression performed by Turkey against the YPG's base in Afrin in 2018. This condition sparked some confusion in international community as people began to question the motive behind US's laid back policy. Thus, taking on this line of thoughts and using the perspective of structural realism, this study seeks to ease the puzzle by answering the following research question: "Why does the United States change its policies with regards to the Turkey-Syrian Kurds conflict in Syria?"

Theories & Method

This study examines the case by using the grand perspective of structural realism or neo-realism. Specifically, this study makes use one of the sub-tenets of structural realism called as balance of threat theory from Stephen

M. Walt (1985). Walt's balance of threat discusses mostly about the power shift in the international system, which is characterized by the presence of an emerging threat and how the other units in the system react to this threat. This is where the idea of 'balancing' is taken place. Balancing means that the other parties whose survival is threatened by this new power will cooperate and establish a strategic alliance. They do this in order to balance themselves with the new power and prevent this emerging threat from harming their security. By balancing, the threatened units can equal the threat the emerging power brings and neutralize this threat in order to bring back the order in the system. This paper seeks to answer the research question by projecting the 'balancing' idea to the previous and current position of ISIS as a common threat in relations with the US policy shift against Turkey-Syrian Kurds conflict.

The selection of the case is motivated by the assessment toward the 'deviant' phenomena. Deviant in itself means that the case selected for this paper shows some surprising conditions that deviate from the common expectation (Gerring, 2008, p. 655). Moreover, the method used for this paper is a mix between qualitative case study and process tracing. Qualitative case study is generally known as a method of analysing a single case or small numbers of phenomenon to give a better understanding about the nature of the cases in a more general manner (Gerring, 2002, p. 37). Besides, process tracing is a qualitative research method that seeks to deeply trace the evidence or sequence of events that constructs a particular case or event (Brecher and Harvey, 2002, p. 443). It aims to unpack, search or prove certain causal mechanism that links the variables within a single phenomenon. Besides, it usually provides a detailed narrative about the historical events that set up the case.

Findings

The findings tell us that ISIS used to be a very dangerous threat as well as a genuine common enemy in the region. This situation triggered the US to establish a strategic partnership with the YPG to battle against ISIS. However, judging from the indicators of offensive capabilities and offensive intentions from Walt's balance of threat theory, it is proven that ISIS is no longer a threat it previously was, and this affects the urgency for US to further defend the YPG's position in Syria.

Discussion

Through the application of 'balancing' principle from balance of threat theory, it is safe to say that US's policy shift is influenced by the change in the significance of ISIS as a regional threat. US saw ISIS as the most prominent threat in Syria and committed 'balancing' with the YPG to counter this threat. Thus, one might argue that US played a role as a protector of YPG against Turkey because it considered YPG as a strategic ally to battle the common enemy in the region. Nonetheless, ISIS's power seemed to heavily decline in the recent years, as proven by the significant setbacks in terms of military strength and aggressive intention. Not to mention that ISIS has lost vast amount of territories it previously occupied in Syria. Since ISIS is no longer a considerable threat in the region, the urgency for the other parties, such as US to stick with the balancing policy also deteriorates. Hence, US no longer see the importance of defending YPG as its partner because ISIS's presence as a common enemy for both US and YPG now seemed to be irrelevant.

Conclusion

US's policy shift concerning Turkey-YPG conflict is mainly precipitated by the position of ISIS in Syria. ISIS used to be the most prominent enemy, which made it crucial for US to defend YPG as an important member of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition group. However, as ISIS's influence deteriorates, the urgency of defending YPG also diminishes. This explains why US seemed to be taking a more passive approach in responding Turkish recent aggression in Afrin.

Keywords: US policy shift, Turkey-YPG conflict, common enemy

Shift of Securitization Priorities of the French Government Concerning Migrants in 2015-2017

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Introduction

In 2015, Europe experienced a huge wave of migrants crossing into its borders. A graphic by the Eurostat has shown that around 350.000 of the migrants were Syrians and more than 500.000 of them were from countries with ongoing conflicts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Eritrea. Thousands of these migrants has been settling in Calais since 2014, waiting for their request for asylum to be granted by the British government. However, on October 2015, British Home Secretary, Theresa May, announced an immigration act to limit the number of migrants entering the UK, even refusing to prioritize unaccompanied underage children.

The uncertainty of protection from both countries, as well as poor living conditions in Calais has urged the migrants to enter the UK by force. On July 2015, there had been 2.000 attempts to cross the borders through Eurotunnel at night, and by the end of 2015, more than 18.000 migrants were detained by the French officials for crossing the borders without legal papers. In 2016, reports shown that there were more than 60.000 attempts of lorry hijacks by the migrants who were trying to cross to the UK. The French and British government had built anti-migrant fences and increased security technology surrounding its borders, even deploying more task forces and criminalizing volunteers giving help to the migrants. These acts are essentially against liberalism and the fundamentals of human rights which make the foundation of both French and British society. This research aims to answer why the French Government justifies the use of violence towards migrants and criminalizing volunteers during the European Migrant Crisis in 2015-2017 as well as demonstrating how the objects of securitizations has shifted from time to time.

Methods and Theory

This research is done through literature study. The theory used as the frame of analysis of this paper is the securitization theory. In this case, a political matter (concerning migrants) becomes a matter of national security through speech acts done by right wing politicians and French elites. Therefore, it is deemed just to use this theory considering the presence of the elements in securitization mentioned by Balzacq, Buzan, and Wæver.

Results

In accordance to the theory employed in the research, this paper shall be divided into several subtitles which are 1) French politicians as the securitization actor; 2) existential threat posed by Calais migrants narrated by the French elites; and 3) extreme measures done by the government to overcome the existential threat.

1) French Politicians as The Securitization Actor

The crisis in Calais is not the first migrant crisis in Pas-de-Calais, however, the current security situation in France differs from how it was in 2002 when the previous crisis occurred, urging the French government to take a different stance towards the issue. Policies made by the Macron cabinet is seen to be a reaction towards the migrant crisis in France. French policies during the Hollande presidency were also aimed to minimize the number of migrants entering France, however, with more emphasis on national security, considering the numerous terrorist attacks which happened in France during his rule.

Both Hollande and Macron are pro-human movement in the European Union. This is reflected through their migration policies that mainly tries minimize the potential threat by extremist groups which may be moving around freely in Europe as undercover migrants. By contrast, during his presidency in 2007 to 2012, Nicholas

Sarkozy had shown obvious signs of being against immigration to France due to economic and cultural reasons. His campaigns mainly revolve around notions of migrant threat towards 'the French Identity'. The shift of policy priorities made by the French government, as well as the rise of French populism, is a clear sign of how migrants were first constructed as a threat to its economy, culture, and national identity, to become a threat towards national security.

2) Existential Threat Posed by Calais Migrants Narrated by The French Elites

The notion of economic threat posed by immigrants coming into France is a narration which has been built for decades. However, the series of terror acts which happened in France in the course of 2014 to 2017 has raised caution in French society. The European migrant crisis in 2015 happened during the time France was also facing a dire situation within its national security and has prompted the government to take immediate and cautious actions concerning migrants coming from the middle east. Many politicians used this notion of national threat posed migrants to gain popularity during the election and a large part—though not dominant—of French society (audience) accepts such notion. This is shown by how Marine le Pen from the French conservative party, Front National (FN), gained more votes (33,94%) in 2017compared to her predecessor, Jean-Marie le Pen did in 2002.

3) Extreme Measures Done by The Government to Overcome The Existential Threat

The situation in Calais is worsen by UK's referendum to leave the European Union. This causes the migrants to take illegal actions in order to enter the UK. To prevent that from happening, the British government budgeted millions of Pounds to increase the security around its borders in Calais, even deploying armed officials to assist the French *gendarmerie* and riot police. However, international human rights watch organizations had reported a number of police violence and procedures which are contradictory with the protection protocols of asylum seekers. Natacha Bouchart, mayor of Calais had stated that giving humanitarian help to the migrants will only cause them to regather in Calais which are also inconsistent with the French government agenda to provide safety for its citizens. This gives Bouchart justification towards her actions to criminalize volunteers and refusing to distribute clean water.

Conclusion

Although not accepted by all French citizens, the notion of migrants as a threat to national securtity has been widely accepted among the French elites, hence, giving the government justification to consider performing extreme measures towards Calais migrants. Government immigration policies throughout the years has shown a shift in social dynamics. French migrants which were first constructed as a threat to national identity, culture, and economy, are now a threat towards the national security.

Strategies for Preventing the Role of Indonesian Women in Marawi Conflict

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Terrorism in Indonesia is still becoming a threat for everyone. This research will analyse about the upraising of Indonesian women's engagement in terrorism activities. Indonesia had experience to handle women's extremist in Poso but currently facing women as the perpetrator in terrorism activities. The objectives of this study are firstly, the effect of terrorism networking in Southeast Asia. Secondly, the development of Indonesia women's engagement in terrorism. Thirdly, the threat of conflict in the Philippines. This study used qualitative approach and Differential Association Theory that explains the factors why Indonesian women engage in terrorism. The result of this study shows that the threat of Indonesian women's engagement in terrorism activities as the result of the distribution of terrorism networking, and it will effect another country such as the Philippines.

Keywords: Indonesian women's engagement, terrorism networking, the Philippines

Introduction

Indonesia is still in a vulnerable spot where is inhabited by the terrorists. The act of terrorism and its network have grown since 2002. The acts of terrorism occurred again in 2018, but there is an interesting phenomenon which needs to be highlighted, namely the change of people who performed the acts of terrorism. A series of suicide bombing occurred in Surabaya in May 2018 in which the perpetrators are from one Muslim family and one of them is a woman as wife and mother. Moreover, her young daughters also became perpetrators as well as victims in this act of terrorism. This incident indicates a change in the terrorism which currently involves women since it is usually dominated by men. Thus, this phenomenon is a threat for Indonesia in the future.

The root of terrorism itself is not from Indonesia, but it comes from the countries in conflict, such as the Middle East. The expansion of network is supported by the existing networks until it reaches other countries. The involvement of women in Surabaya can be understood as an effect of expansion in the terrorism network in Indonesia. Viewed from the previous incidents, the bombing in Surabaya becomes a starting point of the incident in which women perform the suicide bombing.

The Unforgotten 9/11 Attack

A memory about the collapse of WTC tower in New York or what is known as 9/11 cannot be forgotten. This building which is one of the icons for the United States of America was targeted by the act of terrorism. A group named Al Qaeda was considered responsible for the incident. The existence of Al Qaeda which shows the claim of jihad in the name of Islam is more obvious, so it encourages the campaign of *Global War on Terror* which is promoted by the United States of America to fight terrorism. It turns out that this campaign motivates the terrorist candidates to rebel and it is seen as potency to expand the terrorism network, in Southeast Asia in particular.

Promising Southeast Asia as a Potential Market

Discussion about terrorism is inseparable from the terrorism organizations named Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The influence of these two organizations is able to attract thousands of their followers, from countries in the Middle East and other regions, such as in Southeast Asia. The growth of terrorism group in general in this region is affected by the existence of other radical groups which have been established first. Therefore, this region is considered having potency larger than other regions since some countries in this region are inhabited by Muslim as the majority; the supply of new 'jihadist' can still be added. However, the misunderstanding in interpreting jihad in Islam makes terrorism grow easily. The new candidates are easily recruited to get training, and every act of terrorism is funded (Vaughn et al. 2008).

In 1990s, the training camp of Al Qaeda trained more than 70,000 young Muslims outside Middle East. Some of them were from countries in Southeast Asia and they were expected to support their struggle in Mindanao (Philippines) and Poso (Indonesia) (Gunaratna, 2002). These two countries had an internal conflict in 1990s. Moreover, Indonesia and Philippines have many islands, so there is a worry that these islands become safe places for terrorists to hide.

The History of Terrorism in Indonesia

Indonesia has a long history related to terrorism. From 2002 to 2018, the bombing has occurred several times. In these incidents, terrorism is often related with Islam since all of the perpetrators are Muslim, so the labelling towards Islam encourages the growth of terrorism in the society. According to the data of citizens in 2010 published by Central Bureau of Statistics, Islam is still the largest religion in Indonesia, but Indonesia is a multicultural country and it does not have a law which focuses on only one religion.

In 2002, Bali was targeted by terrorists to perform the act of suicide bombing. This place is considered a gathering place for foreign tourists to enjoy vacation and engage in immoral acts since it is surrounded by café

and bar. The suicide bombing in December 202 directly targeted two cafés in different locations. Therefore, it hurt and killed tens of people, foreign citizens and local people.

An organization named Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) was then mentioned as a terrorism network responsible for this incident. The leaders of JI are from Afghanistan and they were trained by Al Qaeda, so JI has a place to expand Al Qaeda network in Indonesia. JI is the affiliate of Al Qaeda, so their principle has similarity, targeting the foreign citizens. For the terrorists, foreign citizens are symbols of America or West (Lutz and Lutz, 2004), so fighting them is an obligation which must be met. JI dominates the acts of terrorism to attack foreign citizens, so some incidents occurred after the bombing in Bali, such as in JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton in 2003, Embassy of Australia in 2004, and a second bombing in Bali in 2005.

Seen from the incidents, the patterns of attack are always the same, targeting the Western symbol. The attack in the beginning was very deadly since it used the bomb with a high explosive power and wide range. Besides, the expansion of terrorism network in Indonesia is caused by the kinship, such as the marriage of JI members, so a kinship is established and relates to other terrorist organizations (Magouirk, et al. 2008, page 12). Therefore, the acts of terrorism become the warning for Indonesian government to take decisive action in solving terrorism. Some steps are done by government, starting from the establishment of National Counter Terrorism Agency and Special Detachment 88, so they successfully caught, passed the death sentence, and shot the JI leaders dead on the spot. Thus, the network of JI in Indonesia gets weaker since it loses the leader to control the network. It is proven by the acts of terrorism at a big scale which are reduced after 2005.

Terrorism is not an easy problem to solve. Although the leaders in JI can be killed, it is proven that this network has recruited new 'jihadist'. In 2016 and 2017, the bomb terror occurred again which targeted Thamrin and Kampung Melayu Terminal. There is an interesting aspect in these two actions; it is different from other acts of terrorism which initially target foreign citizens or Western symbol since it attacked the law enforcer (police). It shows a change in terms of the number of victims and intensity in the acts of terrorism, so it causes fewer effects from the target of terror.

Although there is a change in the decreasing effect of terror, Indonesia is not yet free of terrorism. The involvement of women in terrorism adds a long list of tasks which must be completed by Indonesian government. It becomes a new strategy for the terrorism network to recruit and depend on women to directly get involved in terrorism. This strategy can manipulate the polices and government since the instinct of women is gentle, so activity and act of terrorism cannot be tracked. Allowing women to get involved in terrorism is affected by the decreasing number of male jihadists since they were caught or dead on the battlefield. Therefore, the recruitment of women to join the organization and to do the act of terrorism intensifies and is performed in several ways.

Indonesian Women in the Circle of Terrorism Activities

In the global context, involvement of women in terrorism is not only in Indonesia, but also in the conflict area. The network of Al Qaeda also recruited radical women around the world to directly get involved in a suicide bombing in Chechnya and Palestine (Knop, 2007). In Chechnya, women dominated the suicide bombing from 2000 to 2007 compared with other regions (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006). Like what happened in Chechnya, women in Palestine also performed the suicide bombing in the second war in Palestine around 2000. It was caused by a desire to be martyred after seeing their family dead in the first war from 1987 to 1993, so they assumed that they could meet their family again in heaven after being martyred (Berko & Erez, 2005).

What happened in these two regions motivates other women to do the same thing and it has a quite significant influence until Indonesia. The challenge of government in handling the role of women in the acts of terrorism has occurred since an extremist group, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur/East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) in Poso, involved women to support them and trained them to be the combatants. The report of IPAC in 2017 states that women who got involved in Poso were assigned to support the logistics to maintain their funding system and got training for martial art and using weapon, so their survival strategy can be performed continuously (page 13).

Women in MIT group are spouses of men who become the member of this group, so they also have some reasons, such as the desire of women to obey their husband, to protect themselves when attacked, and to support their group in fighting the parties which prohibit the Islamic law in Indonesia (page 14). In the first

point, obeying husband is an obligation for wife in Islam. Some of these women may disagree with the involvement in the acts of terrorism, but they cannot refuse it due to the marriage. Tactic of MIT group is guerrilla and to occupy the hilly area to avoid being found easily, so women in the area have skill to protect themselves and the area, and are ready to die when attacked. Like the objectives of other extremist groups, MIT group also intends to establish a country and enforce Islamic law, so it requires resistance towards different parties in realizing the objectives. Another research also states that some women were caught since they were considered helping their husband who was directly and indirectly involved in the terrorism (PAKAR, 2016). In 2016, a woman named Dian Yulia Novi was published since she was one of the women prepared for a suicide bombing in National Palace. Besides, Dita Siska Millenia, a radical, young woman, intended to do the act of terrorism in Command's Office of Mobile Brigade Corps in 2018. However, these two plans were successfully prevented by polices.

The Engagement of Indonesian Women According to Differential Association Theory

The acts of terrorism can be successful when affected by some factors, such as motivation and easiness of communication. It is relevant with differential association theory by Edwin Sutherland (1949) since this theory learns criminal group as well as behaviour in the acts and motivation which encourages the acts (Jones, 2000).

Recruitment of women is an additional strategy applied by terrorist groups to increase the number of jihadists. Radical doctrine is still applied by the group to make women survive and support the group. There are many psychological factors which underlie the involvement of women in terrorism group. This motivation is inseparable from the personality from oneself and the inhabited environment, so it encourages the desire to join terrorism group. In Indonesia, the desire of women to join the organization is caused by the marriage and invitation from their husband, so women want to get merit and heaven. Besides, it is done to take revenge for their family who is caught or dead.

The strength of terrorism network is based on the intense communication in the organization as well as other networks. The easiness in communication is also beneficial for terrorism group since the access is made easy. The use of social media is considered the most influential factor in the last few years, such as the case of Dian Yulia Novi. She is an Indonesian migrant worker who worked in Taiwan and was indoctrinated through social media, so she was successfully recruited online and prepared herself to bomb National Palace. The involvement of women in terrorism is not only seen from the supporting system; if it cannot be solved, it will affect the number of executors in the field and have a role to manipulate children with radicalism since early stage.

The Development of Terrorism in Philippines

The development of terrorism in the Philippines is caused by some separatist groups which intend to separate from Philippines and establish an Islamic country. This group highly opposes the government of Philippines so they rebel. The development of this group is quite significant since the acts of terrorism are performed intensely. In facing this threat, the government of Philippines led by President Gloria Arroyo accepted the cooperation with the government of the United States of America led by President George Bush to assign soldiers from the United States of America to some regions dominated by radical groups in handling the group.

The prolonged conflict in Philippines, South Philippines in particular, was also used by Al Qaeda. For Al Qaeda, Philippines is a strategic place to conduct training since it has separatist groups, such as Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). It is slightly different from the acts of terrorism in Indonesia since the executors of terrorism in Philippines do not perform the suicide bombing, but they kidnap foreign citizens. These organizations occupy South Philippines which has Muslim citizens and borders with Indonesia. Besides these two organizations, Philippines also has Maute group which dominates Marawi. The aggressiveness of this group was started in 2016 with the attack which was done more than twice. Their objective is to expand the network and seize come cities to be used as their headquarters. At that time, the government of Philippines successfully destroyed the headquarters in the military operation in February 2016, but it triggered the anger of this group to do violence.

The weakening network of Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia caused the discord in this group. The radical followers established the ISIS network and dominated this region. Lately, Maute group in South Philippines becomes the affiliate of ISIS and it continuously performs the acts of terrorism towards government of Philippines. A great battle occurred in 2017 and the leader of Maute group, Isnilon Hapilon, died in the battle.

Discontinuity in the Role of ASEAN for Fighting Terrorism

ASEAN, which stands for Association of Southeast Asia Nations, is an association for countries in the Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN charter provides a strong foundation in reaching ASEAN community with legal status and institutional framework. Besides, it includes norm, regulation, value, and target by showing accountability. ASEAN categorizes its focuses on three communities, namely politic-security, economy, and socio-culture.

International norm and agreement are required to respond the acts of terrorism. In area of Southeast Asia, terrorism network covers some countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand, and has affiliated with global terrorism network. For example, one of the dead terrorist suspects in the case of bombing in Bali, Dr. Azhari, is a Malaysian citizen. In Philippines, Abu Sayyaf Group and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) organizations are established. Some steps of ASEAN in handling terrorism are joint actions with a commitment to counter terrorism as discussed in some regional meetings from 2001 to 2002 (Emmers, 2009).

The declaration of joint action was done to solve terrorism, in Southeast Asia in particular. This declaration was held in Brunei Darussalam for the first time in 2001 after the acts of terrorism 9/11 in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania (the document of ASEAN.org). ASEAN as an association for countries in Southeast Asia has the challenge to implement its role in a war against terrorism. The campaign of ASEAN, in this case, is not yet significant to achieve target since the joint action meeting was held only in 2007. In 2018, terrorism network, in Indonesia and Philippines in particular, is not yet solved well. In fact, ASEAN has a considerable opportunity to mediate countries as well as other organizations in order to improve international cooperation in the field of transnational security.

The Threat of Terrorism Networking Between Indonesia and Philippines

When ASEAN is not strong in following up the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia, the established terrorism network is easier to communicate. Since Indonesia is near with Philippines in which the border is only Sulu Strait and it borders with Poso and Mindanao, there is a worry that a larger act of terrorism will happen. Moreover, these two regions have a long history as the place where terrorists hide. It becomes easier since Indonesia and Philippines have easy requirement of visa for Middle East countries. Moreover, a few years ago, Philippines does not yet apply data collection system through computer for the immigrants, so it eases the terrorist candidates to change their personal data (Abuza, 2003). Until now, the banking system in these two countries is not yet managed well so it eases the transfer of money from Middle East and vice versa. In the case of bombing in Bali in 2002, the terrorism group successfully received a number of fund from the network in Afghanistan. With the growing number of women in Indonesia who are involved in terrorism network, it will cause a threat to go to Philippines since South Sulawesi directly borders with Mindanao.

Strengthening International Cooperation is the Key Factor

In the case of terrorism, cooperation is required to bridge the variables in handling the acts of terrorism and preventing the increasing number of action. The main purpose of a country in international cooperation is to meet its national interest which is not owned in the country, so cooperation with other countries is required to get a result. Since the scope in the acts of terrorism in Indonesia and Philippines is large, regional cooperation is required (Budiono, 1987).

In order to solve this problem, government of Indonesia and Philippines did a real action through a direct meeting in South Philippines between Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi, and President of Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte. Indonesian government also stated its readiness to

assign polices and special forces to South Sulawesi to fight terrorists (Jennings, 2018). Besides, National Counter Terrorism Agency signed cooperation in preventing, suppressing, and fighting international terrorism and transnational crime (National Counter Terrorism Agency, 2017).

Conclusion

Terrorism does not affect only one country, but it includes other countries, such as Indonesia and Philippines. Terrorism in these two countries is encouraged by an expansion of the existing terrorism network. Terrorism is not stagnant, but it keeps evolving, so there is a phenomenon in which women are involved in the terrorism. Moreover, Indonesian women became the executors of suicide bombing. It will be a threat at national and regional levels, when it is not immediately handled.

Resiliency and Vulnerability of National Values Through Geo-Pancasila Mapping in the Community Borders and Coastals in Sangihe Island

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Border and coastal communities are culturally, religiously, family and socially unique. Unlike communities on the mainland that tend to be separated structurally in terms of social, economic and political. Coastal communities tend to be neglected and most of them have no compensation for decent and prosperous living

Poverty and welfare have resulted in them having to go unlawful across the country's border to seek a better life. In addition, relatives and family relationships are the main reasons. Therefore, transnational crimes such as trafficking, smuggling and other negative activities can easily occur.

The Sangihe community has close family, economic and social ties with the Philippines. Traditional trade routes inherited by kingdoms and sultanates in Ternate, Tidore, Sangihe, Zulu, Mindanao areas cannot be separated by the borders of the country. The economy that has existed in the past to the present time has become a boomerang for the coastal border community which currently has become three countries. Since the countries are formed then all their activities are considered against the law when crossing the line.

Border and coastal communities are always harmed from economic and social aspects. So often this community is easily infiltrated by the passers including terrorists. The brought radicalism can easily penetrate the poor and the marginal by establishing a hierarchy of terrorism directly or indirectly. Then it will make it sleep or active depending on the situation that occurs whether naturally or engineered. Conditions like this can make it neither active nor active depending on the strength of radicalism in society and the ability of the control factors that suppress it.

The vulnerability to the influx of radicalism and terrorism in border and coastal communities cannot be ignored. Some terrorists have lived and become religious scholars in some villages. They come and go leaving a good impression in the community. Some even have married and have more than one wife. They live side by side with local people honorably. Despite the suspicions, they are well received by the local community. The village and sub-district governments initially did not object to their presence as being regarded as religious teachers and trustworthy people.

The purpose of this research is to find the values of Pancasila which is known as the ideology of the Indonesian nation that triggered by the founding father of the nation is Soekarno and Hatta. Pancasila has a binding power and directs people to live in mutual respect, respect and mutual tolerance. The indicator used is 36 Pancasila grains that explain about Pancasila itself. Therefore, the values that exist in the community that are compatible with Pancasila are measured by psychometric approach. Initial analysis shows that the border and coastal communities of the Sangihe archipelago have high Pancasila values and fall into the positive Geo-Pancasila category. Geo-Pancasila Indexation is made through the formulation of psychometric analysis methods.

From the results of interviews openly found some facts that developed in the community that, 1. The people of Sangihe who inhabit the coast and the border still hold firmly Indonesian citizenship. 2. The people of Sangihe still celebrate national days regularly. 3. The people of Sangihe even in the Philippines remain proud of claiming to be part and nation of Indonesia. 4. The Sangihe community rejects the activities of radicalism and terrorism. The facts, it can be concluded that although the people of Sangihe are depressed with cross-border geography problem, the problem of welfare and economic disparity, but the nationalism spirit is quite high.

The strong soul of nationalism that supports the values of Pancasila in areas prone to conflict, separatism, radicalism, terrorism and various anti-national factors in this research mention a new term called **Geo-Pancasila**. Simply explained that Geo-Pancasila is geography or land, location, territory where people have strong Pancasila values.

The values of Pancasila present in the border and coastal communities of the Sangihe Islands region are not affected by economic and political issues. Besides they are strong in religion, they live in harmony and peace. Mutual sharing and social life thick with mutual cooperation. If there is a party, then people are not reluctant to help each other. Or there is a family or community who died, then they will help alleviate the burden of the family and even the costs of grievance are borne together. The height of religious life and tolerance becomes a force in the social life of society.

The freedom to choose a religion in one family is considered normal. In religious holidays they visit each other to celebrate together. So, no wonder in one big family could be his parents are Christian and his children are Muslim. On religious festivals visit each other and bring the typical food festive routine carried out.

In the border and coastal communities of Sangihe there is a group of Islam that assimilates to local value or *adat*. They recognize themselves as people who are Muslims but do not follow the true teachings of Islam. They are called Old Islam (*Muslim Tua*). Although they are different but still accepted by their fellowmen from different factions.

During the events of Poso, Ambon and Halmahera in the late 1990s, the people of North Sulawesi in general and in particular the communities within the border and coastal communities of the Sangihe archipelago were unaffected by the incident. On the contrary there is communication and coordination between the villages of different religious groups to jointly prevent the entry of terrorists or foreigners who deliberately spread the idea of radicalism in their region.

The greatest challenge for border and coastal community communities in the Sangihe archipelago is the entry of the Internet that can access all information in the world freely including false news and information about religion. After two decades of religious conflict in Indonesia especially in Ambon and Poso, the people who currently live on the border are younger generations who fall into the millennial category. They live in a period of reform that is not so much taught about Pancasila. Liberalization of information through the internet can poison even raises the idea of radicalism that will lead to terrorism.

Geo-Pancasila has been deeply rooted and able to survive in coastal communities and the border of Sangihe. Although information liberalization may affect this generation but its effects and impacts can still be contained. The cultural values corresponding to Pancasila in this region are still inherited and inherited by the younger generation. The older generation is able to guide young people to keep Pancasila value.

Empathy, Fairness and Intergroup Bias

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Introduction

The Internet today has many benefits but not all individuals can use them well. One of the misuse of the internet is to spread the notions of radicalism. Two girls named Siska Nur Azizah and Dita Siska Millenia are

known to be attacking police at the Mobile Brigade Command Headquarters in Depok, West Java. The actions performed by Siska and Dita are known because of the help requests from the group about the jihad they follow. The reason why the two followed the group because of the lack of means for them to satisfy their curiosity about their own religion. Siska and Dita meet in an online chat forum that discusses about the chant, and about fighting *thogut* and jihad. The knowledge that Siska and Dita get can be more via the internet and group chat, the understanding is somewhat ambiguous it actually even makes Siska and Dita feel that what they do for religion is always right. Therefore, when it is often aired about the violence perpetrated by ISIS, Dita claimed no doubt if it should kill other individuals who have different values with her.

From the above phenomenon shows that there is a high In-group Favoritism on Siska and Dita, high In-group Favoritism resulted in decreasing the sense of empathy to other people who are not part of their in-group. in line with research conducted by Emile G. Bruneau (2017) where he conducted two studies with the number of respondents. in the first study found that Americans have a stronger response to Americans (in-groups) than with Arabs. In the second study, different respondents were Hungarians, where the results obtained were the same: The Hungarians had a strong empathy response to the misfortune in Hungary compared to the Muslim refugees. It is suspected that there is a high In-group favoritism, wherein In-group favoritism itself is a condition in which individuals assess in-group members better than outgroup members (Brewer, 1979), and tend to value more in-group members than outgroup members (Tajfel et al, 1971).

The difference in previous research conducted by Kevin Arceneaux (2017). Where in the results of his research shows that In-group favoritism motivates people to oppose the public program in helping different individuals outside the group. Kevin argues that the empathy gap between in-groups and outgroups motivates individuals to perform in-group favoritism. From the results of this study can be concluded that the empathy gap that occurs in in-group and outgroup can lead to someone having in-group favoritism.

Previous studies have found that empathy has been shown to play a role in improving prosocial behavior and in turn reducing aggressiveness. This becomes highly relevant in terms of the increasing intergroup biases in Indonesia today. Although intergroup bias is a natural tendency possessed by humans like in-group favoritism and out-group derogation, but if not controlled, this tendency will end destructively. Starting from discrimination to terrorism behavior.

This research tries to trace how the influence of empathy on intergroup bias behavior, whether in terms of assessing in-group or outgroup members.

Method

Participants and design.

All participants are moslem (*N*=150, 45 male) with an average age of 19.7 years participate in online experiment study. Each participant was randomly assigned to in-group condition (n = 50), out-group condition (n=50), anda control condition (n=50).

Procedure and materials

To answer our research question, we conducted a online experiment by measuring support to unfairness in three different situations (in-group, out-group, and no-social-identity for control condition). For this purpose, three forms of questionnaire were created and administered online via Qualtrics with activated the randomization feature; each represent one condition of intergroup bias and consisted of a Basic Empathy Scale (BES) (measure two aspects of empathy: cognitive and affective). To manipulate the group bias, we created a vignette for every group identity situation. Participants were exposed to one of the vignettes after they fill out the BES.

Findings

Table 1.

	Group	N	Mean Rank
Unfairness	In-group	50	75,65
	Ungroup	50	79,29
	Control	50	71,56
	Total	150	

This study found that participants were more able to tolerate the unfairness behavior performed by their outgroup members than if it were performed by in-group members.

Table 2.

		Eks 1	Eks 2	Kontrol	In-group	Outgroup	Kontrol
Eks 1	Pearson correlation	1	,044	,234	-,058	-,115	,031
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,764	,101	,691	,425	,830
	N	50	50	50	50	50	50
Eks2	Pearson correlation	,044	1	-,067	,247	**,344***	,015
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,764		,642	,084	,014	,916
	N	50	50	50	50	50	50
Kontrol	Pearson correlation	,234	-,067	1	-,104	-,083	,126
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,101	,642		,471	,565	,382
	N	50	50	50	50	50	50
In-group	Pearson correlation	-,058	,247	-,104	1	,141	,010
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,691	,084	,471		,328	,946
	N	50	50	50	50	50	50
Outgroup	Pearson correlation	-,115	,344*	-,083	,141	1	-,035
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,425	,014	,565	,328		,810
	N	50	50	50	50	50	50
Control	Pearson correlation	,031	,015	,126	,010	-,035	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,830	,916	,382	,946	,810	
	N	50	50	50	50	50	50

Discussion

The influence of empathy in intergroup behavior indicates that even if a person's behavior is influenced by his environment, there are internal aspects that can keep him awake. This ability of empathy can be one of the alternatives that should be taught at any educational level in Indonesia because the diverse life is a fact. All you can do is live and receive the diversity. For that to be possible and well-lived, empathy is one of the must-have abilities.

Conclusions

The study found that there is a difference when one assesses whether a particular unfair behavior depends on whether a person is doing an in-group or outgroup member. It is interesting to note that precisely the behavior of unfair by in-group members is more likely to be rejected than when those who do outgroup members. One possibility this happens because each member of the group wishes to be the good name of the group. Unfair behavior can be seen as one of the threats and damages the group's reputation.

Contemporary Terrorism and Indonesia's Future

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Introduction

The terror attacks that occured in Indonesia in recent months have alerted many to the new development in the strategies used by terrorists. For the first time in the country, a series of terror attacks in Surabaya and Sidoarjo in May 2018, were perpetrated by one family, consisting of both parents and their underage children. The inclusion of underage children in terror attacks is beyond the realm of common sense. It is also extremely deplorable since children are often the symbol of innocence and purity. Nonetheless what could account for such a phenomenon?

If one were to recall Jean Baudrillard's theories of simulation and consumer society, the phenomenon would not come as a shock. In his theories, the French sociologist and philosopher explained how western societies, ruled by the system of consumption, are able to produce signs, values and meanings arbitrarily (Baudrillard, 1998). The consequence of this play of signs and meanings is the formation of a new reality based on simulations where all values, meanings and events including terrorism could be taken apart and re-created or reinterpreted for a certain purpose. This poses a serious challenge since in a simulated reality, traditional moral norms and values have been suspended to make way for the moral values of the consumption system. Hence it is not totally unpredictable that in the future, events or phenomena will take on a much colder and inhumane feel such as the use of underage children as suicide bombers.

Methods

This research is carried out through the use of alternative explanation and thought experiment. An alternative explanation is achieved by posing critical and deep questions about the phenomenon and identifying several contradictions that arise from the phenomenon. The answers obtained from the critical questions would be used to try and clarify the contradictions in the hope of finding a better explanation (Baggini & Fosl, 2010). The need to use the alternative explanation approach arises after finding that the current explanation on terrorism particularly with regards to the simulation aspect of terrorism has not been adequately addressed. To complement the explanation, this research also uses thought experiment to imagine future events that could possibly occur if the threats of terrorism are not properly addressed.

Discussion

Contemporary terrorism has undergone significant transformations from its older forms. The changes could be seen in the perpetrators of the attacks, the victims, the strategies used by the terrorists and the motive for the attacks (Nia, 2010). Nonetheless, there is still one aspect of contemporary terrorism that is often overlooked by experts in the field, the simulated character of the terrorist threat. Failure to address this aspect would cause most counter-terrorism measures in Indonesia and also the world to fail.

The understanding of contemporary terrorism used throughout this research is a form of transnational or international terrorism that has no concrete or clear goals and could be religiously motivated such as the event of 9/11 in New York and ISIS related terror acts (Nia, 2010). Although many scholars have admitted that the advancement of communications and information technology has ushered in a new way of life for the global community, a number of terrorism, security studies, and international politics experts have not given special attention to how simulation as explained by Jean Baudrillard, could influence the nature of security threats such as terrorism and the public's perception of it. They still view the threat from a one-sided perspective of reality and mistakenly believe that the simulated version of reality represents the genuine or true reality (Verene, 2007). These experts are unaware, either intentionally or unintentionally, that a security threat such as terrorism has taken on the character of simulation turning it into a type of shadow or fake threat since it is not rooted in a true or genuine context. This break from its genuine root or context causes threats such as terrorism to be easily manipulated and transported from one context to another, increasing its political and strategic value.

This unawareness of the threat's simulated character causes some analysis of terror acts to miss the mark, since with a simulated threat, the perpetrators of terror could be those other than the people who claimed to have committed the terror acts. The people who admitted or claimed the attacks were only acting as mere fronts for the real perpetrators hiding behind the simulation. This is not a new phenomenon in wars and terrorism. States have been known in the past to clandestinely use proxies to carry out their bidding in other countries (Held, 2008). Simulation merely complements this strategy, causing it to become more sophisticated.

Analysis that focuses on the obvious elements of terror acts seen in media reports would not make any contribution to a successful counter terrorism strategy since they wrongly identify the root cause of terrorism. A more effective approach to contain the threat is to reveal the play of simulation behind it to find the real root cause of the threat and then take the proper steps to eradicate it. If the root cause is not addressed, terror attacks would continue to occur in various mutated forms. This is especially important in the Indonesian context, whereby failure to address the simulation aspect of the threat and take the proper measures to contain it would turn the country into a hotbed for terror acts in the future. With time, these acts would not only destroy the peaceful harmony of its citizens but also threaten the unity and sovereignty of the state.

Findings

This research found that the threat of contemporary terrorism in Indonesia is a simulated threat, in the sense that the threat does not originate from within the country. The threat is an external threat that is imposed on the national context. This research also found the participation of global powers in the west in forcing the terrorism agenda on the rest of the world including Indonesia. Unfortunately, however, due to the presence of simulation and their vast power and resources, the real forces behind terrorism have been able to escape detection and prosecution from the law to the detriment of the whole world.

Furthermore, the research also found that the main cause of contemporary terrorism lies in the logic used by the system of consumption or globalization in the west. This logic needed the presence of contemporary terrorism to convince the world that the forces of globalization are the good forces and that the terrorists are the bad forces. The logic is incapable of reflecting on its past actions since according to Baudrillard the logic of consumption itself is immoral as it works through the manipulative play of signs and meanings (Baudrillard, 2002). Hence it needed the simulated reality or world of simulations to absolve itself and become the 'good'. The appropriate solution for the world, including Indonesia to contain the threat of terrorism is therefore to reveal the play of simulation and refuse to abide by the logic of consumption and simulation used by the west. The west on the other hand should desist in further using its present logic and make substantial correction to the logic. The manipulative character of the west's consumer society logic remains its major flaw.

Conclusion

Although the threat of contemporary terrorism is steep in simulation, it still remains a real threat that must be addressed by world governments including the Indonesian government. The threat is capable of causing real damage to people's lives by creating sufferings and loss of lives, sowing seeds of hatred and discrimination that are detrimental to peace and humanity in the long run.

Keywords: Contemporary Terrorism, Consumer Society, Simulation, Globalization, Reality

Comparison of National Values in Two Special Groups

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Introduction

The national value of Indonesia is Pancasila. This value become a reference for Indonesian people to live their social live. As the noble agreement of the founders of the nation that Indonesia is bound by the same value, Pancasila (Soekarno, 1945). The National Value is the identification of the acceptance of the idea of what is as excepted, appropriate, and proper as well as improper (incorrect, unexpected, and false) based on Pancasila as measured in five dimensions of religio-tolerance, humanity, patriotism, democracy, and social justice (Meinarno, 2017).

In the research conducted by Meinarno since 2011 showed a good pattern of national acceptance, especially in youth group (Meinarno, 2017). However, the way each group live the national values was not necessarily uniform. There were certain circumstances that affect this condition, such as welfare gaps, religious understanding, ethnic pride, and the condition of the state of the border.

In Indonesia there are some special groups that need to be considered in the acceptance of national value. These minority groups need attention, yet they are marginalized. These two groups are communities who live in the border and violent extremist groups. The appreciation of the national value for the border community are not necessarily the same as the people on the main island. Meanwhile, in terrorist groups, they have always claimed that they live values that are not in harmony with the mainstream (common people).

National Value

In BPUPKI meeting June 1, 1945 Soekarno proposed Pancasila as the basic value of Indonesia. These values are strung together to the value system (Koentjaraningrat, 1991). Thus a value system usually serves as the ultimate guide to human behavior (Koentjaraningrat, 1974). This value system is a powerful thruster for the life of the society in Indonesia. This national value system has becoe a creative social breakthrough. This means that Pancasila has considered capable of accommodating many existing social diversity (Ali, 2009; Somantri, 2006; Ramage, 2005). This is similar to seven Canadian values as the embodiment of "the values shared" to build social unity (Kymlicka, 2002). Table 1 shows the national values and their definitions.

Table 1. National Value Summary

Value	Definition	Details
Religio-tolerance value	Believe in God and keep His commandments according to belief and do not impose trust on others	faithfulness, tolerance toward different groups of beliefs, spirituality and religiousness
Humanitarian Value	Recognizing equality of rights and duties, affection for others, forging relationships with other nations based on mutual respect	respect, fair, courage
The value of Patriotism-unity	Give priority to the interests of the nation rather than self / group, love of the homeland and nation as well as develop a sense of unity for the nation.	loyalty, citizenship (having a strong stand on duty, loyal friend)
The value of democracy	Decision-making based on consensus for the common good by not imposing the will to others, can be accounted for and implement the decisions taken.	responsibility, harmony
The value of social justice	Maintaining the balance of social obligations by introspection (in the form of noble qualities of human beings) and self-development that aims to promote social life.	friendship, justice and humbleness, help

Border Community

Border area often overlooked in the discourse or scientific study. As we know that only in the era of president Joko Widodo border issues become important. It is as if the community is re-awakened that the Indonesian territory is not just fenced land, but has many aspects in it.

Border area becomes interesting because it is very far from the reach of many people. Yet the length of Indonesia's border ranges with thousands of kilometers in the form of land and sea. Sea borders, especially the islands, are very important. Numbers of islands are at the forefront and become the border of Indonesia with other countries. Problems arise when the border area raises political tensions, such as when Indonesia lost Sipadan and Ligitan to Malaysia (Pangestoeti, 2015). What is worrying on a large scale is the unilateral claim of the People's Republic of China to the Natuna Island marine area (PRC recognizes Indonesia's islands). However, the question is whether the people living in the area are experiencing the same tension with people who only know from the news?

Violent Extremist Group in Indonesia

In the year 2000, bombs started exploding in Indonesia with its peak incident in 2002, the Bali Bomb. At the beginning, the society and law enforcers were unsure about the perpetrators and motives. It was only known to uphold Islam and related to radical Islamic groups. The hypothesis that terrorism represents a form of psychopathology suggests itself naturally by atrocities that terrorists have been known to perpetrate, and which vitiate fundamental norms of human conduct (the kidnapping and beheading of civilians, seemingly callous perpetration of massive casualties, etc.). In this vein, Silke (2003) commented that “in the early 1970s it was widely believed that terrorists suffered from personality disorders and that there would be an exceptionally high number of clinical psychopaths, narcissists and paranoids in the ranks of the average terrorist group” (p. 30). Even as recently as September 11, 2002, Walter Laqueur wrote that “all terrorists believe in conspiracies by the powerful, hostile forces and suffer from some form of delusion and persecution mania. The element of madness plays an important role in terrorism” (as quoted in Silke, 2003, p. 30).

Studies in Indonesia showed that there were no indications of pathological disorders among the actors (Sarwono, 2006. 2008). This was contradictory to the assumption stated by previous studies by Hare (1991, 1993) and Rehov (2005). They stated that the terrorism actors possess psychopathic syndromes, neuroticism, and were influenced by social-economic factors, as common people believed. Sarwono’s further studies showed that violent radicalism (terrorism) is a learned attitude and has nothing to do with abnormal personality (2010). Therefore, this group is considered to be a special group not because of their psychological abnormality, but because of their extreme violent actions.

IDENTITY POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP & NATIONALISM

After 20 years of political transition, Indonesia is still struggling with its democratic quality. Despite its success in installing democratic institutions, Indonesia's democracy is still greatly challenged by lingering problems of authoritarian legacies. Political corruption, dysfunctional political parties, oligarchies and political dynasties are among the problematic challenges in improving the quality of Indonesia's democracy.

While these problems remain, recently, Indonesia's democracy is also dealing with the new but globally rising phenomenon of populism and identity politics. It particularly began in Indonesia with the 2014 presidential election and culminated in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Issues of religion and ethnicity were used and mobilized by politicians and political parties in order to gain popular votes. Not only have these issues greatly shaped the election process and results, they have also divided the society politically. If not given consideration and careful handling, the rise of identity politics will put democracy and social cohesion at risk.

In the context of democratic consolidation and the improvement of democratic quality, it will be especially important to assess the penetration of these phenomena throughout the Indonesian political landscape. Given this discussion, it is thus important to understand these phenomena since it is apparent that the consequences of the rise of identity politics continue to play out and they are likely to be profound.

This panel will address issues related to identity politics, populism, citizenship and nationalism. This panel is open to discuss theoretical aspects and empirical studies, as well as comparative analyses of other countries in comparison with the situation in Indonesia.

What's driving the 2016 Islamist-Mass Mobilization? Aksi Bela Islam and the Limits of Islamic Right-Wing Populism in Indonesia

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When hundreds of thousands of muslims marched in Defending Islam Action (known as *Aksi Bela Islam*) rallies in Jakarta demanding prosecution of its incumbent governor, Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama, for blasphemy against Islam, there have been debates over how and why such phenomenon occurs in Indonesia. While some research relates the emergence of *Aksi Bela Islam* with identity politics, others highlight the notion of rising conservatism. Using the perspective of populism, this paper examines to what extent that the *Aksi Bela Islam* signify the rise of Islamic right-wing populism in the country. It argues that despite the seemingly xenophobic-driven Islamist mass mobilization, the capacity of *Aksi Bela Islam* to emerge as Islamic right-wing populism is limited due to several factors: *firstly,* the emergence of a unified cross-class alliance of the Islamist groups was driven by common political agenda rather than a unifying ideological platform among the Islamist groups. *Secondly,* popular support to the *Aksi Bela Islam* were a result of mounting social and political tensions as well as momentary response to the allegation of blasphemy case rather than showing their adherence towards the ideological and political agenda of the Islamist groups

Keywords: Aksi Bela Islam, Islamic populism, right-wing populism, conservative groups, the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election

Introduction

Study on populism has been gaining scholarly attention due to its global upsurge in many parts of the world. Rising support for charismatic leaders and populist parties has disrupted the politics almost around the globe, putting democracy in menace. Like other countries, Indonesia's new democracy has also witnessed the rise of populist leaders and their electoral success, both in local and national elections. While much of the scholarly discussions describe populism as negative phenomenon and 'pathology of democracy', populist phenomenon in Indonesia is rather seen as a challenge to established structures of power and elites than representing an anti-democratic ideology.

Many observers and pundits have found it difficult to understand the popular support for *Aksi Bela Islam*, knowing that much of the narratives in the rallies resonated a mélange of xenophobia. What have been the cause of mass mobilization in the rallies that initiated by vigilante and conservative Islamist groups? Why, despite Indonesia's reputation as a model of moderate Islam, xenophobic religious sentiments could easily affect Muslim voters in Jakarta? Why did people from across the regions, classes, and backgrounds, seem to adhere to the rhetoric that peddles a mélange of xenophobic fabricated by vigilante and conservative groups like FPI, HTI and GNPF-MUI? Can the popular support and the coalition among conservative Islamist groups be interpreted as the rise of radical right-wing populism in Indonesia?

At its surface, this phenomenon can be seen as inseparable from the political contestation in the Jakarta (Karim and Bayo 2017, Qadir 2016). However, the massive use of ethnic and religious sentiments during the competition between Ahok (a Chinese-Christian) and Anies (an Arab-descendant and Moderate-Muslim) have made the election portrayed as the most polarizing election in the country. Some framed the election as a battle between democratic and undemocratic forces, particularly between liberal and Islamic fundamentalist values (Varagur 2017). Some others highlighted the role of social media in embodying the wars between the two forces, which then contributed to the increasing polarization among Indonesians (Budiari 2016, Riyanto 2016, Tapsell 2017, Aspinall 2017, Vernaz 2017). As noted by Lim (2017), a large amount of anti-Ahok campaign material was critical of Ahok's ethnicity and religion, labeling Ahok as infidel (*kafir*) and communist.

So far, there are at least three poles of debate in interpreting the emergence of *Aksi Bela Islam*. The first is those who relate the phenomenon with identity politics (Prasetyawan 2014, 2017) and tribal nationalism (Lim 2017). According to these studies, the emergence of *Aksi Bela Islam* as well as the defeat of Ahok in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election suggests the exploitation and manipulation of identity politics –perpetrated by political elites and vigilante groups alike (Priamarizki and Haripin 2017). The second pole of debates more likely relate the phenomenon with rising conservatism. They argue that the mobilization of muslim elements in *Aksi Bela Islam* rallies not only signified the use of identity politics in elections, but also represented the ideological agenda of conservative Islamist groups in Indonesia (Jones 2016, Ahnaf 2016, Woodward and Nurish 2016, Assyaukanie 2016, Fealy 2017). The third explanation describe it as Islamic populism –citing Hadiz' terminology (2016), suggesting the rallies indicated the cross-coalition between Islamist groups and oligarchic interests (Pribadi 2016, Iqbal 2016, Anugrah and Izzati 2016, Murtadho 2016).

While the paper uses the perspective of Islamic populism in order to understand the rise of *Aksi Bela Islam*, this paper wants to examine previous prepositions stated that the rallies presented Islamic populism. This paper argues that although the rallies encompassed the elements of populism, however, the propensity of *Aksi Bela Islam* to emerge as Islamic populism is probably limited due to the absence of unifying ideological platform among the cross-class alliance between Islamist groups supporting *Aksi Bela Islam*, and their inability to maintain relevance and populist appeal to the masses. As the '411' and '212' rallies met popular demand to prosecute Ahok, subsequent rallies mobilized by the groups were declining and limited to only their group members.

This paper argues that although the rallies encompassed both the elements of Islamic and right-wing populism, however, there is little evidence that the rallies would signify the rise of right-wing or Islamic populism. The paper further discusses two limitations of *Aksi Bela Islam*: *first*, the absence of unifying ideological platform and the short term agenda of the rallies made it problematic for Islamist groups to maintain their importance as Islamic populism. *Second*, the xenophobic sentiments that were rampant in the rallies were more of a result of mounting social and political tensions as well as momentary response to the allegation of blasphemy case rather than signify the rise of right-wing populism.

On Populism

Despite its global trend and successful penetration in political landscape, the concept of populism remains fuzzy. The challenge of defining populism is at least partially due to the fact that the term has been used to describe political movements, parties, ideologies, and leaders across geographical, historical and ideological contexts. (Gidron and Banikowski 2013). Due to its ambiguity and ambivalence, it is impossible to create single definition of populism. Literatures on the study of populism remark three main approaches to understand populism, which they define populism, correspondingly, as a political ideology, a political style, or a form of political mobilization (Pauwels 2011, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, Moffit and Tormey 2013).

While there are many interpretations of this concept (Mudde 2004, Panizza 2005, Bale et al. 2011, Berezin 2013, Kaltwasser 2013), perhaps the most influential literature on populism can be found in Mudde's work, who defines populism as "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2004:6). However, while the essence of populism thus is not political ideology, it is more than a simply a style of politics. According to Greven (2016), populism is a particular style of politics that is intricately related to particular political ideologies. Although populism's central and permanent narrative is the juxtaposition of a (corrupt) "elite", and 'the people' as whose sole authentic voice represented by the populist, yet, it is important to distinguish various kinds of populism.

According to Greven (2016), right-wing populism adds a second antagonism of 'us' versus 'them' in terms of political positions as well as a specific style of political communication. *Firstly*, based on a definition of the people as culturally homogenous, right-wing populists juxtapose its identity and common interests, with are considered to be based on common sense, with the identity and interests of 'others' usually minorities such as migrants, which are supposedly favored by the (corrupt) elites. *Secondly*, right-wing populists strategically and tactically use negativity in political communication, allowing calculated provocations, personal insults and disrespect of formal and informal rules, using a lot of free media as this resonates with market demands and the news cycle.

Meanwhile, the term of Islamic populism gains its popularity after Hadiz's research on diverse trajectories of Islamic politics in Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Hadiz 2016). Hadiz defines Islamic populism as a particular manifestation of populist politics which constitutes a specific form of social mobilization based on asymmetrical multi-class coalitions. These coalitions advance economic and political agendas that are much less rooted in, and driven by interpretation of religious doctrine or cultural norms than concrete struggle over power and tangible resources within specific social and historical context (Hadiz 2016: 20).

According to Hadiz, a central conception of Islamic populism is that of the *ummah* as proxy for 'the people' in classic populism definition. Yet, if traditional populisms conceive of a 'people' that are subordinated by avaricious elites, the new Islamic populism imagines an *ummah* that is dispossessed, in socio-economic as well as cultural terms, by powerful forces that preside over social orders that are perceived to be inherently exclusionary, unjust and therefore simultaneously immoral (Hadiz 2016: 12). Hadiz also emphasizes the conception of *ummah* that is based on evolution through social conflicts primarily taking place within the boundaries of nation states (Hadiz 2016: 27). According to Watson (2017), what Hadiz means by it the coming together of an imagined *ummah* to express grievances, forge alliances across different classes and interests and make common cause against despised ruling elites who control the State.

Like populism, the concept of *ummah* can be explained both at the ideational level and the organizational level. At the more purely ideational level, the conception of *ummah* can be seen as the product of particular kinds of responses to social circumstances arising from social marginalization or exclusion. At the organizational level, the vehicle for Islamic populism can include political parties, mass organizations, paramilitaries, radical groups, and those that are geared towards bypassing the mechanisms of representative democracy in favor of more direct forms of political participation (Hadiz 2016: 27).

In Indonesia, the rise of Islamic populism can be traced back ever since the era of colonialisation and nationalist movements, where it emerged as a reaction against colonial-era economic encroachment by ethnic Chinese and non-Muslim business interests (Hadiz 2016: 71). Not only it has no parallel with Turkey's experience, it even becomes a distinctive feature of Indonesian Islamic populism –in which Chinese ethnics in particular were perceived as "common enemy" for petty-bourgeoisie Muslim (Garadian 2017), whose interests are disrupted due to business penetration from the Chinese.

In contrast, the trajectory of new Islamic populism in Indonesia has been seen both in the era of authoritarianism and post-1998 democratization. Yet, the distinction between two forms of Islamic populism is obvious; while the first was premised on the the interests of a long declining traditional petty bourgeoisie made up of urban traders, petty commodity producers and rural elites, the latter is more likely to be constituted by an alliance of highly disparate elements: marginalised sections of the bourgeoisie, ambitious and educated members of new urban middle classes still stuck in the lower rungs of the social hierarchy, as well as the swelling masses of urban poor that have descended upon sprawling and chaotic megacities (Hadiz 2017).

Jakarta Election and *Aksi Bela Islam* Rallies amid the Rise Ethnic and Religious Prejudice

In the eyes of many observers and analysts, competition in Jakarta's 2017 Gubernatorial Election was already predicted to be intense and even fierce. Jakarta's position as country's capital has made the region as barometer for national politics, making its electoral landscape always fiercely contested and has been constantly shifting (Hamid 2014: 86). On the other hand, the fact that electoral volatility in Jakarta is also high, in which voters can change their voting behavior dramatically. Likewise, the result of the 2017 gubernatorial election confirms this inclination. After two-rounds of election, Anies Baswedan, won with 58 percent of the votes versus the incumbent candidate, Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama, who gained 42 percent of the votes. Although Ahok won the first round of voting yet he was failed to seize votes from the other candidate, which caused him lose by a landslide.

The election itself occurred in the midst of strong opposition and resentment towards Ahok, both from political parties and conservative groups, making Ahok's nomination never smooth from the beginning. For parties, Ahok's harsh and hostile attitude has made most parties reluctant to support him He is also known as disloyal to political party. While his administration is known as being tough on corruption and making a breakthrough in implementing good governance and city's development and arrangement, his controversial approach and political style makes Ahok's figure considered liable.

However, it is perhaps his identity as a Chinese and Christian that are considered most liable for Ahok. Given that importance of identity politics in Indonesia is still high, Ahok's identity can be a political weapon to go against him. For many conservative groups, it is precisely because of Ahok's religious identity that causes them to reject him and not vote for him. For his political opponents, it would be easy to make use –and even manipulate this religious interpretation to increase negative sentiments towards Ahok's identity. As seen in this particular election, Ahok's identity is often framed along ethnic and religious lines, between Chinese and non-Chinese, as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims. While the latter is particularly related to conservative's interpretation of religious doctrine, the narrative of Chinese and non-Chinese is more related to the rising levels of economic inequality experienced by the urban poor in Jakarta, whom impacted by Ahok's program of neoliberal urban redevelopment and infrastructural improvement (Wilson 2017). Although, in this case, religion was clearly the primary factor that contributed to Ahok's defeat in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election.

Both of Jakarta's election and *Aksi Bela Islam* came amid the rising ethnic and religious prejudice in Jakarta. Hence, when a short video clip of Ahok quoting the Quranic verse Al Maidah 51 and saying that voters were being deceived using that Quranic verse went viral in social media, conservative groups were outraged, calling the incident as blasphemy against Quran, and demanded the government to arrest Ahok for blasphemy allegation through a series of rallies –which then popularized by the name of *Aksi Bela Islam*.

Since the incident of perceived blasphemy in *Kepulauan Seribu* (Thousands Islands), there have been at least six rallies done in the name of *Aksi Bela Islam* but initiated by different Islamist groups, including the Islamic Defender Front (*Front Pembela Islam – FPI*), National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Council's Edict (*Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia – GNPF-MUI*), The Islamic Community Front (*Forum Umat Islam – FUI*), and the Presidium of '212' Alumni. These rallies were done in response to a single remark by Ahok that was perceived blasphemous, driven with a single common agenda to demand for Ahok's imprisonment.

Table 1. Timeline of Aksi Bela Islam Rallies

Name	Description
Aksi Bela Islam I (14 October 2016)	**Initiator**: The Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) **Form of Action**: A small protest and oration in front of Jakarta's town hall **Participants**: FPI members and followers **Demand**: an investigation into a case of blasphemy by Ahok referring to Surah al-Maidah verse 51
Aksi Bela Islam II (4 November 2016)	Called as "411 Peace Action" (although ends in violent clashes with police) **Initiator**: The Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) **Form of Action**: Performed prayer together and oration in front of Presidential Palace. **Participants**: Followed by thousands of participants from various conservative organizations and followers **Demand**: an investigation into the blasphemy case of Ahok and call the President not to intervene the case and protect Ahok.
Aksi Bela Islam III (2 December 2016)	Called as "Super Peace Action 212" **Initiator**: The National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Council's Edict (GNPF-MUI) **Form of Action**: Performed Friday prayers together at Monas led by Habib Riziq Shihab (FPI High Priest) and Bachtiar Nasir (Chairman of GNPF-MUI) **Participants**: A large scale of protest, followed by hundreds of thousands – some even say millions– participants including Muslim believers from various organizations and backgrounds. **Demand**: an investigation into the blasphemy case and request that the Palace not protect Ahok nor intervene the Ahok's case
Aksi Bela Islam IV (11 February 2017)	Called as "112 Action" **Initiator**: The Islamic Community Front (Forum Umat Islam, FUI) **Form of Action**: Performed prayer together and mass preaching, oration and hearing with the House of Representative **Participants**: thousands of participants from conservative groups and alumni of '212' rallies **Demand**: Aimed to oversee the trial process of Ahok's blasphemy case
Aksi Bela Islam V (21 February 2017)	Called as "212 Volume 2 Action" **Initiator**: The Islamic Community Front (Forum Umat Islam, FUI) and the Presidium of 212 Alumni **Form of Action**: long march and public oration **Participants**: around fifteen thousands of participants from conservative groups and alumni of '212' rallies **Demand**: Ahok's dismissal as governor following the trial sentence, Refused criminalization effort toward clerics and the arrest of students who accused of spreading hate-speech.
Aksi Bela Islam VI (31 March 2017)	Called as "313 Action" **Initiator**: The Islamic Community Front (Forum Umat Islam, FUI) **Form of Action**: Long march action **Demand**: to urge the President to dismiss Ahok from his position as governor of DKI Jakarta, and urge the courts to speed up the law enforcement process regarding Ahok's blasphemy case
Aksi Bela Islam VII (5 May 2017)	Calles as "55 Action", and claimed as the climax of Aksi Bela Islam rallies **Initiator**: The National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Council's Edict (GNPF-MUI, later changed the name into GNPF-Ulema) **Participants**: thousands of participants from Jakarta and other regions **Demand**: First, demand the independence of judges in religious defamation cases. Second, ask the judge to decide the case in accordance with the facts of the trial and conscience.

Source: Author's own processed data from various media

From this table, it is clear that the whole rallies were initiated and driven by conservative groups, although each rally was able to mobilize mass participation. Out of seven rallies that were done under the name of Aksi Bela Islam, there at least two major rallies which successfully gathered considerable participants and even gained worldwide attention: '411' and '212' rallies, or so-called 'peaceful' rallies. Although, the messages it delivered were far from inclusive and tolerance. As shown in the table, the rallies were meant to give strong pressure to government and the courts to immediately process trials and impose penalty on Ahok. In a situation

leading up to election, it is hard to deem that the demand was not related to the contestation within the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election.

The '411' rally was initiated by FPI leader Habib Rizieq Shihab, whose personal website published the call for the rally, urging people to join the rally as a form of support to the MUI's fatwa on Ahok's blasphemy case. The '212' rally, on the other hand, was initiated by The National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulama Council's Edict (popularly known as GNPF-MUI) –a coalition of islamist group established specifically to guard Ahok's blasphemy case, and led by Bachtiar Nasir, popular preacher among middle-class Muslim. While the '411' rally was considered a smaller protest followed by thousands of people, the '212' rally has successfully gained much more supports and participation from the people. There were hundreds of thousands –some even say millions – of people came not only from Jakarta but also across regions, all were adhered to the calls for participating in the '212' rally, delivered either directly by religious preachers or through broadcasting messages scattered in social media such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and more.

For most participants, the rally was the realization of their anger about recent political waves that involved accusations of blasphemy against incumbent Jakarta Governor Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama, and for the rest of the participants, it was an expression of their disappointment toward the administration (*The Jakarta Post*, 3 December 2017). However, sor some, the rallies might also set a dangerous precedent precedent by allowing radical groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and Indonesian Islamic Party (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, HTI) to shape Muslim opinions and to redefine what 'diversity', 'peaceful' and 'Islam' means, as well as letting uncritical and unverified words and images (circulated on social media) dominate Islamic discourses (Weng 2016). The involvement of conservative groups –some are even perceived as hard line and another is vigilante– in the rallies is also seen as an effort of the conservative groups to islamising Indonesia, as one describes:

> *"the movement had other agendas, such as changing the Constitution to oblige Muslims to follow Islamic law, proposing bans on non-Muslim leaders in majority Muslim communities, greater implementation of sharia provisions, and the nomination of political candidates for executive office who are sympathetic to Islamist objectives. In other words, removing Ahok was just one part of a much broader Islamisation endeavour. GNPF-MUI leaders probably never imagined when they began organising in October that they could have drawn such massive crowds (Fealy 2017)".*

Populist Elements in Aksi Bela Islam

As this paper argues that *Aksi Bela Islam* rallies encompassed both the elements of Islamic and right-wing populism, this section will discuss the elements of populism within *Aksi Bela Islam* and how they may fit the criteria. In analysing the elements of right-wing populism in *Aksi Bela Islam*, this paper looks into three important elements presented in the rallies: the issues, populist appeals and support, and its strategies.

Right-wing Elements

While some analysts tend to use conservatism and populism interchangeably in discussing *Aksi Bela Islam* rallies, this paper tend to see that this phenomenon as representing right-wing populism, swayed by the conservative groups and their populist leaders. However, it is important to analyse the extend that the elements of right-wing populism existed within the *Aksi Bela Islam*. That said, this section will explain three important features of *Aksi Bela Islam*: issues, supports and strategies. Although right-wing populism does not come with uniform and clearly defined characteristic, however, there are similarities among right-wing populists. Arguably speaking, the elements of right-wing populist also present in *Aksi Bela Islam* –in a different form and degree.

In general, right-wing populists use and capitalize widespread discontent concerning a range of political, economic, and cultural issues to construct their populist issues. for instance, the narrative of 'anti-immigrant' and 'Islamophobia' sentiments used by right-wing populist parties across Europe are in response to the wave of immigration in this region. Immigrants and Muslim-immigrants has been constructed as "non-elite enemies", which are religiously and ethnically different from the "indigenous" European majority. Immigrants are posited as a threat against the presumed (constructed) identity of the European people and their traditional values. Even more visibly than in Europe, issues related to religious and ethnic identity played important role

for Indonesian voters in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. Ahok's loss in the election is seen as evidence of how identity sentiments can have big impact if capitalized and manipulated by political actors. Being a Christian of Chinese-descent, Ahok's identity is often a subject to either racial or religious sentiment from his opponents.

To some extent, similar issues can also be found in the *Aksi Bela Islam* rallies. *Aksi Bela Islam* presented a mélange of xenophobic sentiments, which is used to attack Ahok's ethnic and religious identity. During the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, these sentiments were massively used and even fabricated by political actors, combines an ethno-cultural or even a racial divide, as materialized in the narrative of "Chinese-Infidel" (Cina-kafir). For instance, FPI leader Habib Rizieq Shihab frequently express his rhetoric peddles a mélange of xenophobic fear tactics against Ahok's religious identity, using the words "infidel" to reject Ahok's nomination as governor and influence the protesters in *Aksi Bela Islam* rallies not to vote for Ahok. Although not as deep as religious sentiments, Ahok's ethnic identity as Chinese-descent is also stirred by his opponents to increase anti-Sinitic sentiment. During *Aksi Bela Islam* rallies, racial chants such as "crush the Chinese" or "Chinese-infidel" were often heard among protesters.

While anti-Sinitic and anti-Christian sentiments has been constructed as "non-elite enemies", the antagonism of 'us' versus 'them' within *Aksi Bela Islam* rallies is heightened and used to make distinction between 'the true, morally pure and homogeneous people' versus 'the bad muslims'. In the case of *Aksi Bela Islam*, this antagonism is depicted in the narrative of 'Islam defender' versus 'blasphemer defender' –a clear reference to Ahok's supporters. For the conservatives who believe that Ahok's statement in *Kepulauan Seribu* is blasphemous, their participation in the rallies is interpreted as a sign of love towards the religion and obedience to the *ulemas*, given them a sense of being a 'true Muslim' (*muslim sejati*). On the other hand, those who refuse to join *Aksi Bela Islam* rallies and sided with Ahok on blasphemy allegation, are then depicted as 'hypocrite' (*munafik*).

Islamic populist Elements

One of the reasons why *Aksi Bela Islam* perceived as Islamic populism is perhaps because the rallies, particularly the '212' rally, were successfully mobilize enormous participation from various Muslim organization and elements. In the '212' rally, the participants of the rally were very diverse in terms of religious inclination as well as socio-economic class: varying from followers of mainstream Muslim organizations, members of religious groups, followers of popular preachers, students of traditional and modern *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), followers of conservative Islamic groups, members or sympathizers of political parties (including Islamic parties, Muslim-based parties, and others), politicians, a few Chinese-Christian communities, academics, students, pious middle class, and marginalized urban poor.

In terms of religious affiliations, the participants of *Aksi Bela Islam* can be categorized into two big groups: first, those who are affiliated with conservative groups, and second, those who are followers or members of moderate-Muslim groups. However, if examined more closely, the characteristic of Aksi Bela Islam participants is much more divergent. For instance, within the conservative groups are organizations known as vigilante, hard line Islamist, and conservative-inclined groups. While they shared common value and principle regarding the interpretation of Al Maidah 51, yet, their religious teachings and views are varying and can even be contradict with each other.

Within the Moderate-Muslim groups, many of Aksi Bela Islam participants are followers of Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) –two key Muslim organizations representing Modernist and Traditionalist Islam. Some others are might be followers of popular preachers, while some others are just ordinary Muslims and do not affiliated with any Muslim organizations. The involvement of Muhammadiyah in the multi-coalitions within Aksi Bela Islam, for instance, can be seen in the participation of its youth-wing organization named Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah (KOKAM) and some prominent figures such as Amien Rais, Dien Syamsuddin, and Rosyad Saleh, who are all among Muhammadiyah's organization leaders. Even Bachtiar Nasir, a chairman of GNPF-MUI, is also a member of the Majlis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah – internal institution within Muhammadiyah which could issue legal opinion on religious edicts. As for NU, the involvement of ulamas and their followers were also noticeable in the rally, despite the statement from Chairman of NU who forbid their members and followers to join the rally and cited a fatwa saying that prayers

in on the highway is a heresy. Some of *ulemas* from *pesantrens* in Ciamis and Tasikmalaya, West Java, for instance, even sent their students to go to demonstration location on foot.

In terms of social-economic class, the participants of Aksi Bela Islam include both the middle-class and the poor urban. In fact, a large number of participants of the '212' rally were the urban middle class, that some even described Aksi Bela Islam phenomenon as Indonesian Muslim middle-class populism (Jati 2016). The characteristic of urban middle class participants of Aksi Bela Islam is similar to what Hadiz postulates: a precarious new middle class whom emerged out of an economic modernization process, newly urbanized, a direct product of modern education system, have high levels of education, but find themselves stuck nonetheless in the lower tiers of the socio-economic and political hierarchy, and find the interpretations of Islam can provide a useful lens through which to understand the social world that they encounter and their place within it (Hadiz 2017: 34-37). In this case, the middle class in Aksi Bela Islam is described as pious middle class Muslim who see Islam as an identity marker or a symbolic capital (Weng 2017), but experienced social frustration due to the economic crisis (Pribadi 2016: 45).

While pious middle-class constituted as largest participants in the '212' rally, yet they are not representing or adhere to the islamisation agenda of the conservatives. Their motivation is more related with religious spirit (*ghirah*) to defend their faith and showing adherence to religious edicts (fatwa) from the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI). For majority of this group, participating in the '212' rally is seen as their identity marker of being a 'good and true' Muslims. As Fealy puts it: *for the great majority, this was primarily a religious event, both in the sense of defending their faith against insult and also in expressing their piety through a mass prayer at a nationally symbolic site. They appeared little interested in fundamental changes to the role of Islam in the state, and many rejected on principle attempts to Islamise the Constitution and restrict non-Muslim rights* (Fealy 2017). The urban poor, on the other hand, perhaps constitute only a small number of participants in the '212' rally. Different from the pious middle class, their participation in Aksi Bela Islam rallies is driven by resentment towards Ahok, due to his pro-growth policies which cost them a loss. Many of them are victims of the eviction of informal neighborhoods, whom has to bear the consequences of Ahok's program of neoliberal urban development and infrastructural improvement (Wilson 2017).

Looking at its surface, the mobilization of all of these groups may constitute the asymmetrical multi-class coalitions postulated in Hadiz's Islamic populism, as it is constituted by an alliance of disparate elements: conservative groups, moderate groups, political opponents, the middle class, and the urban poor. Digging deeper, it is important to carefully examine to what extend this asymmetrical multi-class coalition in Aksi Bela Islam meet the criteria of a new Islamic populism.

Family Communication in Development of Child's National Identity

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Introduction

The aim of this study is to describe the role of parents in family communication to developing children's understanding about national identity and their attitudes to other national groups. The national identity is very important for the stability and the cohesion between nationals. The family is the first socialization agent in forming a strong national identity in dealing with the problem of national identity crisis that occurred in Indonesia. Today, children can easily get a lot of information from other countries through the development of internet technology and another mass media. Therefore, it is necessary to develop national identity in childhood phase as the key to the formation of national identity. In family communication, phatic communication between parents and children is one way to instill love and pride as an Indonesian nation through comfortable and pleasant conversations. Interaction between parents and their children can drive children's understanding about national and other groups' identity. This study may contribute in the

development of family communication theory with the approach of phatic communication and about the role of parents in the socialization of national identity.

The conceptual framework of this study is based on the concept of national identity, family communication style and phatic communication. The idea of national identity is a complex concept which its intensities, characters, and origins are varied according to time and places. Benedict Anderson (1991) explained nationalism as a process of "imagining communities" because of the mass consumptions of newspapers and novels, linked citizens to urban centers, and also encourage participation to share culture. The nationalism as a concept means a way for a person to self-identify by attaching to a nation. Nationalism is a form of national identity. National identity may refer to the subjective feeling of people with others about a nation, regardless of one's legal citizenship status. In psychological terms, national identity is viewed as an awareness of differences, and recognition of 'we' and 'they' (Lee, 2012). Relevant to the research focus, in family communication, parents develop nationalism values as a part of socialization. It is done informally to children through daily interaction. Phatic communication (Jumanto, 2014) will facilitate acceptance and support to the relationship of parents and children in the development of national identity process that occur. By doing phatic communication learning process on children will be more comfortable and fun.

Methods

This study is used a qualitative research approach with constructivist paradigm. According to Patton (2002), each individual has a unique experience. Thus, doing research with this paradigm is to understand every way individuals take in viewing the world, and needs to have senses of appreciation for their view. The technique of selecting informants is by combining between purposive and snowball samplings. There are five informants with characteristics:

a. parents (both fathers or mothers) who have children aged 4-12 years,
b. active in informal community and have concern about nasionalism values
c. achieve knowledge about parenting through training or seminars and concern about children development
d. as a residence in Jakarta (Jabodetabek), with socioeconomic status A or B.

Informant is decided by maximum variation sampling approach, to represent the whole audience more closely. Data will be collected through in-depth interview and daily observation from informants. While thematic analysis is used that is preceded by the coding process to reduce data.

Findings

All informants argued, that understanding about national identity is very important because children will grow up with other children from different countries with different cultures, race and religions. Parents' role in socialization can facilitate children to understand their nationality in building better relationships with their peers and to make them feel more secure and feel right to a country. Parents' efforts in counseling children under 8 years with familiarizing children to recognize and memorize the song of independence and national anthem, and also involving them at the commemoration of Independence Day. Several informants read story books to their children for respecting customary, ethnic, religious, and national differences. For children over the age of 8, they may able to obtain information of nationalism from various media they access by themselves, both from traditional mass media such as books, television, and also from various information from the internet. In addition, asking children to play in soccer games or watching football games and family visiting to museum where displays about the Indonesia state's history and facilitated the study of nationality are also a way to promoting sense of nationalism.

All informants also applied phatic communication by having a special call to their children. As much as to build closeness in every greeting delivery at beginning of communication between parents and children. Physical touches and expressions when communication takes place is also become matters to notice. In connection with the socialization process, a good way of communication will facilitate acceptance on children. The approach that is taken in any communication activities should be able to establish bonds between parents and children. To maintain interaction, parents can perform phatic communication in order to socialize values.

How to communicate to a particular child requires easy-to-understand language selection, a less rapid tone, a soft tone of speech, and an informal mode of delivery. The approach in communication is also needs to be adjusted to the children's mood which is quickly shifting, especially for children less than 8 years old.

Discussion

In Barrett, Wilson and Lyons (1999), national identity indeed become more important through the childhood years, in phase of 10-11 years old. Children are able to conceptualize about the social world that drive their identity system. Family communication can mediate the process of developing children national identity. Although phatic communication is not the core of communication, it is important in determining the accomplishment of message reception. Particularly message related to promoting of national identity, phatic communication will be very relevant to support the success of acceptance on children. This form of communication is potential to support the relationship and interaction between parents and children with the pattern of acceptance and rejection, that are based on intimacy between parents and a child. Children tends to be more receptive than rejective.

For the parents with the children under 8 years, it is very necessary to do phatic communication when developing child's understanding about national identity. Because in that age, the child's imagination and psychological condition often causes refusal in receiving any explanation from parents. Therefore, parents must also notice to the way of mentoring to children while watching television and other activities in developing national identity. Parental control is important. The parents with a democratic family type will further support the development of national identity on children. In family with communication concept-oriented pattern shows that the critical ability and the decision making process of children has better base. This finding related with Dube (2010). In this study, all parents chose the type of restrictive mediation and often engaged in active mediation while watching television with children. In restrictive mediation, parents provide time restrictions and decide type of images or content whether on television or internet access duration.

Conclusion

Family communication determines the success of socialization process regarding children' national identity. The role of parents is very important to provide understanding for children. Mothers and fathers have important roles in performing and mentoring communication for children in order to facilitate children for receiving messages about nationalism through a good emotional bond in a fun and harmonious situation.

Keywords: family communication type, national identity, children, phatic communication, parent's role

Adaptive Structuration Process in the Education of Indonesian Migrant Workers' Children: Case study in 9th Grade of Junior High School in CLC Kundasang, CLC Ribu Bonus, and Sekolah Indonesia Kota Kinabalu Sabah Malaysia

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The lack of education for Indonesian Migrant Workers (TKI) children is becoming concern. There are some barriers which can interfere the children with having higher education, such as illegal status of their parents and weak coordination between the agent and the agency. The study aims to analyze the process of communication through the agent, agency, the produced and reproduced structure of the system and examine the particular reason behind the forming of such system. The study utilizes constructivist paradigm which collects data by case study and literature study: the researcher obtained the data through interviewing and

receiving the valid document in Sabah Malaysia. The result shows the illegal status of their parents is a serious problem for the children to gain higher education. The parents' status prevents the children to get the citizenship rights and a set of other documents such as the passport, resident cards, study permits, and so forth. Therefore, this study represented the structure that being produced and reproduced by the Indonesian Migrant Workers (TKI) that opposes and violates the law, then has inhibited the children to get into the higher level of education.

Keywords: adaptive structuration; education; Indonesian Migrant Workers.

Contesting Nationalism with Freedom: The Strategy of the Government of Indonesia in Controlling Radical Social Organizations

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Introduction

The outset of *reformasi* or democratization in Indonesia was marked by both positive outcomes in terms of the freedom, fair and accountable election, good governance, improving the quality of life of the people and the negative outcome in terms of communal conflicts, violent movements, terrorism and the rise of radical groups. The spread of radical ideology has attracted the concern of social and political leaders as it has penetrated to education institutions from lower levels to universities.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is one of the groups in radical category. Its teachings promote anti-unitary state of Indonesia, democracy, Human Rights and reject political pluralism. Entering Indonesia in the 1980, this trans-national organization has developed its network to 30 provinces with 300 branches. It develops its primary basis in campuses in entire Indonesia, notably in state university campuses. As an organization with semi- covert operation, HTI members remain un-identified completely. Open sources disclose its members numbered form two millions to seven millions. As with its massive movements and propaganda in terms of sermon, conference and demonstration which promotes *Khilafah* political system, the Government of Indonesia regards HTI as a threat to the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI).

Findings

In 2017 the GOI declares its policy to ban HTI, arguing that the organization adopts, develops and preaches ideology or teachings which are contrary the 4 national consensus; Pancasila, State Constitution (UUD NRI 1945), NKRI and Unity in Diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). In implementing this policy, the President of the Republic of Indonesia issued Presidential Regulation (Perppu) No 2/2017 replacing law no 17/2013 on Social Organization. The DPR then legitimized the Perppu to become Law No 16/2017. The issuance of Perppu no 2/201 and the banning of HTI receive wide controversies. Those disagree accuse the government as suffering "Islamophobia, jeopardizing Islamic organizations or is anti-Islamic movement. The banning is also perceived as the retaliation of the government allegedly support Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) to Islamic movements as it was disappointed with the loss of Ahok- Jarot in the Jakarta governor election. The enactment of Perppu No 2/2017 was criticized for it is feared to endanger the freedom of speech and the freedom of organization as guaranteed by Human Rights. Amnesty International, for instance, strongly urges the GOI to withdraw the Perppu as it is potential to result in discriminating and violating the right for association and freedom of expression, driving excessive control of the state over social organization, violating privacy right, hurting minority groups and spoiling de-radicalization efforts. (Republika .co.id ,2017)

Method and Discussion

This paper seeks to discuss the policy of the GOI in issuing Perppu No 2/2017 which has been used to ban HTI, its precursors and contentions or controversy over the implementation of policy and strategy. In doing so, this paper uses qualitative approach, employing both primary data collections including interview, documents, news and video analysis and secondary data collection including books and Journal analysis. This paper views that the government policy to ban HTI using the Perppu makes sense with at least four arguments. First, the Government of Indonesia is subject to the obligation to protect the integrity and the sovereignty of the state. The democratization in Indonesia has produced such excessive freedom which urgently requires state to control it. Otherwise, it will endanger state integrity. Second, HTI is believed to be the movement which disseminate radical ideology which has no ground in the Islamic theology nor is it adhered by the majority of Muslim Umma. It will destroy current diverse political system adopted by diverse Islamic states or states with majority Muslim population, including Indonesia. Therefore, prior to Indonesians step to ban HTI, 17 states in the worlds have banned this organization. Indonesia is considered too late to react. There have been more social and political leaders who support the government in banning HTI and issuing Perppu No 2 /2017 than those oppose them.

Third, this article theorizes that law no 17/2013 serves like "accelerator pedal" as it emphasizes more on the freedom or acceleration especially in establishing social organizations. Perppu No 2/2017 serves like "brake pedal" as emphasizes more on the restriction which takes the form of the prohibition to social organization to advocate violence using Ethnic, Religion, Race and Groups (SARA) issues, disseminating and advocating separatism mission, acting like law enforcement agencies, speaking which contain religious blasphemy and practicing, disseminating, teachings or ideology which are contrary to state ideology or Pancasila. Following such prohibition is the law also stipulates straight forward and strict punishment those conducting such prohibition in terms of shorter and more effective procedures in enforcing penalties to organizations and individual who conduct such prohibition. Four, Indonesian constitution (UUD NRI 1945) guarantees the promotion of freedom of expression and association and justifies restriction as well, with the aims at preserving orders, protecting the state sovereignty and state integrity and the freedom of others.

Conclusion

In sum, both Law number 17/2017 and Perppu no 2/2017 (Law no 16/2017) are not contradictory, yet complementarily, just like accelerator and brake pedal in motorcycle analogy. They are both needed to balance the development of democratic state which requires freedom on one hand and strong state ideology on the other hand. These two laws can be implemented together, hand in hand as articles on law no 17/2013 which are not amended by Law no 16/2017 still apply. The implementation of two laws serves as the manifestation of the application of International principle of the Forum Interregnums (non derogable rights) which address individual freedom and the forum exterregnums (derogable right) which mandates the state, under certain conditions, to exercise restriction.

Keywords: Nationalism, Freedom, Restriction, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

The Irony of Penal Populism in Indonesia: Southeast Asian Comparative Perspective on War on Drugs

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In overall, among the Southeast Asian countries that ever stepped into the democratizing path, one may see a commonality in a rise of populist politics. It began by Thaksin's short success in Thailand in mobilizing rural

citizen, then followed by Jokowi in Indonesia later. It is also inevitable to consider the most unambiguous case of how Duterte in the Philippines obtained the political power by utilizing war on drugs as a political mean. Furthermore, such a national manifesto on the criminal policy of war on drugs in the Philippines can be observed both in Thaksin as well as Jokowi political running regarding nationalism protection. In the Philippine context, Duterte managed to build public anxiety on narcotics and formulate a controversial policy that encourages extrajudicial killings not only by law enforcers but also by civilians. This started since, Duterte's campaign in 2016, where he promised that he would kill 10,000 drug dealers and urge citizen to kill drug traffickers. Curato (2017) also called it a political hope because it continued to combine anxiety with hope for its citizens. The war on drugs is made a populist figure as a common goal with its citizens. Two years before, in Indonesia, 2014's Jokowi's presidency was started by execution of Bali 9 and declaration of Indonesia Emergency of Narcotics. In retrospect, the national-wide war on drugs in Southeast Asia was spearheaded by Thailand. Thaksin started the fight against ya ba/jargon for methamphetamines, in 2003, and it resulted in 2.800 extrajudicial killings in the first three months (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Departing from comparative analysis on the policies of war on drugs in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, this paper finally discusses the capacity of penal populism in Indonesia in delivering the mass influence especially in term of citizen support and mobilization.

War on Drugs and Penal Populism in Southeast Asia

In every Southeast Asian cases that have been introduced above, war on drugs has become a part of the policies that marked the entry of new national leaders into the office. In this sense, war on drugs in Southeast Asia can be labeled as penal populism, a political strategy to generate public support by cultivating criminal policy and public fear (Curato, 2016). However, it was not a major marker of such in Indonesia and Thailand cases. On the other hand, penal populism was already the main element of Duterte political orientation since the champagne period (Kenny & Holms, 2018 p. 6). Furthermore, while we may observe other commonalities in details of practice, such as clearance of corrupted elements in the institution, reinforcement by alternative bodies, and the use of extra-legal approaches, there are also structural differences in how the policy was realized which rooted the internal political situation.

Although wars were declared directly by both Thaksin and Jokowi, it can be seen that the extent of discontinuity among the governmental bodies was much higher in Thailand and Indonesia cases than in the Philippines. In Thailand, Thaksin declares the victory of war in December 2003. However, it was challenged by the constitutional monarch, King Bhumibol in his response to the Thaksin's announce in radio (Robert, Trace, & Klein 2004). On the other hand, in Indonesia, in the beginning, Jokowi as the president was one that taking an initiative to announce the war and enforce the execution of long-postponed capital punishment of several big names. In the process, it invited cooperation from various related state agencies including the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Police, Military, and Ministry of Foreign Affair. However, in the routine battlefield, institutions that were tasked to do or taking action of mass incarceration and extrajudicial killings of drug dealers and users were not effectively integrated and synergized, compared to the situation at the time of how the war was declared in the first places. Especially between the police and the National Agency of Narcotics, there we may sense latent competition and the internal politics in the police organization.

War on Drugs in Indonesia: End of Jokowi as populist?

Take a closer look, the narrative of war on drugs in Indonesia has somehow fused with that of nationalism, as since the beginning of the advertisement of policy, it was claimed that foreign syndicate is cultivating Indonesian youth. On the other hand, one characteristic of Indonesian war on drug that can be extracted from above comparative insight of its political context is that its relatively low publicity. Jokowi's war on drug can be said as one that was the least recognized by its target mass in the sense that if it was a purely populist policy by his presidency, compared to Thai and the Philippines cases. In Indonesia the routine justification and performance of the policy in media only lasted in the early period especially it peaked at the time of controversial execution. On the other hand, the narrative of criticism made by opposition side was more concentrated on capital punishment issue rather that particular kind of crime control model that led by the newly appointed government, whereas in Thai as well as in the Philippines, it was so.

On the other hand, it is intuitive to consider that Jokowi as a political figure who has pioneered populism in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2015; Hadiz & Robison, 2017), had implemented penal populism in the form of war on drugs. However, the comparison analysis reveals that Indonesia's war on drugs was not followed by bottom-up mass mobilization as in the Philippines, and also anti-establishment sentiment as in Thailand. Rather, it was the utilization of established functions that Jokowi presented in his war on drugs. Moreover, Jokowi's war on drugs is more suitable to be captured as political consolidation strategy to gain his support base from law enforcement especially police and military by rending them the stage at the same time attaching the strong-man image on him. Nationalism in this context was used as an instrument to rationalize policy as a fulfillment of popular demand and also an infringement of rights which might be caused by it. Thus, Indonesian experience of war on drugs depicts another dimension of penal populism in Southeast Asian that is not only predicated on populism. Instead, Jokowi's war on drugs is much more a political consolidation. In other words, Jokowi's war on drugs exemplified the sovereign power to call "state of exception" in which "entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system" are denied state protection (Agamben 2005, p. 2).

Keywords: Penal Populism, Populism, War on Drugs, Nationalism

Indonesia's Nationalism amid the Growing Islamist Campaign

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In the aftermath of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, there are ongoing discussions among scholars on the rising of Islamist conservatism in Indonesia. Some argue that the Islamic mass mobilization prior to the election demonstrates that conservatism has gained ground on the political campaign in Indonesia (Linsey 2016, Jones 2016, Setijadi 2017). This claim is complemented with the sets of polling data composed by Mietzner and Muhtadi (2017); showing that although attitudes for conservatism among Muslim in Indonesia was declining before the 2016 Islamic mass demonstration, a quarter of the population already displayed support for Islamist socio-political agenda. The concern over this growing conservatism movement, that generally positioned themselves as opposition to Joko Widodo presidency, triggered nationalistic responses from the ruling regime and its supporters. The main reactions from the administration were promoting Indonesia nationalistic narratives as a counter and banning Islamic hardliner group like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) with an accusation that it wants to change the state's ideology of Pancasila (Hadiz 2017).

This scholarly debate, however, has more emphasis on the rise of Islamic conservatism and gave little attention to the nationalistic responses devised by Joko Widodo administration. In order to fill this knowledge gap, this paper will discuss some key characteristics of contemporary Indonesia nationalism during the growing religious conservatism and identify how it was transformed in correspondence to the government's political agenda. It is by nature that nation and nationalism are ambivalent, and there is an inevitable correlation between the past and the future that constructed national collective memories, just like two-faced Janus (Bhaba 1990). Subsequently, besides investigating the nature of Indonesia nationalism nowadays, one should track down the remnants of the past nationalistic narratives. Thus, the first part of the article will focus on the crucial periods of Indonesia history that shaped the myths and symbolism of current nationalism narratives. Secondly, the author will categorize contemporary nationalism in two distinctive forms of banal nationalism and structural nationalism, based on the works of Billig (1995) and Malesˇevic (2013), to explain the different features that have been used to counter rising Islamist politics. The last part will explain the limit of Indonesia's nationalism as the government's political tools and how it eventually needs to "compromised" with much larger Islamist agenda.

Nationalism in Indonesia was widely studied after its independence from colonial rule. During the colonial days, the main political concern was the attainment of independence. This common commitment could easily connect several contesting ideologies during that era (Feith and Castles 1970, pp.152-3). This generic

nationalistic narrative also often echoed by Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia, who was famous for his nationalistic speech and political jargon. The central characteristic of nationalist movement in this era was what has been called as "secular" nationalism, in the sense of no base seeking either in Islam or Communism - two of the biggest political movement during that era- but at the same time was able to unite these two competing ideologies under Sukarno's individual concept of Nationalism, *Agama/*Religion, and Communism; or abbreviated as Nas-A-Kom (Ledge 2010, p. 8).

The nationalism narratives that was built during the Sukarno presidency was overwritten by militaristic New Order led by General Soeharto. The communism purge in 1965 greatly contributes to the nationalistic views of the New Order era. The authoritarian regime that ruled for 32 years built their nationalism narratives upon the anti-communism sentiments that still lingering in the contemporary political debates in Indonesia. The long-lasting narratives made possible by the massive institutionalization of nationalistic agenda through state-centered ideological doctrine that could be encompassed by all citizens (Eric Storm 2018, p. 116).

In today *Reformasi* era which the remnants of New Order's narrative still exist, to fully characterize Indonesia nationalism is not an easy task. One of the challenges is the unclear ideological stances among its political actors, especially many official political parties (Aspinall 2016). One of the most distinctive ideological stances is related to the issues of Islam (Aspinall, Fossati, Muhtadi and Warburton 2018). Thus, Islamic agenda becoming a hegemonic factor in today's Indonesia political constellation.

The 2017 Jakarta Governor Election arguably have the most divisive political campaign in post-Soeharto Indonesia. The mass mobilization by Islamic alliance is driven by blasphemy accusation to the Christian Governor Basuki Tjahja Purnama, probably the biggest political mass demonstration in Indonesia, prevent him to be re-elected. Many of the members from the Islamic alliance, which called themselves 212 Movement alumni, named after the massive demonstration on 2 December 2016, also positioned themselves in opposition to the current Presiden Joko "Jokowi" Widodo (Aspinall, 2018). This paper explores that the growing Islamic conservatism is also part of the struggle to define national identity, something that has been happened during the post-independence period.

The divisive nature of the identity politics that has been fully utilized by the Islamic alliance during 2017 Jakarta Governor Election also found in the nationalistic campaign. Resisting from growing Islamic opposition rating, the current administration answered the challenges with nationalist narratives such as the notable jargon that widely used and spread in the media was "*Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila* [I'm Indonesia, I'm Pancasila]" (Kompas 2017). It is difficult to separate Pancasila—which often hailed as the basic philosophy and foundation of the nation—from established nationalism narratives in Indonesia since the formation of the state. As part of the ideological legacy of the militaristic New Order, the government instinctively used nationalistic narratives that have long been institutionalized and "proved" to maintain the unity of the nation. This article argues that the current government also used another form of identity-based politics (that ground itself on nationalistic narratives, although it is different from nationalism in general) to counter the growing religious conservatism. Therefore, the campaign of Indonesia nationalism amid growing Islamic populism has been reduced to the logic of identity politics.

This Paper further argues that the nationalism narratives which have been used by the government to counter religious conservatism also found to be not the only current regime's arsenals to uphold their power. Before it's too late, the Joko Widodo's administration changed its stance in countering religious conservatism with an approach to the popular Islamic political actors in Indonesia (Fealy 2018). The recent appointment of Ma'ruf Amin, the chief of Indonesia Council of Ulama and an influential Muslim conservative, as Joko Widodo vice president candidate proved that the President's political spectrum is leaning towards compromising the

nationalistic and Islamic political agenda to cultivates votes from Islamist base (Warburton 2018). In conclusion, this action fosters the argument that in contemporary Indonesia, nationalism has been banalized or only used to reclaim the historical past of nationalism for today pragmatic political tools.

Keywords: Nationalism, Indonesia Politics, Conservatism, Islam, Joko Widodo

Don't Join Politic: Netizens Opinion about Today's Indonesia Politic Practice (Netnography Study on Instagram Users Comments of Hotman Paris Hutapea Instagram Post)

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Introduction

Today, more and more people in Indonesia are connected to the internet. The Indonesian Internet Service Provider Association (APJII) reported (Internet Penetration and Internet User Behaviour - 2017 Survey Report) that in 2017, the number of internet user in Indonesia is reaching 143,26 million people (approximately 54,68% out of Indonesia total population). Indonesia internet users spend a huge amount of time using the internet, especially using the social media. According to Hootsuite and We Are Social (Digital in 2018 Global Review 2018 Report), Indonesia internet users spent on average 3 hours and 23 minutes per day using social media.

Instagram is one of the most commonly use social media platform in Indonesia. Hootsuite and We Are Social ranked Instagram as the fourth most active social media platform that Indonesia internet users use (2018). According to Statista, as of April 2018, the Indonesia Instagram users reaches 56 million users. This figure placed Indonesia as the country with the fourth largest Instagram users in the world.

Hotman Paris Hutapea (HPH), a prominent lawyer from Indonesia, is also an active Instagram user (@hotmanparisofficial) that is catching a lot of attention from Indonesia Instagram users nowadays. He posts photos and videos about his lawyer related activities and his glamour yet hard working personal life. The contents related to his personal life are rising debates among Instagram users, whether it is an appropriate thing to do in Indonesia's eastern culture point of view or not. He often posts photos of his luxury cars and him posing romantically with many beautiful women that is not his wife. On the other side, he posted contents that are showing him giving free law advices to "small" people, lectures about law knowledge, advocacy on certain issues that isn't being handled well by government. He does it in a passionate and simple way so that common people understands more about law. This two side of him makes his Instagram account is catching a lot of attention. His Instagram account is currently being followed by 1 million users.

On July 13th 2018, HPH posted a picture of his respond when being asked by a journalist whether he is interested or not in joining politics. He answers: "What for? I am more popular than political parties now". For just 2 days, as per July 15th 2018, this post is being liked by 46.585 Instagram users. Commentaries on this post is also massive. It reaches up to 1.577 comments, commenting in many point of view regarding his answer.

Picture 1: Hotman Paris Hutapea Instagram Post Regarding His Answer in Chances of Joining The World of Politic

Symbolic interaction theory (George H. Mead) believed that human action toward other people or things are based on their perceived meanings toward that specific people or things. Every action made will differ depends on each people or things. Mead stated that meaning is actually a construction of social reality. Human perceive meaning from interaction in society. Afterwards, the perceived meaning is distributed back to the society in any form of interaction, including a comment in a social media post. A comment is made based on perceived meaning that the Instagram user have about an issue.

On HPH's Instagram post, most of the comments made by the Instagram users are form of expression of their point of view towards the lawyer's answer. The comments are not just short comments that telling whether they agree or not with the lawyer's answer. It is also equipped with reasons why the Instagram users are taking a specific point of view. The reasons that explains their standpoint is actually a perceived meaning on how the Instagram users are understanding current Indonesia political practices.

Through this paper, researcher wants to capture these opinions to understand more about their point of view about politics in Indonesia. This is important because Indonesia is entering the political year in 2019. Presidential and parliamentary election will be held and politician will starts creating political campaigns. By understanding the current public perception about politics, both current government and future political candidates can gain advantage. For current government, they can spread the right message towards society so that a successful election can be held. For candidates, they might use it also to create a winning message towards the voter.

The research question of this paper is: how the Instagram users are perceiving Indonesia current political practices?

Methodology

This research is built on constructivist paradigm and qualitative data analysis. The research is using netnography strategy that focuses on the comments that Instagram users posted on Hotman Paris Hutapea Instagram post at July 13th 2018, regarding his answer when being asked about the possibility of getting involved in politic world. Content analysis is conducted to all 1.577 comments that being posted since the posting date until July 15th 2018 (2 days).

Findings and Discussion

In related to symbolic interaction theory, every comments made by Instagram users can be analysed as statements that indicated their point of view about HPH's answer. In addition, commenting through Instagram can be seen as an attempt to emphasize particular identity that each Instagram users hold.

Based on the content analysis of the comments, researcher found 3 prominent findings regarding how Instagram users perceive HPH and the current practices in Indonesia's politic:

Hotman Paris is perceived as a "clean" and inspiring person by the Instagram users.

Despites all controversies about HPH glamorous way of life, most Instagram users that comments on the post is perceiving HPH as a "clean" person. Instagram users understands that his glamourous way of life is actually a fruit of a hard working effort he made. His action by helping the "small" people by giving free political advices is considered as a real work that is needed by the country. His short lectures about law that he uses to post in his Instagram is also making him gained respect from Instagram users. For most of the Instagram users that commented, HPH is considered as an inspirational person.

Indonesian politic is perceived as a place full of "dirty" politician that if a "clean" person enters, their reputation will be perceived as "dirty" also.

Researchers find this finding from Instagram users that hoping HPH is not entering the political world in Indonesia. This type of comment is actually the most comment posted by the Instagram users. They are perceiving political world as a "dirty" place full with a "dirty" politician. Political realm in Indonesia is perceived as place for people to gain economic benefits, fame, and merely power, without even caring about society. There is fear shown by the Instagram users that HPH will be the same like politicians nowadays if he joined the world of politics. They are caring about HPH reputation as an inspiration and they do not want HPH positive reputation tarnished by joining politic.

Instagram users are dreaming a better political practices in Indonesia by having more and more "clean" people entering the system.

On the other hand, there are comments that actually encourage HPH to join the politic world. Researchers see this comments as a hope from Instagram users to have better politician ruling the country. They are hoping HPH can change how political practices implemented in Indonesia. Coming from a wealthy background, the Instagram users believe HPH will not be a corrupt politician while on duty. His previous real action in helping "small" people believes as the right thing to do in becoming a politician. HPH has the right capability to perform as the politician that Instagram users wanted.

Conclusion

From the findings, researcher see the political practices is perceived in a negative way by the Instagram users that commented on HPH Instagram post. The majority of comments which supports HPH not entering the politic world implied the unwillingness of Instagram users to lost another inspiring person by becoming a politician. Politician is not perceived as someone that brings positive impact to the society. It is actually perceived as a stain on your career if a person become one.

To change this mindset, researcher actually sees a way by creating more and more HPH-like figures in current political practices. Instagram users that commented on HPH's post actually dreaming for changes in Indonesia's political world. They are wanting to have better figure in charge. The figure that they wanted is someone who are showing real work in helping the society get better. The real work that a person has contributed must also published in the internet (social media for example) in order to inform as many people as possible. Only working without any publication is also not a "complete" move to gain attention from the netizens.

Another important thing researcher found is building an honest and firm digital persona may be beneficial for politicians. What HPH has taught us is becoming who you really are in digital world is actually much appreciated by the netizens instead of creating too many fake personas.

Keywords: Public politic perception, symbolic interaction, digital communication, politician figure, social media comments

Problematic of Political Representation at Local Level during Reformation Era

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The open proportional electoral system implemented since the 2009 elections has brought dramatic changes to the relationship of political representation in the post-New Order era. The adoption of an open proportional electoral system in *reformasi* era elections (2009, 2014) has encouraged strong competition among legislative members candidates in winning the greatest number of votes. This is because the appointment of candidates to take legislative seats won by their parties is determined by the number of votes acquired. In addition, voters can directly vote on the names of candidates on the ballot paper, so it is possible for voters to vote directly the candidates they prefer. Recognition and proximity of the voters to the candidates began to be built since the election period, with the potential of changing post-election relations with the elected candidates.

As a result, there is a change in the perception of elected representatives towards the constituents, from merely being formalistic to political, in the interests of the next election. The perception towards constituents influences actions made by representatives in their constituencies. This is no exception in the local level, where the relations of representatives and constituents are even closer socially and geographically. To record these changes at an empirical level, this study aims to understand the relationship between representatives and constituents at the local level by looking at aspects of representatives' perceptions of constituents, and the activities of representatives in their constituencies. This research was conducted using a qualitative approach, taking the case of six members of the Banten Province DPRD (Regional Parliament) of the 2014-2019 period, who were interviewed in depth and their activities in dealing with constituents observed during the recess (the period outside the sessions).

This research found the phenomenon of engineering constituencies in the relations of representatives and constituencies at the local level, in this case Banten Province. The representatives manipulate the presence of constituents through a network of supporters who contributed to a parcelling of electoral districts, managing the constituent, and the middleman in channeling the aspirations of the constituents to the representative. The existence of supporting networks can be identified from the representatives' perceptions of constituents based on their interests of political career. In the case of Banten, representatives saw constituencies in the electoral district in two categories: supporters who were the voters, and the strongest supporters. In an effort to manipulate the presence of constituents, the representatives conducted the parcelling of electoral districts based on the election results to determine priorities in the activities and actions of representing their constituents in the constituency. This happened due to the lack of ideology and affiliation with political parties, so that in determining the allocation of resources to be distributed to constituents, it was based on electoral results that were more measurable for the representatives. Relationships that are built are also transactional in the effort to fight for the interests of constituents and maintain support in the constituency.

This study uses Richard Fenno's constituency concentric circle analysis tool to observe representative's perceptions of constituents, and representative activities in the electoral area (*home style*) to explain the relationship of post-New Order representatives and constituents. The representatives classify their constituencies in their constituencies into supporters and non-supporters, and then classify mere supporters and strong supporters for the benefit of the next election. But the case of representatives in Banten showed that in carrying out the classification process, the phenomenon of supporting networks was perceived by representatives as an instrument to manipulate the presence of constituents as the basis for their representation. This is not found in Fenno's theory. Representatives are not burdened with ideology and affiliation with political parties so that the alienation of political support areas in the electoral districts is highly fluid, competitive, and relies solely on representatives.

Meanwhile, Hanna Pitkin's representation theory shows the engineering of constituencies as a consequence of the activity of representing, even though the impact of representation is exclusive and transactional. The results of *substantive acting for* representation are exclusively enjoyed by the constituents supporting the representatives. Thus representation cannot represent the entire constituency in the constituency, but rather represents a minority in the constituency identified from the electoral count.

This study concludes that the relations of representatives and constituents at the local level during the *reformasi* era are fabricated and transactional. This is a consequence of the severance of representation relations during the New Order, and changes in the adoption of an open proportional system based on votes, especially in the two *reformasi* era elections (2009 and 2014). At the empirical level, parcelling of areas by representatives for the sake of their political interests led to the practice of discriminatory representation politics. On the other hand, to maintain political support in electoral districts, transactional practices between representatives and constituent groups of supporters are inevitable as an incentive to maintain such support.

In the end, it can be said that representation is no longer understable merely as Hanna Pitkin's definition as "presenting something that is not present literally" because it is considered that the existence of constituents is not organized and its interests are not identified by representatives. This research shows the concrete efforts of representatives in presenting and localizing constituents to be the basis of the activities and actions of their representatives who are driven by their political interests in each election. As a result, the engineering of constituency, where the representatives manipulate the presence of constituents through supporting networks that have been mapped since before the elections, and become transactional in advancing the interests of constituents, demonstrates the problematic practice of democratic representation at the local level of the *reformasi* era.

Dutch Colonial Government Arrangement, Forest Damar Exploitation, and the Study of Kao and Galela Wars

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This article deals with the government (politics) arrangement and the exploitation of forest and plantation (economic) resources in North Halmahera by the Dutch Colonial Government. After settling the political aspects, the colonial government made economic arrangements for forests and plantations, accompanied by several practices of exploitation of the local population, that is tax policies and labour deployment. Such exploitation caused riots and turmoils everywhere in almost all regions of North Halmahera. This event led to rebellion and wars which became a form of opposition to the colonial government's arrangement policies that suppressed and burden the lives of the local people.

Upon the first three contracts between Ternate and the Netherlands (1817, 1822, and 1824) following the end of British rule in Maluku, North Halmahera was apparently 'tied' to the Dutch colonial system. In general, there was no direct intervention by the Dutch before 1870 in this region. At that time, Ternate and Tidore Sultanates remained to possess their traditional power. As the government system changed from the traditional to the colonial, people in Halmahera were caught by these two forces.

This study uses historical methods including searching and collecting data both primary and secondary. Data collection is carried out in local, national, and international archival and library institutions, especially in the Netherlands. Field research was also carried out by observation and interviews with selected informants. All collected data was clarified with a number of criticisms both internal and external. The results of the analysis, verification, and critique of the data are then interpreted to provide an understanding of the historical events that occurred. Next is history writing for this scientific paper.

The temporal scope of the study is 1870-1909. The year 1870 was the year of the issuance of Agrarische Wet and landrente while the year 1909 was when a damar discussion was held in Morotai which decided that the Sultan of Ternate had traditionally no ownership rights and management of the damar forest growing in the mountains of Halmahera. Although in that period there were several popular resistance movements such as the people's resistance such as: the Jailolo Rebellion led by Dano Baba Hasan (1876) and Loloda popular resistance (1909) as discussed in several previous articles, the focus of the discussion in this article was limited to the period of the Kao and Galela (1904-1906).

In the early 20th century, the Dutch placed European officials in the Kao and Galela regions under the authority of civilian officials. At that time, Tobelo, Ibo, and Loloda were under the Jailolo *Posthouder*. As the

government arrangement ran more effectively, the Dutch expanded natural resources exploitation by controlling ownership rights and managing the potential of damar forest resources in these areas. The problem then is that along with the arrangement of territory, the Sultan of Ternate also took ownership rights over all regions in the same territory. To meet the economic needs of the arrangement, the colonial government made the tax sector to become the sources of income. Income tax, business tax, and the head tax levied to Europeans, while the natives were charged for the head tax. However, aside from tax obligations, people were also forced to do compulsory work for the benefit of the colonial government.

The exploitation of forest resources, mainly damar in North Halmahera was related to the enactment of Agrarian Law and Landreform (1870) by the Dutch Governor-General de Wall in Batavia in 1870. Although the available sources mentioned that the impact was not as significant as what was happening on Java Island, however, the two regulations apparently affected the granting of permits for the exploitation of forest and plantation lands as widely as possible to Dutch businessmen in Halmahera for the monopolistic exploitation of indigenous lands. Damar has become one of the lucrative export commodities for the colonial government that time. Through the system of capitalism and liberal economy they brought to North Maluku, the Dutch colonial government applied the concepts and theories of economic modernisation and global commerce.

The encounter between the Dutch with their modern economy of capitalism and liberalism and the indigenous population with their traditional, subsistence, and resistance towards money and market system has led to inevitable conflicts, both vertical and horizontal. Vertical conflict is characterised by the popular resistance against the colonial government and their policies. Horizontal conflict was marked by riots among people because of the provocation made by the colonial government to eliminate the dominance of the sultan over the damar exploitation. For example, the people's revolt in Kao, known as the Kao War led by Tomini and Kuabang in 1904. Similar events also occurred in Galela around 1906. One of the important issues that the rebels brought up was the arbitrariness of the colonial government in exploiting damar forests as well as tax collection and labor deployment. Such exploitative measures were contrary to mutual cooperation that constitutes the highly valued social cultural identity within North Halmaherans.

The resistance of North Halmaherans shows that the spirit of nationalism also grew outside Java, that is within communities of Kao and Galela districts, since the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Having such spirit to defend the territory and all natural resources, especially the damar forest, the rebels acted with the awareness that being North Halmaherans was their identity that also becomes part of the Indonesian identity under the same historical awareness.

The topic of this article appears due to studies on the history of popular resistance in Eastern Indonesia, including its role in the rise of Indonesian nationalism which has been neglected in the Indonesian history. The main problem raised in this article is the North Halmaherans' spirit of nationalism as a unified Moluccan identity, within the scope of Indonesian identity. This article aims to describe the revitalization of identity and the spirit of nationalism in the history of Maluku in Kao and Galela due to the political arrangement policy that correlates with the economic exploitation of damar forest as the source of income for the local community.

Keywords: Arrangement-Government-Exploitation-Resistance-Halmahera

Rethinking Nationalism In Indonesia Amid The Emerging Challenges of Regional Autonomy, Case Study: Loloda, North Maluku

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Indonesia is experiencing political upheavals, confrontations concerning divided identities. The problem of dividing identities is a direct threat to the nation’s philosophy of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, Unity in Diversity.

The pressure could further intensified within the coming presidential election, where polarizing identities clash. But before we claim Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is our lifeworld--our standpoint onto viewing the world, we must pose a critical question; what is Bhinneka Tunggal Ika? This question entails us to exercise more than descriptive approach to the national slogan. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika often recited but not truly understood by Indonesian.

Should we enter Indonesia through Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, the idea of Indonesia is not monolithic, most importantly in attempting to contextualize nationalism for Indonesian. It's not a simple loyalty to an absolute identity, it is more complex than that. Recognizing this layering complexity, there is a multitude of perspectives in understanding Indonesia. However, in reality, Indonesians fail to equally partake into this multitude of perspectives in Indonesia. One narrative to view Indonesia that is often neglected is the Eastern part narrative. Until today the Eastern part of Indonesia appears to be a remote, distanced area of Indonesia. Geographically, when we say the Eastern part of Indonesia is far, the problem of proximity is beyond actual distance, it involves mentality and even political attitude. Eastern part is considered as the outside, and only periphery to the central of Indonesia located in urban area, such as in DKI Jakarta.

The purpose of regional autonomy is to solve the palpable problem of inequality in Indonesia. During The New Order Regime, power is located in Java, symbolized by Soeharto with his centralistic administration. After Reformation, changes took place in particular to how power is distributed in the hope of achieving welfare. Upon various areas from the Eastern part of Indonesia, we will take our focus into North Maluku, specifically, the sub-district of Loloda. North Maluku was recognized as a province in 2000, following the spirit of regional autonomy, which aims to distribute the power to regulate and administer each region accordingly--depending on their different cultural, political and economical backgrounds. The formation of North Maluku cannot be separated from the incidents occurred in 1999 and 2000. The devastating civil war between Mollucan Moslems and Christians resulted in violent riots causing death to thousands of lives.

The recognition of North Maluku as a new district attempts to accelerate rehabilitation of the Eastern part of Indonesia. The new district is expected to regulate effectively, in order to empower people through bettering access to democracy; i.e. improvement in education, infrastructure and health. The important evaluating question is, how far has regional autonomy eradicate inequality? Returning to Loloda as our research focus, we can pierce into the issue to assess whether justice has been distributed fairly.

Loloda was once a great sultanate, prominent sovereign rich in culture, governing Halmahera and Morotai. However, we hardly hear about the greatness of Loloda in modern times. When speaking on matter of Mollucan Sultanate, we are familiar with *'Moloku Kie Raha'* kingdom alliance, consisted of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo. Based on interviews with several sources, there are two possible explanations on why Loloda faded from Mollucan history, first is the Moti Agreement, which excluded Loloda from the important territorial decision. Secondly, a dramatic rebellion to the Dutch colony in 1909, had resulted to the annihilation of the kingdom, and also banishment of the Lolodan Sultan. There have been attempts to excavate the ruins of Loloda Empire, through tracing written sources mentioning Loloda and the uprising that had took place which ensuing to the kingdom's silent, gradual demise.

This story has famously known amongst Lolodan people as *Kolano Madogaga*, or The Last King of Loloda. This oral tradition builds Lolodan identity as a collective consciousness. They are proud of their heritage, King Syamsudin as the last sultan, and also the courageous hero, Loloda royal navy commander Sikuru who led the revolt. Captain Sikuru as a hero, has been resurfacing as a discourse, reiterating how Lolodan fought back the cruel Dutch taxation and slavery in North Maluku.

The emergence of this long-lost heritage of Loloda has meanings beyond cultural resurrection, it connects to the people's political aspiration. Despite regional autonomy, and identification of North Maluku as a province, poverty persists in Eastern part of Indonesia, including in Loloda. This paper is the outcome of two years of in depth research in Loloda, spreading range of research disciplines from linguistic, history to philosophy. Apart from academic development, researchers involved in this project also consider ethical urgency to raise episteme regarding the Eastern part of Indonesia.

Community movements are rising in Loloda to advocate social justice. There are interesting phenomena happening, first is the appeal to make Loloda as a district (Kabupaten), able to create prosperous future as a district by producing policy aiming to produce welfare for Lolodan people. Loloda is eligible to be a district, with abundant natural resources, vast areas with large population. Another non-bureaucratic method the people currently conducting is recognizing the forgotten sultanate. The people of Loloda performed the ancient ritual of Kolano Madadi in 2017. The purpose of this ritual is to celebrate the return of the king. They officiated Kolano Loloda, believing that his reign will restore the greatness of Loloda.

These efforts are signs of distress and frustration for the mistreatment done by the provincial and local government. We must reformat our distinction of nationalism, leaving its merely procedural function in order to include the Eastern narrative of Indonesia. State has the imperative to be presence, protecting freedom and equality of the people. The philosopher Hannah Arendt (1945;1988) underlines the importance of public sphere, political recognition is the function of the society, where individual has a sense of belonging. The freedom of Loloda is still unrecognized by Indonesia, as they struggle to articulate their identity, and fighting poor livelihood. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and Pancasila as our philosophical guidance must rectify how discriminative and partially we have viewed Indonesia.

Keywords: Rethinking nationalism, North Maluku, regional autonomy, cultural politics, public sphere

Re-revealing the Presence of Afdeeling-B, 1919: Is It Really an Organ of Religious Radicalism in Sarekat Islam's Body?

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Introduction

In the history of Islamic civilization, the phenomenon of radicalism actually never ceased until nowadays. Discourse of the connection between religion (Islam) and radicalism (politics) at this time is increasing by intensity and even manifest into various policies by the power-holder with the character of Islamophobia. In 2018, at least there are bombings in three churches in Surabaya (Catholic Church of Santa Maria Tak Bercela, GKI Wonokromo and Pentakosta Central Church in Arjuno Street) by a family (13thof May 2018) and the police raid of Universitas Riau by presumption that the university is used by its students as the bomb-making place.

Radicalism is not an instant phenomenon; it overcomes a long-process with the supportive condition of society as its nursery. There are various terminology of radical namely from Esposito (1992), which tell us about the revivalism and activism of Islam; Fazlurrahman (1995) with his neorevivalism; and Engineer (2001) who are not agree if radical are to be synonymize with *Jihad*. By his statement, *Jihad* which is inherent to every Muslims is actually a struggle to the better life-state in every aspect –social, economics, politics and culture. Specifically it means as a struggle against self-desire.

This paper is a research output about the re-revealing of the presence of Sarekat Islam's *Afdeeling-B* with the aim to reveal its establishment process, member recruitment process, and its patterns and to re-think: Is there radicalism elements which wanted to make a revolt against the Dutch government? Who established it and where it was established? Is it true that *Afdeeling-B* had a solicitation that teaches radical Islamisation (Roy, 1994)? Is it true that *Afdeeling-B* is Sarekat Islam's *onderbouw*organization? If it is not, then why *Afdeeling-B* caused a culmination-point of SI in particular and nationalist movement in general? Moreover, How about *Afdeeling-B*'s recruitment process?

Methods

This research uses the historical perspective (descriptive-analytics) by the help of three primary newspaper sources. These three newspapers are three SI's primary newspapers which were published in major Javanese

city namely: *Neratja,*published in Jakarta under the lead of Haji Agus Salim; *Oetoesan Hindia,* published in Surabaya under the lead of Tjokrosoedarmo and Tjokrodanoeredjo; and *Kaoem Moeda*, published in Bandung under the lead of Wingya Disastra. These four persons who are in charge of these newspapers are all Local SI and CSI's influential members (Korver, 1985; Larson, 1990). Various primary newspaper sources in Dutch language also became the research's objects to make report comparison about *Afdeeling-B* so that the analysis will remain objective and not biased. These various newspapers namely: *Bataviaasche Nieuwsblaad, Soerabajaasche Handelsblaad*, *De Indische Gids* and *DeLocomotief*.

Meanwhile, to analyse the process of occurrence in Haji Hasan's social movement against Dutch colonial policy, we borrowed help from sociology discipline's theory of Neil Joseph Smelser with his Collective Behaviour Six Determinants Theory (Smelser, 1962). These six determinants namely: firstly about the structural conduciveness, secondly about the structural tension or escalation (structural strain), thirdly about the growth and spread of generalized belief or the presence of ideology, fourthly about the precipitating factor with the sign of leader's presence to support the movement, fifthly about the mobilization of participant for action and finally about the operation of sosial control.

Result

The primary finding of this study revealed that *Afdeeling-B* is not an organization established by Cokroaminoto, Sosrokardono or Semaun as it is circulated around the previous studies and personal websites. Moreover, many said that *Afdeeling-B*, in its development after 1919, is a continuity of Sarekat Islam Merah, which developed into Sarekat Rakyat and then became the embrio of Perserikatan Komunis Hindia –later to PKI, 1924(Niel, 1984; Suryanegara, 2009; Vlekke, 2008).

The finding of this research revealed that the founder of *Afdeeling-B* is Haji Ismail, a member of Sarekat Islam in Manonjaya. The second finding is that *Afdeeling-B* had neither connection to SI or CSI, because Cokroaminoto as the leader of SI had never recognized the establishment of *Afdeeling-B*. This paper's author is in different view with Robert van Niel (2009). Thirdly, two of CSI figures were brought to colonial court, while the founder of *Afdeeling-B* –Haji Ismail were never taken action by the Dutch and there is no continuation of Dutch investigation to Haji Adrai (Wanaraja Garut) and Haji Soelaeman (Ciawi) who actively sold *ajimat kekebalan* or invincibility amulet (*Bataviaasche Nieuwsblaad,* "De Garoet Complot, "25/07/1919, No. 386), especially when Haji Adrai allegedly escaped to Surabaya, Batavia and Singapore (*Kaoem Moeda*, 14/101920, No. 188 and *Neratja*, 27 Maret 1920, No. 61).

Discussion

From the above research, there are still unanswered research questions namely: firstly, why was the *Afdeeling-B* just came to publicly known by the Dutch government when the Haji Hasan Leles Cimareme Garut's revolt occurred in 1919? Secondly, is it true that Cokroaminoto as the leader of CSI were involved single-handedly by making use of *Afdeeling-B*? If Cokroaminoto really making use of *Afdeeling-B*, why was *Afdeeling-B* were not be used by Cokroaminoto since the beginning of its establishment to success the labor strike in *ondernemings*. Thirdly, why was *Afdeeling-B* labelled by radical movement? Meanwhile, Haji Ismail, the founder, said that Sarekat Jannah (1917) –called by Sosrokardono as *Afdeeling-B* in 1919, is a religious puritanitation movement, while CSI and Local Sarekat Islam is a socio-economics movement.

Conclusion

For experts, *Afdeeling-B* (originally Sarekat Jannah) remains a puritanization movement of religious or Islamic revivalism. In its development, when left-leaning factions (ISDV activists/sympathizers), began to gain entry into the CSI structure, they were able to influence Cokroaminoto's policies. Cokro's policies began to weaken, while the left-leaning group began successfully driving CSI policies. They are members of the group that exploits the *Afdeeling-B*, among them Sosrokardono (General Secretary of CSI which was originally from SI Lokal Semarang), Semaun (Head of Local SI Semarang), and Alimin (Chairman of Local SI Batavia).

Keywords: Afdeeling-B, IslamicRevivalism, Sarekat Islam, Haji Hasan, Garut

Self-Concept of National Identity: A Descriptive Study of Santri in Garut West Java

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Introduction

World Bank Summary Report 2016 stated that the world today is constantly facing challenging phenomena which comes in a quick way that never exist before, with a sheer complexity, including poverty and fragility and intergroup conflict. One of the many problems are religious radicalism and terrorism. Indonesia, has been targeted by terrorist attack. Sirozi (2005) said that Post-Suharto Indonesia has been a fertile ground for democratization and at the same time being a smooth target of radicalism, especially radical Islamic groups. Bear that in mind, moslems in various *mazhab* or trends accused or caught in hand as the perpetrator and agent of radicalization. *Pesantren* or traditional Islamic schools around Indonesia since long get affected of these repercussions of Islamic radicalization. Pesantren vis a vis a secular schools, focuses more on the needs to enhance an Islamic thoughts and way of life in these modern-lad values society.

This is a social psychology study with an identity perspective. In this case, we conduct research about national identity. In brief, national identity defined as a sense of belonging and identification with particular nation (Mavric, 2014). The theory derives from Tajfel and Turner's concept of social identity (1986). The theory elaborates social psychology of membership in a group and intergroup relations. When we talk about social identity, it deals with individual sense of self, and how the membership in a group determined and affects his or her behavior towards internal member of a group and external ones. National identity belongs to individual self-concept. Psychologically, self-concept comprises of several identities that has been determined or naturally inherited to individual, in terms of his or her social and cultural background. Self-concept delineates centrality of individual self, that has knowledge structure of his or her identity, attributes and traits and the inter linkages between components (for example, study from Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek & Mellott, 2002). National identity is an important component of individual self-concept, consists of cognitive, emotional, motivational aspects of identification and how an individual awareness of belongingness to a nation effecting his or her behavior.

The study explores self-concept of national identity, Indonesian National Identity, of a *santri* or *Pesantren* students. A *santri* spends years living and learning in a *Pesantren*, or usually called *mondok*. In many cases of suicide bomber, a *Jihadist* always questioned about where and how long he has conducted *mondok* in certain *Pesantren*. In other words, *Pesantren* perceived as having a significant role in developing religiosity among its students, and what kind of religiosity that implicated in his or her daily life, representing the Islamic values to the society as a whole. Leahy (2013) in his study about Islamic schools admitted the importance of studying Islamic schools (like *Pesantren*) nowadays. The sense of urgency of this study lies in the significance of exploring Indonesian National Identity as part of *santri*'s self-concept. Santri, a young generation of Islam, will be the bearer of future generation of Indonesia. In the future sense, santri will play leadership role and bringing this country to the next level of human well-being. That is why, this study is very important. Research questions here are:

How is the process of developing self-concept of Indonesian National Identity among Santri in designated area in Garut, West Java?

Method

The study conducted in qualitative approach, with basic descriptive qualitative design. Within the design, researchers collect data with in-depth interview and complete participant observation in Garut, West Java. We have 4 data sources or research subjects:

- Male, 23 years old and have been *mondok* around 8 years (FH)

- Male, 17 years old and have been *mondok* around 3 years (LK)
- Male, 18 years old and have been *mondok* around 2 years (CS)
- Male, 16 years old and have been *mondok* around 2 years (RS)

The designated *Pesantren* (named AH) is located in Desa Tarogong Kidul, Garut, West Java.

Findings

The study is still on process of continuous data collection and data analysis. Stage 1 findings showed that the four santri enjoys their stay during *mondok* in *Pesantren*. There they learn in a two-sided curriculum, an Islamic teachings and secular-scientific one. The most important findings are, first, the references of subjects are Al Quran and Prophet Muhammad's behavior (*sunnah*). Second, they have firm beliefs that Islamic values are against violence and discrimination. Third, subjects perceive Pancasila (The Five Principles underlying State Ideology in Indonesia) as a foundation for this country but should be subsumed under Islamic Law (Syariah Law). Within this schema, subjects refused to acknowledge that Pancasila is a guiding principle for the behavior of individuals. Four, they have pride as Indonesian youth, and this identity stays as strong as the identity as a moslem.

Discussion

So far, at the 1st stage of study, it has revealed that having Indonesian National Identity means a responsibility that has to be aligned with Islamic values. Responsibility refers to the state of balance between Islamic and secular values, with Islamic values at the top of cognitive schema or reference. *Pesantren*being in constant curiosity of how this educational institution develops religiosity as an important component in moslem's life. According to Social Identity Theory, subjects recognize the similarities altogether the differences that they have in their self-concept compared to other groups. National identity in the study develops during *mondok* and flourishes as a negotiable identity, it relates to other components of identity but Islamic identity being a standard of behavior. The most significant factors revealed during 1st stage analysis are, *Quran* and *Sunnah*, teacher's role and mixed self-concept.

Conclusion

I. Teachers in Pesantren, influences significantly the development of national identity in self-concept among *santri*.
II. The process flows along the years of *mondok* in *Pesantren.*
III. Self-concept of Indonesian national identity of a santri is a mixed and negotiable identity

Keywords: Self-concept, Indonesian national identity, santri, pesantren, Islamic values, Pancasila

Developing Social Resilience for Continuous Building of Nationalism in City of Batam, Indonesia

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Introduction

City of Batam in Riau Islands Province of Indonesia has been designed as a special modern international port

city since its preliminary development. Its location in the vicinity of Singapore and Johor Bahru, Malaysia gives another burden to this island city to show nationalism identity of being part of Indonesia. Clear and distinctive Indonesian nationalism should also be shown up in the border city along with global-multiculturalism that unavoidably attached with nature of an international port city. The tagline of the city, "building a port city with advanced society in terms of thinking, spirituality, and material wealth" or what is referred as *Bandar Madani* deals with sustainable development and society's resilience. This paper tries to argue that sustainable development leads to sustainable social resilience, and developing social resilience will lead to the required level of nationalism.

Methods

Mixed method analysis with case study approach is used in this research. The first step, the quantitative analysis is conducted to know the condition of development and how the community perceives the idea citizenship in local level, national level, as well as in international level. This survey is based on United Nations Sustainable Development Goals' Five Categories i.e. Planet, People, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership. This purposive sampling survey is gathered from 12 sub-districts administratively under City of Batam, targeted to residents between 15-65 years old, employed, and with at least junior high school education. This section is mainly to find out the attachment of City of Batam residents to the place where they are living in. The second step, the qualitative analysis is conducted to know the condition of social resilience. This analysis is based on opinion and inputs generated during the quantitative survey based on United Nations Sustainable Development Goals in conjunction with City Resilience Framework of Rockefeller Foundation. The third step is using case study approach that tries to define nationalism using synthesis analysis techniques based on literature reviews of journal articles gathered from the e-resources of Indonesian National Library within the time frame of 2013-2018. Using nationalism, social resilience, and development terminology as the key search term, the result is then reflected towards the analysis of the second step in order to map the typology of nationalism condition in the City of Batam.

Findings

The analysis from 110 sampling results gathered from purposive sampling survey deals with both quantitative and qualitative data based United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, shows a declining curve of development and this result indicates several unsustain condition in people, place, prosperity, peace and partnership development goal sections. From the quantitative data, the analysis findings show that 80% of respondents mentioned that sustainable consumption and production is considered as the most important, then environment health and degradation (58%) or supports for living and employment (76.25%). The survey findings show that access to a better living and social welfares as well as innovations will lead to sustainable consumption and production. From the second set of qualitative data, the analysis findings show that nationalism is not correlated with the place of living, since 72% of City of Batam residents show their attachment to the city and the island despite of their various original hometowns. In addition to that, the nature of Batam communities that are open to change and transformation may bring better living and social welfares, whereas their openness to innovations related to better physical and social development. Hence, nationalism means the efforts to achieve the same or better quality of life as the neighboring Singapore and Johor Bahru cities. The third analysis uses the synthesis from the gathered journal articles with variances keywords of nationalism, social resilience, and development that has listed 96 results by relevance. From these 96 results, there are several major terminologies emerged as best practices and lesson learnt such as community transformation and efforts, community resilience, security and justice, environmental governance, urban conflict management (including media literacy), and democratic stability.

Discussion

Social Resilience in Building Culture of Nationalism in City of Batam can be seen related with local, national, and regional issues, due to its geographic position. These three issues are interconnected; dynamics, and can have a very political nuance. Sustainable development, social resilience, and nationalism then can be seen in local, national, and regional level.

Locally, the grand idea is to build a port city with advanced society in terms of thinking, spirituality, and material wealth (Bandar Madani). Nationalism is interpreted related with maritime culture and prosperity generated from maritime industry. According to the journal synthesis, community transformation with sufficient efforts supported by good governance is the most applicable in building social resilience and the culture of nationalism. Based on the survey analyzed using structure-process-culture concept of the quality of socio-cultural life of Wirutomo (2014), industrial culture and island living has been immersed in the community. However, the community still waits for the guidance to do transformation and social changes in order to achieve prosperity generated by maritime industry. With 72% educated employable age representative of City of Batam community that are willing to stay in the island despite of economic downturn or other catastrophe and strive to do the best for the island and the community, as well as for Indonesia in general. In this case, the degree of nationalism can be considered is sufficient enough.

In the national level, nationalism is often discussed more on aspects of love for the country, patriotism, and being loyal to the country. For City of Batam's communities, nationalism does not have any correlation with obligation to stay in the country. Located in border area, with Singapore and Malaysia as neighbors, the geographical distance is shorter than to the central governance activities of Indonesia. Despite of better economic condition that offered overseas, City of Batam still have its own attachment and people are willing to serve for better development of their city.

Therefore, in the regional level, social resilience can be seen as striving efforts to match up with Singapore based on the opinion 85% of respondents, or to match up with Johor, Malaysia based on 62% of respondents. Beside the physical development, the most discussed issues in order to increase community resilience are security and justice, environmental governance for island development, as well as democratic stability with clear guidance of development policies from the central government. Nationalism is also being proud to be belonging to a certain nation, not only based on physical development but also by social development indicated by quality of socio-cultural life.

Conclusion

In the context of social resilience empowerment in order to build culture of nationalism in City of Batam, it shows that economic and political powers cannot be separated in the discussion of building nationalism culture. In this case, physical sustainable development has definite impacts on social resilience. On the other hand, developing social resilience is inline with building culture of nationalism in head-to-head competition, since a sense of nationalism based on national pride is built up by society's social resilience as well.

Keywords: social resilience, nationalism, culture, sustainable development

Synthesis of Islam and Democracy in the Context of Turkish Nationalism in the AKP Turkey Era

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The success story of *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP / Justice and Development Party) in 18 years governing Turkey since 2002 is a new history in the Republic of Turkey. Those domestic and international justification are strongly influenced by government performance and the formulation and solidification of nationalist hegemony of the AKP in Turkey. AKP has so far formulated nation, national history, homeland, and national interest. The synthesis of Islam and democracy in the Turkish context is not an easy matter. Islam and democracy do not easily build mutual relationships in Turkish secularism. To see this, Dankwart Rustow illustrates how the strategy of groups to survive, to execute non-confrontational, offense and hegemonic strategies with a background of national unity, the conflict of interest in the preparation period and the needs of the decision phase to complete the transition democracy. In that development, the AKP gave a special taste in

Turkey's political history. The party close to the Islamic but committed to liberal values and democratic reforms that encourage economic growth. The formulation of the AKP shows that not putting Turkish secularism as a serious threat to existence but as an opportunity to develop understanding under Islam is an entity embedded in every Türk.

Keywords: Turkey, Democracy, Islam, Nationalism, AKP

Introduction

The success story of *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP / Justice and Development Party) in 18 years governing Turkey since 2002 is a new history in the Republic of Turkey. The AKP's victory in since 2002 has sparked debate, controversy both inside and outside Turkey. Party victories with Islamic base power face the challenge of leading the government in a Turkey democratic and secular system (Alev, 2011).

This achievement can be seen from the development at the domestic level, and the international level. First, development at the domestic level especially in the 2002-2007 created a major leap, especially in the economic field. This condition is running in the presence of mega-projects that run up to the present time. Second, at the international level the AKP policy enhances Turkey's influence on a global level and coupled with the development of the Turkish Model in democratization in the Middle East countries especially after the Arab Spring. Turkey became a model in the Islamic World in general as a form of Islamic coexistence, secularism and democracy (Fuller 2014, Kirisci 2013).

This perception of Turkey that was conducted by TESEV, Istanbul in 2012 resulted 54% respondents in the Middle East chose Turkey as a political and economic model and followed by Saudi Arabia of 32%. (Barkley H.J, 2012). The popularity of Turkey increased because it successfully combines between politics and religion. (T.B. Park Kucukcan, M. Ayoob and T. Ozhan, 2011).

Those domestic and international justification are strongly influenced by government performance and the formulation and solidification of nationalist hegemony of the AKP in Turkey. AKP has so far formulated nation, national history, homeland, and national interest. These are implemented in domestic and international policies. The AKP nationalist policy is an integral part of the party's political discourse in constructing and consolidating the hegemony of ideology in Turkey.

Viewed in its history, the conception of AKP nationalism can not be separated from the relationship of Islam within the body of the AKP. Scholars analyzed that AKP rejected "*Islamist worldview which aims at islamicizing the society by using the coercive power of the state*" (Hale and Ozbudun). Hale also argued that the AKP as "*Muslim equivalent of conservative parties in western democracies*" (Hale, 2013). The AKP is not only "conservative-democratic" but secular.

The AKP is considered as a synthesis of the Turkish conservative line since the existence of the *Demokrat Partisi*, *Adalet Partisi*, *Anavatan Partisi* / ANAP, *Doğru Yol Partisi* and the Islamist line that could be seen since *Milli Selamet Partisi* era, *Milli Nizam Partisi*, *Refah Partisi*, up to *Fazilet Partisi* split into AKP and *Saadet Partisi*.

Methods

The synthesis of Islam and democracy in the Turkish context is not an easy matter. Islam and democracy do not easily build mutual relationships in Turkish secularism. To see this, Dankwart Rustow illustrates how the strategy of groups to survive, to execute non-confrontational, offense and hegemonic strategies with a background of national unity, the conflict of interest in the preparation period and the needs of the decision phase to complete the transition democracy.

In view of the development of the AKP, in this study will use the concept developed by Rustow. The dynamically developed model seeks to see the interaction between context and actor in some phases. First, the development of national unity as the background of any political actors who will contest. Second, the preparatory phase in which it will be strong with various conflicts of interest with the development of a new political framework that is more open to various actors with diversity of identity, ideology, and other interests.

The third phase, is the deciding phase. Rustow notes that "*political conflict is almost a requirement for a healthy regime transition*". The fourth phase, habituation stage which is shown by the actors who seek to live under democracy.

Discussions

AKP has the character of a combination of Turkish nationalism, Turkish traditional and Islamic values, and strong committed to technological modernization. Hale, rejects that AKP is a continuation of *Refah Partisi* which brings the ideology of National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) with an economic policy view based on Just Order (*Adil Düzen*). (Hale, 2013)

The AKP can be seen as a group that is able to consolidate between the forms of conservatism and the forms of liberalism especially in the political and economic fields. The orientation of AKP ideology is definitively closely related to its nationalism especially in relation to "Turkish nationality". In addition, this nationalism was formed from an understanding of nationalism in Turkish political history. However, AKP's nationalist conception rooted in Kemalist nationalism.

AKP perceives nationalism as ideological instrument of building hegemony in a social formation. Therefore, in modern Turkey, one important thing is how to keep Turkish nationalism in a good-proper place and how nationalism become the main spirit in the government. It is unlikely can survive in a long period of time if it is not because of their ability to formulate nationalism in Turkish policies.

The core of the nation is strongly associated with "Türk" and "Muslimhood". Islam is no longer a cultural component of Turkishness but is not necessarily derived from or instrumentalized for the idea of Turkishness. For AKP, Islam and Muslimhood are the core and integral elements of national identity that not need to be be synthesized in Turkishness.

Democracy in the history of Turkey especially in the AKP era did not work with linear. In 2003-2011 period can be regarded as "silent revolution" for Turkey. In this period, Turkey is seen to have reached a consolidated liberal democratic rule (Aydinli, 2011; Heper, 2011). Turkey has entered the era of advanced democracy (Davutoğlu, 2014). This condition is also fueled by a massive demonstration event in Istanbul's Gezi Park. The resistance movement of the pro-environment group transformed into an anti-government demonstration movement initiated by the left. The issue is also aggravated by the emergence of a corruption scandal, Ergenekon and Sledgehammer.

The pressure on democratic life in Turkey is also present from a series of acts of terrorism in Turkey conducted by the ISIS, PKK and DHKP-C groups and threats coming from the frontier region of the PKK affiliate PYD-YPG. In addition, there was also a form of resistance from the state bureaucracy and 2016 failed coup attempt by Fethullah Gülen's affiliate group.

Domestic political dynamics as well as security threats eventually spawned a number of non-popular policies: state of emergency conditions, clearance of Gülen sympathizers in military institutions, law enforcement, education, public services, non-profit and business sectors. The later criticisms for the AKP government are considered to be running Turkish authoritarianism. Despite these pressures, in the contestation of the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections of 2018, the AKP and President Erdoğan again won the contest with the achievement of a majority vote. This condition seems to answer the international public accusations of Turkish domestic conditions.

Findings

We see that in the last 18 years that Turkey experienced such extraordinary dynamics. The dynamics that hit both the domestic and the international side. The position of Turkey at the crossroads between Asia, Europe and Africa as well as its direct neighboring Middle East makes Turkey unavoidable in the various dynamics of the region. As a result, Turkey faces the complexity of regional security.

In that development, the AKP gave a special taste in Turkey's political history. The party close to the Islamic but committed to liberal values and democratic reforms that encourage economic growth. The image of "New Turkey" became an important force for Turkey's current ruling government with the Turkish vision of 2023 (*Hedef 2023*).

This image seeks to provide increased confidence and a new balance between Islam and the west. The ability of the AKP in its 18 years in power is how to combine Islam with democracy without losing the nuances of Turkish secularism. Turkey under the AKP is able to create a balance between security, democratization and economic development coupled with civilian control over the military. The existence of Islam itself is not like in the days before Erdogan or AKP where the relation of religion and state are in a strict pattern. Today, Turkey uses Islam in the "political-historical" language as a form of "justice" and "human rights".

This condition looks different from the Middle East countries such as post-Arab Spring. The political structure in Arab countries with the power of the status quo Baath-secular-authoritarian regime that switched into the semi-democratic regime with clear participation of Islam in its political process. This condition affects the dominance of Islamists in government or opposition where the visible centrality of Islam in government.

Conclusions

Associated with the Turkish constitution, it is clear that the Republic of Turkey is "Republican (*Cumhuriyeti*), Nationalist (*Milliyetçi*), Populist (*Halkçı*), Statis (*Devletçı*), Secular (*Laik*) and Revolutionary (*İnkilapcı*)." (Halil Erdemir, 2006) The model seen from the AKP in Turkish posture today is the form of "Islamic-Nationalism" (Alev, 2011) . The formulation of the AKP shows that not putting Turkish secularism as a serious threat to existence but as an opportunity to develop understanding under Islam is an entity embedded in every Türk.

Formal Government is Under the Influence of the Strong Man: Study on the Role of Zulkifli Nurdin Controlling Local Politics in Jambi Province

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This study will discuss strong man at the local level as well as their role in local politics in Jambi. Zulkifli Nurdin, former Governor of Jambi (1999-2010) is a strong local man in Jambi Province. Zulkfli succeeded in winning his biological son Zumi Zola as governor of Jambi in the 2015 election. Zulkifli also controls the National Mandate Party (PAN) he has supported since 1998 and became the main party of governor and governor of Jambi 2015, Zumi Zola - Fachrori Umar. In winning his biological child, Zulkifli Nurdin uses various means and utilizes all the resources for that victory.

The method in this research is qualitative method with case study approach where the timeframe to be studied is between 2014-2018 early. This research uses several theoretical perspectives to discuss the strength of Zulkifli Nurdin in controlling local politics in Jambi. The theory of local strong man from Migdal; patron-client theory from James C Scott; William Shadow State's Shadow State.

The study found some of them: firstly, as a local strongman and governor's father, Zulkifli was not only able to help his son's victory as governor and even influence the management of local government under the formal authority of the governor of Jambi. Secondly, with the power it possesses, although Zulkifli lacks any formal power, Zulkifli has managed to do many things by exploiting the weak state power (formal ruler). Zulkifli builds networks with relevant parties in formal and non-formal institutions; control government programs and projects; utilize electoral democracy to secure executive and legislative positions locally to their families, cronies and loyalists; and most importantly can arrange the governor of Jambi. Zulkifli Nurdin who is a local strongman in Jambi has an important position as a single patron can control the government through several clients who placed him in strategic positions in the government of Jambi Province. Thus Zulkifli has been transformed into a shadow state in Jambi Province and has a much stronger position than the formal ruler (Jambi governor). This study shows that shadow state theory, patron-client, and local strong man work in local politics in Indonesia. The findings in this study indicate that the role of shadow state in local government in Indonesia is influenced by the role run by state actors before the election of regional head is implemented.

They (shadow state) who have a large resource capable of influencing the election process and also able to control the government after the election.

Keywords: Local Strong man, Patron-Client, Political Dynasty, Shadow State, Jambi.

Personalised Politics of the Middle Class in Neo-liberal Indonesia: The Tension between Religious and Nationalist Politics in Response to A Hyper-globalised

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Introduction

In recent decades, what is termed as neo-liberal globalisation has affected and transformed global production and consumption around the world in complex and diverse ways. This transformation, of course, is uneven. Both post-industrial and industrial societies experienced tectonic shifts in the national labour markets, with some countries being buffered by government policies and others not. This has brought massive changes in industrial sectors, arguably most evident in rapid development of the service and information industries, which has also been related to rising instability in personal lives and careers, as well as growing tension in stress and anxiety (Beck, 2006; Neilson, 2015).

Some scholars have linked these times of uncertainty with rising populism in both established democracies such as the United States (Jessop, 2002) and United Kingdom (Jessop, 2017), as well as developing democracies in the Middle East and the Asian region (Hadiz, 2016; Mizuno and Phonpaichit, 2009; Mietzner, 2015). In the past decade, identity politics have polarised what used to be assumed as the moderate middle class voters which have in turn legitimised racist narratives among politicians. Indonesia, the largest democracy in the Asian region with a post-authoritarian and post-colonial past, identity politics have emerged in public spaces most notably during moments of high political pressures, namely the Elections. Thus, it is important to draw links between major socio-economic changes among Indonesia's middle class voters with the direction of political narratives. As such, this paper aims to explain the social precedence as to how this condition developed.

Method(s)

This paper applies meta-analysis of previous research and academic work on identity politics in Indonesia. I furthermore verify these findings by using secondary survey reports regarding the middle class. This paper is also informed by a survey conducted among 600 participants of the largest religiously-driven mass mobilisation in Indonesian history, namely the rally against Christian, Chinese former governor Basuki Tjahja Purnama or "Ahok" in 2016. This case was taken as a social event best in explaining identity politics neo-liberal times.

Findings

I found that the development towards social conservatism via identity politics is in fact counterintuitive to the more open markets aspired by neo-liberal globalisation. Hadiz (2018) has argued that Indonesia's "pendulum has now swung back in the direction of nationalism" (p.1), while Rosser (2018) explains this shift by emphasising on four main factors (p. 2-3). First is the vested interested of politico-business elites, the second is democratisation, the third is the need to diversify the economy away from natural resources, and the fourth is the discontent with the "unequalising effects of Indonesia's development trajectory over the past two decades" (Rosser, 2018, p.3).

Indonesia's narrow-minded response to global pressures – be it through foreign investment, international partnerships, democratic aspirations, and internationalisation – occurred within a context of "social dislocations … brought about by the advance of neoliberal globalisation" (Hadiz, 2018, p.1). The intense privatisation and commercialisation of public services (Rosser, 2018, p. 4) has resulted in feelings of alienation, which has led to overt nationalism being found appealing to those whose "upward social mobility and secure employment appear limited" (Hadiz and Rakhmani, 2017 in Hadiz, 2018, p. 3). In other words, any semblance of public participation that protests market effects are sociological responses to the increasingly insecure, rapidly changing socio-economic terrain the middle class must navigate. This is where the notion of personalised politics of the middle class becomes important.

Discussion

Thus, I argue that "neoliberalism" as a system of governmentality must primarily work on an individual level. Every person falling within the social category of the middle class, or approximately 20 million (Thapa, 2017) out of 66 million households (Euromonitor, 2017), comprise of people who regulate themselves according to market rationality. The country's steady rise in GDP per capita from USD 3,737 to USD 4,2727 between 2001 and 2012, with an average annual growth of 18 percent for consumer credit between 2004 to 2012 (World Bank, 2014, p. 34). This growth was accompanied with a rising divide. Between 2003 and 2010, the individual consumption of the richest 10 percent Indonesians grew at over 6 percent per year, but the poorest 40 percent grew only 2 percent (World Bank, 2016). While the middle class expanded from 25 percent to 45 percent between 1999 and 2010, the number of poor people only fell by 2 percent each year since 2002 (World Bank, 2016).

The rise of steady income has resulted in the development of a service industry such as privatised and commercialised real estate, tourism, restaurants, transport, communications, and financial services (World Bank, 2014, p. 34), which was a consequence of the flow of foreign investment into the country roughly since the 1990s. This has introduced the middle class with global brands and lifestyles, gradually introducing ideas of being part of a hyper-connected globalised world; and at the same time more distanced from the poor and working class. The service sector, through classification of leisure expenses that is market oriented, is heavily stratified. To take the example of shopping malls in capital city Jakarta. Upper class shopping malls in the business districts house high end products and fine dining restaurants. These spaces cater to the affluent middle class whose mobility are concentrated in Central Jakarta. Every stratification of the middle class builds a habitus of market-designed consumer experience that segregates them from the rest. This is true in the case of "halal consumerism" which segregates Muslims from heterogeneous Indonesians, as well as upper and lower middle class Muslims among themselves (Rakhmani, 2017). This consumerist middle class are those with high education, fluctuating income and insecure employment who envisions constraints in their upward social mobility (Hadiz & Rakhmani, 2018); to whom the notion of an ummah in which class differences are smoothed over is appealing.

The contending narrative for Islamic morality is one that aspires for pluralist national values (Rakhmani, 2016, pp. 195-200). These values had promoted ethnic and religious equality, as well as the unity of Indonesia which were inherited from the New Order nation-building projects via state curriculum and media. These institutions were once state apparatus designed by the authoritarian regime to construct ideals that unifies the plural nation, which had systematically marginalised indigenous social groups, domesticised women, and depoliticised the public. In the past three decades, these state institutions have gradually been privatised as self-funding and profit-seeking entities.

Conclusion

As a concluding remark, what we see today among the Indonesian middle class is a social condition in which politics are governed by market imperatives, where individuals—lacking in the support of trustworthy public institutions—are left to fend off for themselves. The atomisation of middle class leaves them with yearning of being part of a larger community, be it an ummah or a nation. Paradoxically, these imagined communities (Anderson, 1982) smooth over class differences and social inequality; leaving these cultural narratives vulnerable to manipulation during times of high political pressure. In short, the pluralist national values reproduced in a time of markets is problematic as it claims to defend the interest of the whole national

population. However, at the same time, it reproduces the exclusionary behaviour inevitable in consumerism; a condition that will continue as long as market imperatives prevail.

Keywords: Neo-liberalism, populism, identity politics, middle class, Indonesia

Corruption, Natural Disaster or Terrorism: Which is the Most Impactful as a National Security Threat?

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Every country has its strengths and weaknesses. The weakness that the other party exploits will be a national security threat to a country because it is related to the existence and ability to achieve the national goals. As Quiggin (2007: 24-29) states, threats are the potential of individuals or groups to commit (intentionally or unintentionally) actions that exploit the weaknesses of people or institutions. The national security threat is related to the condition of government and society, so its dimensions are greatly varied. Corruption symptoms, natural disasters and act of terrorism are a common national threat in emerging countries. Many governments have difficulty in formulating major threats, so they waste their national resources to deal with non-priority issues.

Meanwhile, national security is all measures and policies taken by the government to ensure the safety of it-self, the citizen and all subjects under his authority (Quiggin 2007: 7-10). Each country will define and guarantee its broad interests covering the political, military, economic, social and environmental aspects. There are number of critical elements of national security, but it is not easy to identify them. It will be tested the capability of the state to comprehend the real problems encountered, before setting policy priorities to deal with it.

The main function of the state (Fukuyama 2004) is to safeguard the territorial borders and provide the minimum requirement for the community within its territory. The economic function (i.e. creating public welfare) is now becoming more prominent. If a government succeeds in securing regional sovereignty and maintaining its political stability, but failing to meet the basic needs of its citizens, it is still considered to fail to meet its obligations.

Theoretically, perceptions about threats are influenced by two main factors (Garcia-Retamero etc 2012), namely asymmetric power relations and similarity of values between individuals, groups or countries. A realist or structuralist views threat perceptions emerging and can trigger conflict between different status groups and build unbalanced relationships. While the constructivist sees the threats that lead to conflict as a result of different of values and distrust between groups, so that the effort of value formation and group identity will decrease the perception of threat. At this point the national security enters a crucial stage.

Neumann (2018) traces the history of nationalism formation from the roots of diverse ethnicities. Nationalism becomes a shared identity that is built and maintained, while ethnicity is allowed to develop to strengthen the foundation of nationality. Ethnicity is a security issue when threatening national identity. So far there have been three mainstream approaches to explain national security (Hayatu 2017), namely: classical or traditional security, securitization approach, and human security. Besides the mainstream approach, a post-structuralist view emerged that saw the potential threat of the state to the civil liberty, as explained by Foucault and Buzan, where issues of corruption and terrorism became relevant.

In the context of a broad threat, we can examine whether the Indonesian government has a policy priority to deal with the problems it faces? Which of the three problems (corruption, natural disaster or terrorism) is considered a top priority, which is the most dangerous threat to national security, and how to cope with it?

The author argues, corruption is a more dangerous national threat, if not the most dangerous, compared to terrorism and natural disasters in the present. Because, corruption has a very large physical-material and

psychological-mental impact and attacks the control center of all governmental and social activities. Terrorism does generate public fear and insecurity for foreigners, as well as natural disasters causing damage to public infrastructure and social depression. However, corruption transcends all of that impact, generating a distrust of government officials and legal uncertainty. As a result of corruption, all actions and policies taken by the government will have no effect on changing the situation (see Table).

Table. Impact Comparison of Three Types of National Threat

No	Type of Threat	Governmental Impact	Societal Impact	International Impact
1.	Corruption	Increased inefficiency and mismanagement of public assets.	Incidence of distrust in government competence.	Increased unnecessary economic costs and loss of legal certainty.
2.	Natural Disaster	Destructive public infrastructure and crippling the process of public service.	Increased number of refugees and frustration due to physical pain and mental distress.	Increased insecurity and life's uncertainty due to unpredictable destruction.
3.	Terrorism	To undermine the authority of the government in maintaining security and tranquility.	Widespread mass fear and suspicion among community groups.	Growing unsafe perceptions for foreigners and threats to international facilities.

One country does not need to follow the policies of other countries to deal with their own national threats, as Charters (2003) correctly concludes when comparing the differing attitudes of the Canadian and US governments in dealing with the dangers of terrorism and other non-traditional threats. For Charters, attention is not directed to a direct frontal attack, but an asymmetric assault. The enemy no longer attacks the military power of a country, but makes the government powerless by mobilizing covert violence, corruption, and disruption in order to exploit the 'center of gravity' and 'critical infrastructure' of a state.

For Indonesia today, it is not terrorism or natural disasters that are the most dangerous national threats, but corruption that undermines all sectors of government and society. In the conditions of Indonesia experiencing a prolonged transition process since the 1998 reform, corruptors appear to be more dangerous than terrorists or environmental destructor, although we do not minimize the impact of terrorism and natural disasters. Because corruption is clearly the culprit and their motives to undermine the control center of government, while we cannot blame God in the event of a natural disaster.

This paper intends to investigate objectively the dangers of corruption, natural disasters and acts of terrorism in national realm, and then compare the impacts of the three types of hazards to the conditions of government and society. The author will use a qualitative approach by analyzing secondary data and news in the mass media, as well as determining some cases to be studied in detail. It would be more interesting to do quantitative comparison, but the authors do not do it because this qualitative approach will provide the foundation for further research.

In this research, corruption is defining as an act of enriching persons or groups by violating the law and abusing public authority (Klitgaard: 1988). Natural disasters are accidental or unintelligible events and cause a sudden destruction effect (Yamamura 2014). And acts of terrorism are defined as acts of violence intentionally committed by individuals or groups to spread fear in the community to achieve certain political goals (Ganor, 2004: 16-17).

A corruption-free government will be able to deal with the various forms of terror and disaster that afflict its people at any time, with minimal risk. A clean and authoritative government will also not use the means of terror to maintain its power and manipulate aid when disaster strikes.

Keywords: corruption, natural disaster, terrorism, national threat, comparative study.

Negotiating Identity in Transition Time: A Study case of Women Refugees in Roshan Learning Center in industrialised Jakarta

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Introductions

The number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) there are almost 25,4 million refugees and other internally displaced people (IDPs); among them 80 percent are women and their children. The agency mentioned, Indonesia hosts more than 14 thousand number of refugees whom are mostly coming from Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Somalia.

Indonesia, not yet ratifying the 1951 refugees convention and 1967 Protocol, however has a long tradition of opening up to refugees and asylum seekers. Along with recent Government Regulation No. 125/2016, the government shows commitment to protect both vulnerable groups. Nevertheless, this regulation may not specifically address problems faced by the refugees and asylum seekers in their transit time. At the end, the practice of "alienating" refugees and asylum seekers from the society are never discussed openly. The group remains 'exiled' in the sense of not being able to fully participate in the public life, could not work and their voices are barely heard.

Community based organization provides as safe space for women, children and adults refugees in Jakarta to negotiate their identity and contest the stereotypes and negative messages they receive in society. Roshan Learning Center is an example of community-led space serving asylum seekers and refugees located at Mampang Prapatan, the Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) (JAM). The members of the center are primarily Farsi-speaking groups come from Afghanistan and Iran. The center aims to provide children and youth with English classes, while also supporting parents and other adults through practical learning activities such as counseling, health clinics, preparing for a job search and computer use.

Community based organization for refugees represent important resources for a group of refugees to create a positive sense of themselves. Research suggests that women participations in a group activity is linked with an increase of interpersonal communication, self-concept, and stronger communal identity. This is to say, understanding how women refugees in Roshan Learning Center negotiate their identity when living in transition time in the most-packed and industrialized JMA becomes crucial.

The study laid itself out of previous research by Guererro and Tinkler in 2010 about how youth refugees negotiate their imagine and living identity in a photography-based education project in America and Colombia.

Method

The theoretical framework of this study is based on sociocultural theories of self and identity, which maintains that the construction of self is a process of identification that is dynamic, multiple and constructed through social interaction with others. Michael Hetch' the Communication Theory of Identity posits that communication constructs identity and is not simply vehicle for expressing cultural uniqueness. Communication helps builds, sustain and modify one's identity. In this sense, communication and identity is reciprocal.

Drawing from the Communication Theory of Identity this study uses in-depth interviews to seek out how five women refugees search for meaning and find their identity in the transition time.

Findings

Refugees women of Roshan Learning Centers negotiate their identity through communal experience.

Discussion

Identity has never been a static concept, it is negotiated between other people, culture as well as space. Through dialogue one can establish a sense of identity, that of herself and others.

Conclusion

Women identities in the transition time are in the process of reconstruction and renegotiation. By exploring the relationship among multiple identity through artifacts, spoken (interviews and observed conversations) narratives, this study makes visible ways in which displaced women reconstruct personal and cultural meaning. As part of practical suggestion, the study recall the needs to have more comprehensive solution in incorporating cross-cultural communication strategies into building a better sense of self and a identity among the women refugees of Roshan Learning Center, in their transition time.

Keywords: women refugees, identity, Roshan Learning Center, communication theory of identity

Identity Politics in the Design of Indonesian Constitution

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Introduction

While democracy has grown immensely as the world's most significant political system, it is now facing an era of recession. The cause thereof has been the subject of heated debates amongst expert, with some arguing that democracy fails when it becomes attached to election as opposed to government, and others claiming that societal social-political conditions caused it to fail. Yet, the root cause of such deterioration lies in the development of identity politics – a clash between universalism and particularism in a contemporary global setting (Benhabib, 2002, p. vii). Taking the form of populism, identity politics (Müller, 2016, p.1) has become a global phenomenon in virtually all country, including in Indonesia's present day political dynamic. After the 1998's collapse of New Order, the national identity embodied in Pancasila has gradually vanished and instead, replaced by a wave of identity politics e.g. regional identity, religion, and ethnicity (Nordholt, 2008, p. 2). This decline takes its toll in the unprecedented 2017 election of Jakarta regional heads, where for the first time, racial and religious issues were massively used as weapons to fuel public hatred against political opponents (Fealy, 2017, para. 2). Clearly, identity politics disrupts social cohesion and if left unremedied can very well become the downfall of a nation (Wiarda, 2014, p. 156). Consequently, this gives an alarming urgency to effectively regulate the matter as opposed to leaving it in an unattended vacuum. As a blank space can wound the public's sense of justice, this paper seeks to examine the design of the Indonesian constitution in regulating identity politics. Particularly, it will address how identity politics relate to the values of religion, ethnicity or localism in a constitutional state design.

Method

Generally, this paper is a normative legal research relying on literature. Based on the research questions however, this paper utilizes both the descriptive and instrumental approach. The descriptive approach is evident in how this paper elaborates the emergence, development, and arrangement of identity politics in Indonesia. Whereas, the instrumental approach is used in proposing an ideal constitutional design to address identity politics after making comparisons with the legal and factual circumstances in multiple countries. In this study, the author does not utilize all the known research approaches, but rather focusing only on the use of legal approaches, legal history and comparative approaches. The data collection is done by conducting document study, legal literature research, and in-depth interview – all of which classify as secondary data, normally used in normative juridical research.

Findings

There are multiple patterns of how constitution regulates the relationship between state and religion. In fact, Ran Hirschl (2010) named at least nine different models ranging from atheism to a mixed system of religious laws and general legal principles (p.26). There is however, one common thread: to create a conducive development for identity politics, identifying the specific characteristic of a community is a requisite. In all its four constitutions, Indonesia has always established a strong link between state and religion. In fact, the chapter on Religion was the one left intact throughout the constitutional reform period. As Indonesia's constitutional design conforms to the model of religious jurisdictional enclaves, (Hirschl, 2010, p.32) it grants religious autonomy to particular areas. It is the author's opinion that such model creates political uncertainty where identity politics does not have any clear role in the constitution, but becomes a tool for power-hungry politicians. Despite being implicitly present in the constitution, explicit regulation of identity politics is often deemed to be unattainable in today's political dynamic of pragmatism, flexibility, and opportunism that merely becomes "a political deal, not the political dream" (Aspinall, 2011, p.313). Nonetheless, in a community of diverse social components like Indonesia, the issue of identity politics is not confined to the minorities, but becomes the concern of majority as well. As such, it is reasonable to give vital positions in government to the majority without depriving the minority of autonomy in protecting their values.

Discussion

Vital positions should be held by the majority as the normative provisions in the constitution should reflect the daily reality of the political behavior of its citizens (Asshiddiqie, 2017. p.38). Such can be seen in the practice of Lebanon, Singapore, and Malaysia in addressing identity politics without derogating minorities' rights. For instance, Article 19B paragraph (1) of the Singapore Constitution states that "An election for the office of President is reserved for a community if no person belonging to that community has held the office of President for any of the 5 most recent terms of office of the President," referring to Malay, Indian, and Chinese community. Further, Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution reserves "Quotas in Respect of Services, Permits, etc. for Malays and Natives of any of the states of Sabah and Sarawak". These arrangements successfuly maintain national identity while still giving identity politics the appropriate space to grow as one of the driving force in politics. By contrast, Indonesia's only mention of the term "identity" in Article 28I paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution is not sufficient. Although Aspinall (2011) mentions that identity politics only culminate at the local level and can be handled with a network of cross-identity cooperation (p. 303), the issue has now threatened the foundation of Pancasila (Kompas.com, 17 Juli 2018) – thus, requiring a regulation to ascertain utilitarian justice. Therefore, to guarantee that political contestation in elections becomes a battle of ideas and not identity, identity politics should be regulated by giving criteria of Javanese-Muslim as President and non-Javanese- non-Muslim as Vice President. This proposal follows the successful model of Lebanon where identity politics are regulated by having Shiite Muslim parliamentarian, Maronite Christian presidency, and Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, while still protecting the minorities in light of Lijphart's consociational idea (1969).

Conclusion

Regulating identity politics while still protecting minorities' rights will guarantee legal certainty where ideas become the determinant factors to secure votes in political contestations.

Keywords: Identity politics, constitutional law, consociational

The big issues in Indonesian nationalism today are related to the term of transnationalism and globalization. Transnationalism, as defined by Basch et al (1994), is "a process by which migrants, through their daily life activities create social fields that cross national boundaries". We can think about transnationalism in two ways: transnationalism from above - corporations, transnational capital and global media, and transnationalism from below -the informal economy (remittances), the shadow economy (illicit, drugs, etc) and ethnic nationalism. The meaning of transnationalism is intertwined with globalization.

Today, no single country can make policy on its own irrespective of others. Every nation is linked to a global network; interrelations and inter-influence are transferred and adapted. Bilateral relationships between two countries cannot occur without considering the current global economy or geo-politics. Connections are also evidenced in the flows of goods, and humans and information have increasingly become mobilized across the world. Globalization has made the world busy and sometime hectic. Moreover, it does not only influence the macro level, but also the societal level, even at the level of families or institutions (Fukuyama, 2000). Shocks are experienced by people who do not anticipate or adapt to the huge changes caused by globalization (Toffler, 1970),and the clash of different cultures cannot be denied (Huntington, 1998). Digitalization as the latest technological development has been boosting transnationalism in the context of globalization and changed the mindset and habits of almost every individual, community and state policy.

Sub-themes of this panel are: the nation-state challenged by economic globalization, multi-lateral political agreements, and multiculturalism; the spread of identity and cultural models; the transfer of cultural practices, social cohesion and national integration; multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states; cross-border relationships, exchanges, affiliations (kin and social),loyalties- social formations spanning nation-state's, and non -government actors such as aid providers; diaspora and migrant transnationalism, and homeland-oriented political activity.

Nationalism and Globalization: Issues on the Sea Border between Indonesia and Australia in the Context of Maritime Sovereignty

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Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, once stated, "nationalism of the people of Indonesia would likely to flourish in the garden of internationalism", a quote that emphasize how closely related both words are, although it is often dichotomized as two separated concepts. Indonesia was once deemed as "the land below the wind", as Denys Lombard (1996) explained how the country was the island where history came across one another. Furthermore, it is Indonesian historian, A.B. Lapian (2011), who sought an addition to the character by emphasizing that the sea also holds the intersection of history.

So, what makes a country a nation? The answer is the interrelation amongst them. In the case of Indonesia, we had had our time as a colonial subject, long before we understand what it means to be a nation. Nevertheless, it would be fallacious to conclude that we earned nothing from the colonialism, since nationalism was a lesson learned from the practice of European colonialism by the young pundits, pioneering our own model of independence. Through their movement of thoughts, we can see how much of intellectuals they were, very keen on the concept of globalization of their time.

In the 4th paragraph of Indonesia's Constitution's Preamble, there is an obvious notion that independence wasn't only meant "to establish a self-determined government", but also "to engage in preserving world peace and social justice". Sukarno then redefined the meaning of nationalism as a nationhood of humanity,

culminated on the 2nd Principle of *Pancasila*, "A Just and Civilized Humanity". In this context, being a good neighbor is the prominent key to build strong partnership with other nations, knowing the fact that we don't get to choose our neighbors (Purnomo Yusgiantoro, 2009).

To give further consideration regarding the evolution of globalization and transnationalism, this research utilizes historical perspective to discuss relevant issues to be reflected into current situation and the future, with historical method and international relations approach as companions. The relevance of such research is equitable to Indonesian government's vision to be Global Maritime Fulcrum. However, we're outrageously prone to look inwardly on this relationship, neglecting the *raison d'être* of what it means to be partners. Issues of geopolitical struggle and the emergence of nonconventional maritime threats are becoming shared challenges and preposition toward sovereignty. Indonesia is just like an open door to such threats, including issues of illegal immigrants, human trafficking, terrorism, and smugglings.

Those threats mentioned above are quite sophisticated, especially when we're about to discuss the threats in the context of relation between Indonesia and Australia. Thus, this paper would analyze issues relating to the southern border of Indonesia, specifically on the eastern side of the country, regarding the illegal immigration. Such interventions had put Australia's multiculturalism on test when the country refused to process hundreds of Afghan refugees' temporary visa who put their lives on bargain from sailing across the Indian Ocean to Christmas Island, around 220 miles south of Java, Indonesia, late of August 2001. Australia's decision then triggered a quarrel, in which Indonesia presumed this action as an attempt of incrimination.

Australian Prime Minister at that time, John Howard, made it clear that the refusal was a mere governmental action, held by the coalition of Liberal-National Party of Australia who is known for despising manner toward immigration matter, though it is compulsory for Australia to give admission according to UN's 1951 Refugees Convention. Such cynical decision came up just after the outburst of Middle Eastern arrival-by-boats. It was believed that their arrivals were affecting the economic and political stability in the means of misspending the state budget and compromising domestic defense and security.

Taking a part in such regional matter, Indonesia was quick to carry out a humanitarian solution by offering assistance and persuading Australia to cooperate in eradicating syndicate of smugglers along the border, which are the main culprit of the substantial influx. Australia glossed over the offering, but robust with the idea of "paid partnership" by introducing its scheme on establishing Offshore Detention Centers (ODC) in the Pacific, with annual financial aid as the compensation.

It was more of an insult for Indonesian government. Australia then made an amendment to the Immigration Act by proposing Border Protection Bill to the Parliament. It was not that long before Pacific Solution was introduced, generating resentment from Indonesian Members of Parliament since the policy was very partial and interfering Indonesia's domestic affairs. It was a set of immigration policy that allowed Australia to restrict the admission of boat arrivals and categorize the passenger as illegal immigrants. There were two major options given to the passengers; boat interception and repatriation, or, detention at the ODCs on the Republic of Nauru and Manus Island of Papua New Guinea (PNG), two countries Australia had deals with.

These problems are going nowhere. In fact, it has been more complex since the war in the Middle East keeps on raging, up until now. Australia is still the most popular destination in the region, while ironically handing the responsibility over its Pacific neighbors and trapping Indonesia in a dilemmatic position between humanitarianism and transnationalism. Regional partnership is proven necessary for a better regional platform to avoid bigger migrant crisis in the Asia Pacific. It could be something similar to 2002's *Bali Process*, a forum concerning the practice of people smuggling and familiarizing the concept of burden sharing.

Australia often has significant leverages toward the situation going on in Eastern Indonesia. It could be traced back to the maritime networks in the past, branched out to PNG and the Pacific. It was another irony at that time when "the east" was considered as the outmost region, a rim left behind for the thriving "west". Thus, we need to put nationalism in Indonesia in this era to further observation, to eventually guarantee the implication of the 2nd Principle of Pancasila. Therefore, such issues should be considered as encouragements to develop maritime sovereignty. Moreover, Indonesia must be able to become a decent counterpart for Australia on encountering other unfortunate occurence in the future.

Keywords: Indo-Australia border sovereignty, intercultural relation approach, non-conventional threats, Tampa Asylum Seekers, the Bali Process

The Dynamic of Bilateral Relationship between the Republic of Indonesia-Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Field of Migrant Workers

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The bilateral relationship between The Republic of Indonesia (RI) and The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) face some serious challenges in economic and political fields. For example, there are so many Indonesian Migrant Workers (IMW) in Saudi Arabia who receiving some serious problems. These situations forced the Government of Indonesia to impose a moratorium policy for IMW, who work as domestic worker, to Saudi Arabia since seven years ago, 11-th August 2011.

Besides that, there is high gap between the total export value of Indonesia to Saudi Arabia, mainly dominated by non-oil and gas products, and the total import value from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, mainly the oil and gas products. These conditions cause Indonesia still not considered important by the KSA government.

This research aims to discuss the dynamics of bilateral relation between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia in economic and political fields. Especially, since the post-honorary visit of King Faisal until King Salman's honorary visit to Indonesia. Then, the analysis knifes which used in this research are the concept of interdependence from Umar Suryadi Bakri and the strong state theory from Francis Fukuyama.

Based on the data from Migrant Care Indonesia and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, a number of IMW have been executed by the death penalty in Saudi Arabia. Although the Indonesian government has imposed a moratorium policy of sending IMW in domestic sector to Saudi Arabia, the death penalty is still happened. All the victims of the death penalty are Ruyati in 2011, Siti Zainab and Karni binti Medi Tarsim in 2015, and also Mochammad Zaini Misrin Arsyad in 2018.

Based on data from Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), Indonesia is also continuously experiencing a deficit in import-export trade transactions with Saudi Arabia. Recorded in 2016, Indonesia experienced a trade deficit with Saudi Arabia as much as US $ 1.39 billion or around Rp 18.5 trillion. This deficit figure has increased compared with the year before in 2015 with deficit of US $ 1.36 billion. In 2016, the total value of Indonesia's exports to Saudi Arabia reached US $ 1.33 billion. In contrast, the total value of Indonesia's imports from Saudi Arabia actually reached US $ 3.42 billion.

Moreover, there is a span of 47 years between the honorary visit of King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz al Saud to Indonesia, on 10-13 June 1970, until the honorary visit of King Salman bin Abdul Aziz al Saud on 1-12 March 2017. Even the KSA government only put two attaches at the KSA Embassy in Jakarta, The Religious Affairs Attaché and The Military Affairs Attaché.

On the contrary, every President of RI had at least once official visit to Saudi Arabia. The RI government also put six attaches at the Embassy of RI in Riyadh: Attache of Politic, Attache of Defense, Attache of Manpower, Attache of Trade, Attache of Education, and Attache of Police. There is also Attache of Legal at the General Consulate of RI in Jeddah. These conditions make Indonesia consider Saudi Arabia as a very important country for its foreign policy.

The results of this study are also useful to evaluate the extent to which primordial factors, between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, play important role in strengthening the bilateral relationship of both countries. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and also the largest number of pilgrims (Hajj) in the world.

On the other side, Saudi Arabia is a country that serves two of the most sacred cities for Muslims around the world, Mecca al Mukarramah and Medina al Munawwarah. Even the KSA Government is one of the Middle Eastern countries who recognize the independence and sovereignty of Indonesia since the beginning, on the 8-th Muharram 1367 Hijriah (H) or 21-st November 1947.

During the hajj season of 2017, the total number of Hajj pilgrims from Indonesia amounts to 221,000 people. It is the symbol of Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world. Based on the 2010 Indonesian population census data published by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), it is noted that the number of Indonesian Muslim population is 207.176.162 inhabitants. This number reached 87.18 percent of the total population of Indonesia.

Furthermore, compared to the honorary visit of King Faisal 47 years ago, the honorary visit of King Salman in 2017, for 12 days, looked so spectacular. There are 25 princes of the royal family of KSA who followed this honorary visit, together with the other 14 ministers of KSA. In fact, the entire of King Salman's entourage in this visit amounted to 1.500 people, including journalists, entrepreneurs, interpreters, and other professional workers. In addition, this honorary visit also resulted in a number of agreements between the Government of RI and KSA. They are the signing of six Memorandums of Understanding (MoU), three Cooperation Programs, one Cooperation Agreement, and one Joint Declaration.

From those six MoU, one of them is the pledge from Government of KSA to contribute US $ 1 billion, through Saudi Fund, to finance some development projects in Indonesia. The Government of KSA also decided to include a worth US $ 6 oil refinery project in Indonesia. Besides that, there are transactions worth US $ 2.4 million which signed separately by business sector of private enterprises from Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.

Viewed from a geopolitical standpoint, RI and KSA positions are very strategic in its region, Indonesia in Southeast Asia and Saudi Arabia in West Asia or the Middle East. Both coutries are being very active in many international organizations such as United Nations (UN), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Asian African Conference (AAC), Non Alignment Movement (NAM), Asociation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF), and Group of 20 (G-20). RI and KSA also have no diplomatic relation with Israel. It happend since the zionist country invaded Palestine's and seized its independence and sovereignty.

Keywords: Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Billateral Relation, Muslim, Hajj, Attache

Nationalism and Integration: EU Narratives of Regionalism in Southeast Asia

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Introduction

From attempts at building support for integration, to convincing external actors of its role, place and influence, the European Union (EU) has endeavoured to construct, project and reformulate a range of strategic narratives. Academic and policy discussions on an EU narrative have proliferated. Among the EU's plethora of crises in recent years, including a rise in nationalist sentiment and populist parties, there has arguably been a 'crisis of narrative'. As such, in 2014, the European Commission stated that the EU needs to develop a 'comprehensive strategic narrative' that 'clearly articulate[s] what the Union wants to achieve, with whom as well as how when it enters the global scene' (European Commission, 2014: 5).

The EU's narratives have been identified as multiple (Manners and Murray, 2016). The EU itself has recognised this, and acknowledges that there is no EU 'grand strategy' (European Commission, 2014). This paper focuses on one such narrative – its policy of regionalism promotion to other regions, in this instance, to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This narrative is viewed as part of larger, wider EU narratives, including those based on the value and benefits of regional integration, and narratives of the EU's place in the world, where a rich set of literature over the years has explored to what extent and how the EU is a civilian (Duchêne, 1972), normative (Manners, 2002), responsible (Mayer and Vogt, 2006), ethical (Aggestam, 2008), market (Damro, 2012) and normal (Pacheco Pardo, 2012) power, among others.

There has been much debate on an EU 'model' (Breslin and Higgott, 2000; Jetschke, 2009; Wong, 2012; Börzel and Risse, 2012; Beeson and Stone, 2013; Acharya, 2016; Allison-Reumann and Murray, 2017a). Yet surprisingly, less attention has been given to the EU's longstanding aim to promote regionalism (some studies notwithstanding, see Allison, 2015; Murray, 2015; Chaban *et al.* 2015), despite its continuation as an integral part of the EU's external policies, and a main objective of the EU's 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS).

The key question guiding this study is whether the recent and current crises experienced by the EU, and Brexit in particular, have had an effect on this EU narrative. The EU is currently surrounded by crises. In addition to crises beyond its borders, within its member states populism, rising nationalist sentiment and illiberalism are present, and Brexit represents an unprecedented decision by an EU member state to exit the Union (Smith, 2017).

Methodology

This paper, drawing on a conceptual framework of strategic narratives, seeks to uncover how the EU's aim of regionalism promotion has experienced its own narrative changes over the course of the EU's relationship with ASEAN. Primarily, this paper focuses on how a narrative of regionalism promotion has been constructed by the EU, and how this narrative has evolved, and been received.

The paper covers the following sections: it first establishes a conceptual framework based on strategic narratives, explaining how the EU's promotion of regionalism relates to system, identity and issue narratives, and locates regionalism promotion within broader EU narratives, namely narratives that construct the EU as a certain type of power, and established European integration narratives of peace, security and reconciliation. Subsequently, the paper examines the evolution of the EU's regionalism promotion to ASEAN, drawing on the paper's conceptual framework.

The paper is primarily a desk study. In terms of narrative construction and projection, the paper focuses on EU official documents and speeches and statements by officials. Likewise, in analysing ASEAN's interpretation of, and response to, EU narratives, official outputs from ASEAN and its officials and leaders are examined. The conclusion summarises the main findings of the paper.

Findings and Discussion

The paper argues that the EU has moved from a narrative construction that emphasised a need to understand its own complexity and role, to a position of pride that placed too much emphasis on the EU's perceived successes, and not enough on the intended external beneficiaries of its narratives. Coinciding with the recent and ongoing wave of crises experienced by the EU, a tone of modesty has entered the EU's promotion of regionalism narrative. This modesty is also reflected in the EU's current emphasis on resilience – a concept the EU does not directly apply to regionalism promotion, but one, as will be shown in the paper, that resonates with the EU's current approach to ASEAN.

However, the paper also argues that while there appears to be evidence of narrative change that has coincided with the timing of recent crises, there is a need to be cautious not to assume causal links between crises, narrative construction, and narrative reception without evidence. In other words, we cannot be too quick to judge correlation as causation. There is a need to consider other factors, such as changes in the external environment and the perceptions, interpretations and objectives of other actors that influence the EU's narrative of regionalism promotion, and, importantly, how this narrative is received.

In terms of the EU's promotion of regionalism to ASEAN, the EU's narrative may have changed in response to the EU's experiences. However, Brexit and other crises associated with the EU have not had a significant impact on how the EU's narrative is received, or perceptions of the EU. This is because ASEAN's perceptions of the EU have not traditionally aligned with the EU's promotion of regionalism narrative. The EU's 'modest' and 'resilient' turn, however, may mean that further alignment may occur.

Conclusion

Misperceptions persist on both sides; and ASEAN perceptions of the EU and its narratives continue to differ from the narratives constructed by the EU – a narrative projection-reception schism prevails. Debates on the EU as a model and a source of emulation endure, and increased understanding between the two is imperative. Yet a modest turn in the EU's narrative may start to see some of these issues slowly be resolved.

While the EU's crises may have seen a change of EU narrative, they have had less impact on how ASEAN views the EU, given the persistent skepticism in Asia about the EU's approach to regionalism (Allison-

Reumann and Murray, 2017b). Brexit will likely trigger a consolidation of ASEAN perceptions rather than a dramatic shift. It has been argued that the EU has privileged its own experience of integration above other regions, and that this has meant that ASEAN interlocutors have been reluctant to accord recognition to many of the EU's achievements (Murray, 2015: 244). It is also the case that ASEAN is not substantially affected by the EU's failures, crises or tensions.

Keywords: EU; ASEAN; Nationalism; Regionalism; Interregionalism; Brexit; Narratives

Shi'ite Islam, Nationalism and Transnationalism: An Analysis on Twelver Shi'ite Islam in Indonesia

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When Muhammad died, first political dispute was about whether the right to lead was *Muhajirin* or *Ansar*. This political debate then propagated to kinship problem so that when Mu'awiyyah bin Abu Sufyan became Caliph replacing Ali and then appoint his son, Yazid, there was a dispute between the Umayyads and Ahlul Bait of Prophet Muhammad. Those who are faithful to Ahlul Bait of the Prophet are then known as Shi'ites. Today, the majority of Shi'ites is Imamiyah (Twelver). This Shi'ite school continues to flourish and survive. Currently, Imami Shi'ites led by *na'ib* who is also called *wliayatul faqih*. The idea of *wilayatul faqih* was initiated by Musavi Khomeini (Imam Khomeini) in replacing the ideology that the Pahlavi had long held for a long time. Since Iranian Revolution of 1979, using *wilayatul faqih*, Khomeini has succeeded in applying Islamic system into state territory and transformed Persia Pahlavi into Islamic Republic of Iran.

The influence of *wilayatul faqih* is global and universal so that raises transnationalism in Shi'ite Islam especially Imami Shi'ite. There is no exception in Indonesia. In the Middle East, the influence of *wilayatul faqih* transnationalism is highly visible in Lebanese territory, namely with a party called Hezbollah. The party contains a Shiite majority and is led by Shi'ite clerics. Their loyalty was first addressed to God, Prophet Muhammad, the *imams* and the *na'ib* who is currently *wliayatul faqih* and the *supreme leader of* Iran (Khomeini and his successor, Ali Khamenei). In Indonesia, the influence of transnationalism of *wilayatul faqih* is seen with the founding of Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) in Pejaten, Jakarta. The ICC is believed to have direct funding from the Iranian government in "spreading" Shia ideas and Islamic politics and Islamic version of Imami Shi'ite. From this ICC also grow two major Syiah organizations in Indonesia named *Ahlul Bait Indonesia* (ABI) and *Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia* (IJABI). The two are different but remain fixated on the *fatwa wilayatul faqih* that resides in Iran today. The above background triggered the author in conducting research related to Shia Islam and its relation to nationalism as well as transnationalism.

The research method used in this research is descriptive-analytic method, especially using the method of deconstruction version of Muhammad 'Abed Al-Jabiri. This method seeks to describe the culture of thought in Arab Islam especially through the division of three epistemologies, namely *bayan, burhan*and *irfan*. Using these three epistemologies, the authors will describe and analyze how Imami Shi'ite in viewing political and religious issues simultaneously. By using the above method also the author finds that since ancient times, Shi'ite Islam has put forward the name of nationalism and transnationalism simultaneously through the doctrine of *Imamat* and *wilayah*. No exception to what happened to Shia Islam in Indonesia, especially the Shia Imami Islam.

Shia is one of the most unique sects in Islam. The uniqueness of Shias is evident from the fusion of their *kalam* and juridical ideas with their political ideas. They consider recognizing the right of *imam's* leadership, which in fact the legitimate successor of Prophet Muhammad is part of the faith and. It is also seen from the jurisprudence of those who assume that *khums* is a duty other than zakat. *Khums*, which is

the right of Allah, the Prophet and the Ahlul Baitnya, must be issued as much as 20% every year. *Imamat* and *wilayah* are part of their Pillars of Faith and Pillars of Islam. *Imamah* assumes that Allah and Prophet Muhammad have appointed the successor of the Prophet Muhammad either in the Qur'an or in the Sunnah and the substitute is the Ahlul Bait Muhammad of the descendants of 'Ali and Fatima Az-Zahra. Imami Shi'ites has 12 *imams*. The 12th Imam in Imami Shi'ite named Imam Muhammad Al-Mahdi bin Hasan Al-Askari and is currently in occultation that makes the Imami Shi'a trust the *raj'ah* . When Imam Al-Mahdi is unseen, power is given to the *na'ib*s. The number of first *na'ib* was four who then continued to circle among the Imami Shi'ite clerics.

In Indonesia, Shi'ite Islam especially Imami Shiites also declare their loyalty to the *wilayatul faqih* in Iran. Indeed, in Imamiyyah doctrine, anyone who has got *marja'* title, his *fatwa* can be followed but not as necessary as *na'ib*. *Na'ib* is the highest cleric who must be followed because he is a substitute for Imam Mahdi in still unseen. This proof of loyalty can be proven from one of Khomeini's *fatwa*, which is obliged to carry out Al-Quds Day every last Friday of Ramadan to enforce Palestinian independence from Zionist Israel. Indeed Al -Quds Day is not only implemented by Indonesian Shi'ite Muslim, it's just that, for Indonesia Shi'ite Muslim, this *fatwa* is obligatory because it has been emphasized by Khomeini and continued by *fatwa* of Ali Khamenei. In addition, with ICC funded by Iran also shows the transnationalism of Shi'ite Iranian Islam. Often, in major Shia Islam events, the ICC sent several Iran-Iraq scholars to preach his message regarding the application of the struggles of their martyrs (*imams*). In addition, ICC also provides many scholarships for those who wish to continue their studies in Iran such as Qom and Tehran. However, despite transnationalism, Shi'ite Islam continues to uphold nationalism. Indonesian Shia Muslims remain loyal to Indonesia because there is *fatwa* of *na'ib* which obliges every Shi'ite Muslim around the world to follow the provisions of the law agreed upon their nation.

The above discussion shows that not only Sunni Islam which having the idea of transnationalism and nationalism, but Shi'ite Islam has, since then until now has the doctrine of transnationalism and nationalism which the writers say is more organized because they have the doctrine of putting their loyalty to the *imams* and the *na'ib imams* during the occultation. This loyalty is not only happening in the international world, but also in Indonesia, the Shi'ite Muslim is also obliged to put their loyalty to the *na'ib* but also keep their loyalty to Indonesia

Keywords: Nationalism, transnationalism, Twelver Shi'ite, wilayatul faqih, Indonesia

The Role of the Korean Ethnic Church in Diaspora Transnational Advocacy Networks

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Introduction

The intricacies of diaspora transnational political activism have been discussed by Bauböck (2003) and Østergaard-Nielsen (2003); others have examined the impact of transnational religious institutions on diaspora (Hagan & Ebaugh, 2003; Levitt, 2004). However, not much research has had direct focus on how diaspora religious institutions impact diaspora transnational politics. This study argues that the former are capable of being actors and facilitators in the latter based on investigation of the Korean ethnic church.

Three cases of transnational political activism by Korean diaspora are explored: irregular migration, external voting, and contentious politics. The Korean ethnic church is shown to have played significant roles in each. By analyzing cases with Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) theory (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), this study finds that the resources and capacities of Korean ethnic churches enable them to participate in various forms of political activism and facilitate transnational politics for Korean diaspora.

Methods

This study explores how Korean ethnic churches influence participation of Korean diaspora in transnational politics, what role they play within TANs of Korean diaspora, and how they are mobilized for transnational advocacy. To answer these questions, this study conducts a qualitative multiple case study on three advocacy networks. Specific cases are: (1) the Sanctuary Church Network for protecting undocumented immigrants from the Trump administration; (2) attempts to encourage external voting and voter registration among overseas Korean citizens; and (3) declarations on state of affairs by Korean diaspora religious leaders during the Geun-hye Park and Soon-sil Choi scandal. For each case, secondary data was collected and analyzed in advance to interviewing informants. Informants, seven in all, were selected with the aim of gaining multiple perspectives and clarifying areas of interest gleaned from secondary data. Due to geographical constraints, all interviews were conducted via email.

Data was analyzed based on the TAN approach by Keck and Sikkink (1998), chosen because it provides a comprehensive and widely recognized tool for investigating transnational political activism by non-state actors; thus, a good fit for exploring the political potential of Korean ethnic churches. Each case was analyzed on three points: identity, emergence, and operation. The first, identity, considered whether the case exhibited characteristics of a TAN: non-state actors playing prominent roles in networks built upon certain norms, beliefs, or ideas. The second, emergence, analyzed political entrepreneurs, political opportunity structures, and other incentives for mobilization (Tarrow, 2011). The final, operation, examined political strategies utilized by actors in each case.

Findings

In all three cases, the Korean ethnic church was found to have featured prominently in transnational diaspora politics. Results are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary of Results

Case Analysis	Sanctuary Church Network	External Voting	Declarations on State of Affairs
Key Actors	KACE lawyers Sanctuary Churches	NEC officials	Diaspora clergy
Advocacy Goals	Protection of vulnerable immigrants	Increase external voter turnout and voter registration rates	President Park's resignation (declarations as method of contentious politics)
Networking	Political entrepreneurs' recognition of effectiveness of networking to provide better protection for immigrants	Political entrepreneurs' recognition of effectiveness of networking to persuade potential voters	Networking as prerequirement of declarations
Capacity and Role of Korean Ethnic Church	Values, resources, social symbolism: social outreach and physical shelter	Diaspora community center: influential actor leveraged by NEC / voluntary advocacy	Alternative political identity
Emergence of Network	Response to Trump administration policies; Church beliefs and status of Korean ethnic churches	External voting still unfamiliar; Low external voter turnout	Response to Park-Choi scandal; Desire to express political identities as religious Korean diaspora
Operation Tactics	Frame construction Information politics Symbolic politics Boomerang pattern	Leverage politics Information politics	Frame construction Accountability politics Information + Symbolic politics

Discussion

Several points of interest emerged from the data. First, the Sanctuary Church Network exhibited a unique twist to the boomerang pattern. As minorities in a developed country, actors in the Sanctuary Church Network turn to the power of media and the social symbolism of churches to deter immigration officials. This twist questions the traditional boomerang pattern in TAN theory, which has been criticized for overrating the extent to which 'developed' countries' actors come to the assistance of 'developing' countries' actors (Bassano, 2014).

Second, officials from Korea's National Election Commission (NEC) were prominent in the external election case due to the information imbalance and relative unfamiliarity of external voting. However, they actively solicited assistance from nongovernmental actors perceived to be particularly influential within the Korean diaspora community – Korean ethnic churches were among this category. In fact, this case provides an example of government actors engaging with diaspora without the goal of exploiting them as tools of foreign policy.

Third, the declarations case provides an empirical example for Shain and Barth's (2003) argument about how researching diaspora political activism can support the Constructivist agenda on the importance of identity. Among a multitude of possible political identities, the Korean ethnic church provided an option which resonated strongly enough with religious diaspora in this case that it resulted in their mobilization.

Conclusion

This study describes various forms of transnational political activism by the Korean ethnic church. It also highlights diverse capacities of the Korean ethnic church in facilitating political participation by Korean diaspora. Concerning mobilization of Korean ethnic churches, this study supports Østergaard-Nielsen's (2003) ideas about which topics usually mobilize diaspora. On the other hand, the results provide little evidence for the argument that advocacy networks are more likely to emerge when vulnerable individuals face bodily harm (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). This study provides empirical evidence that while not often the main focus of studies on transnational activism, researching diaspora religious institutions can contribute to the body of knowledge on diaspora activism and transnational politics. In future research, it would be interesting to consider how citizenship situations of a diaspora activist group or diaspora religious institution can influence their identities, chosen political tactics, and standpoints.

Keywords: diaspora politics; immigrants; diaspora religious institutions; transnational advocacy networks

Embracing Digital Economy on Millenial Society The Next Social Changing in Indonesia

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Introduction

The 21st century is defined as a digital era which is messy of inter-change information all over the world. News, story, discourse, history, promotion, economic transaction and even hoax are the content of society interaction in every hour, every minute or may be every second. Communication through personal computer, mobile computer or smartphone is a common not only for urban but also for rural citizens. The rise of information technology usage remarkably in the last of one decade is believed as a major caused of social

transformation. The former definition of society which required face to face meeting or bounding by geographic area is replaced by the term of netizen – society is based on internet network.

In 2016, 85% of households in the EU had access to the internet, compared with 70% in 2010. But, this share was slightly higher for households in urban areas (88 %) than in rural areas (80%). Among the 15% of households without internet access, the two main reasons for not having access were that the internet was not considered to be useful (47%) and that the people concerned lacked the necessary skills (42%). In 2016, most households (83%) had a broadband internet connection. The share of households with fixed broadband rose from 57% in 2010 to 74% in 2016. During the same period, the percentage of households with a mobile broadband connection via a mobile phone network quadrupled from 10% to 41%. 8 out of 10 EU internet users go online with a mobile phone

Online shopping is rising gradually and becoming a popular mode of transaction. 7 out of 10 EU businesses use mobile broadband. People do not need to visit a mall or shopping center to buy something. They just switch on their computer or even mobile phone only to browse the internet and find anything attractive in various brand, mode, price and other product attributes. Even to get food people more familiar with delivery order and do not need to spend their effort to go to the restaurant. Paper money could be replaced by electronic money to pay any invoices; house, car, cloth, food, toys, amusement, transportation and even an ice cream.

Regarding this shifting, people adapt new lifestyle and changing their behavior. A man should get involve or he will be vanished. (Fukuyama; 1992; Toynbee 1948). At the same time state institution and business organization are running to clasp it or they are going get shrinking. to nature and strategy should be changed and follow the flow of global changing.

We could be summarized those as the changing of social milieu which includes the nature of economic transaction, the nature of human life style. The consequences of it people there is a changing of social life style regarding the information technology, selfie and shared picture are becoming trend. Many of netizens like to expose their picture in front of prestige or memorable background.

Method

This paper based on the desk research regarding news, scientific publication and academic article. The data were collected and analyze through mix methods; quantitative and qualitative approach. The triangulation process has been conducted to find accurate information before they would be further analyzed.

Finding

Indonesian internet users are growing dramatically and will become the largest digital market in Southeast Asia in 2020. In 2015 internet users in Indonesia reached 93.4 million users (47.9% of the population) will continue to grow until 2019 which is predicted to reach 133.5 million users and in 2020 will be reached 140 million users. This is a fantastic growth. (Alvara Research, 2016)

At least there are three changings appear regarding this phenomenon; the transformation of society life style and social culture, the changing of business way, and the clumsy response of government institution. The interaction among people are very hectic in quantity and quality as well. It has created the new way, new habits and culture of course. The new symbol and could be new language is coming: emoji.

The shock of city transportation business particularly taxi and microbus which are attacked by on-line transportation, the closing of giant shopping centers replaced by on line shop, newspaper replaced by online media and the rise of new kind of business substituting the existing established companies. Sharing economy has been changed the nature of business and the way of consumer behavior (Walker 2015). The closing of retail industry Ramayana, Matahari, Lotus and Debenham close many outlets. Even, Modern Seven-Eleven Indonesia (MSI) at the of 2017 has withdrawn their business. Meanwhile online shopping center are rising such as Buka Lapak, mobil 123, traveloka, Air BNB, Tokopedia, Blibli, Elzatta, Zalora and others.

Meanwhile, government which is tied closely with regulation and bureaucracy is trying to catch up any huge the changing. However, many regulations do not facilitate the public needs, such as permission the current public transportation regulation is for four-wheel vehicle or more only. However, the growing of application using, several motorcycles become public transportation (Ojek on-line) which are litter the road and street not

only in big cities, but also operated in towns. In 2017, several clash among society were happens in some cities and area in Java island, Sumatera and Sulawesi as well.

Discussion

Brette, Olivier and Bruno Moriset (2009) in their research for several years argued about the era of information technology: First, technological devices should be linked to the economic agents who use them and to their own strategies in terms of geographical mobility, notably in innovative, high value-added activities. In other words, besides technology, it is necessary to take into account the geography of labor imperatives, and its social foundations in the analysis Second, we should acknowledge that the "digital revolution" is probably far from having produced its full effect, given that the commoditization of key technologies, such as broadband Internet connections, is very recent, even in the most developed countries. Moreover, ceteris paribus, the decline of face-to-face practices is bound to be a slow, path-dependent social process.

The way of economy activities is not related to the way of transaction. There are several concept regarding it: sharing economy (Edward, 2009), the role of social network (Granovetter, 2011), experiential consumption (Holbrook 2015), conspicuous consumption (dagupta, 2009), and disruptive innovation (Christensen 2015).

As Castell (2010) predicted that a new society emerges when and if a structural transformation can be observed in the relationships of production, in the relationships of power, and in the relationships of experience. These transformations lead to an equally substantial modification of social forms of space and time, and to the emergence of a new culture.

Conclusion

Globalization era which has been happened since 4 decades is boosting by the information technology. Knowledge, skill, and social relationship are sharing, inter-changing, re-organizing and even recreating through internet. So that, this moment, we can say that social interaction is based on the communication through digital network and It has created a digital society. Social transformation should be anticipated by government, society, and family through accelerated learning and oriented to the continuous changing in all aspect of life.

Keywords: Digital economy, millennial society, social transformation, lifestyle

Millennials' Perspectives on Transnationalism, Globalization and Nationalism in the Jabodetabek Area

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Introduction

At the moment the situation among Indonesian youth depicts how the so-called Indonesian demographic bonus can constitute as constraint or as enabler to the formation of Millennials' Perspectives on Transnationalism, Globalization and Nationalism in Indonesia. At this juncture of my research up to 2018 the Indonesian youths living in the Jabodetabek area seems to have positive perceptions of domestic and international politics.

Methods

The 2018 research on Jabodetabek millennials sense of patriotism uses a Linkert Scale giving weight to each answer "0" for not at all agree "1" for disagree (TS) "2" for neutral (N) "3" for agree (S) and "4" for highly agree (SS). Average score is derived from the division of of maximum total numbers (multiplying total respondent with highest score with the aggregate from each choice (which has been multiplied by the weight) and multiplied by 100%

Y=() (STS)+1(TS)=2(N)+3(S)+4(SS))/(4*Total Sample)

> A Linkert scale is a psychometric scale commonly involved in research that employs questionnaires. It is the most widely used approach to scaling responses in survey research. Linkert scales generally range between three and seven points but can be bigger.
>
> In this research '0' means (highly disagree); '1' means (disagree); '2' means (neutral); '3' means (agree); '4' means (highly agree). Average total score is the percentage that derived from dividing the total of the maximum number which managed to result in the research (multiplying the total number of respondents with the highest score of '4') with the aggregate of each of the choice of answers and then multiplying it by 100%.
>
> Y=() (STS)+1(TS)=2(N)+3(S)+4(SS))/(4*Total Sample)

Findings

I investigated the issue of patriotism instead of nationalism in exploring their perspectives on transnationalism, globalization and nationalism as it will clearly measure specifically self-proclaimed response and concepts of national identity, symbolic patriotism, national pride, constructive patriotism, blind/uncritical patriotism, and nationalism (Huddy and Nadia 2007).

My research revealed how in 2017 the Indonesian millennials living in the Jabodetabek area have a very negative opinion of politics in general, but then there was a shift in 2018, these millennials seem to have a more positive perceptions of domestic politics. It was the public mood in an unsettled culture of 2016-2017 determined their opinion and action (Ringmar, 2017).

With regard to political climate, the first element has to do with judgments about the balance of political forces, and the second element with ideas. There is an intellectual atmosphere as well as a political atmosphere and the former may become the latter (King, 1983). The conflict occurring in the 2016-2017 seems to have created public mood that first has a negative view of the political realm and the intellectual outcome of the unrest seems to redirect the millennials view of their sense of patriotism.

Discussion

I was intrigued by the notion stated by Joshua Barker and Gerry van Klinken who quoted Philip Abrams

"The state then, is not an object akin to the human ear. Nor is it a third-order object, an ideological project." He proposed making a distinction between studying the "state system" and the "state idea." The state system is a cluster of institutions that exert political and executive control, and their key personnel. Questions about the state-system and the state idea relate to each other, and how they relate as an ensemble to other forces and elements in society, should produce insights into the actual disunity of the state.

In terms of the state idea is the image that the state projects about itself (van Klinken and Barker, 2009). That is an imagined construction, and studying it should be an exercise in unmasking an ideology (van Klinken and Barker, 2009). According to van Klinken and Barker, they have adopted Joel Migdal's phrase "state-in-society," and that the state's social embeddedness has patron-client features; the social bases in which the state is embedded are quite wide, but the state as a network is not embedded in all places and social formations" (van Klinken and Barker, 2009).

Conclusion

Based on my research millennials in the Jabodetabek area show a high level of patriotism by using two measurements model, the first is the self-proclaimed response and second, the concept of national identity.

This clearly shows the Jabodetabek area youths did not just value symbolic patriotism, but also seems to be interested in giving substance to attempts that aim to reach the goals of the nation. The majority of the millennials thought about the development models that are based on universal values and emphasized on issues of human resources development.

Keywords: Indonesian millennials, Perspectives on Transnationalism, Globalization and Nationalism

The Validity of Press Freedom Index in Indonesia

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Introduction

Press freedom is an important condition in a democratic country. To measure the degree of freedom of the press in a country an index is used, known as the press freedom index. There are many institutions in the world that make measurements and ratings of press freedom. According to Becker (et.al, 2007), there are more than 100 institutions that regularly evaluate the conditions of press freedom. Each of these institutions makes its own method of measuring freedom of the press. Of the various institutions, there are at least five institutions of measurement of press freedom that have been the reference, namely *Freedom House, The International Research & Exchanges Board* (IREX), *Reporters Without Borders/Reporters Sans Frontiers* (RSF), *UNESCO*, and *Committee to Protect Journalists* (CPJ). Although each agency creates different indicators and data collection methods, the index results yield similar findings with each other. Becker (*et.al*, 2007) and Martin (*et.al*, 2016) tested the correlation of index results from each agency and found correlations between each index is very high. A country categorized as a low score in one index, likely to have a low score also in another index. The validity of the press freedom index has been tested.

Since 2015, the Press Council has made an annual report on the index of press freedom in Indonesia. The report was based on research on the degree of freedom of the press in 34 provinces in Indonesia. Indicators for measuring press freedom are adapted by the Press Council from measurement of press freedom index in other countries, especially those made by Freedom House, CPJ and RSF. The Press Council categorizes provinces with high, medium and low press freedom. The Press Council also ranks provinces with the highest and lowest press freedom.

This study examines the concurrent validity of the press freedom index created by the Press Council. Do the results of the Press Council indices really reflect the condition of press freedom in a region (province). Whether the indicators used by the Press Council in measuring press freedom has well illustrated the conditions of press freedom.

Methods

Testing the validity of press freedom index in the world, has been done by some experts, such as Becker, Vlad & Nusser (2007); Seeman (2003); Themudo (2013); Charron (2009); Pantzalis, Stangeland & Turtle (2000); Freille, Haque & Kneller (2007). The method used to test the validity of freedom of press index is to make correlation of press freedom index data with other index data, such as human development index and corruption index.

This study uses methods that have been used by various experts to test the validity index freedom of the press in Indonesia. Press freedom index data is correlated with 4 other index data. First, the index of Indonesian democracy from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). Second, human development index from BPS and Bappenas. Third, the happiness index of BPS. Fourth, the corruption index of International Transparency Indonesia (TII). The hypotheses tested in this study, provinces with high freedom index scores, tend to score high in other indices - democratic index, corruption index, happiness index and human development index.

Press freedom index measurement is valid if there is a high correlation between press freedom index and other index.

The testing process is as follows. First, the researchers collected 5 index data (index of press freedom, happiness index, democracy index, corruption index and human development index) in all provinces in Indonesia. Second, the correlation test is done to see the relationship between the data of each index. Through this test it can be concluded whether press freedom index data is consistent with other index data. Whether a province categorized as having a high press freedom index tends to score a high democratic index, and so on.

Findings

The correlation results between press freedom index and other indexes tend to be low. Correlation index freedom of the press with other indexes, each only 0.21 (index of democracy); 0.22 (index of corruption); 0.29 (human development index) and 0.31 (index of happiness). In other words, a region/province categorized as having a high democracy index does not mean that the region has a high index of freedom of press.

Discussion

There are several explanations as to why the index of press freedom is not correlated with the results of other indices (democracy index, corruption index, human development index and happiness index). First, data collection techniques used. Data for index of press freedom was obtained through interviews with expert informants. While other indexes generally use factual data (index of human development) or interviews with the general public (index of democracy and happiness index). Second, the indicators used by the Press Council in measuring press freedom are not good enough to describe the condition of press freedom in a region.

Data collection methods used by the Press Council are through interviews with experts (informants). The Press Council selected 10 experts in each province. Each informant was given a question about the press condition in the province. Data collection through expert interviews has advantages, which can include indicators that require assessment. Many indicators require an evaluation or assessment of the state of the media in an area. But the disadvantage of data collected through expert interviews is the possibility of informant subjectivity in assessing the condition of press freedom in the province. Critical informants may have scored too low to assess the condition of press freedom.

Conclusion

The validity of the press freedom index created by the Press Council tends to be low. This result is obtained after correlation test with other index data. The hypothesis tested in this study, there is a high correlation between press freedom index in a province with 4 other index data (democracy index, human development index, corruption index, and happiness index). For example, provinces with high press freedom index scores tend to score high for democracy indices, and so on. The results show, the hypothesis is not proven. This study recommends some changes for better measurement of press freedom index.

Keywords: Index, press freedom, Press Council, validity, correlation

State of Exception of International Labor Rights and The Inequality of Labor Standards Among Asean Countries

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Introduction

In how capitalism works, class relation runs in the antagonistic form (Burnham, 2001, pp.104-108). In the production process, the capitalist creates and obtains profit as the employer through the extraction of surplus value from the labor's works. Thus, the core system of capitalism contains social relation based on exploitation between the capitalist and the labor (*proletariat*) (Marx, Capital, 1978, p.110).

Exploitation towards labors in the capitalism system has brought up many political movements based on labor group. Since the 19th century, many labor movements have emerged to voice out labor rights as part of human rights (Engerman, 2005). In 1919, labor union movements held an international convention. That very convention became the real form of political labor movement which then brought international labor standard up and established International Labor Organization (ILO) (Engerman, 2005, pp.66-70).

In 1948, the United Nations (UN) also adopted labor standard and working condition as human rights through article 23 and article 24 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In further development, through article 7 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC), the UN also encouraged every country to acknowledge the rights of every human being over decent and equal working condition for humanity.

Many international labor conventions have been encouraged in order to be ratificated and adapted as national labor standard, including the ASEAN countries. However, even though the standard working conditions have been positioned as human rights norm that is claimed universally, it does not mean that national working standard, which is related to working conditions, is on the equal condition between one and another country. In 2016, Asean Trade Union Council published a research report on labor standard. In the report, many problems on inequality in the standard of working condition among ASEAN countries were found. In fact, equal working time and off time regulation in overall ASEAN countries cannot be found (ASEAN Trade Union Council, 2016, pp.15-16). In that problematical context, this research tries to examine under what circumstance the enforcement of labor rights and the creation of working conditions among ASEAN countries has become an inequality phenomenon.

Method

This research employs post-structuralist method which considers the importance of discursive epistemology to understand the existence of the phenomenon. Discursive epistemology indirectly gives a focus analysis to explore discursive formation that represents social event based on how that social event is meant (Hansen, 2006, p.15; Neuman, 2008, p.74). According to Foucault (2004), a discursive formation can be defined as 'a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices,' which formed *regularity*: an order, correlations, positions and functioning, transformations (Foucault, 2004, p.41).

In practical, discourse analysis is a development of post-structuralist method that related to discursive epistemology. Discourse analysis is a useful way to examine phenomenon, and understood it as text (Neuman, 2008, p.72). In further development, Neuman (2008) found that discourse analysis has some of methods to explore the discursive formation within the relational text between discourses. One of these methods is theory driven, which brings concept, or may be, theories, as standpoint perspective (Neuman, 2008, p.66). Drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben (2005) about state of exception, this research departs from the standpoint perspective that labor rights are the product of political contestation among sovereignty. The use of this method begins with analytical exploration of discourse that represents the political enforcement of international labor rights and international labor standards, and then going towards the political enforcement in ASEAN countries.

Findings

The previous research about inequality of working condition and labor standards among nations are focused on the measurement of labor standards enforcement from international into national. For example, Bohning (2005) found that inequality of national labor standard, which have an impact to global inequality of working condition, was caused by the lack of adherence and the failure to implement International Labor Convention among ILO's state members (Bohning, 2005, p.177). Another example, Flanagan (2006) argued that inequality of working condition was caused because of the differences on the selection of state economic policy; where a state that choose an open economic policy and more integrated towards the global economy is experiencing more improvement on working condition than those who choose closed economic policy that less or even not integrated towards the global economy (Flanagan, 2006, pp.14-34).

This research has a different perspective from the previous research to see the problem of inequality of working condition and labor standards. This research finds out that the state of exception which lies between the international labor standard and its enforcement has become an important circumstance of the inequality of national labor standards and working conditions among ASEAN countries.

Discussion

From the very beginning, ILO has become space of political contestation between labors, employers, and government. Although international labor standards are legal instruments drawn up by the ILO's constituents, the enforcement of labor standards are depending on national and international political contestation between sovereign states. Moreover, the legal nature of ILO conventions or standards calls for their application in the legal system of the country that has ratified them. Therefore, under these conditions, sovereign states might have their ability to use their constitutional and legal power to suspend the enforcement and loosen the standards.

The political contestation between states, as circumstance of labor standards enforcement, recognizes the link between economic development and social development. There are forums such as the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development in 1995 and WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996, which try to endorse the enforcement of international labor standards and promote labor rights as universal standards (Addo, 2015, pp.109-111). The endorsement and promotion, of course, come from developed country which has long applied labor standards and labor rights in their legal system based on the encouragement from the labor movements in those countries. Thus, the endorsement and promotion of international labor standards represent the interests of developed countries; so that developing countries are able to compete (join) in the competition of global production and trade, based on the equal labor standards.

The endorsement and promotion from developed countries can only be done toward core labor standards, and do not reach the practical labor standards. Therefore, developing countries such as ASEAN countries can create law regarding the limitation of working hours, but the limitation of working hours is not necessarily equal from one country to another. It was done so that the developing countries like ASEAN countries can stay competitive for investment and global production.

Conclusion

The inequality of working conditions and labor standards are not some problems that are caused by some countries that do not obey and apply international labor standard very well. They are not the problems that arise because of the differences on choosing state economic policy for global economy integration either. However, there is a state of exception that enables international labor standards and international labor rights to in force but not enforced. Even though there is no single alternative yet, it is needed to think about how to change the international labor systems which run by ILO all this time, in order to make them more powerful in managing the sovereign states' ability to suspend the enforcement and loosen the labor standards.

Keywords: *State of Exception, Inequality, Labor Rights, Labor Standards, ASEAN*

Russia and Eurasian Economic Union in Regional Security Complex Theory

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This research analyzes the relation of Russia and Eurasian Economic Union as the latest regional cooperation in Eurasian Region by using Regional Security Complex Theory as an analytical tool. After the Cold War, a regional cooperation of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) whose members are former Soviet fractional states was formed. In September 1993, the heads of state of the CIS members signed an agreement on the establishment of an Economic Union aimed at regulating free movement of goods, services, labor and capital; to coordinate external financial, tax, pricing, excise and economic policies; to equate the regulation of economic activity and create favorable conditions for the development of direct production relations. However, CIS' effort to strengthen economic cooperation between member countries ended in a failure because not all member countries have the same vision. This effort was made several times, but it always ended in failure. Then in 2014, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus agreed to establish a more comprehensive economic cooperation, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Eurasian region experienced a dynamic development economic, political, social, and security fields. The Eurasian region is also experiencing various issues faced by various regions in the world, which formed the characteristics of post-Cold War international relations such as environmental issues, ethnic conflict, globalization, information technology, terrorism, human trafficking, migrant worker, and drug trade. All of these issues are transnational, in which the effects and impacts of these conflicts are not limited to a single country. Some of the issues of concern in this study are the conflicts of Russia and Georgia, the Ukrainian crisis, and the issue of terrorism in Eurasia. These issues were chosen because they were related to Russia, which then impacted on EAEU cooperation. This study aims to examine the relationship of strategic issues in the region and the identities of EAEU member states' identities to Russia's national interests.

Regional Security Complex theory talks about international relations that has an important influence on understanding and analyzing international politics. This theory allows researchers to understand this new structure and to evaluate the relativity of the balance of power, and the interrelationship between it and the globalization trend. Exploration in regional security complex theory is to see the significance of regional elements in understanding the dynamics of international security. This theory suggests an analytical scheme to develop an analysis of how to link security issues in a regional form, where geographic proximity is a very important factor. The main idea of this theory is that it is easier for closer areas to be affected by a conflicted area compared to distant ones, which is a common pattern of interdependence that normally exists within a region-based group. This pattern is called regional security interdependence.

Regional Security Complex Theory can be divided into two variables, namely internal and external variables. Internal variables are seen from three indicators, namely geographical location, how this close geographical proximity encourage security arrangements, interaction between countries and resemblance of values such as economic, social, and political believe. The next variable is an external variable that is divided into two indicators, namely international environmental conditions and emerging issues. The focus of this research is the geographical position, the similarity of social values and emerging issues.

This research uses descriptive-explanative method, a process of observation made to describe an object according to circumstances by involving a particular assessment. This research uses qualitative approach which explains the phenomena occurring within the framework of Russia's foreign relations with countries in the Eurasian region that impact on EAEU cooperation.

Buzan explained the spectrum that drives an area to form a regional security regime, which is the weak and powerful state spectrum as a way of thinking about national security. The spectrum referred to by Buzan is not about power, but rather the degree of sociopolitical cohesion between civil society and government institutions. The spectrum of strong states tends to see threats that come from abroad. While a weak state will focus on threats that come from within, where there are sub-actor countries that threaten the sovereignty of the state. This leads to fragile and fragmented states. This spectrum will affect the dynamics of security cooperation in each region.

Territorial attachment between EAEU member states can be seen from these two spectrums. The members of EAEU, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan belong to the spectrum of weak states. This is, of course, one of the driving factors for EAEU member states to strengthen their cooperation because it has a common interest to strengthen the sovereignty of their respective countries and of course to create a peace in the region that can also strengthen their economic cooperation.

Buzan and Weaver (1998: 119) also wrote about understanding of social value which refers to a common identity possessed by a community. The identity similarity seen in the framework of EAEU cooperation is the use of Russian as the trading language in some member countries such as Kazakhstan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. In the perspective of constructivism, linguistic symbols (languages) become the determining factor of whether a state considers another country as "friend" or "foe". One important factor in social value that needs to be seen is the diaspora that exists in Russia. The diaspora becomes an important factor in attracting a country to cooperate or strengthen its desire to integrate and simplify the lobbies that will be done.

This research found that the Eurasian Economic Union is a potential new regional cooperation for Indonesia to establish cooperation. This is reinforced by the economic sanctions that are currently being experienced by Russia. Therefore, opening a cooperative relationship with EAEU will make it easier for Indonesia to trade with Russia, especially in the military field. Moreover, EAEU is still a new economic integration that requires compliance from its member countries to implement mutually agreed policies. However, it is believed that the EAEU can be a successful organization if member compliance is achieved. Its strategic location gives the organization a positive value and can be a counterweight in the international system.

Keywords: Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Regional Security Complex Theory, Economic Integration, Common Identity

National Identity Within Local-Global Interaction and Socio-Cultural Crisis in Industrial Cities: Study on Worker in Jakarta and Makassar, Indonesia

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Introduction

A study on identity on local and global interaction become an important study in social science considering the dynamics of global society today. Strong globalization stream affects the transformation of local and national identities. Former reserach about identity and globalization has been conducted in these past years (Jenkins, 2004; Ritzer, 2011; Parekh, 2000; Reid, 2010; Sen, 2015; Castell, 2006; Herriot, 2009, Tsing 2005, Calhoun, 1994, Gitlin, 2013; Pawito, 2013, Shibutani, 1976, Peggy & Levitt, 2007).

In the age of globalization the issue of identity become significant if it related to the national identity, as Holiday mention, nationality is still significant factor of cultural complexity, as it construct the foundation for individual's identity but it may contrast with one's cultural reality (Holiday, 2010) Following the Aristova idea, in regards of national identity, it's important to discuss about the distance between local identity, national identity and global identity. On the part of newcomers to a new sociocultural community the choice is between adapting to or resisting the new environment, striving to belong to a new culture or sticking to one's original cultural background; on the part of recipient community the choice lies in accepting or rejecting the incoming culture as an addition to the one they are already part of (Aristova, 2005). Following the Aristova idea, in regards of national identity, it's important to discuss about the distance between local identity, national identity and global identity.

In this age, the encounter of liquid identity and globalization is very complex. Globalization brings about new period in human civilization. Inter-nation borders are obscured (borderless nation) so that cultural identity and national identity become continuously questionable. New values and cultures result from the globalization, creates the collision between each identity, whether it's local, national and global identity. This research strives to explore national identity and socio-cultural crisis in the face of local-global Interaction in industrial cities of Jakarta and Makassar, Indonesia.

Method

This research took place in two cities of Indonesia, Jakarta and Makassar as Indonesian industrial cities. This research is conducted using grounded theory (Cresswell, 2003, p.14, Glasser and Strauss, 1967, p.4) The sampling technique used in this research is snowball sampling. The data was obtained using in-depth interview and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). the informant includes; International workers, academician and public figure. Data being analyze through comparison analysis. Data validation through source triangulation.

Finding

International workers receive the standard working professionalism in the foreign company where they work, in adapting to the company; there is a negotiation of local identity and global values brought by foreign company. Workers in international industries, construct their identities as professional people, who are able to adapt to the global environment, without letting go of their local and national identity. The adaptation to global values is taken despite of its pros and cons; workers tend to respond positively to the globalization value that can improve the existence of local culture. Those who work in foreign companies accept any exposures to globalization openly.

Discussion

Specifically for international worker, all identity of workers within the company were influenced by collective identity (legitimation) in the company organization. Researcher found that both in Jakarta and Makasar, economic motive of workers highly affects their identity construction. In such cases socio-economic benefits of a new culture are outweighed by other factors such as religion, morality, established ways of life that present a much more considerable value for the individual.

This research study the comparison between Jakarta and Makassar in term of identity change and social culture of area exposed to international industry. Jakarta forms identity construction of a variety of ethnics blend themselves with global and national identity. Thus, locality is not important. Whereas in Makassar, their identity construction was absorbing global values that are useful to them. The identity construction still showed a resistance between, local, national and global identity

In the aspect of identity negotiation, in Jakarta they accept global exposure, and furthermore accepting global identity, almost there isn't a negotiation process. Meanwhile in Makassar there's a change in the local identity include the less appreciation towards the local wisdom and local product. Here in Makassar we can see each identity, global, national and local identity still went through process of identity negotiation.

As for the socio-cultural crisis of Jakarta, for the workers in foreign companies, Jakarta is only the place where they earn living, and they still have strong feelings and expectation to go back to their village to spend their retired time. The low sense of belonging to Jakarta results in uncaring about this city's future. Such condition shows the reification of income or money and cultural tragedy all at once in which the expectation of workers of foreign companies is colliding with the condition and cultural reality in the city. Cultural tragedy also occurs in Makassar, which is reflected, among others, in foreign companies' worker pessimism toward local identity. In addition, many ethnics residing in Makassar makes this city vulnerable to horizontal social conflict. Additionally, anomie crisis also becomes the complex problems occurring in Jakarta, in which this city cannot repress the new comers from coming over years and the development of industry, automotive, and property markets leading to some primary crises in Jakarta including traffic jam, traffic violation, and flood.

Conclusion

Jakarta formed a global identity, whereas in Makassar, there's still went through identity negotiation between global, national and local identity. The work standard and rules brought in by foreign companies were set as identity legitimation in both cities socio-cultural crisis happen which include, reification, cultural tragedy, and anomie.

Keywords: National Identity, Socio-cultural, Crisis, Globalization, Industrial Cities

Empathy and Loneliness among youth in Globalization Era

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Introduction

In this globalization era, the speed of advances in technology has been escalated which actually is to facilitate of people problem solving. Unfortunately, some proccess in globalization makes people, including youth. They would feel more convenient and further, tend to preoccupied with themselves and gradually lack of care to others. When people used to be ignorant, they will be difficult to interpret and respond to others appropriately which is called by lack of empathy. Empathy is defined by the ability to understand and feel the way others' thinking and feeling (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004). The theory of prosocial behaviour stated that those with high empathy will respond to alleviate negative emotions in others for selfish reasons (Batson et al., 1987).

Having lack of empathy might create broken relations with peers or other significant person. While relationship has been broken, people might experience of loneliness which is defined as an absence of opportunity to have new relationship with others on an intimate level (Demirli in Pamukcu & Meydan, 2010). In the globalization era, every person may experience loneliness due to social media seems enough to satisfy them. A study that was conducted by Tejada, Montero, & Dunbar (2017) has investigated whether lack of received empathy as an environmental trigger of the loneliness alarm. The finding showed that there was a negative relationship between lack of received empathy and loneliness feeling.

However, there were no studies have investigated about the relationship between empathy and loneliness, particularly among youth in Indonesia. Furthermore, this research used a scale of empathy which was designed by Jolliffe & Farrington (2006) that has two dimensions, affective empathy and cognitive empathy. Thus, this study primarily focused on the correlation between loneliness and empathy among youth in Jakarta. In addition, researchers also investigated on the association between empathy, loneliness and the time spent of playing social media.

Method

A total of 168 youth age 19-25 were participated in this study by convenient sampling. There were two scales used: (1) The Basic Empathy Scale (BES) by Jolliffe & Farrington (2006) to measure empathy that consists of 20 items which determined the level of participants' empathy based on two components, affective and cognitive. Further, the BES focused on four basic emotions (anger, fear, happiness and sadness); (2) the UCLA Loneliness Scale by Russel (1996) to measure loneliness which has 20 items. The participants have to give their ratings on a 4-point Likert type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly Agree). The scale was tested for its validity by using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in order to evaluate each dimension of empathy, cognitive and affective dimension and also the UCLA scale. In affective empathy, the value of factor loading were ranging from .42 - .61 by estimated reliability (ER) = .797. It shows a good fit of the data, as the value of RMSEA = .044, GFI = .99 (χ^2 = 7.41, *df* = 5, *p* = 0.19208). In cognitive empathy, the value of factor loading were ranging from .044 - .65 with estimated reliability (ER) = .846. It was also

showing a good fit of the data, as the value of RMSEA = .038, GFI = .99 (χ^2 = 12.22, *df* = 9, *p* = 0.20110). Finally, in the UCLA scale, the value of factor loading were ranging from 0.33-0.82 by estimated reliability (ER) = 0.88. similar with previous result, it also showed a good fit indicator, that is (χ2 = 51.41, df = 43, p = 0.17768, RMSEA = 0.034, GFI = 0.95.

Findings

It was found that the mean score of youth empathy is considered low, while the score of loneliness is average. Further, by pearson correlation analysis showed that there is a negative relationship between loneliness and empathy (both cognitive and affective). It means that the higher empathy the lower loneliness might be felt toward youth in Jakarta, Indonesia. In addition, there was neither significant relationship between loneliness nor empathy and the duration of time spent for playing social media.

Discussion

Having empathy not just allows us to interact effectively in the social world, but also the "glue" of the social world which drawing us to help others and stopping us from hurting others (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Therefore, having low empathy makes people difficult to think another person feeling, thus, their social relationship will be inhibited. Youth with low empathy may fail to connect their antisocial to the emaotional reactions of others (Hare, 1999). It could explain why many researchers found agrression strongly correlated with lack of empathy (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988; Jolliffe and Farrington, 2004). Living in this kind of place might lead to subjective state such as feeling an absence of opportunity to have intimate relationship with others. In the end, lack of empathy correlates with the existence of loneliness.

The duration of time spent in social media have no relationship with empahy, neither with loneliness. Empathy is quite strongly influenced by parents' attachment (Zoll & Enz, 2010). Youth with higher empathy might have this abillity by seeing and experiencing what they have been accepted from their parents. While Boomsma, Willemsen, Dolan, Hawkley, & Cacioppo (2005) found that loneliness is a complex phenomenon that has both environmental and genetic influences. Gossens (2012) found that there links between loneliness feelings and the rs53576 variant of the oxytocin receptor gene 5-HTTLPR.

Conclusion

This study concludes that youth must keep developing and extending their sense of empathy to maintain their social relationship and make the humanities mattered. Youth that living in a loneliness should be aware of its consequences, such as violence, emptiness, anger and even carry specific risks to health. While nowadays are more common, then by developing empathy, youth will be more considered about the roots of morality which has positive values inside. However, this research could prove to be importance for youth well being in globalization era due to their potential position at the forefront of social and economic change.

Keywords: empathy, cognitive empathy, affective empathy, loneliness, youth, globalization

Public Engagement among Young People: Leason from Public Diplomacy of South Korea

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Background

This research aims to describe the role of cultural product in the public diplomacy process to engage youth people. There are two research questions to achieve the research objective: (1) How the behaviour of audience show their engagement toward the show, (2) What kind of engagement that the audience show toward South Korea as a country. Using the case of South Korea, we argue that Running Man (RM), one of the most popular television reality show, has develop engagement of youth audience in Indonesia. Learning from the South Korea, the Indonesian government could use public diplomacy to increase young people engagement toward Indonesia, not only within the country but also in other countries.

Public diplomacy refers to the process to increase attractiveness and value of a country among a certain society (Melissen, 2005). The process could use soft power such as education, culture, and language (Arif, Golan & Moritz, 2014). The process is usually expanding through media, especially mass media (Ross, 2003). Olson and Sonderman explain that the advancement of information technology has caused the role of state diplomacy to develop state image is not only the domain of official diplomats or agents appointed but the state, but also becoming a public domain (in Effendi, 2011). The purpose of public diplomacy is generating public interest in other countries (Taylor, 2008); not only focusing on building relationships between countries as in traditional diplomacy. Stages of public diplomacy from the state to the audience: listening, advocacy, exchange diplomacy, international broadcasting (Cull, 2009). Stages of public diplomacy from the audience to their peers: familiarity, appreciation, engaging, persuading (Mark in Effendi, 2011).

Public diplomacy through mass media could incite public engagement, audience's feeling of connected and involved with the culture that they have consumed then transmitting the feeling toward other people by sharing the media content (Calder & Malthouse, 2008). The characteristics of engagement in this research are affective commitment, positive affectivity, and empowerment (Kang, 2014). The behaviour of engagement could be ambient participation, observational participation, curatorial participation, interpretive participation, and or intensive participation (Brown & Novak, 2008).

Methods

Using qualitative approach, this research use in-depth interview to gather empirical data. Using purposive sampling, the four informants of this research are those with these characteristics; (1) are *Running Man* (RM) audience that have followed RM since the first its broadcast in 2010 to the episode 267 when the data gathering was conducted on November 2015 (Until 30 July 2018 the show already has 411 episodes); (2) Between 16-30 years old; (3) Consume other cultural product, e.g. going to concert of South Korean artists, or learn Korean language, or join Korean theme Internet forum, or collect Korean goods.

RM has become one of most searched show on Internet in Indonesia. The seven (now eight) actors in the show usually competed with each other to do a certain task, shooting in many locations in South Korea and several cities in the world (including Jakarta) and showing the culinary richness of South Korea.

Findings and Discussion

On the engagement of participants to RM, researcher found that participants fulfill all scale of cultural engagement from Brown & Novak (2008). The result shows that all participants already on the last and highest scale of engagement by promoting and sharing RM to their closest circle.

The engaged participants to RM marked the inception of Public Diplomacy activities by the participants their selves. The participants begin to introduce relevant country, then, appreciate and giving positive opinions to other so the country would have important position. The last public diplomacy activities performed by the participants is encouraging foreign public to see the country's attractions such as tourism spot and learning about South Korea.

The public diplomacy activities performed by participants set up the engagement towards South Korea as a nation. All informants have all of the characteristics of engagement as explained by Kang (2014). Participants are able to identify South Korean Products, and also have very good opinion to South Korean products as well. Lastly, the South Korean products are able to empower them, in this case, by motivating participants to learn South Korean culture, try its food, and even encourage them to visit the country.

At the end, through the program, the sense of belonging of Indonesian youth toward South Korean grew. The youth started to expressed their closeness by giving positive comments and encourage other to feel and learn about the South Korean way of living. RM is identified as fun, funny, unique show that tightened the interaction between participants and South Korea. On this process participants unconsciously keep consuming Korean Products, which is considered as a succesful way to create a good image and public opinion to foreigner toward South Korean as a nation.

The full process of the engagement of Indonesian youth toward South Korean could be seen in the Figure 1.



The effects of these public diplomacy activities through empowering the cultural products could be used to enhanced national awareness and empower nationalism as well.

Conclusion

This qualitative research found that cultural product like television show could has an important role on building the engagement toward a certain country. This research found that public diplomacy could create good relations with other nationals, although done by the non-government agent. This kind of public diplomacy is known as cultural diplomacy because it is using every cultural source on the program and then become the highlight to the viewers. These highlights encourage viewers to know more and connect with the country.

This finding lead to conclude that the same effects may apply to Indonesian show to engage its own national viewer to enhance their engagement to Indonesia as their country.

Keywords: Cultural Product, Engagement, Public Diplomacy, Reality Show, Running Man

Coconut: Between a Global Commodity and Dusun Pusaka

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Introduction

There has been a lack of portrayal of globalization dynamics in micro-level. This is despite the fact that globalization does not only connect state to state, but also villages to villages through chain of trades. Take copra for example. As a global commodity, it has connected coconut farmers or copra producers in rural areas to global markets in Europe. Thus, this paper attempts to contribute to the discussion of global trade by capturing the complexity of copra producer dynamics in the villages of Seram Island, Maluku.

Copra itself is a commodity processed from coconut meat. Statistical data of Indonesian plantation in 2015 shows that most coconut plantation is in the form of smallholdings (*perkebunan kelapa rakyat*), which amounts to 98,98%. State-owned plantation only amounts to 0,11% and company-owned plantation only amounts to 0,92%. Interestingly this recent statistical data is not much different from the data of coconut business in early 20th century. Rasid Asba (2007:105) notes that there were only 5-6% European business who invested to coconut plantation, when compared to their investment in other commodities. This data shows that since 20th century, copra has been a global commodity produced by local farmers.

In early 20th century, copra was an export commodity designated by colonial Dutch East Indies for regions in Eastern Indonesia, including Maluku. The significant demand of copra in global market drove Maluku farmers to expand their coconut plantation. As written by Asba (2007):

> *"Copra ranked first in Maluku exports. During 1928-1930, the number of copra exports reached three millions rix dollars. ... Copra needs in local and global market made farmers in the thousand island area expanded their planting area."*

Asba's finding seems to show that the high demand of copra in market impacted the rise of copra productivity. This seems to match the supply-and-demand law commonly utilized by economist: high price results in high supply; the rise of supply directly correlates to the rise of productivity.

However there is something peculiar with copra trade in Maluku. Compared to other commodities produced by farmers (for example: clove, nutmeg, and cocoa) since the middle of 20th century, copra selling price has been relatively very low. Why is then the supply of copra commodity from farmers in Maluku (Seram Island) maintains a steady rate despite the low selling price? This is what we attempt to answer in this paper.

Methods

This paper utilizes anthropological approaches, based on ethnographic researches with participant-observation and in-depth interview. Research is conducted in administrative village of Yainuelo, located in southern part of Seram Island. This village initially is a part of hamlet in Sepa village. Even though Yainuelo is now administratively autonomous, customary issues in the village still obeys to customary regulation in Sepa village. This results in the regulation of coconut plantation in Yainuelo. There are owners who live in Yainuelo and in Sepa; some of the fields are also owned collectively by families in both Sepa and Yainuelo.

The first author is born, lived, and raised in Yainuelo. One of the reason why Yainuelo is chosen as a field site is because of first-hand knowledge of the first author in matter of coconut plantation in the village. Said knowledge is composed of the first author's reflection on his childhood experience and stories circulated in the village about the existence of coconut in Yainuelo.

From such reflection, we would like to ask, why does the supply of copra commodity in Yainuelo and Sepa maintain a stable rate? Despite the fact that selling price of copra in the market has always been relatively low compared to other commodities. This question guides us to dig deeper on this phenomenon. The data on copra trade in Maluku since 20th century has been studied extensively. We also conducted a participatory observation to the patterns of cultivation and control of copra plantation in Yainuelo and Sepa. To explore this problem further, we conducted in-depth interviews with families who own *dusun kelapa pusaka* in Yainuelo and Sepa.

The concept of Roy Ellen's arboreal subsistence unit and Jones and Cloke's trees of agency are utilized to analyze the phenomenon.

Finding

Our finding shows a contradiction to the commonly accepted assumption about the law of supply-and-demand. The stability of copra commodity is not affected by its low price in the market. There are other reasons that determine coconut farmers to continuously produce copra: *dusun kelapa pusaka*. This means the stability of copra supply in the global trade chain has a complex intertwining with kinship relation in *dusun kelapa pusaka*.

Discussion

The price and production of copra

Statistical data of coconut plantation published by Ministry of Agriculture in 2015 and 2016 shows:

i) From 2014-2016, there were increase of the size of coconut plantation area. In 2014, its area amounts to 112.261 ha, in 2015 it grew to 112.585 ha (increased 324 ha), and in 2016 it grew to 112.664 Ha (increased 79 ha).

ii) In 2014-2016, there were also increase of copra productivity in Maluku. In 2014, the productivity was 96.268 ton per year, in 2015 it risen to 97.289 ton per year (increased 21 ton), and in 2016 it risen to 97.445 ton per year (increased 156 ton).

iii) The price of copra in Maluku domestic market of 2014 showed a fluctuating price. In January, the price per kilogram is Rp6750; in February it is Rp6750; in March it is Rp7167; in April it is Rp11750; in May it is Rp6613; in June it is Rp6750; in July to December it continued to fall to Rp5953 per kilogram.

This data shows that, regardless of the unstable price of copra in Maluku during 2014, the size of the plantation and productivity in 2015 continued to increase. This means, the assumption that a commodity price is directly proportional to its supply rate, cannot hold true.

Dusun kelapa pusaka

The factor that influences the production of copra despite its unstable price is the existence of *dusun kelapa pusaka*. From the data we gathered, there are four reasons that contributed to the formation of this *dusun*

kelapa pusaka:

i) The longevity of coconut trees, as it can spands the lives of four generations of farmers.

ii) The concept of ownership based on trees before coconut plantation is used to produce copra. Coconut trees were already planted in Maluku long before copra commodity is introduced. At that time, however, coconut is not planted in the form of plantation like sago, clove, or nutmeg. Coconut is planted only for daily consumption, not in a mass scale.

iii) The concept of collectively-owned land.

iv) The rather cheap price of coconut in the market.

Conclusion

The trade of a certain commodity has resulted in attempt to blur the boundaries of states. All economic actors are integrated to a global chain of trade, including commodity producers who reside in rural areas. However the dynamics of copra production in Seram Island villages has shown that the phenomenon is more complex and different than it is usually imagined. Studies on economics and history have neglected to capture such an anomaly. Our paper demonstrates that the stability of supply is not always determined by market forces alone, but also by cultural and natural (trees) reasons.

Keywords: globalization, coconut, copra commodity, dusun pusaka

China Controls Business Actors to Implement Belt and Road Initiative as Connectivity Project

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Introduction

The development of China's foreign economic policy under the leadership of Xi Jinping has shown a new trait, i.e. the more complete position of globalization vision or China's connectivity agenda through a multilateral cooperation scheme called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, BRI cannot be easily seen as a form of mutually beneficial cooperation, although it is constituted of five forms of focus work: (1) policy coordination, (2) facility connectivity, (3) free trade, (4) cooperation and financial integration, and (5) complex cooperation between individuals (grassroots level). Several existing studies have focused in revealing the various motives and objectives of China through BRI. The authors have classified the debates in revealing China’s BRI objectives under two types of rationality, namely strategic political rationality and economic rationality.

The first perspective sees BRI as China’s effort to improve its status in the regional and international economic and political structures. This will usually be accompanied by a range of fundamental considerations, such as the agenda to secure the energy supply of Indian Ocean and South China Sea, domestic security, and minimizing the risk of counter-reaction from the US (Prasad, 2015; Clarke, 2017; Len C, 2015; Ye, 2015; Wang, 2015; Aoyama, 2017; Ploberger, 2017; Rolland, 2017). Long before the emergence of BRI, contemporary realism experts revealed that China will continue to maintain its pace of awakening to offset the dominance of the US (Ikenberry, 2012; Mearsheimer, 2014). Overall, these literatures indicate that BRI's presence is a grand strategy package in the projection of China's contemporary international relations.

The second perspective argues that the objectives of BRI actually depart from economic motive. It basically argues that there is a pragmatic motive behind the presence of BRI to integrate global economy and finance

as a result of the slowdown in China's economic growth after the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 (Junxian & Yan, 2016; Tsui, et al., 2017; Rolland, 2017). On the domestic front, BRI is a new arena for China's economic development agenda, which is based on several factors. For example, the modalities of developing the service industry, technology, and infrastructure (Lin J. Y., 2015). On the regional front, BRI's presence can stimulate economic cooperation of a much more complex region - followed by several strategies, among others: (1) efforts to minimize development gaps and accelerate regional connectivity (Hong, 2016; Jetin, 2018); (2) turning the region into a part of Chinese economic circle and to encourage the expansion of Chinese companies in the sector of infrastructure development (Yu, 2017); (3) encouraging the rate of investment and infrastructure development assistance (Callaghan & Hubbard, 2016; O'Trakoun, 2017); and (4) developing Chinese industrial cooperation with various strategic state partners (Jianren, 2016). Broadly speaking, the literatures from this perspective indicate that BRI is a continuation of the Open Policy that has been enacted by the early reformers of China.

The two perspectives above can be connected in certain condition, namely a condition where the state is able to control, discipline, and define the interests of business actors to be in line with the interests of the state. In other words, the state and business actor has a compatible interest with one another under the idea that business expansion is in line with defending China's awakening, while Chinese diplomatic expansion will be the same as strengthening foreign business activities. However, such analytical framework cannot be found in existing discussions.

On that basis, this study proposes a new framework to explain BRI as China's overseas economic policy agenda by identifying the country's penetration process in influencing business actors for strategic economic and political agendas at the regional level through BRI.

Methods

This study employs qualitative method that departs from an attempt to formulate new interpretation on one variable against another variable in an intimate and constructive manner while using theory in general. Along with the qualitative method, this study employs a case-study approach based on Preliminary Illustration of a Theory. This model aims to illustrate the theoretical ideas used in a case study (Odell, 2001).

In order to simplify the design of this study, the authors use a theory framework called State Control of Business Actors. This theory is created to identify the extent to which the relationship of government actors influences business actors to serve as strategic economic-political instruments (economic statecraft). This theory was the brainchild of William J. Norris (2016) who argues that economic statecraft occurs due to the process of interaction between government and business actors at the domestic level. Furthermore, Norris offers four major variables underlying the country's penetration of business actors for foreign economic policy (Norris, 2016).

Meanwhile, efforts to track state penetration actions on business actors through BRI can be seen from two business sectors, namely transportation infrastructure services and high-speed rail industry. This is decided under three fundamental considerations. First, these sectors have become one of the new focus of Chinese government in strengthening China's global trade – which has been dominated by conventional manufacturing sectors. Secondly, the emergence of China's national policy in continuing its *Go Global* mission or internationalization of company by making the infrastructure and transportation industry sector as a part of economic diplomacy strategy. Thirdly, these sectors correspond to the connectivity agenda brought by BRI.

Findings

The fundamental finding of this research is that the Chinese government has succeeded in controlling business actors in the transportation infrastructure and high-speed rail sectors. This implementation is seen from the domestic and regional aspects. The domestic aspect can be viewed from four variables.

Discussions

First, before controlling business actors, the domestic political environment of central government and local government incorporated the BRI agenda as an instrument towards "National Rejuvenation". This convergence

of interests is due to the pattern of relations between the two that went through a hierarchical autonomous system. Local governments have the authority to implement economic development schemes that are compatible with national programs. In other words, the local government runs a federal system but is constitutionally responsible to the central government. In addition, local government involvement as a center of national development is due to a program of economic reform and open door policy. China's provinces are mandated to promote and run cooperation with several regional countries. Since the relationship between the central government and local governments results in a pattern of economic decentralization, the local government became a vital part in translating the strategic interests of the central government to several regional countries. These provinces are Xinjiang [Northeast China], Yunnan [Southwest China], and Guangdong [China Coastal region]. Based on this context, the authors found that BRI is a continuation of the decentralization system and open-door policy – which will be facilitated by local governments to strengthen relations between China and other regional countries.

Secondly, the intrinsic purpose of the government and business actors became compatible through a coordination mechanism and hierarchical relationships. In other words, BRI program has the goal of developing the capacity of economic growth both in the domestic level as well as within a company. This strategy also means that the state has defined the business interests of a company to be convergent with national interest. The compatible relationship takes place in the emergence of domestic economic problems, while business actors have a goal to strengthen their expansion in various countries. In addressing the slowdown of China's post-2008 economy, BRI can be seen as a means of the Chinese government to mitigate the domestic economic problems without resorting to structural reform policies. It means that overcapacity can be relocated to external markets that lie along the BRI line. The eventual process of relocating labor, capital, and investment flows is part of business actors' expectations to move actively in international business or overseas markets.



Thirdly, the market structure is made more lean and concentrated in one or two companies with specialization in the field of work aimed at facilitating the central government to monitor and coordinate directly. The Chinese government has set and specified for its infrastructure construction company through one multinational corporation, China Communications Construction Co. Ltd. CCCC Ltd was born as the result of mega-mergers conducted by the government since 2005. Reflecting from observations in Southeast Asia, the massive involvement for infrastructure cooperation is in the construction of high-speed rail. Companies

involved in particular are China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) and China Railway Group Ltd (CRG). Although it takes place on a market structure with a duopoly model, it does not mean that the state has difficulty controlling them. The state has specified that the focus of CRCC is the completion of a high-speed rail project in China by 2025 with a rail length of 38,000 km. Meanwhile, CLG is focused on completing or winning contracts for high-speed rails, especially in countries along the BRI line. Then, for the high-speed rail industry focusing on the development of technology and rapid train facilities, the government has appointed one company, China Railway Rolling-Stock Co. Ltd. CRRCs originating from mega-mergers of two of the same companies, namely China South Rail (CSR) and China North Rail (CNR).

Finally, the pioneering relationship between the government and business actors is through state acquisition schemes in regulating the ownership and management system of the company in accordance with national policy. After conducting a mega merger for two industrial fields, the role of the state pretty much becomes essential in the direction of corporate commercial and strategic interest. The ownership system is fully owned by the central government which is totally controlled through 100% shareholding. Then, the company's managerial pattern is made compatible with China's Go Global policy, for example CRRC has a focus as a company that upholds three key principles, namely innovation, reform, and internationalization. Furthermore, the appointment of the company's leadership personnel is carried out by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) which previously received a mandate from the National Council. SASAC then appoints corporate leaders with a variety of considerations, ranging from work skills and professionalism, field-appropriate expertise, all of whom are engaging in strategic positions within the structure of the CCP Committee.

The successful state control of business actors in transportation infrastructure and high-speed rail sectors will in turn facilitate China's economy-political interest in the implementation of BRI at regional level. This finding is based on a physical infrastructure cooperation agreement in Southeast Asia, which includes the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. On one hand, cooperative contracts involving Chinese companies are the most important part of organizing the company's internationalization program. On the other hand, the engagement of cooperation agreements also has China's strategic importance links to the three countries. Clearly, the connectivity agenda through BRI contains a strategic element to deepen China's economic and political ties, with the end result is to maintain its status as a strategic partner country at the regional level.

This argument can be proven by several cooperation contracts that have been agreed upon after the promotion of BRI in Southeast Asia in 2013. For example, in Malaysia there are two mega-projects involving Chinese companies namely CCCC Ltd, East Coast Railway Link (ECRL) and Malaysia China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP). Then, in Indonesia there are two mega-projects contracts involving Chinese companies named CRCC and CLG for the Jakarta-Bandung Rapid Train, and CCCC Ltd for Port of Kuala Tanjung in the industrial estate sector. Furthermore, the physical infrastructure cooperation between the Philippines and China includes several strategic projects, including the Davao Coastline Port Development Project (DCPDP) and the Mindanao Railway Project (MRP) involving CCCC Ltd.

Overall, the above cooperation project produced two fundamental scenarios. First, the involvement of Chinese companies in winning infrastructure cooperation contracts can go smoothly due to BRI's presence that offer a connectivity agendas, and ease of funding assistance with business-based cooperation mechanisms. Secondly, infrastructure diplomacy will continue, because the three leaders of the country are running populist policies that accelerate the development of physical infrastructure. In other words, business opportunities gained by China stimulate the ease of promoting strategic political interests – for example, Malaysia is a strategic area for China's oil supply line [Malacca Strait]; Indonesia is part of a successful iron diplomacy [High-speed rail] which is the focus of China's latest industry; and the Philippines will begin a physical infrastructure project as an instrument of diplomatic normalizations that had previously been tenuous in the days of Aquino III.

Conclusion

Based on the findings and analysis in this study, the authors affirm that the connectivity agenda through BRI contains China's strategic economic and political rationality at Southeast Asia level. All of which runs integrally due to the success of the state in controlling business actors at the domestic level. This is evidenced by the involvement of Chinese companies in the cooperative contracts in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which was done in a homogeneous way. The construction services to construct roads, ports and

other supporting infrastructure were carried out by China Communications Construction Company Limited (CCCC Ltd), while the high-speed rail system was carried out by Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC).

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), State Control, Business Actors, and Connectivity Agenda

Halal Food in Indonesian Food Self-Sufficiency: The Challenge of Globalization and Nationalism

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Indonesia is an agrarian country with abundant natural resources. This potential should place Indonesia as a country with food self-sufficiency. Globalization and trade caused food as a commodity. In trading, commodities are subject to trade provisions and regulations. The existence of these provisions and regulations in some conditions becomes an obstacle in developing commodities to compete. This obstacle is one of the causes of imbalance access to commodities, including access to food. But on the other hand these provisions and regulations can actually increase the competence of commodities that ultimately affect the state revenue, as well as the stakeholders on the commodity. Food is a national strategic interest. Fulfillment of food needs to be a part to gain public credibility that supports nationalism. So the state seeks to meet food needs and the achievement of self-sufficiency. Food self-sufficiency is not just the availability of food either from local or import, but also the access to food. The existence of trade and globalization activities, making the need for food is not only the presence of abundant food, but also related to access to food by the community. Especially when the food becomes a trade commodity, then to get the food only be done through trade even though the food is visible. It can be said here that even though farmers do an active role in processing food, but it's not easy to get the food that has been processed by the farmers. This is because the food they prepare has become a trading commodity. To get access the food is needed fund. This condition affect self-sufficiency and food sovereignty.

Food self-sufficiency consists of three pillars*, the first* pillar relating to availability, relating to domestic supply or production and local resources in meeting food needs. *Second,* accessibility (accessibility of physical and economic), relating to the ability of the community to access or fulfill food needs which food as part of trade commodities have economic value. *The third* pillar is related to the stability (stability of supply and price), is the sustainability of food supply at affordable prices. While food self-sufficiency emphasizes the management of potential local resources. As an agrarian country, local resources refer to food produced from the agricultural activities of the community as potential food resources. Local food resources are foods that originate and made from local produce and processed with local resources and wisdom. Local food is an example of traditional knowledge that can provide the pride of a nation, ethnic group, or community in a particular region because the knowledge provides a regional identity. Development of regional identity as part of the development of nationalism. On the other hands Indonesia is a Muslim majority country that needs halal food. The fulfillment of halal food becomes a necessity and an obligation for Muslims. At the international level, halal provisions have been listed in the codex alimentarius. Indonesian government has also developed halal policies and institutions. Nevertheless, the development of halal products in Indonesia, including its food products, is has not maximal yet when it compared to other countries, including the countries with non-Muslims majority. Thus globalization and nationalism become food self-sufficiency challenges through halal certified food.

Use the qualitative method by analyzing the data based on topics discussed both primary and secondary. Type of research used is descriptive analysis which means the data obtained through the analysis process using literature study, then analyzed by the concepts that have been described. The secondary data obtained from the literature study will be described narratively in the earlier parts of the research report. In this case it is a literature review using the main concepts. While the primary data obtained from interviews with several parties. The variables are divided into Unit of Analysis and Explanation Unit. The unit of analysis in this study

focuses on Indonesia's food self-sufficiency and Indonesia's halal food, the Unit of Explanation is the challenge of globalization and nationalism on food self-sufficiency.

The existence of halal food in Indonesia as part of the fulfillment of community needs. With the Muslims majority, halal food is part of Indonesia's identity. As part of the identity, the halal provisions at the international level of trade commodities should be easy to fulfill for Indonesia considering its potential. Halal certification is part of the competence and food quality. Recognizing this, certified halal food becomes a potential for developing and managing Indonesian food into a quality commodity. Food management becomes part of the national development plan in economic development. Economic development for community welfare is essential to gain public support and develop nationalism.

Food self-sufficiency can be achieved if access to food can be achieved by all Indonesian people easily. The existence of Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) become part in the fulfillment of food self-sufficiency. SMEs become the motor of local food product management. As a Muslim majority country, halal food needs become part of religious obligations. the Indonesia Government has facilitated by developing halal product policies and establishing institutions which responsible for halal certification and management. In international trade, the terms of commodities with halal certification have been determined in the Codex alimentarius. In this Codex, halal food provisions also cover the fulfillment of health and food safety. Food product development through local resources by SMEs becomes the focus of halal food development in Indonesia. Halal certified food, in this case both processed and unprocessed, has become an international trend and need. International consumers, both Muslim and non-Muslim countries, recognize that halal-certified food commodities have been tested. This means by halal certified should have met the provisions relating to health and food safety.

This research is expected to be part of the development of Indonesian food self-sufficiency strategy through halal food by developing local resources and potential that already exist. The existence of food SMEs with halal certified products, will increase the competence of halal Indonesian food products in international trade. In the end it is expected to support economic development through increasing the income of business community and farmers. Increased economy will be positively correlated with the welfare to obtain and facilitate access to further food fulfillment. In this case can be said there is a linkage between the development of halal food with food self-sufficiency. Provisions in international trade as a result of globalization as a challenge, as well as efforts to develop halal certification on food products, face up as challenge to nationalism that halal certification of local food products is part of nationalism.

Keywords: Halal Food, Food Self-sufficiency, Nationalism, Globalization

Defense and Security Manufacturing Industry In Visegrad Countries: The Shifted Ideology and Security Issues Post the Soviet Union and After Joining the European Union

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Introduction

Changes in the international political order that occurred since the end of the Cold War have presented both inter-nation cooperation and competition that tends to lead to international, regional and national influence. These developments, among others, led to changes in the world security situation with the emergence of challenges in security issues. In order to address the growing security issues, a strong security and defense system is required in accordance the threats faced. The defense and security manufacturing industry in the European Union is one of the biggest motors driving in the development of current security and defense

systems. Maintaining the regional security in the future faces complex and uncertain challenges and threats. State or supranational need to have defense and security manufacturing industries to maintain the security of their territory. To address the growing number of security issues, a security and defense system is pivotal to confront the threats.

Visegrad countries are the former of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the four satellite states of the Soviet Union, that are Poland, Hungarian, Czechs Republic and Slovaks formed the Visegrad group on 15 February 1991. The four countries then joined the European Union in 1 May 2014. This change made a shift in social, cultural, economic, political and military situation after the four States withdrew from the Soviet Union. The ideologies and the challenges in defense and security also shifted. This study aims to trace the change of ideology and the defense and security manufacturing industry in Visegrad countries after the post of Soviet Union and after joining the European Union.

Method

The author applies descriptive-analyses in this research. There are two stages of analysis. First-stage analysis, explaining the relationship of security theory and identity theory towards the ideology of Visegrads countries enhancing their military equipment industry, followed by a second stage analysis, explaining the Visegrad countries' interests and objectives in developing and enhancing manufacturing industry in the security and defense sectors. The main data of this research is primary data. The data collection techniques are interview and study literature. The method of data analysis is qualitative analysis supported by quantitative data.

Finding

This study is aimed to; first, explain the interests and objectives of Visegrad countries in developing and enhancing their manufacturing industry in the defense and security sectors after the Cold War. Second, to find what make the Visegrads countries different in their defense and security manufacturing industry post the Soviet Union and after they joined with the European Union.

Discussions

Defense and security equipment are the main tools used in war or in security and territorial defense. After the World War II and the Cold War, the mainland Europe is considered safe. The Visegrad countries as the former of Soviet Union confronted the changes and challenges in their political identity and security issues. Maintaining the security of the region in the future faces complex and uncertain challenges and threats. State, region or supranational need to maintain their territorial security by having the defense and security manufacturing industries.

To address the growing number of security issues, a security and defense system play the main role to confront the threats. Security in the objective sense is a measure of the absence of threat to the values it possesses, while in the subjective sense is the absence of fear that the values will be attacked. The defense and security manufacturing industry is an industry that conducts research, development, production and preservation of goods, technologies and services used in military, paramilitary, or security applications. The defense and security industries have customers and users with different backgrounds and objectives. Products or services from the defense and security industries may be used by public or private agents, for public security concerns, or personal security issues.

In relation to regional security issues, regional complex security theory is relevant for analyzing regional security in the Visegrad countries. Regional Theory Security Complex is a theory that emphasizes its focus on the significance of regional elements in understanding the dynamics of international security. According to Buzan (2009) there is a rise of economic and environmental security, with their new types of threat and new referent objects, and the decline in salience of military-political security issues amongst the great power. The security complex is defined as a set of countries in one region, which makes the primary security of these countries merged and cannot be separated from each other (Buzan, 1991). Region in this concept is not referring to a territory definition only territory, but rather to a set of units that have the process of securitization, desecuritization, or even both at once, which have interactions with each other (Buzan, 2003).

The cause of the security problems of these countries cannot be analyzed separately from each other.

This research is to discuss; first, what the ideological and political objectives of Visegrad countries developing their defense and security manufacturing industry beyond the military issues. Second, what kind of threat that Visegrad countries face towards their regional security. Third, what are the roles of defense and security manufacturing industries in the Visegrad countries in confronting security challenges and threats after the World War II and the Cold War.

Conclusion

Since the post Soviet Union and Visegrad Countries joined the European Union, they faced the different security issues. The philosophy of their ideology and defense and security manufacturing industry also changed. This study is aimed to identify how Visegrad Countries develop their manufacturing industry in security and defense to protect their region, ideology and national identity.

Keywords: Security, Defense, Manufacturing Industry, Region, Identity

Transnationalism and Globalization of Corruption: Impact to Asset Recovery and States as A Victim

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Corruption, especially on a large scale, contributes to impeding development by creating a high cost economy, funding power-oriented political activity, and lowering nice living standards in a country. One of the most difficult issues in terms of state financial returns, especially in corruption cases is that the country's money has been abroad in the form of movable and immovable assets. The impact of corruption crimes that cross national borders and globalized, especially in terms of the assets placement of corruption crimes has put the country as a victim of great "suffering". The ease of electronic transactions related to the placement of assets resulting from criminal corruption outside of Indonesia is a corruption proof as a form of transnational crime and is a global concern, plus the countries included in the tax heaven as if in collaboration with corruptor to making the country suffering as a victim of corruption is increasingly difficult to restore the assets back to the state. This asset recovery effort is hampered by a combination of local and external barriers. Externally, the campaign is marked by the lack of sufficient international political. While at the domestic level, it is undermined by the lack of transparency that exists, the investigators and public prosecutors in corruption cases handling often have difficulty to breaking through cross-border barriers in an effort to track and recover corrupted state assets. In relation to legal substance, the barriers which founded are inadequate legislation due to different legal systems between Indonesia and other countries. Another thing which also an obstacle in asset recovery efforts is not only the amount of assets rushed abroad, different legal systems, or the bank secrecy principles, but one of them is the weakness of law enforcement officers. Generally, it can be seen that the placement of the corruption crimes assets from domestic to foreign countries has certainly caused injustice to the state where the corruptor committed a crime, where the funds and assets that should be enjoyed and used for public interest (the citizens) are actually placed in so that the citizens cannot take benefit from the assets.

Keywords: Asset Recovery, Corruption, State

Introduction

One of worst problems country of reversion financial loss, particularly in corruption case is where the corruption money has been out of country becoming dynamic assets or static assets. In international law settings the regulation of sovereignty makes a loss country very hard in retracting the corrupted money which

has been brought abroad. In this case it turns that the punishment process doesn't really achieve good punishment for the suspect. Even they are jailed, organized criminal and others can still enjoy the result of their crime in individual, family or colleague way. Without the process of confiscation after judicature, that perspective will remain existing and existing judicature system will not be effective in retracting country's loss

The effort of retracting county's assets is prevented by the diverse internal or external obstructions, externally, the campaign happens because there is not sufficient international politic obsession, while in domestic domain, it was broken due to insufficient transpirations. As explained by Enweremadu (2013: 51-70) competence of one's law and accountancy is not sufficient, until it is not cooperative from accused one and domestic politics will be limited to explain that the problems have combined for preventing the ways in recovering billions of corrupted money from a country.

Corruptions, particularly in big size, has contribution in blocking the development by creating high cost economy, politic funding orients to authorization and reducing the level adequate life in a country. The World Bank estimates that 1 trillion paid every year for bribing officials all over the world.

Reported in 2011 UNCAC says that corrupted money transferred out to developing country and transited economy is presupposed reaching 20 USD to 40 billion every year, even hundred billion dollars money which is supposed needed for the development of a country has been corrupted and stored to other country in last decades.

Since in the middle of year 1990 a fight to corruption has become an integral part of international agenda development. In line with the awareness of corruption, the problems of country's assets which is corrupted and stored out of a country by public functionaries have been prioritized agenda, proven by the fact that the increase amount of international agreements, for example, the establishment of an organization called Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction in 1997, and United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) legitimated in 2003.

In reality, the investigation and general persecution in overcoming corruption has often gotten problems to pass overseas obstructions as an investigation of retracting corrupted assets of a country. This can be seen that the minimum of repatriated county's loss from abroad, the deficiency of extradition demand and the detention assets granted by the aimed country. In preventing the implementation of law, corrupted ones often do a way for the sake of avoiding theretract and taking over conducted by the county. There is many ways to save the assets: selling, transferring the assets to certain ones. Often, if the assets have moved to other country, law upholder got difficulties to take the assets back, whereas there has been a permanent legal decision (inkracht) in the country. But the legal person must deal with the legal process in the country where the asset was brought.

Corruption eradicating in Indonesia is currently focused on preventions, eradication, and retraction of corrupted issues. A matter of assets recovery to mineralize country's loss is the factor which is not important in overcoming the criminal in economy besides punishing the doer with well-punishment. When the asset has gone to other country, of course, it creates certain difficulties in tracing or forfeiting in the process of court session and confiscating after being made the fixed law decision, when it has to pass some procedures of law where the asset is stored, even when it is not related

Therefore, in retracting the corrupted assets, particularly asset which has been in other country needs corporation of related countries .

Discussion

The County as The Victim of Placing Corrupted Assets to Other Country

Who is meant as the victim? According to criminal law science, the definition of the victim of crime is terminology of criminology science and victimology and then developed in crime/and crime court system. Logical Consequence of victim prevention in congress of united nations VII/1985 in Milan on ("The Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders") announced that Victims' rights are actually seen as integral part of overall court system ("victims' rights should be perceived as an integral aspect of the total

criminal justice system"). Then the definition of victims based on the procedure 1 "Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice For Victims of Crime And Abuse of Power "on September 6, 1985 from United nations in the declaration number A/Res/40/34 in 1985 firmed that "Victims" means persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental right, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within member states, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse power". This is supported by Dr. Robert Peacock in a paper "common impact features of victimization" quoted in the explanation of Nil Christie, says that victim commonly has characters: 1) the weak victims in relation with the doer, 2) victim, is the one who doesn't do illegal things and do the activities of business legally 3) is not guilty to what happens,4) the victim is not related and doesn't know strangers who have done fault. 5) The doer has the right combination from authorization, influencing the ones for sympathy and successfully gaining the status as victim without the side who feels threatened. Furthermore, Dr. peacock says that victim of crime suffers physically: physiological and financial.

However, how if the victim is a country? This happens because of the assets recovery from corruption, particularly when it has been out of the country, many obstructions have to be confronted in the practice. Of course, these obstacles will really influence the significance of those assets to other countries. The obstructions in the effort of assets recovery happening nowadays diverse, that obstruction is influenced by factors. One of them, as explained by Dutcher, is that white collar crime almost relates to money cycling that is not only involving one side, but also it is organized with many kinds of actions, such as deception, inflation and even money laundering.

Related to legal substance, the obstruction found is the legislations that is not sufficient. Even Indonesia has ratified UNCAC, but as for mechanism of asset recovery is not ruled yet in detail. Besides that, the different law in Indonesia from related country has become obstruction in the process of assets recovery resulted from corruption.

The obstruction often happens to this asset recovery is the difference of law system between Indonesia and other countries. But basically asset recovery doesn't have to base on the agreement, some cases can even be basis of good relationship between Indonesia and related country. In ASEAN level, even though MLA in criminal matters have been existed which will be ratified through "Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2008" actually applies non retroactive basis, so Indonesia got difficulties to trace and retract the asset before 2008. Besides the obstruction of the legalization, legal structure is the apparatus of law enforcement also become obstacle. The insufficiency of apparatus of law enforcement, especially judge decision does not mention the amount of assets which will be seizure and lies when it becomes specific obstacle. And addition, fishing expedition is not allowed in tracing in many countries. The obstructions of assets recovery are also caused of the differences of law system and many countries refuse fishing expedition. Even, few difficulties, the asset returned is not in the form of money or share, but in form of car, house, stuffs which have to be converted in the process of selling.

Besides that, the obstacle in asset recovery is not only the amount of assets that are taken abroad, different legal systems, or the principles of bank secrecy, but one of them is the weakness of the law enforcement apparatus itself (Gunarsih, 2011). Regarding the weakness of the judge's decision, the constraints to date, the first lack of supporting evidence, then in the judge's decision not specifically specified which assets and where MLA will be asked, and then a different legal system is also an obstacle. One of them in Switzerland does not know the term corruption, so if here the terminology of corruption is not there, then we adjust it there. Furthermore, it is said that often the judge's decision does not specify how much the asset is and where the asset (account) is to be confiscated. So that in an effort to return assets, and or request for confiscation of assets resulting from corruption, in many countries ask us to mention how much assets are requested to be confiscated and where the account is located, while our court order does not specify. This is what the judges must understand in making decisions.

In some countries, there are strict laws regarding Secrecy Bank (Bank Confidentiality) so that investigators often find it difficult to track suspected assets, even though there is already UNCAC. Even ASEAN countries themselves have not all ratified UNCAC so that this has become a separate obstacle. Another obstacle that is often encountered is the relationship between countries. Of course this is a serious obstacle because in the asset recovery process also requires relationship diplomacy between the two countries.

In general, it can be seen that the placement of assets resulting from corruption from within the country abroad has of course resulted in injustice for the country where the perpetrators committed crime, where funds and assets that should be enjoyed and used for the public interest (the people at large) are actually placed in other countries so that the general public cannot benefit from these assets.

Rawls's theory is based on two principles: He sees Equal Right and Economic Equality. He said that in Equal Right it must be regulated in a lexical level, that is different principles work if the first principle works or in other words the principle of difference will work if no basic right is revoked (no human rights violations) and increase the expectations of those who are less fortunate. In Rawls's principle it is emphasized that there must be fulfillment of basic rights so that the principle of inequality can be implemented in other words economic inequality will be valid if it does not rob basic human rights.

For Rawls, there are two forms of rationality, namely Instrumental Rationality, where reason is the instrument to fulfill personal interests and the second is Reasonable, which is not a function of practical reasoning of people. This second thing is attached to the process who oversees those who use reason for their personal interests to achieve a universal concept of justice or goodness. Here is seen a procedure that guarantees the achievement of universal goodness, with procedures that supervise people per person will result in public conception of justice

Jhon Rawls stated that the main concern of social justice is institutional justice or what he calls the basic structure of society. The social justice theory put forward by Rawls is influenced and based on the thoughts of John Locke who suggested social contracts. Rawls argues that social justice is impartiality, and through social contracts, community individuals collectively produce social goods, not for individual consumption. That is, the availability of social goods will meet the needs of goods for individuals in society.

By using this theory of justice, it can be seen that the task and authority to take assets resulting from corruption crimes is in the State, represented by the State government, which includes national duties and responsibilities in which the State is dealing with its citizens, and international responsibilities where the State is dealing with the international community On the other hand, the country where the assets resulting from the corruption crime are placed has the duty and responsibility to help return the assets resulting from the corruption crime to the victim country.

Conclusion

Asset returns are a system of law enforcement carried out by victim state corruption crimes to revoke, seize, and eliminate rights to assets resulting from corruption crimes from perpetrators of corruption through a series of processes and mechanisms. Both criminal and civil, assets that are inside or stored abroad, which are tracked, frozen, seized, confiscated, and returned to the victim country resulting from a corruption crime, can restore financial losses due to corruption. Also included is to provide a deterrent effect on perpetrators and / or potential perpetrators of corruption.

There is also a mechanism for carrying out the process of returning assets resulting from corruption crimes, namely: first by tracking, then assets that have been tracked and known are then frozen, lastly, assets that are frozen and confiscated and seized by the authorized body of the country where the asset is located, and then returned to the country where the asset was taken through certain mechanisms.

An agreement on asset returns is achieved because of the need to recover assets resulting from corruption crimes as must be reconciled with the laws and procedures of the countries requested for assistance. The importance of returning assets, especially for developing countries is based on the fact that corruption crimes have taken away the wealth of these countries, while resources are needed to reconstruct and rehabilitate communities through sustainable development.

Regarding the process of returning assets resulting from corruption crimes, the perpetrators of corruption crimes are able to freely cross jurisdictional and geographical boundaries between countries. Meanwhile, law enforcers do not easily penetrate jurisdictional boundaries and enforce law in the jurisdictions of other countries. For this reason, global cooperation is needed in pursuing and returning assets resulting from corruption crimes. This is done so that the state does not become a victim of corrupt assets placed abroad.

Foreign Policy in Command: The Role of ASEAN Centrality in Indonesia's Trade Policy

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Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have been a notable feature of current economic globalization. In comparison to only 23 FTAs in 2000, there have been 262 concluded FTAs in 2017 (Asian Development Bank – Asia Regional Integration Center [ADB-ARIC], 2017). Aiming for overseas market access and inflow of foreign investment, almost all countries nowadays embrace globalization by pursuing reciprocal economic liberalization. In Southeast Asia, Singapore and Malaysia are among the most active FTA players. In 2017, besides seven ASEAN-centered FTAs, Singapore and Malaysia has 22 and 14 bilateral/ plurilateral FTAs respectively. Even countries like Vietnam now joins the FTA race by securing six bilateral/ plurilateral FTAs. Despite such a global development, Indonesia remains a hesitant player. As of 2017, Indonesia has only signed two bilateral FTAs, namely with Japan and Pakistan and seven ASEAN-centered FTAs with Japan, South Korea, China, Australia and New Zealand, India and Hongkong. What is distinctive here is Indonesia maintains a strong focus on ASEAN arrangement in its FTA policy. What causes such a trend?

There are only few existing literatures on Indonesia's trade policy. Chandra (2005) and Chandra & Hanim (2010) argue that Indonesia's strong protectionism, coming from mostly domestic-oriented business sectors, has caused Indonesia's both low profile attitude to FTAs and a clear preference to multilateralism (the World Trade Organization (WTO) scheme) over preferential mechanism (such as FTAs). Meanwhile, Bird, Hill and Cuthbertson (2008) argue that Indonesia's democratization has opened up spaces for economic reforms and protectionist supporters to pursue their interests, resulting in Indonesia's trade policy to continuously swing between liberal and populist policies. Ruland (2016) argues that Indonesia's regional corporatist institutions have made trade policy-making process highly asymmetric by giving access to the government and large businesses but not to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). All these writings have one thing in common: they analyze domestic aspects of Indonesia's trade policy.

I argue that international factor is important to understand Indonesia's trade policy. Geopolitical factor, namely Indonesia's position in the midst of Great Power relations, is central to understand Indonesia's clear preferences to ASEAN-centered trade arrangements. Trade policy is subjected to the country's foreign policy, in which ASEAN mechanism has been used to interact with all Great Powers and to ensure that ASEAN is at the driver's seat of Asia-Pacific regionalism (called the 'ASEAN Centrality'). Using neoclassical realism theory, my argument consists of two parts. First, state's perception on global distribution of power is important to understand Indonesia's ASEAN-centered trade policy. Second, domestic debates (and influences) between reformist and protectionist groups are allowed only to the extent that it does not violate Indonesia's ASEAN centrality focus. There are three case studies to be discussed: a) Indonesia's position on the establishment of ASEAN Free Trade Area/ ASEAN Economic Community (AFTA/ AEC); b) the rejection to renegotiate the ASEAN-China FTA in 2010; and c) Indonesia's preferences to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The article uses qualitative research meth using both secondary sources, such as books, journals, media release and others, and primary resources from interviews.

ASEAN has been an important foreign policy tool for Indonesia since the Suharto era. Given ASEAN's past success of providing peace and stability in the region, including resolving Cambodian conflict, Indonesia found ASEAN as both an important and prestigious arena for the country's international standing. Through ASEAN, Indonesia can overcome its structural small-medium power limitations and has the chance to play a 'brokerage role' between the surrounding Great Powers, such as China, Japan and the United States (US) (Goh, 2011). Domestically, geopolitical nature of Indonesia's trade policy is supported by the relatively elitist nature of Indonesia's trade policy-making. Only a handful of ministries, such as the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as large business sectors and several think-tanks involve in the process (Chandra, 2010; Ruland, 2016). All ASEAN-centered and bilateral FTAs that Indonesia has signed so far do not go into parliamentary ratification since Law No. 24/ 2000 on International Agreement does not oblige the executive to do so. It was only recently under the Law No. 7/ 2014 on Trade that the law requires ratification

for FTAs. Under such situations, it is no wonder that geopolitical reasons have a fertile ground to influence Indonesia's trade policy-making.

In all three case studies, it is very clear that geopolitics and the ASEAN Centrality plays a very important role. Before the AFTA was founded in 1992, there were various international developments that somehow undermined ASEAN's existence, such as the end of the Cold War and the alleged protectionism in North America and Western Europe (Stubbs, 2000). When the AEC was launched in 2003, ASEAN had been criticized for not being able to help its members escaping the Asian Financial Crisis and the region has been facing severe economic competition from China and India. In both timelines, the AFTA and the AEC establishment was meant to reinvigorate or reassert that ASEAN is still relevant for global development. Domestically, such a reasoning found an ally from the reformist group since further market liberalization (albeit moderately) is important to cope with Indonesia's economic slowdown before the founding of the AFTA/ AEC. In the second case study, in the early 2010, there were various street and media protests from the populist/ protectionist camp since the ASEAN-China FTA had been alleged to trigger surging import from China. Only a year after the implementation of the ASEAN-China FTA, import volume has risen by 34 percent, especially in labor intensive sectors such as textile, toys and footwear, contributing to import deficit of around US$ 5 billion (Viva News, 28 April 2011). However, no less than President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono opposed calls for renegotiation by asserting that the government needed to maintain adherence to ASEAN solidarity (Viva News, 21 Jan. 2010). In the third case study, namely the TPP/ RCEP between 2010-2014, Indonesia decided that it would choose the RCEP over the TPP. The latter agreement has a clear geopolitical context since the US positioned the TPP as part of its pivot strategy in the Asia-Pacific which, if successful, may undermine the central role that ASEAN has been successfully playing to date (Ravenhill, 2011; Yoshimatsu, 2012). The RCEP's First Joint Statement in 2012 specifically mention that it would maintain the ASEAN Centrality principle. Indonesia's RCEP decision outplayed domestic reform groups that called for further market liberalization more aggressively sought under the TPP.

Therefore, it is clear that a geopolitical factor, namely the ASEAN Centrality, plays important roles in Indonesia's trade policy. It sets the overall direction of Indonesia's trade policy, namely Indonesia's adherence to ASEAN mechanism. It also limits the maneuver of domestic interest groups, such as protectionist and reform groups, which still influence trade policy-making but only to the extent that it does not violate the ASEAN Centrality principle.

Pathways to Prosperity? Resource-Based Exports, Transnational Operations and the Welfare of Oil Palm Smallholders during the Boom Era

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In the first decade of the 2000s, Indonesia experienced a significant natural-resource export boom where palm oil played a leading role. The share of Indonesia's main resource exports (crude oil, gas, coal, copper, and palm oil) in total exports increased from 32% to 46% from 2002 to 2012. From 2001 to 2011, the significant boom contributed to the GDP growth--averaged almost 5% annually, in per capita terms. Palm oil production increased by almost 12% per year from 1998 to 2014, and the share of palm oil exports increased from 2% in 2000 to 9% by 2012. However, the boom was accompanied by some contradictory indicators: the declines in growth rates of manufacturing sector output and employment as well as in some measures of progress in educational attainment (Coxhead and Shrestha 2016).

Indonesia took over Malaysia as the world's largest producer of palm oil in 2007 where its products (palm oil and kernel oil) are mostly exported to India, China and Europe. In addition to meet the demand of the global market, a large portion of the production of palm oil is also intended for the Indonesian domestic (home) market where palm oil became the most common cooking oil and is listed as one of the staple food.

The rapid growth of oil palm plantations in Indonesia began around the 1990s, from roughly only 100 hectares in 1967 to around 1.84 million hectares in 1993 and expanded to approximately 10.5 million hectares in 2013. The phenomenon is part of a trend that is growing in Southeast Asia where in recent decades the spectacular

growth of the industry has contributed significant foreign exchange earnings to a number of countries in the region. After the Asian financial crisis in 1998, the expansion of oil palm plantations in Southeast Asia was characterized by the increasing role of TNCs (Pye 2013). Moreover, Borras Jr. (2013) argues that the current oil palm boom is a direct result of the changed global context, namely the response of capital accumulation strategies to the convergence of multiple crises and the emerging needs for resources by the new centers of global capital. Beside the widespread use of palm oil for vegetable oil and processed food, the prospect of increasing demand from new biofuel markets in Europe and the United States has brought investors to Indonesia. The production costs of palm oil are the lowest compared to other vegetable oil-yielding crops and it is now the largest source of vegetable oil.

The palm oil plantations in Southeast Asia have been in operation since the colonial period with little or direct connection with the West African groves. In Indonesia it was planted for the first time by the Dutch colonialists in the Buitenzorg Botanic Gardens 1848, and as the experimental plots were established in 1860 the Deli's plantation belt in eastern coastal plain of Sumatra was opened around 1866 (Stoler 1995). The first large-scale commercial oil palm plantations were established in the region in 1911 and have been characterized as transnational operations. During the Dutch colonial era oil palm plantations were largely controlled by large foreign private companies. From its independence in 1945 until early 1990s, the Indonesian oil palm industry was largely dominated by state plantation companies.

The strategic role of oil palm in achieving economic growth is due to the Indonesian comparative advantage in terms of labor and land costs. The expansion of the industry was justified under the principle of the "right to development" and as the world's largest producer of palm oil, Indonesia's national policies are aimed at maintaining the country's competitive advantage. To increase the competitiveness of Indonesian agricultural products in the global market, in 1991 the Government of Indonesia liberalized the palm oil market by limiting the state involvement and allowing market mechanisms to regulate the palm oil market (Susanti and Maryudi 2016).

However, it was not until the 1998 Indonesia-IMF agreement that the industry has experienced radical transformation. Not only the agreement lifted the ban on foreign investment in the plantation sector, it also opened up the opportunity for small-scale investments in the sector which previously dominated by a mega-capital oligopoly. The agreement with the IMF has led to substantial investments by Malaysian companies followed by Singaporean and the U.S. companies. The implementation of decentralized government in 2001 has further driven the rapid expansion of oil palm plantations in Indonesia as the districts have had responsibility for the issuance of permits for the first three stages of plantation development.

Indonesian oil palm production currently is concentrated in the island of Sumatra and from 1998 has been characterized by a large number of smallholder plantations. In 2013 50% of the country's 10.5 million hectares oil palm plantations are located in that region where almost 42% (nearly 4.5 million hectares) of oil palm plantations were cultivated by smallholders. The rapid growth of smallholder plantations in the province of Jambi, the main oil palm frontier of Sumatra, was caused by the spread of independent commodity market for oil palm which linked to global biofuels demand (McCarthy 2010). Moreover, in line with the upsurge in neoliberal ideas in favor of privatization, in 1995 the government withdrew from funding the smallholders in the establishment of oil palm plantations, by introducing a new credit scheme known as KKPA (Potter 2016)

The Indonesian development is characterized by biased toward economic development (Salim 2005) and can also be categorized as an extractive regime (Gellert 2010) where the foreign exchange earnings are obtained through the exploitation of Indonesia's natural resources which is always geared to meet the world market demand (Okamoto 2001). Despite its association with deforestation and land conflicts, oil palm represents a vast economic opportunity for the Indonesian government, and thus considered as the main component of its development strategy as well as the main driver of people's economy. While some groups of growers, especially migrants and second generation transmigrants, in Riau and Jambi are doing better; the adverse incorporation of small farmers into the oil palm economy still continues in the latter province where large numbers of local landholders remain poor, and many become landless (McCarthy 2010). Furthermore, Potter (2016) argues that the schemes available for smallholders, in terms of land allocation, have evolved from favorable to the one that has recently become much more onerous.

A highly selective rolling back of the state is one of globalization's features (Bernstein 2009). Focusing on the cases of smallholders in Indonesia's main producing provinces in the era of neoliberal globalization, this paper discusses the processes of incorporating smallholders into the industry and its implications to their livelihoods.

As a number of studies showed that migrant growers are better off than local people, the discussions also include relations between local and migrant growers in the Indonesia's leading oil palm provinces where the issues of 'intruders' can play a part in national disintegration (Suryadinata 2000).

Keywords: oil palm, transnational operations, smallholders, national integration

The Distortion of The Idea of Separation of Power in American Military History

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Introduction

As a nation, America was established on a single noble idea, that is liberty. The philosophy of democracy that prevailed during its early years hinged on a premise that political liberty is the fundamental component of various forms of freedom, in particular political freedom. How such freedom is attained within American society?

The drafters of American constitution ["*the framers*"] had the idea of "*checks and balances*". It stemmed from the French-British philosophy of separation of power proposed by Montesquieu & John Locke. Collectively they posited that the power in a state should no longer rest on one individual, but it has to be distributed to three separate branches, namely the executive, the legislative and the judicial. But while the concept is pure separationist, the framers did not separate the power categorically, but in a certain degree they share each other's power to those three branches.

The reasoning behind this is to prevent absolution of power that would go unchecked. The *Federalist.* no.10 & 51 says "*The different government will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself*". In this instance, America is applying the concept of partial separation of function, meaning that America's statecraft is designed in such a way to prevent the possible overreaching of one branch to the other.

This also applies for war situation. In Artice I, Section 8 of the Constitution, it is stipulated that the authority of Congress is to declare war, whilst in Article II, Section 2, it is provided that the Presidential authority is to be the *Commander-in-Chief*. The questions that follow are how is the operational relation between declaring the war and commanding the war? how big actually the scope of President's power in this matter? Does the Congress have to, at all-time and condition, declaring the war first then the President can start deploying his troops? Can the checks and balances work here?

Method

This paper employs qualitative approach, it is based on literary research where the data is collected, analyzed and connected to other data to form an argument. By using historical, legal dan political approach a final conclusion will be drawn.

Findings

A study conducted by Milton Offutt in 1928 found that during 1813-1927, 76 wars have occurred where America was involved. James Grafton Rogers in his study in 1945 said that America has conducted 148 wars in foreign soil, while *Library of Congress* [1970] found that America has involved itself in 165 wars [Fisher, 1972:177]. Of all this, it is recorded that only five times Congress has authorized war. The last authorization was Iraqi war [Barron, 2016:409]. How could this happen? What happened to the idea of check and balances?

Discussion

This paper argues that in terms of military history, the idea of check and balances suffers distortion that render it impractical. This is caused by 4 reasons:

1] Normative-Conceptual Reason

According to War Power Resolution 1973 [WPR], President has to report to the Congress whereas military force is going to be introduced. As it is possible, this report must be made by the President 48 hours before initiating the operation. History has shown that in many instances, these stipulations were not met accordingly. I argue that this is not caused by insubordination to the constitution, but there is an inherent confusion within the concept of separation of power, namely the absence of clear boundaries of each branch's power.

2] Institutional Reason

Regarding the relation of Congress and WPR, Blechman asserted that the existence of WPR actually has made the Congress feel uneasy for years. If Congress withhold the requested fund, not only it could jeopardize U.S. military personnel, but also it could make the situation in the conflict country to deterioriate, then the Congress could be accused of being apathetic to the cause of humanity. Alternatively, if Congress grant the requested fund, then if something bad occurred, the Congress had to share the blame and responsibility with the President. Blachmannn said that historically speaking, both probabilities are not favored by Congress [Blachman, 1990:194].

While for the president, post 9 / 11, the investigative reporters Arkin and Priest found there were 1,074 new federal organizations established by the President and working for the President. These organizations are working closely with another 2,000 private companies, working in over 17,0000 locations all across America. The number of staff working in Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency rose from 7,500 in 2002 to become 16,500 in the end of 2010, and all of them are working in tight secrecy [Arkin & Priest. 2011:86]. This has raised the concern of over-secrecy of the executive that would evade any checks from any other branches.

3] Historical-Cultural Reason

Under Obama's administration, America has launched 542 drone strikes, killing at least 3,797 people including 324 civilians without substantial checks from the congress. This aggressiveness must be seen from a particular culture shared by American since its early days, namely the paranoia of external attack towards its territory. Based on The Justice Department White Paper and armed drones, America's military personnel went anywhere around the globe carrying the mission to appease its thirst of security.

4] The Strategic-Economic Reason

Since Cold War, America has been making a lot of advancement in military weaponry, with its defense budget that is the biggest in the world. Recently the world sees the rise of China, primarily in economics and trade, and then defense industry. Some scholars argue in order to maintain the military technological gap between the two, Congress has to keep granting massive budget to Department of Defense requested by the executive.

Conclusion

The combination of these factors, I argue, has debilitated the mechanism of checks and balances. It appears to the author that when it comes to necessity, American people is willing to put aside noble principle, since necessity in itself is the prerequisite of freedom and liberty the historical legal and political system was established for.

Keywords: Separation of power, checks and balances, war power, constitution

Papuan Nationalism and Indonesia: Making Sense of Contemporary Papua Transnational Advocacy Network

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Introduction

The early history of Papua became integrated into Indonesian territory was an international politics issue (*Pepera* or *Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*), which was a decolonization issue in Cold War era. In modern era, discussing Papuan issues also has a strong international dimension since Papuan issues are frequently mentioned in international forums by numerous international organization, relating to the demands of self-determination.

One of the most important issues, and continues to be a major question to date, is the matter of Papuan identity in Indonesian identity. Indonesia, as a nation, is depicted as a finished project, which resulted the expression *NKRI Harga Mati*. According to several articles (Chauvel (2005), Drooglever (2010)), Papuan nationalism is tightly interwoven with the process of recognition of Papua integration history through the process of the act of free choice, and is determined by Indonesian contemporary political condition and how Papuans interpret the condition.

Chauvel stated that Indonesia had a significant role in triggering the rise of Papuan nationalism, while Panders denoted that Papuan nationalism was not shaped by Indonesia as a resistance towards Dutch colonization as has been voiced all along, but it was a Papuan response on their interaction with their neighbor in Maluku (or Moluccas) and Malays, and the Christian values which then shaped a dialectic. Drooglever, on the contrary, highlighted that Papuan nationalism was shaped by Dutch imperialism through the formation of political organization and bureaucracy as a preparation for power transfer from Dutch imperials to Indonesia. Bernarda Meterey (2012) complemented various studies of Papuan nationalism which argues that Papuan identity first emerged since 1937 rather than Indonesian identity through education and Christianity sponsored by priests. Bernada (2012) claims that Indonesian influence had not been felt until 1963 when New York Agreement officially recognized Papua as Indonesian territory.

On numerous study of nationalism, there are substantial amount of articles on how scholars make sense of nationalism (Smith, 2001, 1998; Hyland Eriksen, 1993; Anderson, 1983, 1991; Connors, 1993; Gellner, 1983; and Hasting).

Nationalism is rooted in the understanding of the concept of nation, which differs from state. Anderson (1991) on his most well-known *Imagined Community* explained the relations of the meaning of nation, nation-state, and nationalism. The concept of nation precedes the birth of state, while nationalism is a political principle supported by state.

Nationalism in modern perspective is a dynamic process: its existence and sustainability is heavily affected by conscious effort and will of every member to stay united. Nationalism is therefore a concept that develops as time and space continue to renew itself to remain relevant in the midst of changing times. A nationalism that has matured and developed has the ability to bond its citizens to continue being devoted to their nation in their minds and have the same image of the purpose of their lives as a nation.

Indonesia, as a nation, is depicted as a finished project, which resulted the expression *NKRI Harga Mati*. Kahin (1952) stated that Independence Proclamation of Indonesia could be considered as the peak of accomplishment of national struggle that had begun since *Kebangkitan Nasional* or National Awakening (1908), *Sumpah Pemuda* or Youth Pledge (1928), to Independence (1945).

Papuan identity is still voiced in international scene by Papuan Human Rights Transnational Advocacy Network. The important question to be answered in this paper is whether Papuanization is a part of Papuan nationalism or Indonesian nationalism? Will the Papuan transnational advocacy movement strengthen or weaken Indonesian identity? In other words, will the Papuan transnational advocacy movement strengthen the

difference between Papuan and Indonesian people and dissociate the two, or will it integrate Papua within the frame of NKRI (United Republic of Indonesia)?

To be Indonesian, for Indonesians themselves, is yet to be a final process and efforts made by Indonesian government to 'Indonesianize' Papuans have not been very successful and the task is still a tough challenge.

Research Methods

The research uses qualitative methods, limited ethnography and discourse analysis with critical interpretive perspective through qualitative data collective techniques: in-depth and open interviews with informants consisting of central figures in domestic-based Papuan transnational advocacy network who are connected with the organization ULMWP (United Liberation Movement for West Papua) abroad, youth activists, church figures, community leaders and figures, and scholars in Papua and Jakarta.

Information extraction is also performed through the study of documents, case records, books, and journals. Observation process is conducted continuously during the research period of 2016-2017.

Temporary Findings

Preliminary findings of the research suggest that various Papuan human rights transnational advocacy networks organization (Free West Papua Campaign (FWPC), *Negara Federal Republik Papua Barat* (NFRPB) or Federal Republic State of West Papua), although they formed United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), in fact it does not eliminate the autonomy and independence of each organization to implement and execute their respective advocacy agendas. The ideology of the movement is also diverse and various: ethno-nationalism (melanesian, curly-to-afro hair, dark skinned), and democratic nationalism (a more modern nationalism which upholds humanity). On each ideology, the tendency to cut ties with Jakarta is a primary feature similarly found among the organizations.

The next question arise is whether cutting ties with Jakarta will dissociate Papua from Indonesia. Findings upon the question tentatively suggest that although the human rights advocacy network movement grows larger, the issues highlighted to be the main concern and voiced are not well-known among Indonesians. Human rights violation issues in Papua are rarely or never broadcasted in national mainstream media, and advocacy movement through social media is also silenced by security forces.

Conclusion

Making sense of the concept of nationalism in the context of globalization and transnationalism in this era needs a new and fresh interpretation so that Indonesian identity could accept and integrate Papuan identity, or so that Papuan identity would not feel strange and misplaced within Indonesian concept of Bhinneka. The relation between Indonesia and Papua should be a developing relation that complements each other and grows positively with the contribution and inclusion of Papuan people. In this era, discussing Indonesian nationalism has yet to move from the definition that relies on the principle of sovereignty that is interpreted through territorial boundaries.

Keywords: Papuan Nationalism, Indonesian Nationalism, Papuan Transnationalism

The digital era that we find today has changed people's way of communicating, connecting, interacting and relating with each other. With almost everything becoming digital, people's way of using communication technology in the "here and now" era has changed drastically from the conventional to the innovative. With the advent of communication technology innovations that herald new or convergent media eras, there is likely no coming back for older kinds of technology.

Through the media, particularly in this new age of internet connectedness, dominated by new communication technology, more commonly called new media, the public at large can receive or follow all kinds of information, either about recent news, ideas, ideologies, trends or tastes. The list is endless. With this information, the public can then make decisions important for their survival, some of which are based on their social constructions and foundational concepts or life events in their surroundings.

To focus on nationalism as the main theme of this conference, new digital media has been the core topic of various studies, research activities and discussions, particularly in relation to its role in generating and forming the meaning and sense of the concept among the public. Following some references about the definitions of nationalism, in general it can be deduced as something that is closely related to the idea of the nation, national identity, nationhood, national loyalty, sovereignty, patriotism, national supremacy, and ethno-cultural membership.

It is expected that in this conference, specific discussions on nationalism in the digital era will center around questions or issues such as: (1) the role of the new convergent media in building a sense of nationalism among the public, and (2) how do audiences, consumers, or what are now called prosumers, construct the concept of nationalism? Of course other issues can arise concerning digital nationalism, and thus the list of topics is not just limited to these problems or questions.

Social Stability in *Taman Minggu Raya (TMR)*, Banjarbaru, South Kalimantan: An Ethnography of Social Network Analysis

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Taman Minggu Raya (hereinafter referred to as TMR) residing at the municipality of Banjarbaru, South Kalimantan. It is a city park that is strategically located, addressed in the middle of the city adjacent to the mayor's office and surrounded by the government's office complex. TMR is a town square, often a place for people to spend their leisure times; people who enjoy their afternoon, city government staff, tourists, a place shared by all citizens. Residents also come from various areas near Banjarbaru, thus TMR is a gathering place. The creation of TMR as center of activities which could bring more achievement for these actors/nodes, there are some requirement to be met, which is security. Creating TMR's security alone is not enough, they need to maintain TMR as a valuable resource. Social Networks is a net of points of which joined by lines. The points of the image are people, or sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which people interact with each other. A network of this kind has no external boundary' (Barnes, 1954: 43). The research started from an ego centered / personal networks; individual and alter (Boissevain, 1974; Wellman & Berkowitz, 1988), Data collected using an in-depth interview combined with participant observation. Scott (1994: 4) states that in the Social Network paradigm, structures are built based on the relationships built by the actors involved, so that the data collection and analysis carried out is dependent on the data of the relationships it builds. Relationship data is obtained from how actors engage in social relations with each other and bound by the same interest. Thus, data can be categorized into three important elements: Point, Line and Direction (See Agusyanto 2007; Scott 1994: 9-12). Identifying actors involved in the social networks for securing TMR as a resource, first, the originator and creator the TMR, which is the RDR, OFN and DP actor. Second, the actor responsible for daily

security management at TMR. Third are actors who are in charge of maintaining security during music concerts / grand remembrances. Fourth, security coaching and recruitment. These actors bound by a specific social relationship, have its own unique relationship. Interconnected to a certain network that are unique. The center of activities at TMR is the result of collaboration of a social network in Banjarbaru. Actors in this case found opportunities from TMR's existence as a strategic public space. They then built social relations with various other actors to make TMR the center of activities in Banjarbaru. TMR which is used as a center of activity is one of the ways that actors in this case fulfill their needs. Competition between people fighting over resources is also important in this regard. Competition and cooperation are two things that cannot be released from one another. Cooperation is a way to deal with competition and competition is a way because of the collaboration in fighting for resources between people. TMR which has been used as a center of activity is not necessarily left alone but is maintained by the actors in this case. The maintenance of TMR as the center of activities is the collaboration carried out by actors by building social relationships between them. Maintenance at TMR is carried out through security services by actors who work with one another. The actors in this case are one example of the phenomenon of social networks that exist in society. Actors numbering more than three units, form the relationship of social relations between one actor and another. there is a set of bonds that connect one actor to another. These actors streamed 'something' in their relationship, be it goods, direction of coordination, instructions, work advice, etc. among them. there are certain patterns of social relations that exist between them. A will contact B for certain rights and obligations in the network, and vice versa, B will contact C or A if they need the role of other actors in a social network. The circuits that are formed between the relationships between actors in this network, ultimately differentiate them from one network to another. These bonds bind actors who are related as a whole and are relatively stable or have an element of time that limits them. In other words, in a network, there are rules and laws that govern the patterns of social relations between them. there are rights and obligations that govern what can be done by them and what should not be done by actors who belong to members of a social network (Agusyanto, 2007: 9-13). There are social relationships that are formed, maintained and maintained by actors. This social relationship has the construction of a social relationship that is different from one another. In the field, researchers found that there were actors who were connected to one another, in which the relationship between the actors had social interaction between them (Barnes, 1954). These actors have no restrictions on where they come from, who they are, whether public servants, thugs, buskers, political elites of an area, all parties can be involved and what distinguishes them from other social units is the interest (Agusyanto, 2007).

In existing social relations, there are exchanges that occur between actors. This exchange between actors is governed by the interests of actors who engage in social relations. The interests of actor A will be different from those of actor B, therefore they negotiate to meet their respective needs and interests. For example, A requires a job that can provide a permanent income for him, but he is a thug who does not have a tertiary education, so A will contact actor B who is actually a government employee to find him a job. Actor B is an employee who needs security services for TMR, but can coordinate with existing thugs, therefore both will exchange with the aim of meeting their individual needs.

Discourse of Nationalism in Film “Denias, Senandung di Atas Awan”

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This research is raising the nationalism discourse in the film of “Denias, Senandung Diatas Awan”. The awareness of an importance of a nationalism themed film is already appeared since Indonesian new order era. According to Teguh Karya, film has a national function which is important for a country itself (Sen, 1994:85-75). However, nationalism themed films at that moment is an extension from government for its own interest at the status. The dark days of the Indonesian’s film industry fallout when then reformation era has declared. Differently with the new order era, Indonesian’s films in the reformation era has a courage to representing the reality and conflict against the society. Nevertheless, nationalism themed film still seldom produced. Mean while in the reformation era, Indonesian film is tending to be on a romanced and upper-class life story themed films. The shining of the romance themed films is tending to close a space for nationalism themed film. It is

undeniable that the dim of the nationalist film has implications for lifestyle and behavior of society in general. The fading of the patriotism and the love of the homeland, especially in the younger generation, is marked by the rampant cases of crime committed by the youth.

Methods

Qualitative text research method as an analysist of Michel Foucault discourse with approachment of language text analysist and orientated on social toward the discourses. The discourse approachment figuring practical discursive which formed by relation of power toward social identity construction, social relation, and knowledge-believe system. Foucault concept of "power and knowledge" has a truth of claiming that access of the universal right couldn't speak about a position out of the discourses. Data collecting technique's which obtained by watching and observing every sequel and the dialogue in the film.

Findings

By the analysis of the Foucault discourse about the power and knowledge which is shown on the film of "Denias, Senandung Diatas Awan". The story of the film is based on the true story of how a local man of Papua which have a high spirit to going to school even though in a poverty line. For the information, the reality in the status quo shown there still many children (especially in Papua) couldn't reach the education and they having a high spirit to going to school is only given to middle or upper class which have a vital position such as chief of tribe, and having a important position with a wealthy condition. After being analysed trough the discourse's analysis of Foucault with a relation of power that shown in this film succeeding on shows it nationalist discourse through spirit, hard work, educational, ethnicity, natures wonder and social class struggle. This film echoing the national anthem of Indonesia Raya as patriotic side as a positive aspect. Educational aspect in this film shown as a high spirited and hardworking for going to school. Ethnicity that shown in the film is exposing the tribes in the Papua remote area. Scenery of the natural wonders shown on the mountain, hill, and the rivers of Papua. Social class struggle shown in the film as the main character achieved his dream to go to school even if he in a poverty line. It is undeniable that the dim of the nationalist film has implications for lifestyle and behavior of society in general.

Discussion

Nationalist discourse on the film and the youth is interesting to be reviewed in many opportunities, because however a young generation is the changing generation which is responsive toward the revolution around. Finally at the year of 2000 is the leading year to a modern (from technology, story and setting). The films in Indonesia has gained a positive feedback from every aspect. In 2006 the presence of the film "Denias, Senandung di Atas Awan" produced by Alenia Pictures directed by Ari Sihasale and Nia Zulkarnaen, has gained it popularity of Indonesian film makers. The nationalism discourse raised by this film, can be seen from it content which contain several aspect of life such as education, ethnicity, natural wonders, and social-class struggle and friendship. These aspects are rarely appears on the contemporary Indonesian films especially nationalism themed film. Therefore, this film signed a new paradigm and innovation in the film industry with nationalism themed.

This film is starring by Albert Thom Fakwader as a main character Denias. Directed by John de Rantau and starring Ari Sihasale too which is local man of Papua. The shooting of the film is located in Wamena and Timika. This film is well known as a success film in national and international level proofed by the film of "Denias, Senandung di Atas Awan" winning a nominee of "Humanity Award" Biffest 2006, "Honorable Ethnicity Film" FBB 2007, dan "Best Movie" Jiffest 2006. Even this film entering a nominee of Oscar Awards in 2008 as foreign movie Award. The successful of the film proofed Indonesia's film existence in International level as a nationalist themed film.

Conclusion

Nationalism discourse in the film and younger generation is interesting to be reviewed from many aspects and opportunity. However young generation is the changing generation which is responsive toward the revolution

arrounds. Film of "Denias, Senandung Diatas Awan". Is successfully to raise the nationalism discourse, shown by the content of the film which contain several aspects such as nasionalism, education, ethnicity, and natural wonders, and social-class struggle and friendship. These aspects are rarely shown in contemporary Indonesia's films especially nationalism themed film. Therefore, this film is signed a new paradigm and innovation in Indonesian film industry which is nationalism themed film. By the analytical of the Foucault discourse about power and knowledge which is shown by this film, could be concluded that the film successfully show the nationalism as the "power" by spirit of hardworking, education, ethnicity, natural wonders, and social-class struggle. This film is conveyed and represent the importance of moral of education for children through the film.

Keyword: Nationalism, discourse, Youth, Hardwork, Education, Ethnicity, Social Class Struggle

Improving Start-up Entrepreneur Decision Making Process during Crisis through Human Virtual Intelligence

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Introduction

Nationalism can be transformed to many aspects. One of them is in entrepreneurship spirit. Entrepreneurs take a significant role in the development of a country. Entrepreneurs create jobs (Fölster, 2000; Shane, 2009). They drive and shape innovation, speeding up structural changes in the economy (Bosma & Levie, 2010). By introducing new competition, they contribute indirectly to productivity. Entrepreneurship is thus a catalyst for economic growth and national competitiveness (Kelley *et al.*, 2011).

Many start-up ventures fail at an early stage due to poor entrepreneurial decision-making that lacked practical business knowledge, skills, and experiences. Especially when they were hit by crisis. Unlike Chief Executive Officers (CEO) of large and mature organizations, who make important decisions collectively, a Start-up Entrepreneurs (SE) has to make decisions on his own. However, his decision-making could be improved significantly if he is able to consult a virtual network of advisors, mentors, business partners, relevant parties, and information systems that is termed as Human Virtual Intelligence (HVI). The main issue is how can an *ad-hoc* decision-making SE be transformed into a consultative decision-maker who can make effective business decisions in multiple contexts during crisis?

Method

To find out, an in-depth study on SE decision-making practices was conducted to determine their decision-making lifestyles. The study employed mixed methods including crowdsourcing, psychometric profiling and a lifestyle field study. Using Checkland's Soft System Methodology and Snowden's Cynefin Framework, a transformation model was developed. To validate this model, Action Research was conducted on members of the Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs Association. In the validation, a pre-test comprising of questions on business decisions was used to determine the SE decision-making competency. From the test, the worst performers were selected as candidate for transformation. An HVI awareness program was developed and then provided to the candidates for them to quickly learn how to utilize HVI to make consultative business decisions. After finishing the program, a post-test was conducted to determine if the candidate's business decision-making has improved. From the study, it was found that more than 80% made effective decisions in multiple contexts during crisis, confirming that the consultative decision-making transformation model can improve SE business decision-making practices.

Findings

The general situation and the nature of an SE's lifestyle and decision-making practices can be derived from the crowd perspectives. The issues are depicted to acknowledge, explore, define, and express the complexity of SE's situational decision-making practices. Pictures are a better medium than linear prose for expressing situations. They can be taken in as a whole and help to encourage holistic rather than reductionist thinking about a situation (Checkland & Scholes, 1990).

The success of MSEs depends to a large extent on strategic decision-making practices (Robinson & Pearce, 2006). However, compared to big and mature organizations, where the decision making process is more defined and well-understood as well as supported by an abundance of policy and regulations, MSEs are not well-understood. The issues that these organizations confront are normally complex, unstructured, and, in most cases, totally new depending on the areas that the venture is exploring. The decisions require creativity and innovation, and they are highly dependent on the leading entrepreneurial decision-making style. Policies and regulations have not been setup and, in most cases, are regarded as not important in the early stages of an organization's life cycle.

Discussion

The output of this research was a decision-making model, so further research is needed to create a real computing system to support SE's decision-making. Creating an intelligent decision support system (DSS) – small office home office (SOHO) community-based computing system for entrepreneurial endeavors would be very challenging. The SSM ensures what needs to be accommodated in user requirements and then follows up with a software development method to construct the computing system.

The computing system should have connectivity to traditional and social media sites. With business productivity tools, the entrepreneur can do work (sending quotes and invoices) in a shorter amount of time. When in need of quick advice, the entrepreneur can directly call or e-mail his or her personal virtual intelligence community. For harder issues, the crowdsourcing method can be used; however, crowdsourcing appeals can only be made after a thorough search has been done by a data mining system to detect whether the problem has not been answered before.

Problems, answers, actions, and experiences should be stored and managed by a knowledge management system. A problem should also be defined more clearly by a problem composition system. The draft problem can then be sent to a smaller community identified by the system for advice and recommendations. The final appeal would then be sent to a social media site that the system identifies based on certain criteria. This will ensure a high response rate from the knowledge agents identified in the crowdsourcing exercise. This could be very useful during crises.

Conclusion

This paper attempts to provide a way to improve the decision-making practices of SE by utilizing HVI in order to achieve a successful business venture. This research includes three steps: determining the current decision-making lifestyles of SE, developing a transformation model, and validating the model empirically. From the lifestyle study, it can be concluded that SE have a tendency toward *ad-hoc* decision-making. Based on this fact, a consultative decision-making model was developed using the SSM. The model was validated by implementing it into the SE decision-making lifestyle, and the results confirmed that there was a significant improvement in the decision-making practices of the SE when the consultative model was implemented.

The consultative decision-making model is a guide for SE to solve business problems in crises by utilizing HVI. In this very complex business world, the speed of entrepreneurial learning cannot follow the dynamics of the new situations that SE face. The competency gap will widen rapidly unless SE can use virtual intelligence to help improve their situation. SE should not be alone in facing fierce competition and crises or chaotic problems: they must consult their virtual agents to access and exploit the available knowledge and information. Decisions should not be made in a social vacuum. Collective brain power is stronger than individual brain power

Keywords: Start-up entrepreneurs, crisis management, decision making, human virtual intelligence

The Role of Message Management Strategy by Public Relations in Building Image of Government Institution Through Twitter (Qualitative Studies in Directorate General of Taxes)

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Introduction

Today, with the growing technology that brings the internet and its supporting tools, government institution are also working to use it. As a multi-stakeholder institution with one of the largest numbers of people, public communication is important to do. Internet utilized by PR to build image and maintain public trust. According to Onggo, (2004: 2-7), PR activities that use the internet as a medium of communication is called cyber PR.

Cyber PR provide benefits compared to PR activities by using conventional media, among others, can build a strong relationship between companies or organizations with the public because the communication is a two-way communication, so that interaction became more personal. Another advantage is saving more.

One of the social media used in cyber PR is Twitter. Until the first quarter-2017, Twitter users worldwide reached 328 million, increase 14% over the same period in the previous year. Interestingly, Indonesia entered as the top 5 countries with the most Twitter users in the world. Based on data from the Ministry of Communications and Information, Twitter users in Indonesia reached 63 million. With a large number of users, the potential Twitter is used as a choice of means of communication between government institution with their audiences.

Meanwhile, one of the government institution that use Twitter is the Directorate General of Taxes of the Republic of Indonesia. They joined Twitter since April 2012. In fact, the number of followers Twitter Directorate General of Taxes has reached more than 73,500 thousand people (as of December 2017) and still counting.

As one of the government institution that use Twitter, it becomes interesting to see how the strategy of managing messages conducted on Twitter Directorate General of Taxes, as well as its role in building the image of the institution in the eyes of the public.

Method

This research will use constructivist paradigm as base of methodology. Research with constructivist paradigms learns about how a reality is constructed in each individual and how they imply that construction in his world to others (Patton, 2002).

Therefore, this research would be described by qualitative approach. According to Strauss and Corbin quoted by Rosady Roslan, qualitative research is a type of research that results in discoveries that can't be achieved by using statistical procedures or other quantification methods. This study would likely to use descriptive kind of research. Descriptive study is supposed to describe the phenomenon, whether it is based on nature or human construction. This phenomenon could be in kind of activity, form, change, relation, characteristic, and differences between each phenomenon with others (Sukmadinata, 2006).

The primary data would be in the form of in-depth interview by purposive sampling, there will be three informants for in-depth interview, one informants coming from active officer of Directorate General of Taxes, 2 from followers and the other 2 coming from non-followers. After obtaining the data, researchers will perform data analysis activities. Data analysis in this research will be done interactively and continuously until complete until the data obtained saturated. The analysis used in several ways is data reduction, display data, and conclusion drawing/verification (Sugiyono, 2007).

Finding

Directorate General of Taxes is one of the Directorate General under the Ministry of Finance of Indonesia which has the task of formulating and implementing policies and technical standardization in the field of taxation.

To create a common understanding between the Directorate General of Taxes and the public, PR has role to open space for the public to gain access to public information. As a PR officer, PR Directorate General of Taxes performs its functions and duties in providing information, information and education to the public about policies, activities and government measures openly, transparently, honestly and objectively.

In performing its duties and roles, PR Directorate General of Taxes is one of the government institution that utilize cyber PR. The Directorate General of Taxes has an official account in several social media managed by P2 PR. The four social media used by the Directorate General of Taxes are: Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and YouTube.

Twitter Account Directorate General of Taxes has been made since 2012. Below are messages management made by PR Directorate General of Taxes:

a. Disseminating press release which is PR product

b. Update the activities of the latest Directorate General of Taxes

c. Disseminate visual content

d. National Day Celebration

e. Respond to community complaints

f. Greet audience

Discussion

Directorate General of Taxes Directorate General of Taxes has been using Twitter account since 2012 and now it has become one of the main information channel. For the Directorate General of Taxes, Twitter is a very powerful social media and easy to reach the community.

Utilization of Twitter by the Directorate General of Taxes is to get closer and form a friendly branding and serving for the Community. To forms the expected image, they use informal language and self-image as a person with the age of 19-30 years.

The responsible division for managing content is Site Management Section, External and Internal Relations Section. With the flow of content creation on Twitter is brainstorming with the theme specified each month. Then the next created by the creative team.

Throughout 2017 the output of content generated by the Directorate General of Taxes in social media is 10,855 content. Where Twitter holds 91.34% of the total content of 9,915 content. Content management is done by doing the distribution of content, which consists of:

1. Organizational / campaign image

2. Content: product / policy

3. Content responds to issues

In managing content on Twitter, PR Directorate General of Taxes using a model of persuasive messaging. Which has the purpose to change perceptions, attitudes and opinions of audiences. To achieve maximum results in the dissemination of information content, the Directorate General of Taxes chooses to use two approaches: emotion appeal and humorious appeal. Emotion appeal is a way of composing or delivering messages by trying to arouse emotions/feelings of the audience, while humorious appeal is the technique of composing a message accompanied by humor, so that in receipt of the message the audience does not feel saturated.

Related to the impact of the content and management of messages made, PR Directorate General of Taxes revealed data that their Twitter account increased the number of followers to 29,500 followers in a period of one year. If in 2016 the number of followers 44,000, then in 2017 rose to 73,500 followers. It shows that the success of message management by the Directorate General of Taxes is able to attract the attention of the public by seeing the high enthusiasm of the followers.

Conclusion

Through message management strategies with an approach of emotion and humor, Directorate General of Taxes got enthusiasm from the public. Management of messages through social media, in this case Twitter has a role in building the image of government institution in the eyes of the public. Approach in the management of messages conducted by Directorate General of Taxes on Twitter able to form the image in the community.

Keywords: PR, Cyber PR, Twitter, Message Management, Image, Directorate General of Taxes, Indonesia

Digital Information and Nationalism in the Post-Truth Perspective

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Introductions

Post-Truth Era

Humankind once experienced an age where they were faced with easily distinguishable truth and falsehood, because objective facts, which are referred to in defining truth, still has a prominent place. Such objective fact is created from a process and procedure on a specific methodology. However, nowadays humankind is faced with a totally different situation; objective facts no longer take the paramount place, compared to things that touch personal emotions and beliefs, making it difficult to distinguish right from wrong. Even further, not only it is increasingly difficult to distinguish objectively between right and wrong, right and right seems to be in opposition due to the "packaging" that is wrapped around them. Even though they only differ at the packaging level, both can give the impression of being contradictory. The truth ultimately misleads to error/untruth, a situation explaining that we are in now the post-truth era (Ralph Keyes, 2004, p.25).

The term *post-truth* according to the Oxford Dictionary was first used in 1992. The term was expressed by Steve Tesich in *The Nation* magazine when reflecting the cases of Gulf War and Iran that occurred in that period.

The Oxford Dictionary defines post-truth as "*relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief*." This word even becomes Word of the Year in 2016 according to the Dictionary. The essence of this word is the problem between *objective facts* versus *emotional or public facts.* Two different persons can claim different facts about the same situation, and both feel objective.

The Digital World

The development of digital information technology over the past two decades has created an artificial and virtual space, built by bytes in a computer system called *cyberspace.* In this virtual space, various forms of daily life activities can be done in new ways, namely virtual ways, which create new space-time experiences: online games, social media, teleshopping, teleconferences, TV streaming, cybercrime, etc. Within cyberspace,

not only we can experience “different” experiences, but also “transcend” existing experiences. In creating a “new world”, the digital world “removes” reality from its natural context by translating it into binary code so that it can be accepted in cyberspace. However, the codification process must reduce other things that cannot be converted into binary codes, such as perceived experience, ethical values and other things.

The Digital World is the relation of elements that work through the principles of accuracy and precision; built by binary relations and binary code; which gives a definite numeric value; built by the principle of homogeneity that only gives a singular value; which has no evaluation element, because it does not allow comparison. The limitations of the digital world in digitizing reality into cyberspace require the minds of its users to adjust their way of thinking, namely digital thinking. Digital thinking is binary opposition: we/they, feminine/masculine, friend/foe (Alexander R. Galloway, 2014, p.18).

Digital Culture as Threat to Nationalism

The post-truth era creates a large fragile social construction because objective facts no longer take primary place, compared to issues that touch personal emotions and beliefs. Jean-Claude Junker (president of the European Commission) said: “We are living in a postfactual world”. Facts are considered mere opinions, whereas hoaxes are agreed with, because they are congruent with their imagination about what “facts” are. This situation leads individuals to no longer proportionally use rationality in sorting and selecting any information they receive that comes so swiftly through digital technology. This becomes a threat when a digital vector, namely the political vector begins playing a role. The digital-political vector, which moves from a generic continuum towards a series of points, is rooted in criticism, antagonism and the war of positions vis-à-vis each other. In the context of the use of social media as a medium of political communication, the encounter between the concepts of post-truth and digital thinking in cyberspace (which places them facing each other) can develop towards an extreme form of “great divide” of binary opposition, which divides communities into two opposing camps, or “splitting one into two”, as demonstrated since the 2014 presidential elections. That is a big threat to the sense of nationalism, because nationalism as the root of our sense of nationalism requires “togetherness”.

Method(s)

This study uses a literature study to the topic examined. The primary sources and references are those related to the impact of a post-truth way of thinking and a digital way of thinking that can threaten nationalism studied philosophically.

Findings

Digital technology that demands dichotomical thinking from its users (*binary thinking)* can actually create a culture of *digital thinking.* Digital thinking reduces ethical values and the sense of existential experience. This is due to the limitations of digital technology in converting reality into computer byte codes.

This situation exists in an era called the *post-truth era*; the era that is currently influencing widely the way people think about facts or truth.

Discussions

The researcher finds that the presence of post-truth thinking and the rapid development of digital technology that produces digital thinking threatens nationalism. The questions that will be elaborated are:

1. What is the link between post-truth and digital thinking?
2. What is the relationship between the encounters of post-truth and digital thinking and the threats posed to nationalism?

Conclusion

In the context of the use of social media as a medium of political communication, the encounter between post-truth and digital thinking in cyberspace (which positions each other in an opposing position) can develop towards the extreme form of the "great divide" of binary opposition, which divides communities into two opposing camps, or "splitting one into two", as demonstrated since the regional head election contestations some time ago. This is a major threat to the sense of nationalism, because nationalism as the root of our sense of nationalism requires "togetherness". Without togetherness, nationalism will fade, the Republic of Indonesia that is diverse in ethnicity, religion, race and class will be vulnerable to the desire to eliminate each other.

Keywords post-truth, digital thinking, nationalism, cyberspace, politic-digital

Strengthening the Indonesian National Identity in Digital Era through Citizen Journalism: A Case Study of the NET Citizen Journalist (NET CJ) Programme

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Introduction

Having 34 provinces and more than 17,000 islands, Indonesia is a huge country in terms of geographic, language, tribes and cultural diversity. Therefore, Indonesia has '*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika'* [unity in diversity] as its national slogan. However, this diversity has not been portrayed by Indonesian television news, which is still Jakarta centric; all national television companies are located in Jakarta. Armando (2014) finds that national televisions seldom take into account local stories as important news, and the few number of local stories are mostly about disasters, crimes and riots.

Citizen journalism is a condition whereby audience use their means to do journalistic works, which allow them to inform each other (Rosen, 2008). With only Internet and smartphone camera, ordinary people could produce and share news videos. Therefore, "there are new possibilities for everyone in the process: journalist, newsmaker and the active 'consumer' of news who isn't satisfied with today's product — or who wants to make some news, too" (Gillmor, 2003, p. vi).

Citizen journalism might be as an alternative or synergy to mainstream media. Bruns (2010) names the collaboration between professional and citizen journalists as "Pro-Am" journalism model. Compare to all television stations, NET is the most serious one on managing citizen journalism through NET Citizen Journalist (NET CJ) programme. It is not a television programme, but a term for a team and activities in the News Division of NET that select, edit and broadcast citizen journalist's videos on website and television platform. The label of NET CJ is also referred to the NET CJ members who send videos.

NET CJ members produce hard news, soft news, and features packages, with various issues such as events, tourism, culinary, cultural, public affairs, accidents and so on. Because they are scattered in Indonesia and abroad, mainly in Indonesia, their videos represent the diversity of Indonesia. Therefore, our research aims to study the perspective of citizen journalists on how the practice of citizen journalism sending videos from outside greater Jakarta might strengthen the sense of Indonesian national identity. We propose two research questions: (1) what issues do citizen journalists usually cover?; (2) to what extent does NET CJ programme represent the diversity of Indonesia?

Methods

Data was collected through a survey and interviews. There were 72 respondents participated in the survey, conducted between 20 September and 2 October 2017. Later on, deeper insight was gathered by interviewing five NET CJ members who had responded to the questionnaire.

Findings

There are 89% of respondents live in Indonesia, from 19 provinces, i.e., Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Jawa Timur, DKI Jakarta, Banten, Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Barat, Sumatera Selatan, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Aceh, Kepulauan Riau, Bengkulu, Lampung, Kalimantan Timur, Kalimantan Utara, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Tenggara, Sulawesi Selatan and Papua.

Mentioned by 63% of respondents, the main purpose of NET CJ members producing and sending videos to the NET CJ programme is to share interesting occasions/events and places in their surroundings, either in their hometown or elsewhere, to national audience. There are only 36% of respondents who are sending videos in order to get honorarium. There are three main things in their surroundings that more than half of respondents think need to be known by public. First, something that characterized (e.g. tourism, food, beverage, cloth, handy craft, etc.); second, something that unique; and third, something that related to public facilities. There are various issues that usually covered by NET CJ members, as illustrated by the Chart 1.

Chart 1. Issues covered by NET CJ members



Discussion

Most of citizen journalists aim their participation in the NET CJ programme to share interesting and/or important stories of their surroundings. They think that local characterized, uniqueness and certain issues in their surroundings need to be known by broader public. These activities allow "voices of ordinary people outside of the institutional structures of both traditional political and media power, represents an enhancement of citizenship through increasing the amount and diversity of information available to citizens" (Campbell, 2015, p. 7). This contribution of citizen journalists has challenge the national television that has broadcast very small portion of life outside Java, moreover Eastern Indonesia, which "strengthen the feeling of that they were unimportant in society" (Hendriyani, Hollander, D'Haenens, & Beentjes, 2016; also see Rakhmani, 2012).

The majority of citizen journalists live in Indonesia, in more than half of the total provinces. These people know more about their regions, as Gillmor (2006) illustrate that audience have better understanding about local issues than professional journalists do, and their number is numerous, while the professionals are limited. As Wibowo and Heychael (2014) explain that national televisions have less capacity to tell important and interesting stories from across the archipelago because of its lack in infrastructure and staff in the regions outside of Jakarta. We think that representing the diversity of Indonesia on television screen might strengthen the Indonesian national identity - a unity in diversity.

Conclusion

Citizen journalism allows televisions providing various stories from across the archipelago and portraying the diversity of Indonesia. Watching the diversity on television might strengthen a sense of Indonesian national identity of television audience.

Keywords: Citizen journalism, national identity, unity in diversity, Indonesian television

What Young Adults Think About #NKRIHargaMati in Digital Era: A Qualitative Study

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This is a descriptive study that aims to explain how young adult groups interpret issues related to the hashtag #NKRIHargaMati, which was popular in a number of social media in recent years. The issue of #NKRIHargaMati deserves to be understood further, to understand the social context behind it. This is important because with the use of digital media that is viral, quick and prevalent, in an academic context, we need to further question whether this issue is related to messages about a national crisis or problem or an issue of national identity, promotion of certain goods/services/ideas (for example changes in certain behavior), increasing knowledge or shaping individual awareness in the life of the state, or merely a jargon.

Related to this study, in a number of writings on social media, the use of the #NKRIHargaMati hashtag seems to strengthen along with the celebration of the Republic of Indonesia's independence day or the commemoration of a day that is imbued with Indonesian national discourse (such as Youth Oath Day, Pancasila Day, National Awakening Day, etc). In the opinion of the researcher, however, the use of hashtags such as #NKRIHargaMati is not necessarily related to the national discourse. On the other hand, sometimes the use of hashtags on an issue is also intended to emphasize the position of a person or group of people on certain social issues, which can be perceived as a form of support for certain situations. In other situations, the use of hashtags for certain messages is also increasing in celebration of certain contexts, in the promotion of goods, services or ideas in other social contexts. In general, related to the national narrative in the Indonesian context, the use of hashtags for messages containing nationalism appears in versions that emphasize the nuances of Indonesia's greatness, as an entity worthy of adulation, as in the following, namely: #IndonesiaHebat,

#IndonesiaKeren, #SayaIndonesia, #SayaPancasila, #100%Indonesia, and so on. In this context, the purpose of this study becomes important in understanding the meaning of the #NKRIHargaMati issue, by focusing on the selection of messages with specific hashtags.

In today's digital era, the use of hashtags (#) is important to observe in creating certain messages. When someone makes a particular message on social media, the hashtag is used at the beginning of a word or set of words (without spaces) to provide a label or keyword or key concept that is specific; which will be used by the reader (*user)* to facilitate search for further information on related topics that is more specific or comprehensive. For example, if the message/topic maker wants to share information about health services in Penang, Malaysia, in creating the message, the message creator will provide a series of hashtags for key messages related to health services in Penang, Malaysia, such as the following: #penanghospital, #medical, #medicaltourism, etc.

The use of the hashtag (#) is expected to be a reference that makes it easy for netizens to find information that suits their needs. Therefore, when the message creator uses a hashtag on a particular word or phrase, this can be indexed by the system in social media so that the word or phrase can be searched or found by other social media users. In various studies on the contents of messages in social media, the use of hashtags in words or collections of words becomes an important aspect to observe because this is related to content, trending (something that is very popular at a certain time), and very specific brands.

Related to the explanation above, this study wants to explain the position of young adults in interpreting the #NKRIHargaMati issue when they consume messages/issues in certain media. To understand this position, the researcher used the framework from Stuart Hall regarding *Reception Theory/Studies.* Stuart Hall states that this theory tries to see that the contents of messages in the (mass) media do not necessarily have extraordinary abilities in influencing readers/viewers of the media. Thus, Hall stated that the message creator (producer) cannot always influence the reader/audience (as consumers) who consume the contents of the media. In this situation, the reader/audience can have diverse positions, as consumers; namely as *dominant, oppositional* or *negotiated* consumer, in interpreting the contents of the message consumed. Related to this situation, there are a number of factors that shape the position of the reader/audience of the contents of the media; age, issues that arise, the context behind the emergence of the issue, and others.

In selecting informants, the researcher used a number of criteria such as a certain age (18- 35 years old), consumption of social media, exposure to #NKRIHargaMati issues, gender distribution, and willingness to be interviewed. To collect data, this study uses the focus group discussion technique with a number of selected informants (there are two groups, each of which will consist of 6-8 informants). Key questions asked to informants refer to a) their understanding/knowledge of communication messages using hashtag (#) signs (this includes the messages they have received so far, what messages are attracting their attention/being discussed by people/netizens, why the message is widely discussed, etc.), b) how they receive the message/information (including what media are used as sources of information, whether individuals/groups have a role as sources of information, etc.), c) their understanding of #NKRIHargaMati (include aspects such as what they understand from the hashtag, why a hashtag is needed for the message, as well as what concept/context they want to build from the #NKRIHargaMati message, etc.), d) how they interact (how they communicate with groups of friends or with other communities, how do they find out certain information, how do they distribute messages to others (information sharing), and others). Further, the information obtained in this FGD will be analyzed using thematic analysis.

The findings of this study indicate that young adult groups do not necessarily agree with the meaning of #NKRIHargaMati (not *dominant).* Based on the age criteria in this category (Erikson), the 18-35-year age group has a number of specific characteristics compared to the younger age category; i.e. the increasingly strong position of individual values, and in certain situations, their opinions about something are more well-founded and not easily influenced by their peers). So, the position of young adult groups will be in *oppositional* or *negotiated* situations in interpreting the issue of #NKRIHargaMati produced in social media. The factors that shape this position are formed by a number of aspects including individual knowledge in understanding discourses about nationality and citizenship of Indonesia, socializing experiences in schools, workplaces and within families, individual values in understanding discourse as Indonesians, knowledge in using social media, social context that takes place when individuals consume information, and others.

Keywords: Hashtag, #NKRIHargaMati, Reception Studies/Theory, Qualitative, Young Adult.

Nationalism in The Context of Political Polarization in Indonesia: Individual Response to Government Campaign “Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila” on Social Media Based on Generation Cohort

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Introduction

Monday, May 29, 2017, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) released a video titled "Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila" in his Instagram account. In the video was presented by President Jokowi in the framework of #PekanPancasila inauguration that held from May 29 to June 4, 2017. At the end of the video, President Jokowi firmly said himself as an Indonesian citizen uphold Pancasila. In the website www.presidenri.go.id said that the purpose of organizing this Pancasila Week is to strengthen and reintroduce the foundations of Pancasila and to attract the younger generation towards Pancasila.

The government campaign "Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila" takes place amid the polarization of politics that still warm after the election of DKI Jakarta. As is known, during the election of Jakarta Governor 2017 political polarization in social media occurred between pro-Ahok and anti-Ahok (Lim, 2017). This political polarization is a continuation of political polarization during the 2014 Presidential Election between Jokowi supporters and supporters of Prabowo (Lim, 2017, p. 10). The narratives constructed by pro-Ahok groups during the election of DKI Jakarta that the anti-Ahok group is a group of anti-diversity ("ke-bhinneka-an"), where diversity is part of the values of Pancasila.

Departing from the background above, this research would like to see how the response of generation groups especially the younger generation to the campaign "Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila" in the midst of political polarization that occurred.

This study uses the theory of news diffusion and the concept of public opinion in the digital age to analyze the behavior of generations of groups in response to the Pancasila campaign in social media.

Method

The approach taken in this research is quantitative method. The research was conducted by survey method using self-administered questionnaire. Samples are ITB alumni network spread in Jakarta-Bogor-Depok-Bekasi-Tangerang Selatan (region of greater metropolitan Jakarta) region as many as 374 respondents. The sample selection uses the probability principle of the sample, which gives equal opportunity to all elements of the population to be sampled.

Respondents are divided into three groups of generations, namely Baby Boomer (BB) generation, X generation and millennial generation. Individual responses are measured based on the expression of sharing, posting and commenting made by individuals in social media after obtaining the news "Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila". Partisanship is measured by the degree of individual support to the Jokowi government. News campaign "Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila" hereinafter referred to as political news in this research.

Findings

Based on data analysis, millennial generation is most passive in responding to political news. Instead, the BB generation most actively responds to political news in social media. Overall, 50% of the BB generation express themselves in social media, while millennial generation is only 21% who express themselves. Generation X is between the two with a proportion of 42.4%.

The BB generation is also most active in all forms of expression:

- Sharing: 33.3% of the generation of BB continue the political news, while the millennial generation is only 7.3%. Generation X is between the two with a continuous proportion of 21.1%.
- Commenting: 26.3% of the generation of BB also commented on the political news, while the millennial generation only 16.5% who also commented. Generation X is between the two with a proportion of 20.4% who also commented.
- Posting: 25% of the generation BB post self-photos, while millennial generation only 4.6% who post the photos themselves. Generation X is between the two with a proportion of 15.3% who post a photo of themselves.

The same pattern occurs also the degree of partisanship of respondents. BB generation most partisan, meaning the highest level of support for the Jokowi government. The sharpest political polarization is in the X generation.

Discussion

This study shows that millennial receive the slowest political news diffusion and are most passive in expressing themselves in social media on political issues. While studies abroad, indicate an increase in millennial political participation as the development of social media technology (Holt, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Ljungberg, 2013; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011).

This characteristic is in stark contrast to the baby boomers who are most active in the expression of political opinion in social media. Whereas the level of use of millennial generation of social media is higher than the baby boomer generation. Social media should increase the participation of its users in expression because of current and future trends is sharing as stated in PEW Research report 2011.

According to W. Lance Bennett, the younger generation is cut off from conventional political talks. They see the face of politics as dirty and political information from the mass media is full of engineering (Bennett, 2008). In the Indonesian context, political talks in social media are full of political polarization and hatred (Lim, 2017). Perhaps this is the situation that makes millennial withdraw from the involvement of political discussions in social media.

The online political space in social media in recent years has made more social fragmentation as a result of the increasingly sharpening of political attitudes. Millennial generation in theory is very much in keeping with group harmony. They are a more inclined generation that is more cooperative and community-oriented (Sandeen, 2008). The logic of competition that brings fragmentation and hatred does not make millennial comfortable. Perhaps this may explain why passive millennial generations in political discussions in social media today.

Conclusion

The Pancasila campaign lacks the attention of the millennial generation. The political polarization that occurs in social media makes millennial withdraw from political discussions, even they restrict access to information on political topics. Government efforts to campaign Pancasila to millennial need to consider the right communication channel that is the medium used by this generation such as Instagram. Furthermore, Pancasila campaign content should consider the impact of political polarization that appears to be acceptable to all generations.

Keywords: nationalism, political polarization, generation cohort, social media, political news diffusion.

Do Reading App Reviews and Trying Apps Predict the Use of Communication Apps?: An Experimental Study of the Relationship between Behavior, Attitude and Intention to Use

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Introduction

This study examines the acceptance of mobile communication apps particularly for non-user using an experiment. Mobile communication applications have been used in over the world. The usage of this technology grew rapidly 203% on the 2013 (Wang, 2016) as following the high number of smartphone (Hassan, et al 2014) and wireless Internet network acceptance (Yang, 2013). Previous studies were also proved that the intuitive touch screen of smartphone leads the high of adoption. The touch screen is flexible and able to be customized by the users (Nicolau, Guerreiro, Jorge, & Gonçalves, 2010).

Various communication apps as WhatsApp, Line, WeChat, KakaoTalk, and Viber have increased a social interaction among its users (Pawade et al, 2015). The smartphone is not only considered as a telecommunication device but also as a multi-use device for socialization and entertainment (Shin, 2012). The smartphone and tablet culture has changed the way people interact with devices, screens, content, and media (De Prato, et al., 2014; Shin, 2012). It requires the higher involvement of users compared with mobile Internet in general (Chung, 2014).

Email and text messaging are major (90%) user activities on smartphone and tablet (Marketing Cloud, 2014). In Indonesia, instant messaging apps usage has its own characteristic. Indonesian prefer to chat on the instant messaging and it placed Indonesia as the highest process volume of digital messages in South East Asia (Grazella, 2013). The average of installed instant messaging apps in Indonesia was 4.2 (Rudd, 2016). It showed Indonesian user installed four or five instant messaging apps on their mobile device with WhatsApp and BlackBerry Messenger as the most favorite apps (Amin, 2014).

Mobile communication apps acceptance has been studied in various contexts as China (Huang, 2003; Mao & Palvia, 2010), Saudi Arabia (Al-Gahtani, 2016), Pakistan (Hassan, et al., 2014) and South Korea (Lee, et al., 2012). It has modified Theory of Reasoned Actioned (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and Technological Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) with other concepts as follows: social needs, collective value, and user testimonies. Reading app reviews on the app store had affected the mobile app's acceptance positively (Song, et al., 2013). Trying the apps before installing or trialability has also confirmed as a positive influence of intention to use apps (Conrad, 2013). This study examined user internal element to describe instant messaging apps as follows: attitude toward apps (Shin, 2012; Yang, 2013), subjective norm (Yang, 2013), *perceived usefulness* (Hassan, et al., 2014; Yang, 2013), *perceived ease of use* (Hassan, et al., 2014; Yang, 2013), *perceived usability* (Shin, 2012), *perceived enjoyment* (Hassan, et al., 2014; Shin, 2012), *perceived quality* (Shin, 2012), *perceived behavioral control* (Yang, 2013), *perceived aesthetic* (Shin, 2012), *perceived expressiveness* (Yang, 2013), and reason to use (Gerlich, et al., 2015).

Method

Experiment following a 2 (reading app reviews vs no treatment) x 2 (trying apps vs no treatment) was conducted in response the domination of self-report critics on the TPB studies (Sniehotta, et al., 2014). Eighty participants (51 females, 29 males, between 15-18 years old, mean = 16.43, SD = .883) were randomly assigned to measure the acceptance of instant messaging apps involving 11 variables.

The participants were screened with questions on whether they use communication apps, particularly instant messaging. The potential participants who were not users of any type of communication app were asked to participate in the experiment by sending a short message to their contacts. Then they were randomly divided into four equal groups and placed in different rooms. They were told that the experiment consisted of reading app reviews and/or trying apps and filling out a questionnaire aimed to evaluate their experience. The data were analyzed using SmartPLS to develop a modified model.

		Trying apps (Treatment)	
		Yes	No
Reading app reviews (Treatment)	Yes	1st group	2nd group
	No	3rd group	4th group

Findings and Discussion

The model fit was tested by Partial Least Square-Structural Equation Model (PLS-SEM). It fulfilled three criteria (1) *Standardized Root Mean Square Residual* (SRMR), (2) *Normed Fit Index* (NFI) and (3) *The Root Mean Squared* (RMS_Theta).



The model consists of valid indicators and variables that are significant statistically ($t > 1.96$). There are five variables that construct the model fit and other eight variables were reduced; (1) perceived enjoyment (PE), (2) perceived quality (PQ), (3) attitude (AT), (4) intention (ITN) and (5) treatment (reading app reviews and trying apps). The model fit also shows that combination treatments of reading app reviews and trying apps contribute intention to use apps significantly comparing other treatments. Intention to use is also influenced by the attitude toward apps. On the other hand, no treatment affects perceived enjoyment and perceived quality. The treatment was not proved to predict attitude toward mobile apps. It indicates that participants' attitude toward communication apps is already formed before the experiment conducted. Participants' attitude is weakly influenced by perceived enjoyment and perceived quality.

Hedonic factors such as pleasure, fun, and joy (perceived enjoyment) when using mobile applications contribute positively to participants' attitude. Utilitarian factors as the good service and appropriate with users' need, also predict attitude toward communication apps. The findings support previous study (Shin, 2012) that proved perceived enjoyment and perceived quality positively affect attitude toward apps. Shin (2012) also proved that attitude positively predicts mobile apps intention and usage.

Conclusion

This study proposes a model of the acceptance of mobile communication apps, particularly for non-user context. An experiment (N=80) was conducted to examine two treatments and eleven variables. The data were analyzed with PLS-SEM using SmartPLS. A proposed model fit consists of five variables (1) perceived enjoyment, (2) perceived quality, (3) attitude, (4) intention to use and (5) treatment particularly reading app reviews and trying apps. Other eight variables were reduced due to validity and reliability issues. The model fit explains the interrelation between the variables that positively predict the acceptance of instant messaging apps.

Keywords: smartphone, mobile communication apps, technology acceptance, instant messaging, trialability, app reviews

Analysis of Public Disclosure Implementation on Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service Office Website

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This study aims to analyze the implementation of public information disclosure in the regional office, namely the Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service Office. Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service Office is one of the branches of the Directorate General of Treasury at the Ministry of Finance Republic of Indonesia. Tasikmalaya State Treasury Office itself has the main duty is to carry out the distribution of funds to 172 units of work consisting of ministries outside the Ministry of Finance and Local Government which is the main public of Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service Office. The Office of the State Treasury Service is one of the government agencies that has the obligation to serve the public and is required to be transparent to the information needed by the public. Not only to convey information, important information disclosure is done to build public trust in its government. Public information disclosure must be integrated by government agencies from central government to local government.

According to Law No.14 of 2008 (UU KIP) on public information disclosure, the type of public information that must be submitted by public bodies consists of two types, namely information that must be submitted by the Public Agency and public information that must be provided and periodically announced. The law also discusses the adaptation that the Public Agency should take in technological developments. To channel the information is needed a communication medium that is easily accessible by the community. Website is one of the media that can be used for such activities. Website is a media that must be owned by public body according to Regulation of Information Commission of Republic of Indonesia because website fulfill media criteria according to Information Commission Regulation, that is fast, simple, accurate, and low cost.

The question in this research is how the Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service Office applies the public information disclosure through the website. This research uses qualitative descriptive method whose data source obtained by conducting interview. Interviews were conducted to three research informants in accordance with the criteria, the researchers used purposive sampling technique. This research is more specifically using in-depth interview techniques are semi-structured for the interview process is flexible but still use the guidelines because the information that will be required for research is certain. Then, researchers also do data triangulation to ensure that the data obtained by researchers tested the truth. Triangulation is done for website experts.

The results show that public information disclosure has been well implemented by Tasikmalaya State Treasury Office as a legitimate constitution. Implementation of the Public Information Disclosure Act has been considered good because the information that must be provided and published regularly is already on the website. In addition, on the website of the Tasikmalaya State Treasury Office there is information that must be submitted according to the law of the Republic of Indonesia number 14 of 2008. Based on the findings and

discussions conducted, the types of information according to the law are not all listed on the website of the Office Services Treasury. Information that must be submitted on the basis of findings includes the Central Government Financial Statements, other information provided for in the legislation and information relating to the Public Authority, and information on activities carried out by the Public Authority. Subsequently, for information that must be submitted periodically including Information about the Ministry of Finance profile, a summary of information on programs and / or activities being carried out within the scope of Public Authority, a summary of information on performance within the scope of Public Authority in the form of a description of the realization of activities that have been or are being carried out including its accomplishments, a summary of financial statements, a summary of the Public Information Access report, information on binding, and / or public effect legislation, decisions and / or policies issued by the Public Authority, and information on the rights and procedures for obtaining Public Information, the manner of appeals and the process of dispute resolution of Public Information along with the responsible parties that can be contacted.

The information is presented to the public through various media, one of which is the website. Website of Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service Office itself can also be said to have met the criteria determined by law or the Information Commission Regulation. The statement is supported by findings that indicate that the website is user-friendly. However, the website appears quite simple because it follows the provisions of the Ministry of Finance which is the headquarters. Website is not the main media used by Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service Office itself to disseminate information because the website is managed by the headquarters of West Java province. The use of websites by KPPN Tasikmalaya itself is still less than optimal because of the lack of experts who can manage the website, whereas wesbite is considered as an effective medium also in disclosure of information to the public. Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service only provides content in the form of new information to be sorted by the head office. The results will be uploaded to the website by the head office. Finally, data updates are often too late and important information can not reach the public.

In addition, this study proves that the government has adapted to the development of technology in accordance with what is ordered by the law, namely developing information systems for the management of public information more quickly and efficiently. The media makes it easier for the public to communicate with the government, and vice versa. The use of these media can also be said to support the implementation of information disclosure by the government to the public, because all people who have reach to the internet can easily access the communication media. So, it would be better if the management and update information on the website Tasikmalaya KPPN more improved again in order to be utilized by the public with more optimal, that is by updating the information every day on the website.

Keywords: Public information disclosure, website, Tasikmalaya State Treasury Service Office

Model of Source Credibility and Self-Advocacy on Vlog's Subscriber in the Context of Nationalism

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Introduction

Video Blog (Vlog) is a new trend on blogging via YouTube. Several studies on information system identified that information's source credibility, information quality, information usefulness, and information satisfaction would lead to information adoption (Coursaris & Osch, 2016; Dedeke, 2000; Maditinos, Mitsinis, & Sotiriadou, 2008). Moreover, information adoption is also related to viewer characteristics such as prior knowledge and information relevance. A study of Coursaris and Osch (2016) still see the important of any type of information-related lead to information adoption. However, YouTube and any type of vlog offer the viewer and adopter to be a subscriber. In addition, the feature of YouTube could be possible to a subscriber on specific channel of Vlog.

Several studies proposed that the next level study after adopting the information is on the advocacy. For example, in terms of health case, (self) advocacy is important after patient seeks useful information in order to involve in health care decision-making interactions (Brashers, Haas, & Neidi, 1999). Many people express a desire to get more information if they have adopted a more participative approach. Self-advocacy is being related to information engagement (Hagan, 2015). Self-advocacy is also related to satisfaction (Salazar, 2018).

In terms of nationalism specially to celebrate the 73rd of Indonesia independence, several Indonesia vloggers posts videos with title about "Indonesia independence", "nationalism", "Pancasila", "Merdeka" and any related messages on it. The videos from vloggers have been viewed and commented by their subscriber. In the preliminary study, the comments are a part of information engagement and satisfaction.

Therefore, this study proposes to include self-advocacy variables as a part of model of source's credibility, information relevance, prior knowledge, information quality, information usefulness, information satisfaction, and information adoption. Moreover, subscribers of Vlog channel did not only adopt the information, they could express their idea by using comments' feature from YouTube. Subscribers could be able to speak up, to express their opinion (Mineur, Tideman, & Mallander, 2017) and advocate for their own needs.

Methods

This study applied quasi experiment design (Krishnan & Sitaraman, 2013). The potential participants were invited voluntary by informal invitation posted in bulletin board of several private universities. After the potential participants registered their name, email, hand phone number, and their subscription of YouTube or vlog channel, they were contacted to confirm their willingness to participate. One hundred eighty-four of participants were randomly assigned (Oktay, Taylor, & Jensen, 2010) into two groups. The first group was assigned as treatment group that was asked to follow several instructions. They were provided two links. The first link is the instructions to open their subscription on youtube.com or vlog channel, to watch the vlog about nationalism, and to spend their time at least five minutes on the nationalism vlog. After they finished open, watch, and spend their own subscription YouTube/vlog channel, they were asked to open the link of google form contained the indicators of observed variables. They were asked to fill the questionnaire on the google form. After fulfill the questionnaire, they were given a token of electronic pulse for their mobile phone number. The second group was assigned as control group. They were asked to open directly the link of google form contained of the indicators of observed variables. After full the questionnaire, they were given a different of electronic pulse for their mobile phone number.

The google form consists of 56 indicators from eight variables. The construct of source credibility consists of six indicators (Fogg, et al., 2001; Sundar, 1998; Irwansyah, Rusfian, & Ernungtyas, 2016; Coursaris & Osch, 2016; Bhattacherjee & Sanford, 2006). The adapted construct of information relevance consists of 10 indicators (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994; Sadoski, 2001). The construct of prior knowledge consists of five indicators (Rogers, 2003; Edmondson, Winslow, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2003; Pagani, 2004). The construct of information quality consists of 12 indicators (Wang & Strong, 1996; DeLone & McLean, 2003; Taylor, 1986; Klein, 2002; Naumann & Rolker, 2000). The construct of information usefulness consists of five indicators (Sussman & Siegal, 2003; Hölzel, et al., 2015; Pandey, Patni, Singh, Sood, & Singh, 2010; Davis, 1989). The construct of information satisfaction consists of three indicators (Wixom & Todd, 2005; Coursaris & Osch, 2016; Pagani, 2004; Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus, & McCann, 2003). The construct of information adoption consists of five indicators (Winter, 1975; Sussman & Siegal, 2003; Watts & Zhang, 2008). The adapted construct of self-advocacy consists of 12 indicators (Brashers, Haas, & Neidi, 1999; Salazar, 2018).

This study used Structural equation modeling analysis. The main analysis method used software of Smart Partial Least Square (Huang, Wang, Wu, & Wang, 2013) as a research model analysis tools.

Finding

This study finds that more female (56%) are participants in the quasi experiments. Most of participants (65%) come from Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi (Jabodetabek). Participants are dominantly (86%) having smart phone more than five years.

By using Smart PLS, the result of fit degree size is goodness of fit. It means the model of eight variables could

be fit and acceptable. This study accepts the fit of the research model of eight variables. The research model consists of 56 indicators from eight variables. The eight variables are (1) source credibility, (2) information relevance; (3) prior knowledge; (4) information quality; (5) information usefulness; (6) information satisfaction; (7) information adoption; and (8) self-advocacy.

Table 1. The Result of Goodness of Fit Model

Measurement	Score	Standard of Goodness of Fit	Explanation
Goodness-Fit-Index (GFI)	0,967	> 0,90	*Goodness of Fit*
The Root Mean Square error of Approximation (RMSEA)	0.063	< 0,10	*Goodness of Fit*
Adjust-Goodness-of-Fit-Index (AGFI)	0,970	> 0,90	*Goodness of Fit*
Tucker-Lewis-Index (TLI)	0,942	> 0,90	*Goodness of Fit*
Normed-Fit-Index (NFI)	0,953	> 0,90	*Goodness of Fit*
Comparatif-Fit-Index (CFI)	0,990	> 0,90	*Goodness of Fit*
normed chi-square (CMIN/DF)	1,949	≤ 2,00	*Goodness of Fit*

Discussion

In context of nationalism, the vloggers create vlog (a video blogging) based on their own credibility. As the research model is accepted as a goodness of fit on the variables, this study is succeeding to add self-advocacy on the previous study about credibility (Coursaris & Osch, 2016). Therefore, the idea of nationalism that is delivered via video on Youtube.com or Vlog channel is successful for millennial generation who subscribe the channel. Source's credibility is important (Fogg, et al., 2001). Subscriber's characteristic such as information relevance is intervening the relation between source's credibility and information satisfaction (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994). It is similar to prior knowledge that can intervene the relation between information quality and information usefulness (Pagani, 2004). For the subscriber, they do not only adopt the information (Watts & Zhang, 2008) but they also advocate the information at least for themselves (Salazar, 2018).

Conclusion

This study is succeeding to add self-advocacy on the previous research model of source credibility, information relevance; prior knowledge; information quality; information usefulness; information satisfaction and; information adoption. In the contexts of nationalism, credibility is a main part to be related on the type of information, subscriber's characteristics, and self-advocacy.

This study suggests the further study should use the model for any context not only about nationalism but it could be possible for any issue that people can express their idea and advocate other people.

Keywords: Credibility, Information, Self-Advocacy, Vlog, Nationalism

The Role of Public Information Disclosure in Strengthening Nationalism

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This study aims to provide illustration on the performance level of the Information and Documentation Management Officers (*PPID*) at public agencies in the information transparency era and its connection with

the value of nationalism. The method used phenomenology approach. That result was then analyzed further by using literature study approach to find the connection with the value of nationalism in Indonesia. The results showed that the high numbers of PPIDs whose performance levels were still in the red zone. This condition will affect in lowering the participation of the people and make the government's public policy to have not been implemented optimally. In such condition, the values of nationalism that are supposedly maintained in the society, such as the value of obeying and practicing the state regulation, are yet to be well implemented.

Introduction

This study aims to provide illustration on the performance level of the Information and Documentation Management Officers (*PPID*) at public agencies in the information transparency era and its connection with the value of nationalism, which is one of the pillars of mental revolution. To carry out the so-called mental revolution, the Indonesian President Joko Widodo designed the *Nawa Cita* concept, which encompasses nine priority agendas for social changes in Indonesia. One of the nine agendas is to establish a clean, effective, democratic, and trustworthy governance by prioritizing the efforts to restore public trust to the government. In line with such agenda, Law No.14 of 2008 on Public Information Disclosure (also known as *UU KIP*) was enacted. It regulates and requires all public agencies to provide transparent and accountable information to the public in accordance with the provision of such law.

UU KIP requires each public agency to appoint a PPID to carry out their obligations under the said law. The data used in this study are generated from the monitoring and evaluation process on the PPIDs at the Ministries/Agencies, Provincial Government Offices, and Municipal/District Government Offices conducted in 2017 by the Directorate General of Public Information and Communication of the Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Information. The writer was involved in the process as the Head of Evaluators Team. The results generated from the monitoring and evaluation process was then analyzed further by using literature study approach to find the connection with the value of nationalism in Indonesia.

It is assumed that if the PPIDs can carry out their functions well in accordance with the provisions of UU KIP, public agencies that uphold transparency will be established and in turn the public trust will improve. If the public put their trust on the government's performance, nationalism will be maintained and well developed. Thus, the writer has a deep interest in examining the performance of PPIDs of the public agencies 8 years after the enactment of UU KIP and its connections with the efforts of strengthening the value of nationalism in Indonesia. The shift from the withholding public information to disclosing public information has become a concrete social change that occurs in Indonesia today. Such social change may be closely related to the efforts of maintaining and promoting the value of nationalism among the people. It is in line with the value of nationalism in the form of a trust to the nation resulting from the equality in terms of attitude and behavior. The values of nationalism that are supposedly maintained in the society, such as the value of obeying and practicing the state regulations; the value of fostering kinship and solidarity among fellow countrymen; the value of initiating changes for the sake of the development of the state and the nation; and the value of prioritizing the spirit of unity over individual or group interests. It is assumed that if all PPIDs carry out their function well and all agencies can uphold their transparency, the unity among the people, the pride as a nation, as well as the trust to the Nation and the State can be achieved.

Analytical Framework

Public Information Disclosure

UU KIP was firstly encouraged by coalition of civil society and later on initiated by The House of Representatives. It took ten years after the Reformation to prepare the implementation of information disclosure. In the past decade, we have seen that various efforts to encourage people's participation in decision making process, because we have difficulties to access the public information. UU KIP has laid a foundation for the public agencies to fulfill the publics' rights to access information. The objectives of UU KIP are to: a/ guarantee citizens right to acknowledge public policy making plans, public policy programs, public decision making process, and the grounds of a public decision making; b/ encourage public participation in public policy making process; c/ to increase active public involvement in the public policy making and good

governance for the public body; d/ constitute good governance which are transparent, effective, efficient, and accountable; e/ acknowledge the grounds of public policies that have eminent effects on people's lives; f/ develop science and to advance the intellectual life of the people; and g/ improve management and service of information in public bodies in order to constitute excellent information service (UU KIP 2008).

According to UU KIP Article I Paragraph (9) PPID means an officer that responsible for storage, documentation, provision and/or service of information in public body. The PPIDs of public body has obligations and shall: a/ provide, disclose and/or issue public information under its authority to Public Information Requester, except for exempted information according to regulation; b/ provide accurate, correct and non-misleading public information; c/ build and develop information and documentation system to manage public information in a proper and efficient manner to access easily; d/ provide written consideration of every policy taken in order to fulfill the right of individual to public information. In order to fulfill that obligation, PPID may utilize electronic and non-electronic facilities and/or media. At the present, not all public bodies in Indonesia have appointed PPID. The data from the Ministry of Communication and Informatics of the Republic of Indonesia showed that 68.22% of public bodies have formed PPIDs and public bodies in the categories of State Institutions/LNS/LPP are the slowest in terms of forming PPID. Followed is the table in regards to the total numbers of public bodies' PPIDs in 2017.

Table 1. PPID Total Numbers Recapitulation

No	Institutions	Total Number	Have appointed Information and Documentation Management Officers (PPID)	Percentage (%)	Percentage per Cluster
1	Ministry	34	34	100.00%	
2	State Institutions/Ministry-Level Institutions/UNS/LPP	126	47	37.00%	51%
3	Province	34	33	97.06%	
4	Regency	416	284	68.27%	73%
5	City	98	85	86.73%	
	Total	**708**	**483**	**68.22%**	

Source: PPID website of the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo) data from the Directorate of Public Communication, Directorate General IKP 2017

The data above shows that the public bodies have not been fully committed in implementing the information transparency compliance according to UU KIP. Some obstacles occurred in the implementation of UU KIP, including in forming PPID and carrying out its duties, are the lack of understanding of the public bodies in relation to UU KIP and the deficiency of the heads of the public bodies to make the transition from closure to transparency of information. According to some conducted research, there was one research about the implementation of public information transparency in local governance published by FISIP UGM and TIFA Foundation in 2012. From that research, some data were found in relation to the obstacles in implementing transparency of information, namely general and specific obstacle. General obstacle arises due to the lack of socialization by authorized institutions such as the Central Information Commission (*Komisi Informasi Pusat*) and Provincial/Regency/City Information Commission (*Komisi Informasi Propinsi/Kabupaten/Kota*), all of which are formed in accordance to UU KIP; the Ministry of Communication and Informatics; the Ministry of Home Affairs; and other authorized institutions. Another obstacle found is related to human resource in terms of the quality of the appointed commissioner and PPID. On the other hand, specific obstacle is related to budget problem and problem which is particular in nature in certain areas. An example for this particular problem is in Papua, where sub-ethnic conflict and ethnic penetration into the bureaucracy have caused checks and balances system to fail from working.

Nationalism

Nationalism (Anna, 1998) is a political, social, and economic system characterized by the promotion of the interests of a particular nation, especially with the aim of gaining and maintaining sovereignty (self-governance) over the homeland. The political ideology of nationalism holds that a nation should govern itself, free from outside interference and is linked to the concept of self-determination. Nationalism is further oriented towards developing and maintaining a national identity based on shared, social characteristics, such as culture and language, religion and politics, and a belief in a common ancestry. Nationalism, therefore, seeks to preserve a nation's culture, by way of pride in national achievements, and is closely linked to patriotism, which, in some cases, includes the belief that the nation should control the country's government and the means of production (Paul and Tom, 2005).

Some of the qualities that characterize integral nationalism are anti-individualism, statism, radical extremism, and aggressive-expansionist militarism. The term Integral Nationalism often overlaps with fascism, although many natural points of disagreement exist. Integral nationalism arises in countries where a strong military ethos has become entrenched through the independence struggle, when, once independence is achieved, it is believed that a strong military is required to ensure the security and viability of the new state. Also, the success of such a liberation struggle results in feelings of national superiority that may lead to extreme nationalism.

According to **Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia as cited in Listiyarti (2007:26),** the word 'nationalism', which derives from the word 'national' and the affix '-ism', refers to the concept of being one nation encompassing the notion of awareness and spirit of patriotism. Thus, the concept of nationalism put an emphasis toward the spirit of patriotism and the love towards the homeland which are developed from the similarity in attitude and behavior among the people. It is then important to continuously maintain the value of nationalism to prevent it from being lost. Nationalism constitutes a concept which believes that one must give his/her the highest loyalty to the State. Therefore, it can be said that nationalism is a value among the people to unite which arises from the trust to the nation. Hence, the values contained in nationalism have to be continuously maintained in order to foster the unity of the people. The said values include developing the love towards homeland and nation; fostering kinship, solidarity and harmony under the spirit of unity; obeying and practicing the state regulations; initiating changes for the sake of the development of the nation; participating in the activities that are useful for the development of the nation. Those values need to be constantly fostered and sustained by continuously making social changes that can improve the public trust.

According to John Hutchinson (2000:34), Nationalism is more of a cultural phenomenon than political one since it is rooted to ethnicity and pro-modern culture. Even if nationalism has transformed into a political movement, it is superficial in nature since national political movements are based on cultural motivation, especially during cultural identity crisis. From this point of view, nationalism political movement is a mean to retrieve ethnic pride back as the foundation to build a nation based on cultural communality. The spirit of nationality will result in social solidarity, the will to sacrifice, and the growth of patriotism. Social solidarity will strengthen the spirit of nationality of a nation.

The meanings of Nationalism on www.wikipedia.org are 1/ an understanding which argues that the highest form of loyalty must be presented to the state; 2/ a profound feeling of bond to the homeland; 3/ a process of forming or developing a nation; 4/ a form of a nation's language and symbolism; 5/ a social and political movement for the sake of a nation's importance; 6/ a nation's doctrine or ideology, be it general or specific. There are many forms of nationalism in the world. The forms of nationalism are as follow:

- Citizenship nationalism (civic nationalism) is a form of nationalism which happens where a state gain its political truth from its citizen active participation. The affiliation of a nation is voluntary. This form of nationalism was first established by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and became the source of his works. Among his famous works is a book titled Du Contract Social (Social Contract).

- Ethnic nationalism or ethno-nationalism is a form of nationalism which happens where a state gain its political truth from its cultural origin or the ethnicity of its society. The affiliation of a nation is hereditary. As an example, Joko is a Javanese because his parents and ancestors are from the Javanese tribe. Joko speaks Javanese because it is used by his parents and had also been used by the people before them.

- Romantic nationalism is a form of ethnic nationalism where a state nation gains its political truth as something natural (organic) and as an expression of a nation or a race. Romantic nationalism heavily focuses

on ethnic culture that matches with romantic idealism. An example of this is the folklore of "Brothers Grimm", which was taken from the writings of Herder, is a collection of tales that are closely related to German ethnicity.

- Culture nationalism is a form of nationalism a state gains its political truth from shared culture and is not hereditary such as in relation to skin complexion, race, or language. An example of this is the people of the People's Republic of China who regard their nation based on shared culture. The racial aspect has been cast aside so that the minorities have been regarded as the people of China. The willingness of the Qing Dynasty to implement the Chinese customs also proves the China's cultural integrity.

- Nationality nationalism is a form of citizenship nationalism which is often combined with ethnic nationalism. In nationality nationalism, a nation is a community that contributes to the maintenance of a nation and its strength. An example of nationality nationalism is Italian fascism which abides by Mussolini's slogan: *Tutto nello stato, niente al di fuori dello stato, nulla contro lo stato* (*Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State*). It is not a wonder that this form of nationalism is against the objective of individual freedom and the principles of liberal democracy.

Religion nationalism is a form of nationalism a nation gains its political legitimacy from shared religion. An example of this is the nationalism spirit in India which originated from the Hindu religion. However, to many nationalist groups, religion is just a symbol and is not the main motivation.

Even though there are different definitions in regards to nationalism, Hans Kohn (1971; in the book *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* translated by Sumantri Mertodipura, in Sutarjo Adisusilo, 2010), emphasized that the essence of nationalism is the same, which is "a state of mind, which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation state". The context of nationalism in the writer's study is Nationality Nationalism, where the nationalism value which grows in the society can contribute to the maintenance of a nation and its strength. The value of obedience to a nation must always be constantly nurtured and strengthened because it is the foundation in nationalism spirit in Indonesia.

Ernest Gellner in his book *Nations and Nationalism* (1983) in Sutarjo Adisusilo, wrote that nationalism gives birth to a nation, while democracy gives birth to state and government, thus nationalism along with democracy give birth to a nation state. Democracy is not just a tool but also becomes the objective of the state nation itself, which is to realize justice and prosperity for its people of the whole nation. Historically, democracy is older than nationalism. Democracy has been developed since the ancient Greece approximately in the 6^{th} century B.C. Modern democracy had then been developed again in Europe around the 17^{th} century with the rise of political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Lokce, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Baron Montesquieu, and many others. Modern democracy theory is being perfected constantly through various governmental systems. The last figure who was talked about in relation to modern democracy theory is John Schwarmantel (1994; in Sutarjo Adisusilo, 2010), mentioned three main characteristics of a democratic state, which are: 1/ participation: a state guarantees its citizens to actively participate in managing the state; 2/ equality: a state guarantees the same treatment for each state nation; 3/ accountability: a government must give its accountability to its people. Therefore, transparency of information from a government to its people is necessary, so it can be controlled and monitored by the people to avoid all forms of deviations, corruptions, or misappropriations of power by the government. Hence, democracy is inseparable from nationalism itself, where one of the pillars in democracy is the transparency of information.

Public Policy Communication

Public policy is a set of actions which is set and carried out by the government that has a certain objective or is oriented towards a certain objective for the sake of public interest. The core of public policy or government policy (state) is a decision carried out by authorized government officials for public interest. This public interest is a whole entirety of the combination and crystallization of opinions, wishes, and demands from the people (Laswell & Kaplan Islamy, 2002 in Tya Tirtasari, 2018). *Ilmu Kebijakan* is the translation of policy science. There are three actions that are necessary to be conducted in policy agenda arrangement: (1) to build the perception among the stakeholders that a phenomenon can be considered as a real problem. This is possible since a particular symptom of a particular groups of people can be considered as an problem, while by other groups of people or political elites is not considered as an problem; (2) to set scope of problem; and

(3) to mobilize supports in order for a problem to be included into the government's agenda. Mobilization of supports can be done by organizing variety of groups in the society, using political powers, using mass media publications, and many others. According to George C Edwards III (Tya Tirtasari, 2018) there are four variables in public policy: communication, resources, attitude, and bureaucracy structure. These four factors are implemented simultaneously because each one of these factors are related. Our aim is to increase the understanding about policy implementation. Understanding simplification is achieved by decreasing implementation explanation into principle components. Policy implementation is a dynamic process which includes the interaction of many factors. Sub-categories of the factors are presented in order to know their impacts on the implementation of a policy.

Communication factor, according to Edward III, has three dimensions: transmission, clarity, and consistency dimensions. Transmission dimension requires public policy to not only be delivered to the policy implementers, but also to policy target groups and other concerned parties. Clarity dimension requires transmitted policy to be accepted clearly for the concerned parties to understand the meaning and goal of the policy itself. Edward identified six factors that encourage uncertain policy communication: 1/ the complexity of public policy, 2/ the wish to not disturb groups of society, 3/ the lack of consensus towards the public policy objective, 4/ problems in implementing new policy, 5/ to avoid policy accountability, 6/ the nature of court policy making. The uncertainty of communication message does not always disrupt the implementation of a policy because on a certain level, the implementers can be flexible in implementing the policy. Consistency dimension means that every command in a public policy must be consistent to avoid uncertainty among the policy recipients.

Table 2. 2017 PPID MONEV Participants



Source: Report of Monitoring and Evaluation Process on PPID Performance in 2017, Directorate General of Public Information and Communication, Ministry of Communication and Information

Every PPID that returned the instruments was given a username and a password to access the application we provided. The PPIDs were asked to answer some questions using narratives to explore their knowledge and experience on the implementation of UU KIP. That way, the answers given by the PPIDs were qualitative and tended to be subjective, and therefore, can be referred to as a phenomenology method. The answer to each question had to be accompanied with supporting evidence to check the track record of each PPIDs. The aspects measured in this study are the provision of public information, the stipulation of public information, and the report of information access within the agency. Each aspect is covered in the question items in accordance with the provisions of UU KIP and has their own assessment scores. The results of the PPID performance monitoring and evaluation process were analyzed by referring to some literatures related to the efforts of strengthening the value of nationalism.

Table 3. PPID MONEV Assessment

ASSESSMENT RESULTS

1. Monev results will be stated in the form of a score/value then used to determine a predicate
2. In order to be proportional, scoring is divided into the following categories:
   - Ministry PPID
   - Institution PPID
   - Province PPID
   - Regency/City PPID
3. Value Range and Predicate

NORMAL VALUE	CONVERSION VALUE	PREDICATE	MARKER
86 - 100	596-700	Excellent	Blue
70 - 85	491-595	Good	Green
50 - 70	351-490	Satisfactory	Yellow
<50	<350	Poor	Red

Source: Report of Monitoring and Evaluation Process on PPID Performance in 2017, Directorate General of Public Information and Communication, Ministry of Communication and Information

Findings

The data generated from the monitoring and evaluation results show that 163 respondents completed the application, but only 81 respondents could be validated, which were 15 PPIDs at ministries, 5 PPIDs at agencies, 21 PPIDs at provincial offices, 23 PPIDs at district offices and 17 PPIDs at municipal offices. Following the assessment process involving the 81 PPIDs, it was found that most PPIDs who were assessed were still within the red zone, with the scores < 350. In terms of percentage: 55 PPIDs (67.90%) were still in the red zone with "poor" grade and the range of score ≤ 350. Meanwhile, there were 17 PPIDs (20.99%) who were in the yellow zone with "satisfactory" grade and the score between 351 and 490. Then 6 PPIDs (7.41%) were in the green zone with "good" grade and the score between 491 and 595. Finally, only 3 PPIDs (3.70%) were in the blue zone with "excellent" grade, whose scores were over 596, namely the PPID at the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housings (650), the PPID at the Ministry of Finance (599) and the PPID of DKI Jakarta Provincial Office (618).

Table 4. 2017 PPID MONEV Result

2017 PPID MONEV Result (Validated)



Source: Report of Monitoring and Evaluation Process on PPID Performance in 2017, Directorate General of Public Information and Communication, Ministry of Communication and Information

The data show that the performance of PPIDs at the public agencies which were the samples of this research had not optimally applied the provisions of UU KIP and its subordinate regulation, namely the Regulation of Information Commission No.1 of 2010. The data acquired from the assessment of each evaluation aspect show that most of the respondents: had not fully comprehend their duties and responsibilities as PPIDs; had not had any guidelines on the public information service standards; had not had a proper understanding on the principles of public information service; and had not made any report on the information access as stipulated in UU KIP. The high numbers of PPIDs whose performance levels were still in the red zone, we can see that the heads of public agencies still had not paid full attention to the performance of PPIDs, as required in UU KIP.

Discussion

This situation shows that there is lack of compliance of public bodies towards the public policy which have been made by the government in order to maintain the unity of the nation and state. As previously mentioned, the three dimensions in public policy communication factors presented by Edward, in the context of this research's result, have not been fully accomplished. UU KIP has not been completely disseminated as whole to all implementers of the policy. In reality, UU KIP, in some parts, is thought as uncertain for the public bodies concerned. The example for this is which category of information are supposed to disclosed or enclosed. Besides, the consistency of public policy implementers has also become one of the benchmarks of the success in the implementation of UU KIP.

The data above show that public information disclosure is not a simple matter, although its application has been required by a governing law, UU KIP, since 2010. According to Yoseph Stiglitz (2002), there is a positive correlation between information disclosure, good governance, and the prosperity level of a State. Information disclosure also becomes an essential prerequisite for the fulfilment of people's rights to public information access. Therefore, government must fulfill such rights to establish the public trust toward the government and to encourage them to participate in the development of the nation. To have a meaningful public participation, the disclosure of information to the public has to cover the political agenda to be carried out by the government, the policies and decisions that have been made and implemented, and the information on the alternative policies that have been chosen and dismissed (Curtin, 1996; Heritier, 2003 in Tya Tirtasari 2018).

Lasswell (Tya Tirtasari, 2018) proposed that the concept of policy studies often intersect with communication studies. Public policy is a series of actions that are stipulated and implemented by the government which are oriented to the public interests. Therefore, it is necessary for government officials to be able to implement and to pursue the objectives of the government. If the PPIDs, in their capacity as government apparatus, fail to carry out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions neither of law nor in line with the objectives of the government's public policy, it can affect the public trust towards the government. The role of nationalism according to Apter (1967:97), as quoted in Sutarjo Adisusilo (2010), involves three aspects, namely cognitive, goal orientation, strategic aspects. In other words, nationalism must contain mutual knowledge and understanding on the existing social situations as well as mutual aspiration to be achieved through certain fighting strategies. Today, it refers to the spirit to continue to fight for upholding democracy, alleviating poverty, eradicating corruptions, etc. Nationalism can be continuously maintained if the five main principles of nationalism, namely unity, liberty, equality, personality and performance, are applied. Benedict Anderson (2001), as quoted in Sutarjo Adisusilo (2010), states that Indonesia suffers from the threat of "nationalism deficit", which refers to the decline of the spirit of being one nation. Therefore, it is vital for Indonesia to continuously foster and strengthen the sense of nationalism, which can be achieved by, among other things, reinforcing the pillars of democracy. One way to do this is for the government to be accountable and transparent on whatever the government has done, is doing or will do for the people. If the government fails to fully communicate the public policy as stipulated in its own instrument of law, in this case UU KIP, it will inevitably result in the declining of the value of nationalism in Indonesia.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this study is that the performance of PPIDs as the government apparatus had not been optimal as required by UU KIP. This condition will affect the rights of the people to access information related to the government's activities. This, in turn, will lower the participation of the people, and, thus, it can be said

that the government's public policy has not been implemented optimally. In such condition, the values of nationalism that are supposedly maintained in the society, such as the value of obeying and practicing the state regulations; the value of fostering kinship and solidarity among fellow countrymen; the value of initiating changes for the sake of the development of the state and the nation; and the value of prioritizing the spirit of unity over individual or group interests, are yet to be well implemented. This condition will also undermine a pillar of democracy that is considered as one aspect in nationalism. Thus, this study recommends the government to improve its public policy communication by paying more attention towards the implementation of public information disclosure in Indonesia, particularly on the observance of the PPIDs to the provisions of UU KIP, in order to sustain the pillars of democracy to maintain the sense of nationalism among the people.

Keywords: Public information disclosure – public policy communication – values of nationalism

Social Contractual Utilitarianism in "Cibeusi" Digital Village

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Introduction

Ellis (2012) states, that social contractual utilitarianism is based on the idea that every person has to be treated equally with the social contract of the good things. Three moral principles included compassion, justice, and honesty (Arnold, 1999) as the ideal basic characters. From this perspectives, notice that the best social contract can make the best society. The concern is specifically with the basic characters, such as compassion, fairness, and honesty, because in every society this degree could be different in one another. The contract is equipped by the description of the society, institutional situation, individual's understanding in right, obligations and responsibilities, values, laws, customs (Ellis, 2012).

UNESCO fully supports The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) setting the ground for its contribution to the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action for promoting and defining the concept about knowledge society (Dutton, 2004). The knowledge society is the broaden concept from global information society, in order to enhancing information flows, have to grasp on knowledge. In case of digitalization, the relationship between social humanist's point of view and the knowledge society challenge that narrow the digital divide, guarantee the free flow access to knowledge and information, and build the consensus. This has to be based on the human rights and freedom, especially in accessing the digitalization.

In some area in Indonesia, there have been implemented the digitalization as a program to fill the gap and improve underdeveloped villages, using digital technology. The program has been assisted by the cellular service provider. On the third year of the program, Cibeusi village is selected to be one of the areas with the digitalization program to support their village as the eco-tourism. Digitalization and internet access are intended to ease and support the local to promote their eco-tourism as one of their economic resource (Alia & Ngazis, 2016). In consequence, this study found out the possibility on aspects of social humanism in digital village. This case of social humanism movement to bridging the digital divide of ICT was carried by a national cellular service provider, in case from the corporate social responsibility program to the village which needed to be digitalized and help to develop eco-tourism.

Method

This study wanted to examine the single case about digital village in West Java about social contractual utilitarianism. Cibeusi village as the case study is located in Subang, West Java. In Xmart Village 3.0 program, XL and Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) collaborated with the purpose to develop and support a standardized digital village. Their intention is to develop a range of tailored programs from the specific needs, so that every

village will be different in the development itself, such as economic factor, tourism, reading interest, health, culture, and administration (Tribunnews.com, 2016).

Three steps were taken in observing, firstly was collecting the information about the village from online article and online media. Web or search engine has been attracting a significant number of users as well as information providers (Chu & Rosenthal, 1996). The next step was the direct observation on the field to examine the clear evident about the programs. Document observation also taken as the procedure, with the clippings and proposal of the program in eco-tourism, done by the community member. The last step was taking the oral interview with relevant people in the field, the members who live in Cibeusi village to draw their point of view and how they act.

The result from the in-depth interview and observation are organized and made sense of the data (Basit, 2003) with three steps of coding (Moghaddam, 2006). Thematic approach is taken in analyzing the themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and data triangulation was done as the validity procedure (Creswell & Miller, 2010).

Findings

Data showed that Cibeusi is dedicated as the underdeveloped village in 1990's, not only in terms of economy and living standards, especially in terms of education, has made the members attracted to build Cibeusi village. They began to build a formal education in the form of kindergarten to high school level. In addition, residents are also aware of the wealth of natural resources that can be preserved in the form of tourist destinations, such as waterfalls in several locations, to increase the economic and local empowerment. Kelompok Penggerak Pariwisata as the tourism driving group, tried to be equal in making the tourist destination mapping to lower the inequality among the members. With the socialization about the eco-tourism concept, all community members, village institution and organization will decrease the conflicted party, because they already treated equally.

The aim of making Cibeusi village as the eco-tourism destination is based on the idea that every member should get benefit from every natural potentials and resources, which can be the selling power to increase the economic level among the members from time to time. Every village representative has to join the training and instruction, held by the local government, in concerning how to be a good tour guide and create a comfortable home stay. Thru this procedure the number of conflicted party will be decreased, particularly how community members should get their part in developing the natural sources.

There are three basic concepts that always keep in mind and put forward, set the goals, courage to do the things, and calmly handle the problem. With the good purpose and goals, they set how it can be beneficial to other member or party. They concern with the eco-tourism village can be worthy to the society. The bravery to do the things will give the positive reaction. From the action done by the Cibeusi village member, draw the cellular service providers' attention that already maintain the corporate social responsibility programs, such as XL.

Some activities were conducted, such as geo-mapping, creating village's website, Instagram account and digital content, such as video 360, book digitalization, and standardize of smart toilet. In this case, the community member asked for the digital coaching for the young people and the women so they can be capable in using the digital technology, such as reading the digital device, browsing the internet, using computer and designing using the software. The geo-mapping process helps to give the accurate position with the GPS (Global Positioning System), because one of the greatest and famous waterfall, Ciangin, still not available on the Google maps. That is why one of the members has to share the location directly from where they stand, then in one click away, it is already recorded.

Discussion

This study found that social contractual of utilitarianism is about the agreement and how it can make a better situation for the society. At the beginning the community members agree to develop their village with a decent education and natural resources to be the eco-tourism destination in West Java. To manage the natural resources, the community members have to communicate with another member and the chief of village and organization, such as tourism driving group. Cooperation among members is an important thing to do. Informal meeting and agreement become the method to communicating and socializing community members'

needs, based on people way of life in rural area. In additional, the help from XL Xmart Village 3.0 has been expanding the scope of potential visitors to Cibeusi village with digital technologies. At the end, even it's just a one-shoot program from XL, the local member has the full authority about what they need, continue to work with what they have, and expand more skills about digital technologies.

Conclusion

From the observation that examined from this village, shows that social contractual utilitarianism as a part of social humanism presents significant role. This role is to increase the agreement among local community member, also the leaders and the third party, in this case national cellular provider with digitalization programs. The agreement as a part of social contractual of utilitarianism dimensions could make a good thing to begin and maintain the digital village. The equality among community members in the village arise because the agreement that are made from the beginning. Concept about social contractual utilitarianism should be explored in another case and also bring to investigate the next concept about social contractual egalitarianism and real equality of opportunity.

Keywords: social contractual utilitarianism; social humanism; digital village; eco-tourism; rural area

Indonesian Youth and Social Media: A Study About Political Preferences in Digital Era

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Introduction

This paper would like to see how the exposure of information flow in social media affects youth generation's political preferences. Studies show technology and information in today's society are growing rapidly and are applied for various reasons and areas, such as elections, campaigns in the material world as well as in the digital world. In Indonesia contexts, the voters are clearly differentiate from social-economic class, age, and religion. Therefore, the issue of youth is the most interesting thing to be discussed in this paper. In the modern era, social media has become a common tool as a campaign tool, and seeing the facts of most young people, the target of using social media as a campaign is felt to target young people. Political contestations that occur in social media often use black campaigns, ranging from the use of racial issues to the use of religious issues as a tool to bring down their political opponents. Youth generation in Indonesia can be said to be still vulnerable in sorting out which information is correct and where the information is wrong, because even though they grow up with the digital world, their literacy rate in finding and verifying the correct information is still quite low. I deliver this study in 2017, addressing to gain qualitative insight into the views of young people on their role in Indonesia and Indonesia's role in the world through an exploration of their perceptions of authority, media liberalization, diversity and tolerance, economic opportunities, and international relations.

Methods

This study applied focus group discussions and in-depth interviews as it's data collection methods. Data are gathered from some of the top universities in Jakarta and Makassar. For focus group discussions, we selected 8 -10 students from various disciplines and from different ages (mostly born between 1995-1999), ranging from those entering the first year in college to those who have entered the final year, then i chose 3 people whom we feel have a point of view from focus group discussion which is interesting enough to be an informant when conducting in-depth interviews. Using these two methods and with the range of different research subjects can certainly represent how the perception of Indonesian youth today.

Findings

From our findings during this research, i have found some interesting evidence, especially how aspects of the digital world, precisely social media, play an important role in determining political preferences in youth Indonesia. Because, in my research, i've finds three major groups, it can be differentiate by their ideology, religions view, and their neutrality about the latter two groups.

The first group consists people from what i label the left-wing spectrum, in general they are more aware of the various conditions occurring in Indonesia today, as evidenced by the various criticisms and responses they provide to the various cases I throw during focus group discussions, such as about the current Indonesian government, political life, cases of "defamation" of religion, and the criteria of the leader they will choose in the upcoming election. They are more inclined to discuss how the state and society should work together to overcome the problems of those cases and to exclude racial and religious matters. Interestingly, those with this kind of thinking come from relatively wealthy families and have a fairly high literacy rate, their preferences in accessing information come from abroad because they feel the information contained within the country is less able to answer their curiosity about what is going on in Indonesia and in the world.

The second group consists people from what i call the right-wing spectrum, the opposite of those on the left-wing spectrum. Although they are aware of the various conditions and cases currently occurring in Indonesia, they still regard religion and other abstract matters in response over such cases. They have their own preference when they are accessing information in the digital world, mostly domestic news portals, usually the preference comes from people they consider to be legitimate and qualified religiously or influenced by their parents.

And the latter are people who feel impartial to any spectrum. Apart from their apathetic responses to the various cases raised during the discussion and interview sessions, they continued to monitor developments from their social media accounts, and during the election they tended to choose candidates who were considered the best among the worst in their opinions.

Discussion

I draw on the term of youth generations from Brosdahl and Carpenter's (2011) categorization of generations, specifically referring to Generation Y (born after 1981). A main characteristic for Gen Y is early and frequent exposure to technology, which has advantages and disadvantages in terms of cognitive, emotional, and social outcomes (Immordino-Yang *et al*., 2012). Social media in the broadest sense of the term and define it as any online service through which users can create and share a variety of content. Although social media have existed from the birth of Gen Y (1981), they were widely adopted after 2003 (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). They encompass user-generated services (such as blogs), social networking sites, online review/rating sites, virtual game worlds, video sharing sites and online communities, whereby consumers produce, design, publish, or edit content (Krishnamurthy & Dou, 2008).

Some studies suggest that Gen Y actively contributes content, creating and mashing (i.e., combining of content from multiple sources); that they gravitate toward social media sites where they can participate (Dye, 2007) and as the connectivity and mobility provided by the social media increasingly becomes part of everyday routine, its use is reflected in the various aspects of social life, including expressions of opinions. Wattenberg (2008) noted that:

"Young people are almost always in the forefront of new types of activities, and are typically more adventurous and open to novel ways of doing things. If there really is a new kind of political engagement, then it seems reasonable to hypothesize that young people would be among the first practitioners of new means of involvement in the political proces"

Conclusion

From these findings, when we are talking about youth in Indonesia we cannot rule out the fact that the interaction that they intertwine is more prevalent in the world of social media. It also makes social media enhanced political participation among the youth of Indonesia through a variety of information that is contained there, an aspect of modernity, is inevitable as Internet connectivity increases and its use becomes

more and more indispensable, though there are preferences (eg the influence of parents or religious views), which makes political views among the youth split apart into various views.

Keywords: Indonesian Youth, Social Media, Political Preference, Social Networks

E-tourism of Indonesia's Tourism Ministry and MICE Destinations

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Introduction

Tourism is an important economic activity with its direct contribution to national GDP, thus it will give benefit in terms of economic growth of Indonesia. Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia Tourism Ministry (2017) shows the data of national tourists in 2017 reached the number of 15,707,590 people which has increased from the year 2016 in the number 13,779,837 people. This is supported by the growth of telecommunications and information technology followed by the use of media.

Utilization of media is part of Indonesia tourism ministry's marketing strategy called Paid Media-Owned Media-Social Media-Endorser or POSE (Indonesia Tourism Ministry's annual performance report, 2017). Paid media uses national paid media, local origination, and tourist destinations to create awareness, convergence, media content in electronic form, online, print, and social media. Owned media uses media that has been owned as a source of all information, such as websites. Social media is used to create attachment to the target market, while endorser is used in advertisement.

Indonesia's Tourism Ministry as the destination marketing organizations (DMO) also enacts Indonesia as part of the MICE (Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Events / Exhibitions) destinations. MICE deliver major economic benefits to host countries (Moore, 2018). A total of 16 MICE destinations have been established, namely Jakarta, Bali, Bandung, Surabaya, Solo, Yogyakarta, Makassar, Batam, Medan, Manado, Padang, Palembang, Balikpapan, Bintan, Semarang, and Lombok (http://www.kemenpar.go.id/).

In this era of digitalization, the media plays an important role in shaping the choice of tourist destinations. Among the range of ICTs, the Internet is the number one source of information for travel and tourism (Munro and Richards, 2011), one of which is the use of e-tourism. Through e-tourism, tourists can search and collect information that can support the choice of tourist destinations. The potential of e-tourism as a new public medium depends on the quality of web pages and e-services (Ku dan Chen, 2015). This technology helps the country to support itself, decentralizing aspects of government to allow more individual participation, while making that infrastructure less dependent on those outside of it (Chayka, 2015).

Hence, the websites should meet the visitors' information needs and must provide the necessary channels that promote engagement (Campillo et.al, 2010 in Martínez-Sala et.al, 2017). In other words, e-tourism through websites are designed to be information accessible to everyone. Therefore, the objectives of this study are to determine whether the tourism official websites have effectively fulfilled their role as the main communication strategies of destination marketing organizations and to manage relationships with public through their official websites.

Method

This study uses a quantitative approach method based on the content and functional analysis of a set of indicators that provide descriptive information on Indonesian tourism ministry and 14 MICE destinations' official website. Data collection method in this study is by observing the tourism official websites with scoring for comparative descriptive analysis. The analyzed method in this study refers to Martínez-Sala et.al (2017) and Luna-Nevarez and Hyman (2012).

Findings

Results on communication and interactivity

In general, most of the websites are still not establish a two-way communication channel between the website's managers and users, and among users. This can be seen in the unavailability of the online chat feature on the websites. However, online information gathering (email, social media) and offline (phone, mail address) have been provided on the websites.

Results on social media and travel aids function

Features available on Indonesia tourism ministry and 14 MICE destinations' official website in general terms, can be described as positive in this indicator. Only 14 MICE destinations are counted because two websites are under maintenance. The highest score of 0.79 is achieved by Indonesia's tourism ministry website as the tourist destination information center in Indonesia, followed by Yogyakarta's tourism official website.

The website's content is assessed in terms of variety and suitability to the tourists need (Cavia et. al, 2014 in Bonjisse and Morais, 2017). All the tourism official websites provide high travel aids content function, such as the list of city tourism destinations, city map, accommodation, and calendar of events.

Discussion

A good e-tourism must provide features, such as (1) general tourism service information publicity, (2) advertising tourism product/service, (3) advertising tourism product/service with price, (4) email enquiry and interaction, (5) online booking for tourism product and service, (6) online payment, and (7) tourism sites registration with user ID (Shihab and Murtadho, 2012).

The Indonesian tourism ministry and 14 MICE destinations' official website have not fully met these criteria. Most of the website features that have been owned are points 1 to 4, while the 5 points already owned by Indonesian tourism ministry's website, integrated with the social network based on special recommendations, which is TripAdvisor.

Effective tourism destination website should be evaluated in the aspect of information, communication, transaction, user relationship, and technical service (Putra et.al, 2018). The results show that content information has the highest score among all. As a tourism official website, they have to provide information as clearly as possible even though people could just search the information just by entering the destination-related keywords in a search engine.

As one of the aspects of communication, interactivity is needed for facilitating bookings, links, customer support and service (Bonjisse and Morais, 2017). The research findings indicate the low interactivity on the website at the user and user manager level as well as on the inter-user level caused by the unavailability of such features. Research conducted by Míguez-González and Fernández-Cavia (2015) confirms that interactivity is low due to unavailability of space for users to publish their opinions or recommendations so that they turn to social media. The Solo city's official website has space for users to write comments or opinions about Solo in the "review" column, but the page is currently under maintenance.

Conclusion

The tourism official websites indirectly have the intention to promote local tourism destinations, but they have not effectively fulfilled their role as the main communication strategies of destination marketing organizations to manage relationships to public.

Keywords: digitalization, e-tourism, interactivity, nationalism, website

Indonesia, a Digital Nation: Problems and Initiatives

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Introduction

Information and communication technology (ICT) development was seen as liberating as it opens more access, enhances interaction, facilitates participation and creates new opportunities (Benkler, 2006; Shirky, 2008 and 2011; Jenkin, 2006; Tapscott 2007; Rifkin, 2014). The internet – based technology increases the use of information, communication and participation in economy, social, politics as well as culture. Advances in technology and machinery can be traced back since the Industrial Revolution as the First Machine Age. The trajectory is expected to continue a trail of success stories as we enter the Second Machine Era of Revolution 4.0 (Bryfnjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Schwab, 2016).

On the other side of the coin, ICT – mediated process had raised concerns and criticisms (Schiller, 1999, Fuchs, 2014, Kostakis and Bauwens, 2014; Scholz, 2013; Hill, 2015; Noris, 2000; Carr, 2008; Owen, 2015). The digital economy is suspected to be just an extension of the dominant capitalist model with its vast contradictions and disparities. The new/digital economy had introduced the term 'digital labors' for workers in digital era and in micro level, internet – based media has negative impacts on users' ability to think deeply, a process which need certain level of concentration and contemplation (Carr, 2008).

Expectations and criticisms regarding ICT revolved around the concept known as disruption or disruptive innovation. Disruption is the process by which smaller companies with limited resources successfully challenge the market leader(s) for addressing the forgotten segments and providing goods and services at lower prices (Christensen, et al, 2015). The challengers did share something in common, they are ICT – based companies subverting the established market leaders in a relatively short time. And this is the logic behind the theory of disruption.

Turns out the disruption is not exclusive to commercial nor economic areas. Since ICT development does have impacts in all aspects of human life, it disrupts not only individuals and corporations but countries as well. ICT's disruptive impacts to the nation-state appeared in various cases such as *Anonymous*, *Wikileaks*, *The Syrian Electronic Army*, Edward Snowden, *Bitcoin* and *Arab Spring* (Owen, 2015). In these cases, the concept of nation-state was challenged again and again with ICT as the impetus.

The nation-state as an imagined community shared by people living in a certain area under a defined government is being challenged if not threatened by the development of ICT. The nation's imagination is the result of social construction prompted by print media (Anderson, 1983). Anderson's thinking was developed further by Schlesinger (2001) which states that mass media e.g. print media, radio, film and television formed the cultural identity of a nation. Mass media play an important role in the process of nation character building and collective consciousness sharpening through public debate and the spread of political agenda. Therefore, mass media also play a role in the formation and development of political culture and communication system especially in constructing public space of the nation state to build imagination together.

No wonder, the rise of nation-state as the primary unit of international politics coincide with the development of ICT. Gutenberg's printing press in the 15th centuries paved the way for a transition from the disaggregated feudal system of the Middle Ages to a more structured form of political power (Owen, 2015). And that very same power is facing a revolutionary change coming from ICT. What was once hierarchichal and control base, is now a network.

Currently, the public consume information through a combination of mass media and social media. But there is a tendency that the consumption via social media stands out due to technological convergence. Digital media is affecting the citizens' imagination which was previously produced and reproduced through mass media. The logic between the two types of media differ significantly. Social structure is mediated by media technology, a.k.a media technology is behind the logic directing behavior and perception (Altheide, 2011). Elements of media logic include the distinguishing features of a medium (print, internet, blog), the type of organization, presentation, emphasis on specific behavior and the grammar used (Altheide and Snow, 1979; Snow, 1983 in

Altheide, 2013). The differences between the two in their mode of production, distribution and media use (Klinger dan Svensson, 2014: 6).

At the heart of political communication, political polarization poses considerable challenges to democratic process. The issues here are not ideology but affect, an emotion based on primordial sense of partisan identities that are acquired very early in life and persists over the entire life cycle. The affect built in-group and out-group senses as well as created a social distance between parties and dislike over one another (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012). This tendency was seen in most part of the world including United States of America (Trump versus Hillary), United Kingdom (Brexit), and Indonesia (Jakarta Governor election in 2017) to name a few. Fragmented media is named as one of the reasons exacerbating the polarization.

With such a complex and divided social and political condition, problem identification become a must-do to find a satisfactory resolution to the problem. *Kolaborasi Indonesia*, an extension forum of *Forum Rembuk Nasional* in 2000, responded to the problem by identifying what are the problems faced by Indonesia to become a digital nation and how Indonesia as a nation-state survive the ever-changing shared imagination in a complex digital media landscape.

Methods

Kolaborasi Indonesia facilitated 2 (two) focus group discussions in Jakarta on May 2017 (offline) and June 2017 (online). These events were attended by academicians, business (wo)men, NGO activists, government officials and politicians. Participants were invited to join the online discussion via webinar application and live streaming in kumparan.com.

Findings

The discussions confirmed threats to Indonesia as an imagined community in digital era based on political polarization seen in Jakarta's governor election in 2017. ICT development induces major changes and innovations at the fast pace and the amount never been seen before in history of the nation. The future is closer than ever before because it happens as we speak. Social media not only threatened to divide the nation but also shakes the core identities of the nation-state as well.

As a nation-state, Indonesia is facing horizontal, vertical as well as regional structural changes. Economization, individualization, globalization and digitalization are now the bread and butter of Indonesian citizens. Issues to be discussed further by nation-state stakeholders are: (1) *Pancasila as core values*; (2) *Diversity and unity*; (3) *Understanding disruption*; (4) *Democracy and leadership*; (5) *Declaration of independence recontextualization*. These are critical points based on statements made by informants and participants.

Furthermore, a new set of compelling and relevant stories is a prerequisite for Indonesia surviving the digital era as a digital nation. As imported artefacts, digital technology used in Indonesia requires extensive research and customization prior to media usage.

Discussion

Threats to Imagined Community. Shared yet collective imagination about Indonesia constructed by mass media is being undermined by social media. Lim's (2017) study on social media about Jakarta's governor election in 2017 issued racism and sectarianism content. This tendency increases the polarization among citizens while using the freedom of expression argument since it raised and spread hatred instead. Social media was filled with hate speeches, false news, labeling and stigma on candidates. The election not only divided the public based on issues but it set up permanent political and social fronts. These fronts persist in 2018 serial regional election in some regions such as West Java, Central Java, and North Sumatra.

Shared Imagination Construction in the Digital Age. Racism, sectarianism and hate speeches threaten to reduce shared imagination as they were made visible by social media. Based on *We Are Social* in 2018, about 49% of Indonesian are active social media user making Indonesia the 3rd country in term of growth rate in social media usage with 23% increase compared to 2017 data. Users in Indonesia spend roughly 3.5 hours a

day consuming social media. The most popular social media in Indonesia is *Facebook* with 130 million users, equals to 6% percent of overall Facebook users. This number indicate the magnitude of potentials as well as problems that arise if social media is not well-regulated and well-managed.

Conclusion

The construction of shared imagination as a nation in digital era is still far from conclusive. These findings offered directions and required further probing as they are mere initiatives to develop Indonesia as a digital nation. In the future, these particular fora can be directed into the making of narratives to strengthen national identity. Though prematurely stated, nation branding can be considered as an eligible option (in Dinnie, 2008: 116). Nation branding is about national identity as the main sources of nation-state positioning (Yananda and Salamah, 2014). As mass media play significant role in building national identity, nation branding can be co-created using digital technology.

Keywords: Digital Nation, Information Communication Technology, Nation Branding

NATO's Public Diplomacy in Europe on Digital Era

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This research discusses about NATO's public diplomacy in Europe on Digital Era. This research uses qualitative method with the data sources from videos about NATO which produced by NATO Public Diplomacy Division (PDD). This division was created in 2003, which trying to reach the audiences throughout the world using lots of platform and social media activities. NATO currently uses Internet-based media and public engagement, alongside traditional media, to build awareness and support for NATO's growing role, goals and mission. The internet-based media includes NATO twitter, NATO Facebook, NATO Instagram and NATO YouTube channel, which those are used to provide a variety of information about NATO through its videos. For this research, there are 20 videos that randomnly chosen about NATO made by PDD. The video is then analyzed with the agenda setting theory, the concept of public diplomacy and the concept of military diplomacy.

From the results of the study it can be concluded that NATO uses the mechanism of agenda setting, public diplomacy and military diplomacy as its operational agenda, because in the analyzed videos there are certain agendas, especially politics, with the aim of influencing the viewer's perception, promoting their interests to the public and other political entities, and to show military cooperation. Twenty videos produced and published by NATO's public diplomacy division tell about how NATO faces various threats in maintaining European security and international waters. Some videos explain how NATO maintains border security in Eastern Europe. This was shown by sending 4 battalions to member countries bordering Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, to protect them from the threat of potential attackers. NATO also maintains European countries from cyber-attacks through the Cyber Defense Unit, which was formed as part of the Estonian Defense League to protect Estonia from cyber threats. The majority of this unit consists of civilians and is one example of NATO's cyber threat defense.

In addition, NATO also maintains European security from ISIS. Using its base in Turkey, NATO flew AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft to observe and manage air space in Iraq and Syria which were the base of ISIS. NATO protects its country members from enemy missile attacks. Collective defense is at the core of NATO's mission and its ballistic missile defense capability is one of the keys to safeguard the security of its members. Some videos show how NATO maintains maritime security in northern Europe which uses its base in Iceland which is managed and run by the Icelandic Coast Guard to provide support for NATO air surveillance of fish theft, pollution monitoring and rescue missions in the area. Some videos also show how NATO maintains the security in the Black Sea area from terrorist threats, human trafficking and fish theft. The black Sea is directly adjacent with Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia

and Georgia. Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania are members of NATO while Ukraine and Georgia are NATO partners. Moreover, NATO maintains European security from natural disasters. Bosnia-Herzegovina is an area prone to natural disasters. Because of this, NATO and its partners conducted humanitarian exercises in the form of natural disaster management exercises in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO maintains the security of European airspace. NATO uses airspace for everything, from personnel and materials transportation, weapons systems shipping, medical evacuation to ground and sea forces air support.

Therefore, maintaining the security of European airspace is important for NATO. NATO maintains European security with its army strength. The NATO army is needed to influence the situation on the ground. The NATO army is not only able to deal with enemies but also with local residents and local authorities. NATO maintains European maritime security. By maintaining this security, NATO is capable of sailing the sea around the world in order to transport soldiers and war equipment. In addition, through nautical strength, the organization can help humanitarian missions, counter terrorism and clean up mines and protect trade routes. For this reason, maintaining the security of the European maritime region is important for NATO. Some videos show how NATO and its partners maintain security in Europe. In Iceland, NATO held joint exercises with NATO partners, Sweden and Finland. In the Black Sea region, NATO held joint exercises with Georgia and Ukraine. NATO maintains also security in the Adriatic Sea. With Montenegro joining the organization, all countries in the Adriatic Sea coastal region are NATO members.

Keyword: NATO, videos, agenda setting, public diplomacy, military diplomacy

Motivation of Funder Participation in Digital Media (Case Study Crowdfunding R80 BJ. Habibie Aircraft in Kitabisa.com)

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Introductions

BJ Habibie is The Indonesia Father of Aerospace Technology has successfully launched N250, the aircraft made in Indonesia. This time, he tried again to achieve the glory of Dirgantara Indonesia through the production of R80 aircraft as a form of nationalism. This aircraft was conceived by B.J. Habibie started the basic design, technology, until the scheme of production. However, the effort to realize this idea is not easy. In addition to Indonesian aircraft experts who have been prepared through aerospace education and technology programs in the era of the 90s has many who become aerospace experts in other countries as well as switching professions in other fields, the realization of this idea also encountered barriers to capital. It takes capital, which amounts to no less than Rp 200 Billion for the development of aircraft prototype, and around Rp 20 Trillion for business development (Kitabisa.com, 2018).

To break through these barriers, some parties are willing to contribute to the idea by launching a funding program, which is currently popularly referred to as the *crowdfunding* program. *Crowdfunding* is a joint fund-raising effort by utilizing a web platform, which is a meeting place between the project owner and the funding public. Project owner often gives a product or service as reciprocal (Techinasia.com, 2016). Through this effort, the Indonesian public's attention has been raised. Since it was first initiated on the platform Kitabisa.com, with the support of 23,776 donors generated about Rp Rp 9,181,473,750 from at least 185 fundraisers from the public figure who participated in this campaign #TerbangkanPesawatIndonesia.

Although there is a relation between motivation and contribution to the online community (Kraut & Resnick, 2008), only few researchers look at motivation in crowdfunding. Belleflamme et.al. (2010) analyzed the answers of four entrepreneurs using the *crowdfunding* platform to grow their business. They found that raising funds, gaining public attention, and getting feedback on products and services campaigned into aspects that motivated their participation in *crowdfunding*.

Methods

The method used in this research is inductive. This is especially by conducting semi-structured interviews, one by one with *crowdfunding* investors, following the pre-arranged interview questions, but it does not rule out additional questions when informants provide experience information and/or clarification as needed.

Researchers interested in assessing public motivation so they participated in *crowdfunding* R80 aircraft program. For that, the researchers looked at all transcripts and used the open coding process. After identifying all the examples, the researchers classified the motivations into the conceptual categories.

The next section, the researcher presents themes based on the data set during the interview, which illustrates the informant's behavioral phenomenon. The researcher compiled these findings to present a framework for thinking about the reasons and how they participated in the *crowdfunding* R80 aircraft program from an investor perspective.

Researchers also look at digital media used for *crowdfunding* R80 aircraft program on Kitabisa.com, so researcher get an idea of how *crowdfunding* motivate the occurrence of public participation in support of the main objectives conveyed BJ Habibie to make the Indonesian nation aware and committed to jointly support the development of Indonesian aerospace technology.

Findings and Discussions

Supporting founders and project ideas

From the discussion, Habibie who is the 3rd President of Indonesia becomes a positive motivation for the public. When Habibie asked the public for support, the public was proud. This pride is a form of investor nationalism that plays an active role in supporting the R80 aircraft program. This nationalism departs from the sender of a message that is a national figure.

In addition to Habibie as the main message sender, the R80 aircraft program at Kitabisa.com also gives public the opportunity to participate as a Fundraiser to help disseminate information by creating a self-funded account integrated with the master campaign account. The fundraiser is supported by several prominent Indonesian figures and communities in the community, including Yusuf Mansur, Ippho Right, Najwa Shihab, Agung Hapsah, and communities such as youtubers and others. The results of the interviews reveal the existence of Fundraiser which is a public figure is a special attraction to motivate the public for participation.

Looking for Reward

In *crowdfunding*, parties who involved has a certain motivation to participate. The founder's motivation is to find funds that can finance the project, the funds are sourced from investors. One of the motivations that encourage investors to provide funds is looking for rewards. In *crowdfunding*, rewards are usually shaped products, goods, and services.

This program is a kind of *crowdfunding* rewards or fundraisers who later donors can appreciate for his contribution. This system according to the results of research is able to motivate the public. This award is used as evidence that the participating public has shown a sense of nationalism. The awards are also research results can be a participating public space sharing in their personal digital media accounts or groups so as to spread the R80 program's information and motivate more and more participating public.

Acquire Values from Participation

Based on they experience, the informant explained that they gain certain values from his involvement in the *crowdfunding* R80 aircraft program. This message is packed with a spirit of independence that can motivate the public to learn more about this program and understand, so that the public participates. Digital media is also an element in motivating public participation. This is found in interviews with informants that *crowdfunding* on official websites on digital media is capable of generating a sense of public interest. By

this *crowdfunding*, the public feels the program is something that can not be missed, because with this public can contribute to the state in a creative way.

Conclusion

Based on the findings in this study, researchers found the motivations that appear in investors when contributing are: (1) supporting founders and project ideas; (2) looking for rewards; and (3) acquire the values of participation.

Crowdfunding which is the development of industrial and communications technology that involves motivation as a driver of the occurrence of the activity therein. Active participation can have a significant impact on the types of ideas that are introduced to the world, especially its *crowdfunding* R80 aircraft, who raises nationalism in different forms, namely through digital media. When the researchers explored this phenomenon in a new way, a crowdfunding platform can be enhanced in a manner beneficial especially funders, and society in general.

Keywords: crowdfunding, Investor, motivational, Public Participation, R80 Aircraft

Do the Laws in Indonesia Provide Sufficient Protection to the Domestic Industry in Cross-border E-commerce Compared to the Laws in China?

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The rapid development of information technology has introduced a new trend of conducting trade known as electronic commerce (hereinafter "e-commerce"). This paper discusses whether or not laws and regulations in Indonesia have provided protection for its domestic industry, particularly the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), in cross-border e-commerce. In doing so, this work applies comparative approach with the laws and regulations in People's Republic of China (hereinafter "China"). This work shows that the prevailing laws and regulations in cross-border e-commerce have not able to provide sufficient protection for the domestic industry if compared to the ones in China. This is because the prevailing laws and regulations are only general in nature. There are no specific regulations apply for Indonesian SMEs although many of them are start-up companies. China, on the other hand, has enacted several regulations specialized for cross-border e -commerce which provide protection for domestic industry, amongst other, cross-border e-commerce taxation and duties, transaction limits, and limitation of commodities on cross-border e-commerce imports. This paper, therefore, suggests Indonesia to consider in revising the prevailing laws and regulations in cross-border e-commerce that are MSMEs-friendly.

Introduction

Empowering MSMEs to engage business in e-commerce seems to be the solution that the government suggested to increase the distribution of domestic products within the e-commerce businesses in order to compete with other merchants or products from outside Indonesia or from cross-border e-commerce practices. As MSMEs are the biggest economic drivers in Indonesia, the government should ensure that Indonesia is not just a market for other products or merchants from other States.

This paper aims to further examine the available provisions within Indonesia's laws and regulations in protecting MSMEs engaging businesses in cross-border e-commerce. Moreover, this paper aims to analyse whether or not the existing Indonesian laws and regulations on e-commerce have provided sufficient protection to MSMEs' and/or domestic industry interests in cross-border transactions compared to China and to find out how should laws and regulations on e-commerce provide protection for MSMEs and/or domestic industry interests in cross-border e-commerce.

Methods

This paper is a juridical-normative research focusing on the existing legal norms with the laws and regulations, court decisions, and prevailing norms within the society (Sri Mamudji, 2005). This paper is focusing on the prevailing laws and regulations in Indonesia related to cross-border e-commerce. Furthermore, this paper is using two kinds of approach, namely: statute approach and comparative approach. Moreover, comparative approach is used because in this paper Indonesia's laws and regulations on cross-border e-commerce are being compared to China's. China is chosen because China has enacted series of regulations that are specified for cross-border e-commerce and aims to create a fair competing mechanism for cross-border e-commerce businesses and traditional retailers.

Findings

The table below is the comparison of laws and regulations in protecting MSMEs and/or domestic industry between Indonesia and China. The comparison below has been classified based on the cross-border e-commerce import models, both in Indonesia and China.

Table 1. Indonesia and China Protection for MSMEs and/or domestic industry in Cross-border E-commerce Comparison

No.	Protection	Import Models	Indonesia	China
1.	*De minimis* threshold	Direct purchase imports	USD 100	None
		Bonded imports model	None	RMB 2.000 per transaction; RMB 20.000 per year (if exceeding the *de minimis* threshold will be levied as general trade – no duty exemption)
2.	Tax applied	Direct purchase imports	Consigned goods: within the limit of USD 100 will be exempted from duties. Tariff 7.5&% +VAT 10% + income tax 10%; will be applied if the value is more than USD 100.	Personal postal tax: 15%, 30%, 60%; based on the categories set forth in Circular 2/ 2016
		Bonded imports model	Tariff 7.5&% +VAT 10% + income tax 10% (*de minimis* threshold is not applied)	Import tariff 0%; VAT 11,9%; consumption tax 70% of the standard rate
3.	Commodities Limitation	Direct purchase imports	None	None
		Bonded imports model		Positive Lists
4.	Foreign investment	Direct purchase imports	Listed e-commerce in the negative list as limited foreign capital ownership; allowing MSMEs to be protected.	E-commerce is 100% open for foreign ownership
		Bonded imports model		

Discussion

From the comparison above, it can be seen that in governing the general transaction of e-commerce itself which includes the legal basis of electronic contracts, etc. Indonesia and China can be considered as at the same stage. Both of the States are still developing the basic law/ regulation on e-commerce, yet the States have several supporting laws and regulations in governing e-commerce transaction. However, in protecting the interests of MSMEs and/or domestic industry from cross-border transactions, Indonesia and China have visible differences. China seems to have more advanced regulations in protecting the interests of its MSMEs and/or domestic industry from cross-border transactions.

The series of regulations enacted by China are not only protecting the MSMEs and/or domestic industry by imposing tariffs, yet also controlling the importation of the goods via cross-border e-commerce Positive Lists while giving substantial tax benefit.

The key elements in China's provisions above in protecting the MSMEs and/ or domestic industry from cross-border e-commerce transactions can be narrowed down into three points which include the cross-border e-commerce taxation and duty mechanisms and their supporting provisions. They are namely:

1. Cross-border e-commerce taxation and duties;
2. Transaction limit;
3. Limitation of imported commodities.

Conclusion

The existing laws and regulations in Indonesia on e-commerce have not provide sufficient protection to MSMEs and/or domestic industry interests in cross-border e-commerce yet if compared to China. It is because the laws and regulations in protecting MSMEs and/or domestic industry in Indonesia do not cover all of the import models.

The laws and regulations on e-commerce should protect the MSMEs and/or domestic industry interests by focusing on tax and duty provisions and imposing tax and duty for cross-border e-commerce transactions aimed to balance the competition among e-commerce, traditional retailers (offline businesses) and MSMEs.

Keywords: cross-border e-commerce; international trade; MSMEs; domestic industry

Social justice and social well-being are significant issues related to nationalism. Social justice is defined as the equal distribution of resources and opportunities which involves the fair treatment of people at the local and regional level as well as regulations that purposefully discriminate against people based on their differences. Social justice is the concept of fair and just relations between the individual and society.

This is measured by explicit and tacit terms for the distribution of wealth, opportunities for personal activity, and social privileges. The issues of social justice are a result of unequal wealth and resource distribution, and unfair treatment of individuals with different traits and laws that support segregation.

Social well-being, according to the United States Institute of Peace, is an end state in which basic human needs are met and people are able to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement. This end state is characterized by equal access to, and delivery of basic needs services (water, food, shelter and health services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of social fabric and community life. Social well-being is also the positive state of relationships, social stability and social peace, which involves an individual's relationships with others. It consists of the way people communicate, interact and socialize with one another.

This session will discuss the impact of social justice and social well-being issues on the formation of nationalism at the individual, group, community, regional and national levels.

Practices of the Police and Human Rights in Bali

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Introduction

As many tourists from around the world have been traveling to the island, Bali is receivable to be considered as Indonesia's front yard. Balinese are also aware with the fact that international eyes are looking for every detail of the Island. Since 2008 to 2018, an average number of foreign tourist arrival in Bali are 3.305.609 for each year within 12, 64% of the annual growth (Bali Government Tourism Office, 2018). A local adage said that "*sebuah jarum jatuh di Bali, seluruh dunia akan mengetahui*". The world will hear even while only a needle falls in Bali. A crime-related incident in Bali will affect the image of the whole country. For instance, the occurrence of the Bali bombing (in 2002 and 2005) made several nations issued a warning for their citizens to not come to Indonesia. Putra and Hitchcock are emphasizing that the Bali bombing incident had an enormous impact on international tourism visitation to Indonesia (Putra and Hitchcock, 2006, pp.157-166). Moreover, the event had also a broader consequence on international tourist arrival in the Southeast Asia region (Henderson, 2003, p.41).

The circumstances while Bali is a center of attraction for international visitors are advantage and challenge for the administrator in building Indonesia's image. Government practices in implementing human rights standards in Bali may be a benchmark for other regions in Indonesia. The analogy is: if Indonesia is a house, a beauty and neat of Bali as a front yard should be a priority to manage. If Indonesia fails in achieving its front yard, what would happen with other space of the house that was not visible for guest?

Problem

One of Indonesia's principal state agency that has a responsibility as a duty barrier of human rights implementation is the National Police of Republic Indonesia. Within its forces and resources, police are the most potent agents among the state bodies (Neyrond & Beckley, 2012, p.7). However, in Indonesia's context, Police has become the most reported agency for an allegation of human rights violation. Whereas, Jack Straw pointed out that police duties and services should be delivered in a way which respects the human rights of individuals (Neyrond & Beckley, 2012, p. XIV). Theoretically, "policing means protecting the human rights" (Patten, 1999, p.4). Delivering excellences police services is a part of police mandatory in protecting the rights of the citizen. As Patten pointed out that professional police are who effectively bring a service paradigm of their daily work (Neyrond & Beckley, 2012).

One of the most significant challenges for the police in maintaining and sustaining a public order is an awareness that police is delivering a service, not a force, and stick to the protection of individual rights. This paper tries to examine how police in Bali province (Kepolisian Daerah Bali/Polda Bali) balancing the duty to maintain community order in a way protect individual rights of people. We also try to discover what Polda Bali practices which are considers conflicting with human rights standards and seeks to understand their pretext.

Methods

The data used for this paper are referring to the survey of the Department of Criminology Universitas Indonesia on public satisfaction toward quality services and performances of Polda Bali. The poll had conducted in the whole of the Island from April 2018 to May 2018. Both of us are members of the research project besides Yogo Tri Hendiarto and Anggi Aulina Harahap. What we are doing on this paper is narrowing the scope of the research and use several data which relevant with an issue of human rights standards in the police practices.

In gaining appropriate measurement, the research is using a mixed-method approach which is defined as the whole process of research (research design, data collection, and data interpretation) that combining both quantitative and qualitative methods (Teddie and Tashakkori, 2009: 7). Within a mixed-method approach, we expect may anticipate limitation of a quantitative method which is more deductive and a qualitative way which is more inductive (Neuman, 2014, p.241). The total number of survey's respondents are 450 people who are from nine cities/regencies in Bali province. Moreover, to gain deep-qualitative insights, we interview 12 figures who are representing traditional and religious leaders, tourism practitioners, civil society, journalist, and academics. The methodological limitation of this piece is our quantitative and qualitative instruments are not specific in measuring human rights aspects in Polda Bali policing.

Findings

Six Indications of Commitment

We addressed six indicators to assess is Polda Bali committed to human rights or not; these are ensuring the rights of citizens, respecting a plurality, treating the citizens equally, fulfilling the needs for distinctive, providing the access for disability, and sensitive toward the needs of the minority. We found that in general, our respondents are satisfied with Polda Bali performance in bringing human rights standard in their daily business maintaining public order in the province. Within the score 1 to 11 while 11 means the best condition, the overall rating of Polda Bali in implementing human rights standards is 9,02. The highest point of six indicators above is for an aspect of police in ensuring the rights of citizens, especially in providing access to justice and settling law cases. Ranging from 1 to 11, Polda Bali gets 9,4 for this indicator. The statement of Ida Pangelingsir, the head of Forum Komunikasi Antar Umat Beragama/Inter-religious Communication Forum, is clarifying the score. He pointed out that generally, Polda Bali effectively solved the law cases which was reported by the public (Interview, April 12th 2018). Polda Bali is also perceived respecting a plurality and treating the citizen equally. The score Polda Bali gets for both indicators are 9,15 and 9,08. Regarding those indicators, Abdul Aziz (Head of Pengurus Wilayah Nahdlatul Ulama/ The Regional Board of Nahdlatul

Ulama) said as follow:

> *"The police are not considering the religious identity of people while delivering a service. They are protecting us regardless of our belief"* (Interview, April 12th 2018)

Regarding fulfillment the necessities of a crime victim in the specific situation, for instance, a victim of sexual assault, Polda Bali is perceived efficacious in complying with the needs for distinctive. The score for Polda Bali in this aspect is 9,00. Sympathy to the victim, as well as professionalism during investigation are the key to dealing with the victims of sensitive criminality. Statement of Budewati Nengah, a prominent woman activist in Bali, clarifying the excellent grade of Polda Bali while dealing with issue of sexual-related crimes.

> *"As long as we are accompanying victims (during the justice process), (the victims) will be fine. We usually support while investigator did an examination, and we try to propose the questions that representing the actual incident. If the way of addressing the question to the victim is bias, the case will be messy"* (Interview, April 13th, 2018)

We also found that respondents are satisfied with Polda Bali's performance in providing service access to a disabled person and sensitive toward a minority group. The score for both aspects is 8,98 and 8,5. Although Polda Bali gets a good score (the score is above eight within a range from 1 to 11), those two indicators get the lower score while it is compared to other aspects. In a human rights perspective, minority group and disable person are seen as vulnerable that we need to concern. It's vital for Polda Bali to improve the quality services of these indicators.

Voice of Disappointment

Toward the six indicators, Polda Bali is perceived implementing human rights standard correctly. However, it's important to note that there is no record of human rights violation it doesn't mean that there is no human rights violation. Sumantika, an editor of *Bali Post*, pointed out that as long as he knew there is no incident of human rights abuse by police in Bali; but he affirmed that "*I don't say that there is no abuse"* (Interview, April 13th 2018). From Forum Bali Tolak Reklamasi (Forbali), we found the voice of disappointment on Polda Bali implementation of human rights standards.

Forbali fellas dissatisfied due to the police is frequently inhabiting their movement in resisting the plan of Banoa bay reclamation. Several events showed Polda Bali might be considered restricting freedom of expression and freedom of opinion of the people to express their rejection of the Banoa reclamation. The restrictions are for instance a ban to use "Forbali" t-shirt and a disallowance Superman Is Dead to perform, a Balinese band who are actively and become a symbol in resisting the reclamation. Suriadi Darmoko, a director of Walhi Bali tells us his disappointment as follow:

> *"Issue of Bali Tolak Reklamasi is prohibited to be addressed on the music event. If they are addressing "Bali Tolak Reklamasi", the event will be banned"* (Interview, July 10th, 2018)

> *"People who organize the music event, the permit will not issue if Superman Is Dead perform. The most remarkable is while a student of Poli Teknik Bali submit a permit to Denpasar Police. The officer revokes the permit while they knew Superman Is Dead will perform."* (Interview, July 10th, 2018)

> *"In 2016, we are the victims of beatings. While the President Jokowi come, we wear the "Bali Tolak Reklamasi" shirt. Police hinder whoever wears the shirt. The officers who encounter (and beating) us is not using a uniform, but we knew the head of city police is in the location. We did report the incident to the National Commission on Human Rights"* (Interview, July 10th, 2018)

Discussions: Understanding the Success and the Critics

According to the quantitative data, respondents are assuming that Polda Bali is already implemented human rights standard and got a good score for the six indicators. Those good scores, which naturally are perception, in line with the result of respondent's satisfaction survey toward Polda Bali services in general. We argue that while Polda Bali meets the expectation and may handle anxieties of Balinese society, respondents are not hesitating in give favor for the police, including delivering a good score in the survey.

One the most Balinese anxiety is related to the presence of a gangster in the island. There are up to prominent five gangster organizations in Bali (Bonella, 2013:25) and play a role as security backing in several

entertainment spots (McDonald & Wilson, 2017). I Wayan Windia, an expert in Customary Law from Universitas Udayana pointed out that during the election period, the gangsters are show off force by their billboard on the roadsides (Interview, July 12th, 2018). Budewati Nengah also pointed out that the gangster's billboard and their convoy are intimidating for some people (Interview, April 13th, 2018). In handling the gangster issues, ranging from one to eleven, the overall score of Polda Bali is 9,21 (Dept. Criminology, 2018). People see Polda Bali is committed in handling the gangsters and they feel the presence of the state to protect them. This satisfaction toward the police's performance implies a positive thought of our respondents, including a positive assessment to the human rights implementation by the Police.

Another reason the succeeded of Polda Bali in six indicators of human rights standard is due to the Chief of National Police Regulation (Peraturan Kapolri) number 8/2009 as a norms-set and guideline for officers in implementing human rights standard is effectively socialized. Polda Bali is consistently promoting the Kapolri's regulation on human rights to police officers in the Island. For example, Polda Bali is socializing to their members the regulation number 8/2009 in October 2016 in Klunkung and in December 2017 in Denpasar. This kind of events is crucial in raising the awareness for Police member to use human rights as a guideline in doing their mandates.

However, it's also important to understand the critics toward Polda Bali, especially the dissatisfaction of Forbali who perceived the police is burdening their freedom of opinion. The police officer who is face-to-face with Forbali activist in Pesta Kesenian Bali/Bali Art Party incident (June 11th, 2016) said that the restriction in wearing Forbali t-shirt is due to "a commander order." The police may consider that their restriction is to ensure the Bali Art Party, which is attended by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, is running smoothly without disruption of anti-reclamation campaign during the event. The officer's discretion is understandable but cannot be justified. According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, expressing an opinion is categorized as a derogable rights that may be limited in a certain condition. The Kapolri regulation number 8/2009 is explaining that expressing an opinion may be derogated during "emergency situation" that officially declared by the authorized officials. Because there is no declaration that securing the Bali Art Party as an "emergency situation", the discretion of officers who forbidding Forbali activist attending the Bali Art Party by wearing the Forbali t-shirt may be considered as an abuse of freedom of opinion and expression.

Conclusions & Significance

Although in general respondents of the research are satisfied and perceived that Polda Bali had already implement six standards of human rights, Forbali as a prominent peer-pressure group in Bali is dissatisfied with the way of Police treating their effort to resist the Banoa reclamation. Polda Bali should see and utilize this disappointment as a mean to leverage the officer's understanding of human rights.

Hibbert conveyed that there is connectivity between human rights and social justice, normatively (philosophy-level) and conceptually (idea-level) (Hibbert, 2017: 1). Therefore, we believe that our discussion on this piece may contribute to the panel of Social Justice of the International Conference on Social and Political Science, 2018.

Keywords: Polda Bali, Bali, Police, Human Rights

Social, Economic and Environmental Sustainability for Sustainable Community in Brayut Tourism Village

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Introduction

Indonesian potential cultural and natural resources have put tourism into one of the important sectors in supporting the economy in Indonesia. As noted by the Ministry of Tourism (2017), the number of domestic tourists reached 263.68 million trips with a total expenditure of domestic tourists amounting to 241.08 trillion IDR. Meanwhile, the cumulative number of foreign tourists visiting Indonesia during January - December 2016 was 12,023,971 visits and was able to contribute to foreign exchange revenues of 176-184 trillion IDR in 2016 (Ministry of Tourism, 2017).

One of the tourism that is growing and widely spread in Indonesia is the Tourism Village. Referring to Law No. 10 of 2009 concerning Tourism, a tourism village is a tourist destination, also known as a tourism destination which integrates tourist attraction, public facilities, tourism facilities, accessibility, which is presented in a structure of community life that integrates with the prevailing procedures and traditions. Indonesia has 74,093 villages, and 1,073 villages have the potential to become tourism villages. Beyond these figures, there are still many village tourism potentials resulting from engineering development. Tourism village development will encourage productive economy in the community itself. Developing tourism village will not only be able to improve the local economy but also increase the socio-cultural value and environmental preservation (Green Tourism Village Development Guidebook, n. A). The types of tourism interests directly related to this include natural tourism, agro-tourism, cultural tourism, creative tourism, and adventure tourism that have strong roots in rural resources.

Refer to the report of PNPM (National Program on Poverty Alleviation) Desa Wisata from the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy, by 2012 there were 978 tourism villages throughout Indonesia (Green Tourism Village Development Guide, n.a). In recent years, the development of tourism villages in Indonesia has been quite rapid and has become the concern of many parties. This development certainly must be addressed by how to develop it, organize it, manage it, and immediately pay attention to the benefits for the community and the surrounding environment.

Several studies related to tourism villages in Java described how to empower village communities in developing tourism villages, how community participation in the implementation of tourism villages, the benefits of tourism villages and how sustainable tourism village development. However, these studies generally look more into the framework of community-based tourism (community-based tourism) is carried out from, by and for the community.

The development of tourism villages is not only able to improve economic and social well being in the community. It basically also embodies the sustainable social, economic and environmental development. The research of Brayut tourism village in Sleman District, Yogyakarta, has proven how various activities in Brayut Tourism Village have encouraged the realization of a sustainable community.

Methods

This study uses a qualitative approach and the selection of research informants is carried out purposively. Primary data collection was carried out through in-depth interviews and observations in Brayut Village, Pendowoharjo, Sleman District, Yogyakarta.

Findings

The Brayut tourism village has developed since 1999. It is one of the pioneering tourism villages in Sleman District. At present, the Brayut tourism village has received the status as independent tourism village from the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy. In addition, from 2011 to 2016, the Government of Yogyakarta Special Region gave awards as the best tourism village (Dewi, 2018).

As with other tourism villages, the development and implementation of the Brayut Tourism Village are carried out within the framework of community-based tourism. Community-based tourism is tourism that cares for the survival of the natural, economic and social and cultural environment, and the community as the planner, manager, and owner. So, it has a positive impact on improving community welfare. The types of tourism developed in the Brayut Tourism Village include natural tourism, agro-tourism, cultural tourism, and adventure tourism which have strong roots in rural resources.

The community of Brayut Village has utilized their assets, i.e. physical assets, financial assets, human assets, social assets, environmental assets, and cultural assets, for improving facilities infrastructure and other facilities for tourists. Environmental and cultural assets are a mainstay in developing and implementing a tourist village. These environmental assets include the environment (animals, plants) and those who do not live (mountains, rivers, etc.). Cultural assets include the customs or habits of the community in living daily life in the village.

Discussion

Various activities carried out in the Brayut tourism village described that the utilization of assets in the community has important links and relationships between these different assets.

The community in Brayut tourism village has good mutual trust and commitment for providing various facilities for tourists. They not only utilize physical assets (such as traditional houses), cultural assets (such as dances and traditions of local residents), but also rural environmental assets (such as rice fields, rivers). The existence of these activities has created various livelihoods, not only in agriculture but also in the service sector.

Finally, all activities in Brayut tourism village have created a sustainable community. A sustainable community continues to thrive from generation to generation because it has a healthy and diverse ecological system, a social foundation that provides for the health of all community members and a healthy and diverse economy (Green & Haines, 2012).

Conclusion

A community of Brayut Village, Sleman District, Yogyakarta, has utilized their existence of assets (i.e. human assets, financial assets, social assets, physical assets, environmental assets, and cultural assets) for serving their tourists. In its implementation, the tourism village has also paid attention to the balance between the economic, social and environmental dimensions. So that the implementation of tourism villages can maintain the sustainable community.

Keywords: Tourism village, community assets, sustainable community

Obesity in Adolescents in Indonesia: Threats to Demographic Bonus 2020-2035-Literature Review

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Introduction

Obesity is a preventable disease but in fact has become a global pandemic. The prevalence of obesity continues to increase. At the world level, the prevalence of Bodey Mass Index (BMI) between 1980 and 2013 increased substantially in children and adolescents. In developing countries, children and adolescent boys rose to 12.9% and teenage girls to 13.4% (Ng et al., 2014). Indonesia was first ranked among Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN, UNICEF, WHO, 2016). The prevalence of obesity and obesity in Indonesia continues to increase (around 11 points), much higher than the prevalence at the global level (Rachmi, Li, & Alison Baur, 2017).

Obesity is a very serious and complex problem both in terms of its causes and impacts; as well as countries that experience it considering that many developing countries have experienced it. Judging from the cause, obesity occurs because there is an imbalance between energy in and out energy (Jones, Bentham, Foster, Hillsdon, & Panter, 2007; Lee, McAlexander, & Banda, 2011). Obesity will be followed by various types of cardiovascular diseases that require large maintenance costs. There is a positive correlation between weight gain and increased health care costs (Dinh-Toi Chu, 2018; Lenhart et al, 2013).

The problem of obesity in adolescents becomes increasingly complex because the interaction with the outside world is getting higher so the potential influence from the outside world is getting stronger. Meanwhile, the impact of obesity will be very dangerous to individuals (health and psychological), society and the country. In line with previous studies, the authors argue that the greater the number of Indonesian adolescent who are obese, the greater the threat to national development because human resources are not qualified. This article will present the profile of overweight and obese adolescents in Indonesia and an analysis of the risks that arise.

Methods

Data was collected through a quantitative approach with a baseline survey of 600 respondents in 3 provinces, namely DIY, Bali and South Kalimantan with 2 locations in each province representing cities and villages. Respondents were adolescent with the age range of 16-18 years who were selected by simple random sampling. The collected data were analyzed by univariate and multivariate with the help of SPSS.

Findings

This article aims to describe the profile of obese adolescents in Indonesia and the risks that arise from obesity. Based on the data obtained, from 600 respondents compared to men and women, in the overweight category, more women were 19.7% and men were 17.3%. Meanwhile, the number of respondents who experience overweight obesity is more dominant in urban areas that reach 59%. However, the distribution for overweight, village and city categories has the same proportions.

Respondents who were obese, 61% of them had fathers who were also obese. Meanwhile, for the overweight category, there were many respondents who had a father of obesity / obesity (35%) and overweight/overweight (39%). Respondents who are obese/overweight, the majority of them do not have friends who experience overweight/obesity.

In the categories of underweight, normal, overweight, or obesity, the majority of respondents' pocket money is in the range of Rp. 10,000 to Rp. 20,000. Even for the obesity category, the majority of pocket money is in the range of Rp. 20,000.00 and below.

Discussion

Obesity category, the number of girls and boys in the range that is not much different, namely 6.1% (male) and 8.4% (female). Likewise in the overweight category, women were at 19.7% and men at 17.3%. If it is associated with Indonesian culture that is closely related to patriarchal culture, making men not only as heads of families but also in certain positions will be more dominated by men.

Although (Rachmi, Li, & Alison Baur, 2017) stated that the risk of obesity is more common in urban areas but not with this study. Data shows that for obesity in adolescents predominantly occurs in urban areas, reaching 59%. However, for overweight, the distribution is really evenly distributed, namely 50% in the city and 50% in the village. Village development makes access easier and technology more affordable. Open access, encouraging the economy to develop, and its impact, the more varied types of food, including high-calorie and high-fat foods.

From the data of the influence of family and friends, it can be drawn a common thread that although adolescence is a critical period that is strongly influenced by peers, the problems with eating habits and physical activity patterns remain more influential are the family. This condition is quite different from the opinion of experts that adolescence, family influence began to diminish and more dominant outside influences (Santrock, 2003).

The negative impact of obesity can be categorized into the impact of physical health, psychological, survival, economy, and progress of a nation. In a country context, the various diseases that accompany obesity and overweight make health costs swell (Chu et al., 2018; Lehnert et.al., 2013). In 2018, BPJS Health is estimated to have suffered a loss of Rp. 16.5 trillion (Primary, 2018). In the next few years, this potential loss will increase if various cardiovascular diseases increase.

Previous studies have shown that obesity will greatly disrupt people's performance in the next few years (Amis et al., 2014; CALLAHAN, 2016). If now adolescents already have overweight and obesity, the next 10 to 20 years they will face various cardiovascular diseases that hamper their productivity which has an impact on the nation's competitiveness.

Conclusion

This description shows that the problem of obesity in adolescents is a complex problem, not only caused by lifestyle factors of the individual but broader socio-economic factors. Meanwhile, the impact that can arise as obesity increases can have an impact on health, psychology, the quality of human resources as a whole, damaging the national health system, reducing the ability of the nation's competitiveness, and even becoming a threat to the state. The complexity of the causes and impacts that cause the problem of obesity should not be underestimated.

Adaptation Strategy of Indigenous Peoples in facing the Social Change: Case study on the Koroway Indigenous People, Mabul Village, Koroway Buluanop District, Asmat Regency, Papua Province

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Introduction

The UN in 1995 has issued a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a moral foundation for each country in the context of providing services and protection for indigenous peoples. In addition, there is the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 of 1989 concerning Customary Law Society in article 2 paragraph 1 which states that the government must be responsible for developing, with the

participation of the community concerned, coordinated and systematic actions to protect the rights of the community and to guarantee respect for their integrity.

The Government has issued legislation to carry out the mandate of the United Nations above by issuing a Presidential Decree No. 111/1999 concerning the Guidance of the Social Welfare of Remote Indigenous Communities whose activities are mandated by the social ministry. then in 2015 this presidential decree was replaced by the Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 186 of 2014 concerning Social Empowerment of Remote Indigenous Communities and its operationalization was carried out based on the Regulation of the Minister of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Number 12 of 2015 concerning Implementation of Presidential Regulation Number 186 of 2014.

But the problem arises with the existence of development activities in the form of empowerment, especially for indigenous people, generally less attention to the development of culture and the values of their local wisdom. So that the changes experienced by indigenous people seem rushed and result in confusion in indigenous peoples. As happened in most indigenous peoples in Papua, most of them are still in the stage of cultures development as a hunter and food gathered, then in a very short time they have to go to the stage of farming and settling. This has caused a lot of problems in indigenous communities especially about how their mechanism is in responding to changes in all aspects of community life.

Based on the phenomenon above, this research raises how the adaptation strategies of indigenous peoples, especially the Koroway Indigenous Peoples in the face of change.

Methods

This study uses a Qualitative approach which is a form of research conducted in a natural setting where researchers are the core instrument in data collection (Creswell, 2012). The selection of this qualitative approach is because field activities are a central activity where there is direct personal contact with the people studied. Understanding of the facts under study must also be comprehensive and holistic and try to understand deeply the life experiences of indigenous peoples and subjective meanings derived from research informants.

This research informant consists of community leaders who have an understanding of the dynamics of the development of people's lives. Indigenous Peoples in general can tell their daily lives. The Regional Government is responsible for ensuring the fulfillment of civil rights and basic needs.

Data collection methods were carried out by conducting in-depth interviews conducted on community leaders and local government and Focus Group Discussions conducted on Indigenous Peoples in general. To add to the completeness of the data, this research conducted observations and literature studies, especially on Indigenous Peoples.

Findings

The Koroway Indigenous People, especially those living in Mabul Village, Koroway Buluanop District, Asmat Regency, have experienced a very significant change. This can be seen until the late 1990s they still live in the middle of the forest and live in tree houses, even they were formerly known as cannibal tribes. It was only around the early 2000s that they began to come into contact with the community outside them, they began to interact with the exchange of goods (barter) and in 2009 began the Asmat district government entered their territory and began to enter several government programs there.

This change in the Koroway indigenous community was only seen very rapidly when the program of empowering remote indigenous communities from the social ministry entered in 2011 to 2013. This program provided assistance in the form of stimulants by building them home and some household and gardening equipment. Furthermore, this empowerment program is carried out by the regional government through related agencies. The changes that occurred initially before the empowerment program entered they were still the Rukun Tangga Mabul status and in 2011 their territory turned into a Village and in 2016 they became the capital of the Koroway Buluanop district. Changes from remote areas in the middle of the forest, then in a short time they turn into district capitals, but their livelihoods still remain as gatherers and hunters. Many skill programs are given but not yet run optimally because there are many obstacles that are experienced, one of them is the level of education and the location of their residence from Asmat district.

Discussion

Changes that occur in the Koroway indigenous people are indeed very significant. Changes that occur bring positive and negative impacts. The positive impact is that their rights, especially civil rights (holding ownership of KTP, KK, Birth Certificate, Marriage Certificate) are fulfilled, in addition to their basic needs in the form of clothing, food and shelter as well as physical infrastructure (electricity, transportation equipment and others) fulfilled. But the negative impact is the presence of cultural shock on them and their unpreparedness in facing social change. Their awareness of hygienic and healthy living behavior is still not maximized as seen from observations where a young mother (many underage marriages) holds a child while smoking cigarettes (there are habits in men and women to smoke).

In the face of changes, especially in adaptation, there are certainly several factors that can influence the success of adaptation, including the potential in the community. In the Koroway indigenous community there are several positive potentials in fulfilling the changes that occur, namely the Koroway indigenous community is a society that is open to outsiders, this can be seen by the arrival of outside communities who open businesses in their area and this is the forerunner of the market and they start learning to trade This shows that there are several houses that open small kiosks. In addition to the Koroway indigenous people who are open to migrants, they are also indigenous people who are quick to learn, from starting to see, try and finally they can do it. This can be seen from a number of Koroway indigenous people who have the skills to build houses using modern tools as well as livelihood problems, some Koroway indigenous people are quite enthusiastic in learning how to grow crops with productive crops and they have successfully harvested beans land but they are constrained by marketing. Another potential influential community figure, what the traditional leaders say must be followed by the community. So that changes will occur if an approach is made to the figure at the beginning of the empowerment stage.

Conclusion

Development, especially for indigenous people, must pay attention to the peculiarities and values of local community wisdom so that the development planning development is adapted to the development of culture and the needs of indigenous peoples.

Development must be carried out by emphasizing on the process and not on the results, so that planning changes need to be developed in every development.

Keywords: Indigenous People, Adaptation, Social Change, Local Wisdom

Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET) in Indonesia: Overcoming Social Injustice Among Youth

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Introduction

NEET is a term for youth who are not engaged in education, employment or training. Eurostat, the ILO and certain other organizations define NEET rate as the percentage of the population of a given age group and sex who is not employed and not involved in further education or training (Elder, 2015:1). The number of NEET in various countries tends to increase. In Japan, based on Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare data, the number of teenagers including NEET increased by 8 percent from September 2002 to September 2003 (Brinton, 2011). Based on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data, in Australia, the youth included in this group is 580,000 (OECD, 2016).

The term NEET often has negative meaning because of their condition as individuals with "no status" (Furlong, 2006). In line with those thought, Yates and Payne argue that many of them face various social problems and have higher risk compared to other groups (Yates & Malcolm, 2006). In some countries, they involve in various criminal actions, have mental or health conditions that limit their activities. They often are depended on other people for living and caring. NEET creates the excluded young people who are disengaged from the daily lives of their society. Even, they live in a high risk and vulnerable condition. Many of them face injustice. However, it can not be denied that many people are intentionally being the NEET.

The objectives of this paper are, first, to identify who are the NEET in Indonesia: where do they live, is there any differences between sex, rural-urban, individual characteristics such as age, education level, marriage status, family background (whether the households are female headed household, per capita expenditure, age-based household composition). Second, different from previous literatures that generally put NEET in labor and economic studies, this paper will focus on respondent daily activities in their environment, information sources, their capability to read and write Latin, Arabic and other languages. Those variables will enrich NEET analysis. The third objective is to examine various options to solve NEET problems based on the findings. These options will contribute as input for national and local government to achieve social justice and increase youth wellbeing.

Method

This paper uses secondary data as the main source of data. The secondary data used is the National Social Economic Survey (Susenas), Socio Cultural and Education module 2015. The respondents of this paper is Indonesian youth aged 15-24 years old. In order to identify NEET characteristics, I use regression analysis by using logit method. The dependent variable is binary number 1 if the respondent is NEET and 0 if the respondent is not NEET.

Findings

Almost a quarter (23.8%) of youth in Indonesia are included in the NEET category. NEET is more common in female (34%) than male (14%). This is due to the large number of women who do the work as housekeeping. The most cited reasons for not engaging in employment, education of training among female are because they are taking care of household. This is true among 64.3% of urban female; while among female living in rural areas, the figure is even higher (74.4%). Moreover, the proportion of female saying they are doing household chores increases with age.

The incidence of NETT varies across provinces. Banten tops the list with a NEET rate of 7.6%; followed by Aceh (7.3%) and DKI Jakarta (7.1%). It is interesting to learn that DKI Jakarta and its two neighboring provinces (Banten and West Java) are in the top-five of NEET provinces. West Sulawesi, a relatively new province (which split from South Sulawesi in 2004), has the lowest NEET rate (2.7%). The two other provinces with lowest NEET rate are Bali and Jogjakarta. NEET in Java (6.0%) is higher than that of off-Java (5.4%). While respondents living in urban areas (5.8%) reported slightly higher NEET that those residing in rural (5.4%)

The rate of NEET increases with lower level of per-capita expenditure. The average of NEET among youth in the lowest quintile per capita expenditure is 45.0 percent or almost one in every two youth is classified as NEET. While those in the highest quintile is 18.2 percent or only less than 1 in every five youth from the riches quintile are not engaged in employment, education, or training.

In terms of marriage status, ever married (married or divorce) male youth are less likely to be classified as NEET than their unmarried counterparts. The reverse is the case among female youth; married female youth are more likely not engage in education, employment or training in comparison to unmarried female youth,

Discussion

The rate of NEET of this study is similar with the Global Youth Wellbeing Index (24%) (Sharma, 2017). While, another report by ILO, Unicef and World Bank report shows that 27.5% of Indonesian youth is categorized as NEET (Understanding Children's Work (UCW) Programme, *2013).* The report also found that

difference of NEET between male and female is bigger than between rural and urban settings. High youth unemployment (22%) and NEET rates (24% of youth not in education, employment, or training), suggest limited job opportunities in the formal labor market and significant barriers to entering business.

The youth economic burden is experienced by themselves, tax payers, and also society as a whole. Society lose the maximum contribution of the youth potential. The NEET may rely more on government supports. In addition, they have poor health condition and more likely to be involved in deviant activities.

Social exclusion that experienced by the NEET can be analyzed by Ruth Levitas' social exclusion theory. Social exclusion involves the lack or denial of resources, rights, good and services, and the inability to participate in the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of the people in society, whether in economic, social, cultural, or political arenas. It affects both the quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society as a whole" (Levitas, 2007:25). Social exclusion and living condition experienced by the NEET show the existence of social injustice in terms of distribution system among groups in the society.

Conclusion

In regional, the position of NEET in Indonesia is troubling because many youths cannot fully participate in their society life. Other than that, they experience various social problems and exclusion. With such a large NEET percentage, policies that address the problem of youth idles need to be formulated. More specifically, policies for women who are large enough have status as the individuals who takes care of their households. Furthermore, female headed household is regarded as an excluded human group.

The NEET miss the opportunity to develop themselves that influence their future life. NEET status can ruin youths' productive potential and influence lifetime patterns of employment and wellbeing. Young people falling into the NEET group frequently find themselves at the margins of society and vulnerable.

Keywords: NEET, youth, Indonesia, Social Exclusion, Social Justice

The Dilemma of the Fulfillment of the Right of the Child to the Education of Child Prisoners in LAPAS: Constraints and Solutions

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Introduction

Various research on education for inmates found about the importance of education and training for prisoners in prisons and their positive effects on prisoners and the community. However, ironically the results of research also showed that education for child prisoners in various LAPAS in Indonesia did not meet the criteria set by the government. This condition is clearly a social issue, as well as a serious human rights violation, because it violates the international convention on the rights of children and the mandate of the 1945 Constitution article 31 paragraph 1 and paragraph 2, and Law No.20 / 2003 article 5 paragraph 1 which states about the right of every citizen to obtain the best quality education. Therefore, it should get more priority for the handling through comprehensive and cross-sectoral improvement based on comprehensive research results while maintaining the principle of 'in the best interests of the child'.

Method

We have done this research for 8 (eight) months in several LAPAS (2016) and LPKA (2014, 2015 and 2018) respectively. The main problems are: (1) education management model in LAPAS, and (2) inhibiting factors.

Data were collected using qualitative methods in the form of in-depth interviews of key informants and field observations.

Findings

Reality of Implementation of Education in LAPAS

Our results showed that the implementation of education programs for child prisoners in LAPAS generally run smoothly, depending on leaders and officers of LAPAS, were not sustainable, and not in accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of National Education. In fact there are various obstacles encountered by LAPAS on implementing the educational programs.

Most of the education programs implemented are Kejar Paket A, B, C or Community Education Programs that were hosted at a nearby parent school, or being organized independently. Tutors who taught Program Kejar Paket were generally from PKBM, LAPAS officers, volunteers and/or inmate tutors. While teachers who taught in the school generally came from the nearest parent school. However, in most of LAPAS, the 'teachers' who taugth are the officers of LAPAS and/or some volunteers, because the teachers from the main school rarely came, never even attended the class for various reasons, such as fear of entry, not enough transport money, and so forth.

Educational funding also varies. Program Kejar Paket were generally derived from PKBM and/or self-help convicts. Whereas Sekolah Jauh was generally derived from the BOS funds of local governments whose amount was fluctuating and was just enough for the money transport teachers and student stationery.

There were some problems related to education facilities and infrastructures. Some LAPAS had no bench and chair, so students had to study on the floor. There was no laboratory and props for science experiments, so lessons were only theoretical in the classroom. The textbooks were generally not suitable with the current curriculum and the quantity was not enough for all students. There was no fixed school schedule. Because it depended on whether teachers could come and taught. The learning process was generally one-way and monotonous. Teachers prepared the notes, one student copied it on the board, then others student took the notes. There was no assignment, because the lessons only took place in the classroom, while books and stationery couldn’t be taken to the cell room.

Obstacles Encountered

The above reality showed that the implementation of education in LAPAS faced many obstacles. These constraints include:1) Internal obstacles There is no clear policy on LAPAS related to Education Service Standards in Penitentiary. Another problem is the limited education budget due to the minimum budget from the Dinas Pendidikan Kabupaten/Kota. Meanwhile LAPAS could not set their own budget for education. The main problem of human resources is the weak work ethic of the leaders and officers of LAPAS who prefer to play safe and do nothing, out of fear of getting sanctioned. Related to the teacher from the home base school, they rarely came to teach, as they fear of getting in from LAPAS, or no sufficient salary. So the officers of LAPAS were forced to perform their duties as 'teachers', although they did not have the competence to teach and violate regulations. Another problem is the very limited facilities and learning infrastructure, due to limited operational funds. 2) External constraints generally come from relations to the stakeholders especially Dinas Pendidikan Kabupaten/Kota. The results of our study found a policy of the Minister of Home Affairs that prohibits the Regional Government from providing financial assistance to the Central Vertical Agency. The policy resulted in the cessation of education funding assistance for LAPAS, so that the LAPAS lost the main funding source of education in LAPAS. In addition, the local government also implements a policy that BOS funds were only allocated for education of prisoners from their territory, not for inmates from other regions. 3) Constraints from Individual Prisoners Children was usually lazy inmates' attitude to school and learning. Child prisoners prefer vocational training, as job skills guaranteed their future better.

Discussion

Due to the various implementation of education programs in LAPAS and the difficulties faced, there must be a first step to overcome them, which is that the three related institutions, namely LAPAS, Kemendiknas and Local Government must abandon their respective sectoral ego and are willing to establish a harmonious cooperation among the three, bound under the Minimum Service Standards Policy (SPM) of Education in LAPAS. Through this SPM policy, the parties are 'forced' to allocate some resources (funds, human resources, Sapras) to support the implementation of quality education in LAPAS. So that the constraints of limited funds, human resources, and Sapras can be resolved, and will realize the uniformity in the implementation of education in all LAPAS in Indonesia. Indonesia should implement The Import Model as applied by Nordic nations. Because this model is suitable with the current education policy. With this model, teachers are employed by MONE and Local Government. Authorities in education in each region have full responsibility, including financial responsibility, for prison education. The educational law is not distinguished between in-prison and in-community education. Education in prisons should be the same as any education in the community. In principle, subjects offered in prisons and communities are the same, and teachers have the same level of competence.

Conclusion

The Import Model is a model of education implementation in LAPAS that is most consistent with the laws and regulations in Indonesia. Cooperation between related institutions, especially with the Ministry of National Education and Local Government is important. Through this educational model it is expected that the implementation of education in LAPAS will be uniform, sustainable, and the quality will be the same as education beyond the walls of LAPAS.

Keywords: pendidikan, hak atas pendidikan, narapidana anak, LPKA, Standar Pelayanan Minimal

The Urgency of Community Asset in the Continuity of Corporate CSR Program

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Introduction

Community asset is one of the most important factor in the continuity of corporate social responsibility (CSR) program. Its disregardance will potentially impel the program to fail. The CSR of the company, especially in Indonesia, is an attempt to fulfill its responsibility as regulated by The Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 concerning The Limited Liability Companies, notably the Chapter 74 Article 1-4, The Law of Republic of Indonesia Number 25 of 2007 concerning The Investments, notably the Chapter 15 and 16, and the global demand on performing an ethical business for the company.

The CSR is an inevitable case due the emergence of demands to the company. The company realizes that its accomplishment is not only measured by the internal factor, the environment and the community along the company are also vital. This shows the shift of relation in the company, community, and environment where they are located. The company that was positioning itself as the giver of donation through the charity and philanthropy to community is now positioning the community as its ally which produce the possibility of its contribution in the continuity of the company (Rahman, 2009).

PT X Tbk is a company that perform the CSR program. One of its tangible program is the catfish cultivation program that has been held in hamlets (RW) 01, 08, and 10, Cakung Barat. Unfortunately, the program that has

been proceed since 2016 to Mei 2018 faced a fail due the neglect of the company. The company failed to preserve the vital asset of the hamlet 01. Green and Hainess (2012) (in Adi, 2012: 283) stated that the community asset approach is used to acknowledge the asset of the community and to develop them in order to achieve the community independency, including the resolvement of its adversity.

Methods

This research is a descriptive research with the qualitative approach. The selection of the informant uses the purposive sampling which defines the administrator of the catfish cultivation in RW 01, the CSR and Communication of PT X Tbk, and the chief of hamlet 01 as the informants. The data collection is gathered through in- depth interview and observation.

Findings

The research results in the acknowledgement of the use of social mapping by the PT X Tbk to know the need of the society. The social mapping acts as the base to create the program, although the program given to the society still needs to adjust with the program that was already conducted before due the limited fund of the corporate CSR. The catfish cultivation itself has a correlation with *Bakti Sehat* Program and *Warung Gizi* Pro- gram that has been ran before.

The selection of hamlets 01, 08, and 10 as the conductment place is evoked by the consideration of their similarity of urban characteristic, as it reduces the possibility of jealousy in the society, and the focus of only one program. During the first conductment, its participant was only the members of the PKK who was also interre- lated with the *Warung Gizi* Program. As the time goes by, the cultivation has been shifted to the Karang Ta runa due the activities of the PKK and the change within its board. Its change was also impelled by the shift on the lead of hamlets. This shift created a new problem at the beginning as the Karang Taruna never encounter a training before, although they then demanded it to the company.

The place of the cultivation in hamlet 01 is located in the third floor of the *Fasilitas Terpadu*. The building was built by the company due to the limited area, although it could not overcome the whole problem. There was an issue with the catfish pond as the third floor only has a partial roof. This condition got worse as the conductment by Karang Taruna was not certain. The Karang Taruna does not have the division of role as the members are expected to have their own awareness and they rely their reminder only through *WhatsApp*.

The cultivation has been monitored by the company through a credible third party. The third party must get involved in the program since the socialization and the conductment phase. In this program, the third party did not give any solution towards the problems as its contract has ended. At this time, the monitoring and evaluation has been taken over by the company.

Discussion

The research shows that the fail of the catfish cultivation in hamlet 01 has rooted since the planning phase. The company did not build the vital assets for the community while the asset itself could be used as one of the community resource to reduce or prevent the poverty and injustice (Green and Haines, 2012).

In the aspect of the community asset components, notably the human resources, the research shows that the Karang Taruna was not ready to take over the responsibility of the PKK. The Karang Taruna was not adjusted with the cultivation since the very first beginning. This obviously impacts their capability regarding the cultivation conductment, notably the *Biofloc* technology which they could not operate.

In the aspect of physical asset, the cultivation location at the third floor of the *Fasilitas Terpadu* also has an issue as the floor only has a partial roof, although its close location with the market could escalate the selling if the program succeeded. This issue plays an important role as the economically, the company would only fund the seminar, the training, the infrastructure, and the first conductment of the catfish egg and the pellet.

Further maintained and the pellet are charged to the Karang Taruna. In order to fulfill its responsibility, the Karang Taruna uses their organizational cash, even their member's money, in the hope of futuristic profit when the program succeeded.

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, community assets, community empowering, sustainability

"Mama Marind Su Hilang" Ecological Crisis in Kampong Zanige, West Papua, Indonesia

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Introduction

"Mama Marind Su Hilang" is generally interpreted as "our land has been lost", a movie titled Marred Anim's unrest, in Kampong Zanige, Merauke, West Papua. Zanige is a part of the area of Industrial Plantation Forest (HTI) clearing conducted by big companies in 2010 (Savitri 2013). Marind Anim tribe experience an ecological crisis that adversely affects the sustainability of tribal life and its natural environment. That problem also happens in other parts of the world as it is concerned by The Amnesty International (2018). Based on the various secondary data analysis and ethnoecological approach, this paper explains that the development policy labeled environmental sustainability unfortunately brings ecological crisis in West Papua. This paper will discuss whether the situation can be addressed through an ethnodevelopment approach and how it relates to nationalism and inclusive development.

Findings

Marind Anim tribe relies on forests as the main source of their life. The mega-company has acquired a concession of millions of hectares of land as part of the development of Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) (Sujana 2012, Savitri, 2013). The project seems to be more a capital accumulation than it should be solutions for the world food and energy crisis. People regret the presence of the company because of its bad impacts to the community. There are only a few people can be accepted to work as casual laborers. Companies use armed forces to threaten communities that are perceived to disrupt company activities. They regardless of customary norms that consider forests to be very sacred to their tribe. The sago field, which is the community food barn that is damaged by tree-planting, is irreplaceable. Population is also difficult to get hunted animals as their source of nutrition. It is followed by an increasing the number of children with malnutrition as well as suffering from respiratory problems, bronchitis and asthma.

Discussions

As was the case in Zanige Village, changes in the level of complexity of work, the total value of production, ecology, landscape and biodiversity and the quantity and quality of food, lead to chaos and disorganization in the agricultural world today (Ploeg, 2008). Transformation the forest management system into the global commercialization system tends to transform the people of natural wealth owners into wage laborers. Agrarian commercialization is usually followed by proletarianization (Setiawan in Wiradi 2008). In the ethnoecological perspective, Papuan people have a close relationship with nature, forest, is very sacred; who gave birth, fed and gave shelter to humans (Sujana 2012). The Marind-Anim community do not use 'indigenous people' as an identity to represent themselves to outsiders. "Anim Ha: The Owner of Land Identity" They believe that they are the Anim-Ha or the Real Man with personal dignity and self-contained superiority. For Anim-Ha, the land is the source of becoming (Savitri 2013). Marind indigenous peoples feel the arrival of companies in their territory as 'colonization', not just 'taking' the natural resources of their resources, more than it has destroyed all

customs and customary values. As the capital enters the life frontier, the ideological struggle between modernism and custom (Anim-Ha) has broken the owner of land identity (Savitri, 2013). There is what Kottak (1999) has said that not only is there a clash of cultural models but also the failure of the state, the war at the regional level and the increasingly unclear rules. In industrial modernity conditions antagonism occurs between classes, national statehood, and linearity of rationality and technical-economic control. In this situation developed 'supra national' and 'non-class specific global hazards' as a result of 'techno development' itself (Beck, 1996). The moral movement of ecocentric globality with the dictum of 'saving the planet', only as rhetoric and marginal, is defeated by the instrumental movement of globality (Huber in Duarte 2001) Local ethnoecology faces challenges, transformations and replacements Migration, media and industry have separated people, values and technology (Kottak, 1999) .The phenomenon of large-scale land acquisition is a phenomenon occurring since the beginning of history (Roudart and Mazoyer in Gironde and Golay, 2016). The economic, political and cultural changes with the deregulation of financial markets have altered production systems, sales sources and strategies, as well as technology from some transnational manufacturing firms as well as agribusiness companies (Borras 2009).

The government as a legitimate holder of natural resources policy should pay attention to whether what happens is actually a land grabbing, or land deals and what role to take. There are workable alternatives to corporate land accumulation and large-scale industrial farming (White, et al 2012). The government challenge in the current development policy. The humanitarian and environmental crises have led to activism and agencies based on environmental identity, gender and politics. An alternative development approach that needs more attention to development at the local level, is participatory rather than technocratic, builds on existing cultural traditions rather than rejecting them by reason of impeding development (Fong 2008). However, a successful ideology, such as a nationalist or an ethnic one, must simultaneously legitimize a social order, i.e. a power structure, and provide a meaningful frame for the articulation of important, perceived needs and wishes of its adherents. A list of necessary conditions for the peaceful coexistence of culturally diverse groups within the framework of a modern nation-state (Eriksen 1991).

Conclusion

The ecological crisis experienced by the Marind tribe suggests an asymmetric relationship between companies and indigenous peoples, so the ethnodevelopment approach should be considered to counteract imbalances (Stevenhagen in Fong 2008). However, sub-ethnic and differential responses between Marind sub-ethnic to the situation occur, it is necessary to consider inclusion for all sub ethnic groups. An inclusive development that can refer to the principle of liberation (Sen 1999) is important, where there is a process of widespread freedom where people enjoy and have a freedom to affects social progress. Through community participation it has a commitment to decide what is chosen for development, there is a generic common ground with a general concern for " quality of life ", which not only focuses on income but what individuals have.

Keywords: ecological crisis, ethnoecology, ethnodevelopment, nationalism

Ecological Nationalism: Indonesian New Nationalism Towards A Social Justice (?) (A Case Study of PLTU Construction in Batang – Central Java, Indonesia)

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This paper aims to discuss the issue of nationalism in a context that is more relevant to one of the important phenomena in today's global dynamics, namely environmental damage that has reached a massive spatial scale, with an intensive level and impact of damage, and various diverse patterns of damage. The challenges presented by the evolution of these global environmental problems, especially climate change, have *de facto* taken to task modern civilization, which depends on the abundance and ease of fossil-fuels energy. Various

scientific disciplines, ranging from biology, physics, sociology, law, philosophy, politics, etc., including international relations, have given serious attention to the complexity of the problems presented so far. It is important therefore to examine how environmental issues as one of the critical agendas of the global community today can be seen in the perspective of Indonesian nationalism.

Within that framework, ecological nationalism (eco-nationalism) is the principal concept that will be used in the discussion of this paper. Eco-nationalism is selected because conceptually it gives a further meaning to the concept of nationalism, which is traditionally understood in relation to aspects of nationalism that have political dimensions, full of heroism, resistance to power or domination of influence of other countries, especially politically and militarily. Politically, nationalism is also often interpreted as sovereignty. Hamilton (2002: 33), in his discussion of eco-nationalism, tried to trace the meaning of eco-nationalism by first recognizing the two types of nationalism inherent in the history of European nations, which he referred to as civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Although in the context of the history of Europeans, especially in global conquest, these two concepts of nationalism have to do with the existence of nature (the nature and the territory), according to Hamilton, civic nationalism is a social construction, which emphasizes the existence of social solidarity based on certain values, the formation of identity through shared institutions and the feeling of sharing the same fate. While on the other hand, ethnic nationalism emerged in relation to the legacy of colonialization, conquest, genocide, and natural exploitation, which resulted in the annihilation of thousands of human communities with their respective traditional languages and cultural heritages. In other words, ethnic nationalism respects the existence of cultural diversity, so that a threat to cultural diversity is considered as a threat to the diversity of the ecosystem and the existence of every living creature in it. In Hamilton's view, modern ecologism must prioritize the value of diversity, both natural and social; pay homage to the existence of indigenous peoples and racial/ethnic equality, because their culture is seen as "tutors" that teach respect and maintenance in place of a lifestyle that is destructive (towarsd nature). Further, for Hamilton (2002: 39-40), the thread between nationalism and ecology is located in democratic values and decentralized forms of governance. One thing that needs to be underlined is that the state must not lose its soul, so that it deprives its people from their own community and essence of life.

Meanwhile, Lejla Music (2017: 239), interestingly states in her article that both the concepts of eco-nationalism and environmentalist nationalism represent the highest form of nationalism, as they rule out the tendency towards racism, ethnic violence, religious fanaticism and militarism. Eco-nationalism is based on bioregionalism that prioritizes the goal of protecting the environment for the achievement of a better common life. Therefore, various forms of participation, including full involvement of women both in the name of gender equality and respect for human rights, starting from participation at the local level to international negotiations, are among the fundamental ideas of ecological nationalism. In an era where global climate change is a critical agenda of the global community, the cosmopolitan idea in the concept of eco-nationalism is the answer that is considered a most effective way to deal with the complexity of the problems presented, both through mitigation and adaptation policy approaches.

Meanwhile it is also interesting to see K. Sivaramakhrishnan's views on eco-nationalism. According to him, the eco-nationalism is basically an understanding that contains the personal views/insights, which reflects a combination of understanding cosmopolitanism and nativism in defining relationships where the nature is expressed as a form of national pride. In the local context of South Asia, this form of nationalism has long colored historical writing. In essence, according to Sivaramakrishnan, this eco-nationalist approach based on eco-feminism and environmental protectors offers a better perspective in shaping non-conflict societies and providing solutions to conflicts that arise as well as the process of peacemaking. Finally, several other literatures link eco-nationalism with green activism and the ideological competition between the far right vs. the left wing, (Catterall, 2017), or with social movements (Dawson, 1996). In the early 1970s, transnational activism was becoming more prevalent in continental Europe, dealing with environmental problems caused by massive industrialization, because the existing problems could no longer be effectively solved by individual countries concerned. The rise of green activism is also seen as a form of state failure to protect its citizens from the effects of environmental damage.

Meanwhile, in the context of Russian and East European countries (such as Lithuania and Ukraine), eco-nationalism is more closely associated with the anti-nuclear movement. This movement is more political in nature, and has a greater undertone of nationalism, because it is substantially a demand for the greater rights of local citizens to determine their own preferences (local self-determination). This phenomenon also shows that eco-nationalism can be interpreted as a manifestation of the desire to eliminate the dependence on foreign

sources to meet the needs of fuel and energy by way of promoting sources of alternative energy that can be searched and maintained in their national scope. Thus it can be concluded, that eco-nationalism can be associated with independence in meeting vital energy needs for the country concerned, a strong concern for the importance of environmental protection which is manifested among others by social movements or citizen movements, and the importance of a clear state role in protecting the citizens from issues related to environmental issues.

Based on the literature review above, it is important and interesting to discuss eco-nationalism in the context of Indonesia. As the world's biggest tropical archipelago with the fourth largest population, with of unique and complex geographic and demographic character, Indonesia is a country that is very rich in natural resources and at the same time extremely dynamic in its economic development. In connection with environmental issues, especially in the aspect of natural resources management, Indonesia faces what is known as the "growth -environmental (GE) dilemma" in managing its economic development, namely how it can spur economic growth to produce a high quality standard of living for the majority of its citizens, but at the same time able to maintain the quality of its ecological environment. Cases of management of mines by Freeport in Papua or Newmont in West Nusa Tenggara Barat, or management of oil palm plantations in Sumatra, are real examples of the challenges in the dilemma. The intense influence of economic globalization, on the other hand, presents an urgency to sustainably meet national energy needs along with population growth and continued economic development. The conditions obviously present challenges that are not easily answered by the Government, for these challenges are complex, multidimensional and contain high technicalities, in accordance with the character of the environmental issue as one of public policy that is unique compared other issue areas, in particular the potential of threshold effects and bureaucratic fragmentation (Cartel, 2001).

The main assumption underlying the discussion is that the state has sovereignty in utilizing its natural resources within the boundaries of its jurisdiction in accordance with its development preferences. However, the state also has the responsibility to ensure that the management of natural resources in its territory will not cause environmental damage that has an impact on the conditions in other regions outside its jurisdiction (beyond national territorial boundaries). In other words, this paper will ultimately discuss another concept of nationalism that will substantively challenge the issue of sovereignty (in reference to territorial boundaries), demanding the state's central role as provider of prosperity, and simultaneously respond to new challenges that are multidimensional and transnational.

This paper will focus on the study of eco-nationalism by bringing up a number of relevant data from the results of qualitative research based on a case study of the rejection of the construction of the PLTU-B (Coal-Fired Power Plant) in Batang, Central Java. The case was selected because it was considered representative to analyze the concept of eco-nationalism and the principles contained therein. In addition, the character of the issue also illustrates a deep conflictual relationship between economic, social and ecological interests. A tug of war between local, national and international interests is also highly visible in this case. In terms of actors, this case is a battleground between state actors (the central and regional governments and relevant foreign governments, including foreign funding agencies) and non-state actors (NGOs, multinational companies, local communities). Through the analysis of the PLTU Batang case study, the authors argue that Indonesia has not been able to move to embrace eco-nationalism, both in the context of cosmopolitanism at the elite level and green activism at the local level, because the state is weak in vision and policy, as well as suffering from GE Dilemma and strong foreign influence, while the civil society is not adequately unified. Substantively, this case challenges the concept of eco-nationalism, as not reflecting the basic principles and norms of eco-nationalism that are cosmopolitan; while conversely also does not indicate the existence of green activism with the idea of liberalism.

Keywords: ecology, nationalism, state, environmental destruction, activism, development, companies, communities

State, Society and Relations of Dependence over the Long Term in North Seram, Eastern Indonesia

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This study examines changing historical constructions of 'self', 'state', and 'society' as well as their interrelation in the indigenous community of Hatu Puti, located near the north coast of Seram in the central Moluccas of Indonesia. In popular literatures on peoples in the central Mollucas, this community is usually categorized as *A lifuru*, meaning pagan, wild, untamed or savage inhabitants. Contrary to its seemingly isolated circumstances, people of Hatu Puti have been involved in relations of dependence with a long succession of near and far sovereign powers, and they are surrounded by a landscape of many waves of immigration, economic change, and shifts in basic environmental conditions.

I seek in this presentation to understand major forms of long-term continuity and transformation in political relations of dependence among Hatu Puti people themselves and in their relations with external centres, and its concomitant consequences for their notion of self and well-being. These historical continuities and transformations have been generated through contingent intersections of many different factors. In tracing these processes across a long time span, I attempt also to understand how at each historical step this community most of all struggled to overcome the political domination that they were experiencing in relation to states and ethnic hierarchies, and to define their niche in a world of long-distance interconnections. My study's ultimate focus is understanding the ways Hatu Puti people are adapting to the current policies of the Indonesian state, which have involved dramatic increases in local-level government budget allotments and restructuring of local leadership offices.

The methods that I used for this study are ethnographic field research and library research including the study of archives and local manuscripts. This community is chosen as my research site because of the following reasons. First, this community is an example of recently-very rare existing type of society that still practices a mode of making a living as tropical foragers. So understanding this community serves as the utmost important record of knowledge before this human way of life totally disappears from the surface of the globe. Second, members of this community still remember that they had moved their settlement at least five times before they have settled in the location where they are dwelling now. The elder generation of this community personally experienced the devastating process of displacement that they have gone through. I therefore conducted an ethnographic research in this community with an aim, among many others I will explain later in the final section of this writing, to understanding the effect of displacement to human community like Hatu Puti.

As any other human being in other part of the world, people of Hatu Puti have to engage in relations of exchange with other peoples in order to be able to survive. Since a distant past, this community, in addition to their way of life as hunting and gathering, has also been involved in a global trading network of highly valued items such as *gaharu* (*aquilaria malaccensis*), clove (*syzygium aromaticum*), nutmeg (*myristica fragrans*), and, even exotic trade items such as bird of paradise (*paradiseiea Sp*), parrot (*gracula religiosa*) and cockatoo (*cacatua alba*). The island of Seram has been one of the important producer of clove, nutmeg and *gaharu* in the archipelago. Since the 17th century, this island had become a zone of contestation for political domination among local rulers (Ternate and Tidore) as well as foreign powers such as Dutch, English and Portuguese.

The involvement in this global market and the struggle of power relations it entails made people of Hatu Puti entangled in a complicated relation of dependence and independence, and suffered major violent migrations. The Hoamoal wars, which lasted for more than 25 years from 1625 up until 1656, began originally as military patrols and inspections from the Naval might of the VOC to West Seram for controlling and limiting Seramese trade relation with outside world (especially with the traders from Makassar). However, these expeditions were occasionally launched against villages in East Seram, and drew eventually the kingdom of Tidore to wage war against the VOC and its ally Ternate for political domination in the region. These long and devastating wars drove people of Hatu Puti to migrate to several places from western part of the island to Central and North Seram. The imposition of spice monopoly by Ternate (with the support of the Dutch) vis-à-vis Tidore in the region dragged the inhabitants on the island into a devastating battle of political contestation. Of course these inhabitants of Seram endeavored to gain self-determination and sovereignty, and free themselves from the

political domination of outsiders. Yet, they were not infrequently compelled to ally themselves to either one of these two opposing camps. This alliance was not permanently set for once and for all. In this battle of political domination, a group of people such as people of Hatu Puti might in one time ally themselves to Ternate as against Tidore, but shifted in other times the alliance and chose to join the camp of Tidore as the contender of Ternate.

The people of Hatu Puti maintained for the most part of the period of Hoamoal Wars their independence, escaped toward the deeper side of the forest, and moved from one place to the other at the heart of this rain tropical forest. During those years, they indeed upheld a friendship relationship with communities dwelled on the coast for selling forest produce, and buying outside items they needed. Yet, they could also raid peoples of those communities either for the purpose of head-hunting ritual or for getting human captives for slave-trade activities with outside world. We have to remember that spice trading network during this Age of Commerce in the archipelago went also hand in hand with slave trade activity.

Five years after the Independence of Indonesia, the settlement of Hatu Puti became one of central military bases for a separatist movement against the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. This separatist movement, which is called 'the Republic of Maluku Selatan or RMS, emerged in Seram Island in 1950. The nearby village Sawai, on the other hand, became then the temporary base of Indonesia's republic military troops to eliminate this separatist movement. In 1963 this movement was eventually put to an end with the capture of Smokil as the leader of the movement by the Siliwangi troops from West Java. Since then the village of Hatu Puti was joined the nationhood of Indonesia, and absorbed into the village of Sawai within the framework of adat or customary law as *aniala* (meaning child) and *petuanan* (meaning parental guardian) respectively.

After *Reformasi* with the application of the direct-outpouring of financial aid to villages, the people of Hatu Puti tried to gain recognition as independent village in order to be eligible to this financial aid. This time, they had to play a serious game of power relations cleverly. They performed this quite nicely, the outcome of which was obvious with the official recognition of their settlement as a *desa administratif* (meaning, literally, an administrative village) eligible for the financial aid from central government.

In this long-time span of history, this community underwent a complexity of human experiences which is full of contradiction and ambivalences. In this study I try to develop an ethnographical understanding on how the people of Hatu Puti define social well-being and self-identity amidst this complexity of contradictions and ambivalences with the desire to explore how such processes are being deployed in a specific cultural and social environment. In addition, I seek also to understand how the nature of dependence and independence creates an attachment to leadership and, even nationhood as well as its limitations.

Keywords: dependence; contradiction; ambivalence; well-being; attachment; leadership; nationhood

History of Connectivity: Initial Assessments on the Political Economy of Indonesia's Infrastructure Development

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Introduction

At the age when infrastructure development is touted by governments as an unquestionable force of good, it is important to acknowledge that infrastructure development is political. By political, I refer to the fact that it could not escape the Laswellian question of "who gets what, how and when." Infrastructure development creates winners and losers. It connects some people while disconnect some others. In accordance to this argument, Robert Dayley's empirical observation on Thailand's development found that there is a symbiotic relationship between 'infrastructure development' and 'marginalization,' caused by "various structural and behavioural political economic mechanism" (Dayley, 1996). It is important to acknowledge that the

development of cross-border transport infrastructure is not simply a single-faced force for integration and connectivity, but is also creating an "asymmetrical integration" (McDonald, 2015).

With this understanding in mind, we can understand that the issue of infrastructure development often become complicated because it is a question of priority and development strategy. *Which city connected to which one? With what kind of infrastructure? Who will benefit from such development and who will be the losers? Why we choose this kind of infrastructure instead the other one?* For example, President Joko Widodo decided to cancel the Sunda Strait Bridge mega-project initiated during President Yudhoyono's presidency as a political gesture to show his commitment for people-oriented and maritime-based development. Thus, the history and future trajectory of infrastructure development, including multi-modal transport system, in any country, could not escape from the influence of the political-economic structure that surround their evolution. Indonesia is no exception.

Method

This paper attempts to briefly trace the evolution of infrastructure development from the colonial period until today. By doing so, we could understand that the existing problems related to infrastructure development in Indonesia, from disparity/inequality (i.e. Java-concentrated infrastructure) to poor planning and maintenance to lack of funding and other complexities such as land ownership problems have their roots in the history of infrastructure development itself.

Findings

- The development of transportation infrastructure in Indonesia was strongly connected to the development of the Colonial economy and colonial production system.
- The development of physical infrastructure accounted for 40 percent of total development expenditures in the period of 1975 to 1990. In this period, the length of paved roads increased nearly six-fold, the number of telephone lines rose seven-fold, and the installed capacity of the state electric company increased eighteen-fold (World Bank, 1994 in Barber, 1997). The government also started to build toll ways in Java in 1970s, started by the construction of Jagorawi (Jakarta-Bogor-Ciawi) toll way in 1973-1978. In places where the plan was resisted by local residents, the infrastructure development was enforced by force.
- One important feature of infrastructure development during the New Order is centralization.
- Another important feature of infrastructure development during the New Order period is the rise of crony capitalism
- While Indonesia's economic performance has been bouncing back after the crisis, infrastructure development has become relatively slower.
- President Yudhoyono and President Joko Widodo put infrastructure as their priority.

Discussion

The centralized pattern of infrastructure development during the colonial period was continued during the New Order period and remains as an important problem today. Poor planning and poor maintenance were connected to the corruption related to the rise of crony capitalism in the New Order period (and even before). Decentralization and democratization, ushered in by *Reformasi*, created a more complex environment to execute any infrastructure projects. Furthermore, this complexity was added by the lack of available resources.

Conclusion

Many of the current problems of Indonesia's transportation are connected to the political economy of infrastructure development throughout its history.

Family Resilience Who has A Celebral Palsy Child

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Children with disabilities with the type of Celebral Palsy (CP) are low compared to other types of disability, but according to the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health, 2014) CP is categorized as a type of severe disability and the most burden some family. This is due to paralysis and damage to the brain so that it has difficulty controlling the muscles. Children with CP need attention, assistance and extra assistance in carrying out daily activities 24 hours from their parents and also education from special schools at a considerable cost. Experience that occurs in families with CP children is excessive worry, sadness, and environmental rejection with various stigma. CP children, need encouragement and support from family. Therefore, the family must be able to provide motivation, so that the child has a good spirit to develop and become more prosperous. For that, the family needs the ability to adapt in order to carry out its functions in the midst of the problems faced.

The purpose of this study is to illustrate how the families of children with Celebral Palsy (CP) are resilient. This study uses a qualitative approach with a type of case study research on three (3) families who have CP children who attend the Disabled Child Development Foundation (YPAC). YPAC as the largest educational, handling and shelter institution for CP children in Jakarta. Qualitative data obtained through literature study, observation, and in-depth interviews. The thinking framework used in this study includes the Rights of the Child, Family Function, Multidimensional Approach and Family Resilience as part of family wellbeing

Children with disabilities have the same rights as other children around the world (UNICEF, 2013). They have the right to live, grow, develop like other normal children. Children with disabilities are very dependent on their family and environment. Families help children to prepare and develop their social skills when outside the family (Collins, 2009). Multidimensional approach sees individuals and the environment as a system related to CP children. According to Harms (2010), a multidimensional approach consists of the biopsychosocial and spiritual dimensions of individuals and changes as a result of individual factors (inner world) or environmental factors (outer world). Both of these modifying factors interact and have reciprocal relationships (Harms, 2010). Environmental factors include the relational dimension consisting of family, friendship groups, and wider social networks and social dimensions consisting of social support and social capital. The meeting point between the needs of individuals and the available environment can be a source of strength for the family, a key to family resilience

The results of the study describe how the situation that occurs in families with CP children and how the resilience of the three families. According to Wittenberg and Saada (2009), having children with cerebral palsy can affect the family psychologically, socially, and physically. The existence of physical and psychological impacts faced by families who have CP children due to their physical limitations, making CP children dependent on parents in carrying out their daily activities, parents must help mobilize children who are adults. Barriers to the body functions of people with CP can increase in complexity with age, because more and more stages of child development are missed (Slaich, 2009).

Physical impact, for example when one of the mothers falls, is not even able to walk when mobilizing her child, sleep patterns are less than 5 hours due to having to do delayed homework while taking care of the child all day. Psychological impacts include sadness and resentment, worries about the condition of his child who does not go independent in adulthood, and the continuity of his child's life if both parents have died. Economic difficulties are also faced by families with CP children, parents try to work in their spare time to earn extra income. According to Patterson (2005) when family demands are greater than the family's ability, the family will experience a crisis.

The lack of understanding and lack of support from the environment on disability issues makes family members stigmatized and victims of verbal abuse. According to Myranska (2013), being stigmatized is a victim of stereotypes, lowered his self-esteem, and treated unfairly by people around him because they are considered different, often get pity and dislike from those around him, and there are even people who claim not to have children like a child from the family. The negative response from the community makes the family reluctant to socialize, close themselves, and keep a distance when with family members who bear CP.

Family members with an internal control center have the confidence to be able to control fate, have the ability to change situations, and are able to create the situation they want (Harms, 2010).

The family has a belief that the condition of Cerebral Palsy that is owned by the child is a charity field and a gift from God that must be thankful for, this is what makes the family always try to provide the best care for their children. those faced have hidden objectives and will benefit themselves in the future.

Family resilience according to Simpson and Jones (2012) becomes important, families who have resilience will be able to care for children better than families who do not have resilience. Family resilience is the ability of an individual to adapt when finding misery. How families survive and recover after facing life difficulties (Walsh, 2016). Research results show that all three families are able to withstand the various problems they face related to problems that occur in the family and the environment. Families who survive show strong relationships interwoven with the entire system around them, among others with extended families, friendship groups, YPAC and an environment that does not discriminate against families. where this is a source of strength that the family has. Although not all families experience the same conditions.

According to Walsh (2016) families with the same source of difficulties do not necessarily have the same resilience, where the differences in the family's resilience are caused by differences in the sources of power that each family has. The source of strength is a protector to minimize the impact of the problems that occur, where the source of strength can help families to adapt and overcome their problems (Kalil, 2013). The source of strength can come from the personality or value of each family member (individual), the value and commitment between family members, and support from the surrounding environment such as extended family, friendship groups, neighbors, to institutions. In addition, according to Benzies and Mychasiuk (2009), the relationship of husband and wife in the form of mutual support which is characterized by good communication creates a comfortable environment for children to develop. The source of strength in family resilience is having cooperation, support, and commitment among family members to go through a joint crisis called family closeness (Walsh, 2016). When families are well received and supported by those around them and have access to education and health facilities, families will be motivated in caring for their children.

Keywords: Family Resilience, Celebral Palsy

Analysis of Ideas in River Management Policy regarding Pattern of Water Resource Management in Ciliwung River Area in Jakarta

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Introduction

Research regarding policy making rarely focuses on ideational approach, when in fact, idea is an integral factor that needs to be discussed because it is ever present in the policy formulation process. This research will focus on the topic of idea continuity in Ciliwung River management in Jakarta. Idea that we refer to is "developmental idea" or *pembangunan* that has its roots in New Order era. We find that developmental idea orthodoxy shows its persistence and influences modern river management in Jakarta. Ciliwung River itself runs from the headwaters area in Bogor and disembogue in Jakarta. Moreover, the river faces many problems including flooding, degrading water quality, and slum area in the river bank, hence the complexity of management is inevitable. River is an important aspect of water cycle that can sustain the lives of many, affecting the well-being of a city even a nation's citizens. The mismanagement of such substantial resource can hinder the goal for sustainability.

The idea for sustainable river management has been known since 1970s but the effect of the New Order regime, especially on the developmental paradigm, was too persistent. This situation has led to policy makers implementing structural measures into river management for many years, making it a norm. With the shift of

era and political regime, it is to be expected that change in ideas and practices in old orthodoxies are going to happened, but the findings in this research suggested otherwise. Based on these backgrounds, this research tries to answer the question of *how does the developmental idea (ide pembangunan) become persistent in the Ciliwung River management policies in Jakarta?* This research uses two set of concepts to answer the research questions: the concept of idea by Stone (1998) and ideational change concept by Legro (2000). Both are used to understand the position of idea in the policy making process and to answer how and why ideas become persistent.

Method

This research was conducted using qualitative method and it required two types of data, which are primary and secondary. Primary data was gathered by examining documents such official government report, policy document, and past researches regarding similar topic. While the secondary data was from semi-structural interview. The informants for this research are Ir. Teguh Triyono from Association of Ciliwung-Cisadane River Management (Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai Ciliwung-Cisadane/BBWS), dr. Drs. Eko Kusratmoko, M.S., a lecturer from Geography Department of Universitas Indonesia, Sudirman Asun from Ciliwung Merdeka—a non-governmental organization focusing on Ciliwung, and a couple of residents along the Ciliwung River.

Findings

There are three key finding on this research. The first finding is that developmental idea from the New Order era was used to show the regime's ideological position as well as to shape the social life of Indonesians. *Pembangunan* in Indonesia has several meanings, but it was closely knit to economic and infrastructure development. This has lead people to believe that development in terms of material-structural things is what's desirable and regarded as fundamental and final progress.

Secondly, the government believes Ciliwung's biggest issue is its flooding. Believing such orthodoxy can be damaging since flooding is not the only issue the river has to face. This situation has led policy makers to implement more structural programs such as building dams and river embankment to deal with the flooding problem quickly but not efficiently. Lastly, even when it's proven that developmental ideas do not corelate positively with problem solving in Ciliwung River, ideational change is unlikely to happened due to lack of learning process from policy makers and institutions. The notion that the current orthodoxy is enough to tackle the issue at hand, and that new ideas are difficult to enter policy making discussion.

Discussion

Our research had found how and why developmental idea persist in Ciliwung river management policies in Jakarta. According to Legro's concept, ideational change can only happen when two conditions are met, those are the collapse of old orthodoxy and the consolidation of new idea. In the case of Ciliwung River management, both conditions were not present, hence the persistence of old orthodoxy. Legro further stated that the persistence can be classified into three reason, one of which is *if it ain't broke, why fix it.*

Our research and findings suggest three things. One, the old orthodoxy did not collapse due to lack of learning from the policy makers and the low expectation from the citizen of Jakarta regarding flooding solution. Second, flooding has become a nonevent for Jakarta residents. This makes them think that flood is normal and even to be expected. This caused them to have low expectation towards government's ability to cope with flood and further strengthening the notion that the solution Jakarta has today is enough (not broken) thus should not be fixed, thus making the life of people affected by flood not any better. Third, the new orthodoxy did not have a significant momentum to gain recognition. In the case of ideational change, there is almost always a significant moment that push people to change their perspective. Unfortunately, no such event happened in the case of Ciliwung.

Conclusion

The research concludes that in the case of Ciliwung River management, ideological persistence or continuity

of developmental idea happened because when the old orthodoxy did not collapse, and new idea did not gain any momentum to consolidate. Ideational change might not happen soon because of how the policy makers and the people of Jakarta see flood as a nonevent, furthermore the lack of learning from past experience are still considered to be *good enough* as a solution to Ciliwung river ever-growing problem. This research suggests that to shift to new idea, the government can start by evaluating related institutions and its function to redetermining their part in Ciliwung management. Further research regarding people's satisfaction towards government regulation in river management can help enhance this research.

Keywords: *Ciliwung, river management, idea, developmental idea*

Constructing Typology and Protocol Analysis in Classifying White-collar Crimes Cases

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Indonesia has faced corruption problems for decades. Even though that there is a special body established in order to "eradicate" the problem, however it seem not to show significant result in controlling corruption. Corruption in the criminological venture can be placed under the term white-collar crimes. However, since Sutherland coined the term in 1940, the meaning of the term has developed beyond its original one. In one side the development of the boundary of the white collar crime reveal that the term has become an important issue in studying crime, i.e. white-collar crimes, but in other side to conduct research in this area may lead to distort the meaning of the term. In order to eliminate possible problems in classifying an incidence of white-collar crime into improper typology, this paper has two aims, to construct a more comprehensive typology of white-collar crime, and to propose a protocol analysis that can be used as guidance.

Introduction

There are many typology of white-collar crime that have been created. Sutherland (1940, 1949) defined white-collar criminal as people of high social status who violate the law that govern their occupation. When Sutherland coined the term white-collar crime unintentionally the are at least two categories of white-collar crimes that implicitly contain in his definition. In his definition he mentions the occupation a people of high status or respectable. It is the first type of white-collar crime. He also mentions as example the practice of misrepresentation by corporations. So that corporations who commit law violation that govern their business activities is the second type of white-collar crime. Thus it can be said that the basic characteristic of white-collar crime is twofold, occupations and corporations. But Schwedingers (1975) concluded that after scrutinized the Sutherland study on white-collar crime, they identified two more category of white-collar crime, i.e. ethical violation and human rights violation.

As the concept of white-collar crime has become important issue to be studied in criminology, the boundary of the concept much more developed than the original one. Most of the concept represented as typology of white-collar crime. Typology is used to make that the indefinite existence of the object of study understandably. Even though that typologies may reduce phenomena to more systematic observation, they assist in the formulation of hypothesis and guide the research (Clinnard and Quiney (1973). In terms of white-collar crime, Clinard and Quinney (1973) simply categorized the concept into two categories, occupational criminal behavior and corporate criminal behavior. Bloch and Geis (1970) constructed five typologies based on the characteristics of the offenders, namely an offence committed by: a) individuals as individuals (lawyer, doctor); b) employees against the employers (in embezzlement cases); c) public policy officials against the public interest (in providing monopoly services); d) corporation agents against public interest (the case of false advertising); d) merchants against consumers (consumers violation cases). Green (1990) constructed four typologies, namely: a) organizational/occupational crime; b) state authority occupational crime; c) professional occupational crime; d) individual occupational crime. Jo Ann Miller (1994) constructed for typologies,

namely: a) organizational occupational crime; b) government occupational crime; c) professional crime; d) individual occupational crime. Hagan (1989) constructed nine typologies, namely: a) individual against individual; b) employer against individual; c) organization against individual; d) individual against employers; e) employers against employers; f) organization against employers; g) individual against organization; h) employers against organization; and, i) organization against organization. Actually not all type can be included in the typology of white-collar crime, such as individual against individual and individual against employ can be a conventional incident of crime, so there is a need to construct more or less comprehensive and accurate.

The aims of the study

This study has two aims. First, is to construct a more comprehensive typology of white-collar crime. Second, to proposed a protocol analysis that can be used as guidance in categorizing a white-collar case into proper typology.

Methods

In order to construct a more comprehensive and more or less accurate typology of white-collar crime, the study was based on comprehensive understanding of the basic circumstances of white-collar activities, namely the nature of respected occupation and the nature of organization in which the incident of white-collar crime may be in existence. The understanding is based on literature review of relevant references.

After the typology construction finished, it needs step by step guidance on how to identify and to proceed whether a case can be categorized as a white-collar case and fall under what typology.

Constructing comprehensive typology of white-collar crime.

Typology in various form are still been used in scientific analysis (See. for instance, Baum, 2012; Cases, 2013). Typology is "attempts to specify the ways in which the attributes of observable phenomena are empirically connected in the formation of particular types" (Clinnard, Quinney, 1973:10). While the type function is "as a point of reference that determines the extent to which any empirical case conforms to it, the principal consideration therefore being degree of approximation" (Rhoads, 1967). The way in which the typology is constructed follow Weber (1978) explanation in the formulation of ideal type, that need intuition and common sense. However, the process should include all possible type based on mutually exclusive and exhaustive principles.

The nature of occupation and its consequent to typology

As occupations are varied, based on occupation category, occupational crime can be breakdown into occupational white-collar crime, professional white-collar crime, and bureaucrational white-collar crime. Such a breakdown of occupational types of white-collar crime is based on the nature that each type has distinctive characteristic. According to Hall (1969) occupation is " the social role performed by adult members of society that directly and/or indirectly yields social and financial consequences and that constitutes a major focus in the life of an adult." In terms of high social status occupations, occupational refers to managerial job in an organization, especially corporation. Professional is a type of job based on professional high education and training, and need professional license in doing their job, i.e. lawyers, doctors, pharmacists etc. Profession has the right to control their job by themselves and external evaluation is considered as illegal (Green, 1990). Bureaucrat is a person who represent bureaucracy in giving public service as monopoly. Bureaucracy represent governmental function in rendering public service (Ritzer, 1992). Only through the bureaucracy people may get the service, i.e. driving license, passport, citizenship identification card, etc. Even though bureaucracy is an efficient organization, however it vulnerable for deviancy (Bendix, 1977). Crime committed by a bureaucrat can also be seen as an act of corruption.

The nature of organization and its consequent to typology

Based on its distinctive characteristic of organization, and that sociologically (beyond the legal principle) the governmental agent can by the subject of criminal offence, organizational white-collar crime can be breakdown into, corporate white-collar crime, and governmental white-collar crime. Organization is collectivity of person which has division of labor, authority, communication and responsibility (Hall, 1974; Etzioni, 1964). Corporation is an organization in which their main purpose is to maximum revenue through business activities (Blau, Scott, 1962; Clinnard, Yeager, 1980). Thus corporate crime in this sense is law violation that govern corporate activities. Goverentment is a formal compulsory organization which has territory (Weber, 1978). The function of government is to administer state and nation life, through allocation of economic resources, distribution of wealth, to preserve the security and economic and monetary. In this sense, governmental crime is law violation that govern the governmental practice. It composes committing a violation of law, and omitting governmental duties that harm the citizen.

The nature of cyber technology

Cyber technology has led to the emergence of cyber-crime. Cyber-crime only committed by people who has expertise in this area and almost impossible committed by lay person. As people who comprehending cyber technology can be categorized as distinct people, crime using cyber technology can be included as a type of white-collar crime. There are three type of cyber-crime that relates to white-collar crime, individual cyber white-collar crime, corporate cyber white-collar crime, and governmental cyber white-collar crime (Mustofa, 2007).

Protocol analysis in identifying white-collar crime typology

Cases that seem can be included into white-collar crime can be derived from media news or investigation, bundle of law cases and other sources. The first step in categorizing the case into white-collar crime is that they should be law violation present. However, the term of law not necessarily simply criminal violation, it can be civil law violation, administrative law violation, the violation of code of conduct or unethical practices.

The second step is to identify a high social status people. In this sense we have to define clearly the term of high social status that should be contextually fit with the society in which the research is conducted. It is because that every society has its own definition in categorizing whether an occupation represent a high social status. One that should be taken into consideration that the social status should be related with the occupation or activities in which the violation of the law has taken placed. Cyber-crime should be taken into consideration as committed be people of high social status.

The third step is to consider whether the case should be categorized as occupational or organizational. In this step the researcher should identify who that take the advantage of the violation of the law. If the advantage of the crime belongs to individual it can be categorized as occupational white-collar crime (individual, professional, or bureaucrational). If the advantages of the crime belong to organization it become organizational white-collar crime (governmental, governmental cyber, corporate, corporate cyber). The fourth step is that in considering specific typology of the offender, it should be based on their affiliation, e.g. as individual, profession, bureaucracy, or to act on behalf or for the shake of the organization, corporation or government.

Such a protocol analysis has been tested by Mustofa (2010), asking two analysts to identify 144 media news which expected to be white-collar cases and decided to include the case into proper typology. Only two cases which are misplaced.

Conclusion

In order to assure the validity of a research its need an internal validity of the concept. Typologies can help in constructing comprehensive meaning of the object of the study. However to assure that the typologies can be used properly, it need a protocol analysis in identifying and classifying cases into proper typology.

Democratic Transition Matters: Explaining Transitional Justice in Indonesia

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Introduction

Indonesia's political transition started in 1998 with the fall, after 32 years, of the authoritarian regime led by General Soeharto, following an economic crisis that hit the country and massive demonstrations that took place in Jakarta and elsewhere in the same year (Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Hill, 1999; Aspinall, 2015; Robison, 2001). This change marked the beginning of a transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy, and made it possible for past human rights abuses committed during the authoritarian period to be acknowledged by the wider public.

After five successive presidents and four elections, there have been many attempts to bring about mechanisms for ensuring truth and justice with respect to past human rights abuses, and with regard to more recent abuses during or after the reform process. Indonesia is one of the many countries that has adopted more than one transitional justice mechanisms. In the beginning of the transition, as early as August 1998, truth-seeking was pursued for multiple cases, while legal reform also took place. Both processes later led to human rights trials. In 2004, Indonesia finally passed a Law on Truth and Reconciliation. But a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) had not yet been established when the Constitutional Court annulled the Law in 2006.

In general, the adoption of transitional justice measures and human rights policies was positive in terms of the promotion of state accountability and human rights protection. However, some assessments suggest that the implementation of these measures was deeply unsatisfactory Ehito, 2016, Linton, 2006; Juwana, 2003; Hadiprayitno, 2010, Suh, 2012, ICTJ and KontraS, 2011). I found these analyses helpful but ultimately unsatisfactory because they fail to explain *why* Indonesia produced poor outcomes in terms of substantive accountability and human rights promotion. Yet all of these analyses share the same argument in explaining these failures: lack of political will on the part of the state and ruling elite.

Explaining such poor outcomes of transitional justice and human rights as resulting from the lack of the state's political willingness is unsatisfactory because it assumes the state is monolithic, ignoring the fact that during the transition and in the period of what most scholars referred to as consolidation, state institutions and agents are willing to adopt transitional justice measures with different motivations and interests. My research departs from this doubt. It seeks to explain further and understand transitional justice as unfinished agenda in Indonesia's democracy. I address two questions in this research. Firstly: What is the situation of transitional justice in Indonesia, and how do we judge its successes or failures, as well as its impact on Indonesia's democracy? Secondly: What features of democratisation in Indonesia produced these outcomes? What factors facilitated or hindered transitional justice?

Method

This research examines the implementation of transitional justice measures in post-authoritarian Indonesia, starting from the beginning of the political transition in 1998 until its consolidation in 2009 and beyond. It does so by, first, assessing the procedural and substantive aspects of transitional justice implementation. Following this assessment, the research, second, analyses the factors within democratic transition that either facilitated or hindered the adoption and implementation of transitional justice measures. For the purpose of this research, I use interviewed 79 informants and observed some meetings as well as collecting secondary data from meeting proceedings, reports, and media.

Findings

My research finds that Indonesia's transitional justice has been partially successful in terms of *procedure*. Various mechanisms and institutions were set up to deal with transitional justice issues. But substantively it

has failed in achieving its objectives of bringing justice to victims and strengthening democracy. The failings of state-sponsored transitional justice are related to the nature of the transition from the Soeharto's "New Order" regime to a new democratic regime under the leadership of five successive presidents. Indonesia's democratic transition combined elements of replacement, involving a total break from the outgoing regime, and transplacement, involving ongoing negotiations between elements of the old regime and the new regime.

Discussion

In this research, I explain how the nature of the transition shaped the outcomes of the various transitional justice processes. Adopting a new discourse on human rights and promoting transitional justice was useful both for elements of the outgoing government and for actor from the new regime. It helped them distance themselves from the New Order and to gain political legitimacy in the new democratic landscape. Meanwhile, the negotiated nature of the transition also influenced the implementation and outcomes of the transitional justice mechanisms that were adopted. In particular, it ensured that transitional justice mechanisms protected the interests of the political elite rather than foregrounding those of the victims. When democracy became more consolidated and elections took place, the new regime that resulted from the negotiations and compromises between the political elite of the New Order and the incoming opposition forces, was no longer dependent on transitional justice as a source of legitimacy. The failure of institutional mechanisms to bring about meaningful outcomes was the result.

However, I also show that although formal transitional justice mechanisms failed to achieve their objectives, these failures did not stop the growth of initiatives to correct past wrongs at the civil society and local levels. On the contrary, the failures contributed to such efforts, in these cases, rather than transitional justice producing impacts on democracy, I argue that democracy enabled civil society and local actors to initiate transitional justice efforts from the grassroots. The effect of these grassroots efforts have, however, so far been limited.

Conclusion

The research concludes that state-sponsored transitional justice in Indonesia has been successful only in terms of procedure, and even then only problematically so, but a total failure in substance. This outcome resulted from the nature of the political transition in Indonesia from 1998 onwards.

Even though transitional justice failed at the state level, more positive outcomes have occurred at the community and local levels. Civil society groups and regional governments have initiated partial transitional justice, suggesting that improving justice outcomes can also take place from the bottom up, or from the margins, rather than being entirely dependent upon top-down, or state-centered initiatives.

Keywords: Transitional justice; democratization; human rights; civil society

Nation Building Through Social Safety

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Introduction

Although Social Safety may be new as a term for many people, it is a subject which is much discussed and often complained about but when it's time to take measures, the government, organizations and also individuals don't know how to approach it. This contribution will be about social safety and measures which work, preventive and curative.

There are different definitions and interpretations on what social safety is. Opinions differ from: 'Social Safety is a feeling' to that Social Safety is related to crimes and as such a matter for the government and police. As a working definition the description from Wikipedia (freely translated from Dutch) will be used:

> *"Social safety means protection or feeling protected against the danger caused by or threatened by human actions in public and semipublic space." (1)*

A small detour to development of society, when does social safety become an issue? Maslow's Pyramid (2) will be discussed.

The aim of this literature study is to give an introduction in Social Safety and to explain what interventions can be carried out to increase Social Safety. This study will take a closer look at some interventions from the social disciplines in order to determine what makes them successful.

Method

This study reviews several studies describing Social Safety. As Social Safety is not commonly used term, a definition of Social Safety is derived after comparing several definitions. If a country is ready to address Social Safety is clarified from Maslow's pyramid of needs, the author took the liberty to apply this pyramid on the development of society. How Social Safety can be addressed and what efforts can be undertaken to enhance it is described on basis of content from several studies/advices on Dutch national policy about Social Safety and these are also used to clarify the role of the government, different authorities, organizations and citizens. Two researches on citizen participation and influencing senses will be described more in detail and the possibilities of implementation in Indonesia will be discussed.

Findings

Social Safety concerns society and all its members. Many parties are involved: Departments of Police and Justice; national and local governments; schools and other organizations which work with juveniles; social organizations like social work; Parole organizations, employers but also city planners and project developers and of course civilians, if they are organized for this matter.

Often interventions are planned in an integral safety plan and they can be divided in repressive and preventive measures. Repressive measures (3) can be for instance heavier and customized (alternative) punishment; shorter processing time; intervention in families; violence reaction protocols for police and justice. Preventive measures (3) are amongst others: police surveillances; technical security measures (like camera's); surveillance by stakeholders; social safe design of public space; hotspot surveillance; campaigns for mentality change; quick repair of damages (broken windows principle (4)); civic participation (5); influencing senses (6). In order to design successful policy on social safety the government should be aware of the following aspects: Clear Context; Support and Surveillance; Shared Sense of Norms; Known and Be Known (7)

This study takes a closer look at civic participation and influencing senses.

Civic participation can be deployed for social safety. Keyword is involvement; if people feel involved in their own neighborhood they will protect and care for it. Examples are: neighborhood watch, WhatsApp groups for extended surveillance and warnings for unsafety. Civic participation in social safety in The Netherlands was researched and described. The projects are classified in intensity of effort of the civilians: Creating rules of Conduct and Living; Report systems where civilians warn each other and report to the police and regulators; Civilians who visibly conducts surveillances, whether or not in uniform. These initiatives are successful because the social control increases and with that the feeling of safety. In every neighborhood where there is a civic initiative, the number of burglaries decreased but it is almost impossible to attribute this solely to these initiatives; there is already a trend of decreasing numbers of crime and there are other preventive efforts undertaken. For the local government and the (local) police there are several does and don't to stimulate these civic participation projects. In general: 'directive when it is needed and let go if possible'. Pitfalls are that civilians will tend to ethnic profiling; taking the law into their own hands and 'cowboy mentality'.

Influencing senses as a means of increasing social safety. In restaurants (light, music, scent, soft or hard chairs etc); car-industry (what sound does a closing door make); supermarkets (music, colors, light, scent of freshly

baked bread) but also hospitals who have been experimenting with light, scent, sound and color which has a positive effect on the healing process (healing environments). It is already known that design of a public space is influencing the experience of safety. There have been some not to friendly experiments with blue light and the mosquito; a device which creates a high frequency sound. Friendlier interventions with a positive contribution to safety have been developed. The senses see, hear, smell and tactile sense are suitable to influence and will be evaluated as a means of enhancing social safety. There are some promising results.

Discussion

Indonesia has a relatively moderate safety risk (8) – some parts are very safe, other parts are unsafe. It is ranked 72nd out of 162 on the ranking of the safest and most dangerous countries. The government shows a hesitating but growing interest in Social Safety, which amongst others has resulted in the obligation to appoint a safety official in every R.T. (Rukun Tetangga) area (9). Unfortunately, this official and its function is not facilitated in any way, so for many 'Ketua R.T.' this has become a check off issue.

Safety should be a priority for every government and it should be facilitated.

The above discussed studies have shown several successful interventions which have been implemented in the Netherlands. Some of these interventions can be implemented in Indonesia without any adjustments, other interventions need to be adjusted to make them suitable for the Indonesian society. But may be more urgent is the need to develop a vision on Social Safety which makes it possible to design a national integral social safety plan and local safety plans.

In the meantime, a lot can be done already with more awareness for safe design of public space and use of preventive measures. Indonesia has a very good digital infrastructure and therefore WhatsApp groups can be implemented easily on Rukun Tetangga (R.T.) level. With the right drive and push these groups can evolve and become groups where people physically meet each other and get involved in their neighborhood. Is the society ready to influence senses as a means of enhancing social safety? It looks appropriate to start with small scale experiments and take it from there step by step.

Conclusion

From this preliminary study it can be concluded that it is very interesting for Indonesia to act on preventive social safety measures. It can lead to a mentality change which can surpass its original goal and bond people together and with Indonesia.

Keywords: Nation building; social safety; crime; mentality; safe environment; Maslow; civic participation; civil participation; citizenship; influencing senses

Reconciling Local Need and Global Concern for Rural Economic Development in Peat Swamp Forest Ecosystem: A Preliminary Result from Perigi Talang Nangka, South Sumatera, Indonesia

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Introduction

Global concern is now in recovering peat land ecosystem, and community empowerment who live in and around its ecosystem is included. However, many programs have been implemented for rural economic development in peat swamp ecosystem, but it is no significant improvement identified for community welfare. Rural development often fails due to a lack of understanding on social history and culture. Social and cultural

issues did not taken into account in the decision of livelihood intervention. Unfortunately, the study focusing in ethnographic perspective to support rural livelihood development is missing. Therefore, this paper aims to identify the natural resource-community interaction in peat swamp forest ecosystem to determine sustainable livelihood strategy.

Method

Through a micro policy analysis of rural livelihood framework, this study used a case study in Perigi Talang Nangka Village, South Sumatera Province. The village was selected due to a strong interrelationship between community and peat land ecosystem in economic or cultural bounded.

Ethnographic approach was used as a basis for inquiry process in identifying attribute of the community. We used then such ethnographic result to determine their livelihood platform and strategies. The last step was to assess the livelihood intervention and its impact on household income. Data were collected by ground observation and in-depth interview with key informants identified as local ecological experts, as well as historical-anthropology expert. The data was analyzed by a combination of the descriptive and livelihood analysis.

Findings

The study found that there were three social classes of the community in peat swamp forest ecosystem: rawang, risan, and sungai people. The class was established by a very long cultural history in the form of social diversification based on moral value. Such diversification then led to natural resource-household interaction resulting a different and specific livelihood platform and strategies.

Rawang people use peat swamp forest as a natural capital, lead their livelihood strategy in natural fishery and forest product collection. Unlike Rawang people, farmer and trader were the main livelihood strategies for Risan and Sungai people, using land as their natural capital. A historical interrelationship between livelihood strategy and natural resources also made a different land rights regime. Rawang people used peat swamp and forest as their home range in communally perspective. Access right and withdrawal right were the main bundle of right in order to support their livelihood strategy. Risan and Sungai people looked mineral land as a main asset for their livelihood. Ownership right was the land right regime for Risan and Sungai people.

We also noted global actors (local and national government, logging and oil palm companies) involve in developing villager's livelihood. They did livelihood interventions, such as logging, oil palm plantation, rice field development, intensive fish farming (*keramba*), and *purun* weaving empowerment. Our investigation, however, indicates they seen villagers as a homogenous community, without any consideration to specific livelihood platform on those three social classes. Almost all beneficiaries were Risan and Sungai people, and the failure of Rawang people livelihood improvement should be the result.

Logging was, for instance, the highest contribution to household income (IDR 500,000/day in average) and cover to all social classes. However, unsustainable logging system led to a peat swamp forest ecosystem degradation, as well as the destruction of fish and forest products habitat. Rawang people is the main cost bearer at current generation.

Oil palm plantation, rice field development, intensive fish farming, and *purun* weaving empowerment have also failed to improve Rawang people household income and create unsustainable livelihood activities. We indicate a problem of the ability to reconcile the global concern with local need in rural economic development at our study site, couple with elite capture, and misdirected target group of development.

Discussion

Our research findings imply to a theoretical and practical significance. As a theoretical implication, this study revealed that social classes contribute to the land rights relation and the construction of economic preference in peat forest ecosystems. The failure in understanding some social characteristics can be an obstacle for a better rural economic development. Therefore, an ethnographic approach is a crucial matter to deal with sustainable livelihood in peat swamp forest ecosystem, at least in our study site in South Sumatera.

As a practical implication, we underline the important of redesigning rural economic development. An integration of rural livelihood framework and anthropological inquiry method is a better way to designing a better livelihood intervention for villagers, especially in peat swamp forest ecosystem. The second one, peat land restoration, as a current national priority of the Government of Indonesia, is a good choice to rehabilitate peat swamp ecosystem. It will provide a natural and ideal condition for rawang people livelihood strategies.

Conclusion

Our research concludes that there a specific natural resource-community interaction in peat swamp forest ecosystem to determine villager's livelihood strategies established from a very long time cultural history. The interaction pattern is important to take into accoun in designing rural livelihood intervention to gain their household income. We recommend to redesign rural economic development using ethnographic approach to meet local need with global concern in peat swamp forest ecosystem.

Keywords: economic preference, land right, peat land, rural development, ethnographic approach

Policing Model of Online Hate Crime: Cyber Policing Experience in Indonesia

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Introduction

Police, as gatekeepers in the criminal justice system, is the most heavily constrained sub-systems in policing against online hate crime. Police efforts perceived as a futile effort, a violation of the right to civil liberties, even as a reflection of a repressive regime. Such perception is a result of people having bad experiences with the police, having negative prejudices against the police, and lacking police ability to enforce the law and prevent crime in the cyber world. Understanding the characteristics of society, the weakness of the police and the aspects of online hate crime culminate in the emergence of a demand for an explanation of the policing within the framework of policing model.

Method

Review of the literature shows that previous researches generally explains policing models only as a causal process. Ideally describing a policing model should also refer to discretion, the law as a mean, accountability, relation with the public, professionalization, legitimacy, prevention, and pro/reactiveness. Research data used to describe a policing model in conducting policing against online hate crime is collected by conducting a literature review, followed by interviewing the Director, Ka Subdit, Kanit and Investigators to identify the implementation or policing practices against online hate crime. Data analysis was performed with reference to the activities of sorting the data, describe the findings of the data, interpreting the data, relating to the interpretation of the data with the theoretical framework and verifying to explains conformity with the theoretical framework or explain any discrepancy against theoretical framework in this research.

Findings

In Indonesia, within the last year, an online hate crime is generally preceded by the emergence and development of news and information hoaxes, especially through social media. Such crimes that occur in the

computing environment, then move from cyberspace into the physical world and manifest into attack and vandalism against the house of worship and the occurrence of persecution. Online hate crime, in its later development, has become organized (organized hate crime) and is likely to contribute to the election fraud by intimidation and misinformation in Jakarta's Governor Election of 2017.

The legal basis for policing against online hate crime is the Law Decree No. 19 the Year 2016 on the Amendment of Act No. 11 of 2008 on Information and Electronic Transactions (ITE), and Act No. 2 of 2002 on the Police of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition 11 Optimization Action Program towards professional, modern and trusted Police Institute (PROMOTER) also become a guide in conducting policing against online hate crime.

The development of online hate crime and its impact, particularly on Simultaneous elections (Pilkada Serentak) 2018 and Legislative Election (Pileg) 2019, responded by improving IT and Cybercrime Sub Directorate of Dittipideksus POLRI to Cyber Crime Directorate of Indonesian National Police. Such major structural improvement based on Presidential Regulation no. 5 of 2017 on Amendment to Presidential Regulation no. 52 of 2010 on the Organizational Structure and Working Procedures of the Indonesian National Police. Accompanied by the additional members and building capacity which is done by strengthening the knowledge and ability of investigator in policing case of an online hate crime. Within current context, POLRI works with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Development is also done by modernizing special tools, such as digital forensics tools, direction finder, and social networks analyst system.

Policing against online hate crime carried out by conducting undercover online. The ultimate goal is to neutralize the impact of the online hate crime as early as possible, before generating more harmful effects. Currently carried out by Satgas Medsos or Cyber Patrol on the Directorate of Cyber Crime, which is a real-life practice of undercover online. In carrying out its duties this task force has the authority to implement restorative justice against online offender hate crime, especially if the perpetrator is an underage, blindly forwarding hate messages or first offender.

Inter-agency cooperation is also carried out by the Indonesian National Police, given the fact that policing online hate crime is not an easy task and not only a responsibility of the police alone. One of the manifestations of inter-agency cooperation among others is to block the websites or accounts that are indicated for spreading hatred by cooperating with the Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Information.

Prevention efforts were taken by building awareness of the common interests of Internet users. Altogether developing awareness and knowledge of law and norms. While interacting online in the digital landscape. Attempting to merge with online communities, doing digital literacy. The expected end result is the implementation of counter-hate crime, while identifying fraudulent and counterfeit contents, while also promoting tolerance and diversity values.

Discussion

Looking at its characteristics, policing of online hate crime conducted in Indonesia is a combination of 2 (two) policing models, the professional model of policing and the community policing model. Professional model of policing is a model that emphasizes professionalism, administrative reforms, and technology. Professionalism requires the education and training of police officers, accompanied by increased effectiveness and efficiency, in collaboration with experts in crime control, and encourages police to have an understanding of community life and potential criminals. Administrative reforms are conducted by reorganizing, increasing control and supervision of every policing activity, developing and applying crime-fighting strategies, and supervising individual officers. Technology is intended as an effort to utilize various technological innovations in various policing activities, especially the use of digital forensics.

However, community policing model, also visible in policing efforts. Visible aspects of community partnerships when the police interacted with the community in building awareness of the common interests of computer users and fused with online communities. Together develop awareness and knowledge of rules and norms in interacting online.

Conclusion

Reflecting on policing practices against online hate crime, suggests that the model of policing is basically a general statement that refers to the orientation and approach of the police in carrying out their task or the main role, particularly in controlling crime. A policing model is a concept that can help distinguish or divide, making it easier to recognize, explain or study policing activities carried out or implemented. However, not all elements that theoretically form a policing model can be identified in practice. It is natural that policing activities can be described in 2 (two) policing models and the policing model is not something mutually exclusive.

Keyword: online hate crime, police, policing, model of policing

Quo Vadis Ekonomi Rakyat?
An Explanation on The Ideological Deviation of Economic Legislature in Indonesia

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Introduction

The debate on both ideology antipode is claimed inexpedient and obsolete. However, the two ideologies have become world constellation of many countries' economic system that translated into laws. Some other is favoring the idea of capitalism which is considered self-correcting, flexible in facing any change, and even could also becoming socialistic (Berten, 2000). While others believe, even though the capitalism is nurtured and forged in globalization era to become world dominant system, the failure of capitalism is inevitable since it is laid on fragile foundation. It was Anthony Giddens who first initiated the Third Way Movement that re-evaluate traditional conception of capitalism and socialism. The Third Way stands for a modernized social democracy, passionate in its commitment to social justice. (Giddens, 1999).

In Indonesia, its authentic "third way" was actually introduced long before Giddens sparked his idea. It was Muhammad Hatta who at first introduced the term of "Ekonomi Rakyat" (Hatta, 1931). Ekonomi rakyat does not mean a middle way which chooses impartiality between two big pole ideology. It is authentic and rooted on the value of Pancasila as the *Weltanschauung (Philosophische- Grondslag)* of Indonesia. It was aimed to position people in the center of all economic policies and legislation.

The term of Ekonomi Rakyat is very ubiquitous and easily become a trending topic in every season of democracy feast. It is a compelling political tagline to promote leader candidacy and is always highlighted in every leadership mission program. Ironically, the philosophical value of Ekonomi Rakyat is often not represented in Indonesia economic policy and even legislation. Even in the regime of figures that is acknowledged as a nationalist leader, the value of Ekonomi Rakyat constantly missed out from the regulations.

Methods

This paper reviews the concept of Ekonomi Kerakyatan and define the ideological values within. It also analyses three influential legislations (the amendment of UUD, Legislation of Oil and Gas, Legislation of Investment) which considered inconstitutional or deviate from the ideology of Ekonomi Rakyat. The analyses are based on three methods. First, Conceptual Approach by generalize an outline of legal resources on the historical timeline, the authors will formulate the concept of Ekonomi Rakyat in legislation. Second, Philosophical Approach, having fully understood the concept of Ekonomi Rakyat and people's sovereignty

system, the authors will further examine whether the ontological, epistemological and teleological aspects of the fundamental idea of Ekonomi Rakyat has been manifested in laws and economic policies. The author also reviews the minutes of the Indonesian Independence Preparation Body (BPUPKI), the authentic opinion of the Indonesia's founding fathers regarding the people sovereignty and the position of the people in the Indonesian economic system. Lastly, the research also applies analytical approach to conclude the reason on ideological deviance and to prescribe solutions in reinvigorating the value of Ekonomi Rakyat.

Findings

It is found that the absence of ideological economic value system was influenced by historical background and has been *resulted impractical law products*. Besides, it is also found that the appliance of Ekonomi Rakyat is really depended on the commitment of leader figure. In Indonesian governmental regime successions, it is found that the absence of such value is derived from the leader's misunderstanding on Ekonomi Rakyat itself.

Discussion: Deviations of Ekonomi Rakyat in Indonesian Legal Framework

The Amendment of Constitution

If we referred to the relationship between the rule of law and economic development, it is prescribed the law can be a facilitating factor for economic development *only if* some basic conditions are satisfied. Those conditions vary depending on the history, culture and initial situation in each country. However, they may be concerned with (i) the domestic and international economic situation such as the degree of commercialization and the extension of impersonal exchange, (ii) the cultural attitude of the people toward law, for example, the reliance on formal rules, (iii) the strength (or weakness), efficiency and rationality of the existing informal rules. (Hiroshi Matsuo, 2005)

In the case of Indonesia, the gap between formal rules of economic law in legislation and the informal rules such as the origin people's ideology of law is very clear. It happens in many are, namely the unconstitutionality of Water Law, Koperasi Law, Oil and Gas Law, etc. However, the biggest momentum of Indonesian rule of laws deviation which eventually determining the economic national kaleidoscope was happened at the amendment of Indonesian constitution -Undang-Undang Dasar 1945.

It was back on the early reformation regime when parliament was experiencing *pseudo euphoria*, the article 33 of 1945 Constitution was changed. The origin article 33 was put in Section XIV titled social welfare. This section is actually very representative and self-explanatory. It remains all the readers that the main goal of Indonesian economy should be social welfare.

The 2002 constitutional amendment change the title of section XIV to become national economic and national welfare. Although, the title is still self-explanatory yet the change brought fundamental and significant deviation of social welfare in Indonesia. With this new amendment, the social welfare has not become the primary goal in national economy. Its ultimate position is reduced in meaning and rule. It is now only a derivative goal of national economy.

Moreover, the article 33 was edited with two new clauses in fourth and fifth paragraph.

> *"(4) The organisation of the national economy shall be conducted on the basis of economic democracy upholding the principles of togetherness,* ***efficiency*** *with justice, continuity, environmental perspective,* ***self-sufficiency****, and* ***keeping a balance in the progress*** *and unity of the national economy.*
>
> *(5) Further provisions relating to the implementation of this article shall be regulated by law."*

The additional clause has brought incompatible value in constitution. Mainly the value of ***efficiency*** never become a goal in Pancasila.

> In order to explain the deviation on such additional clause, it is important to understand the value of Ekonomi Rakyat which differ to the value of neoclassical. Although value of neoclassical ideology has been globally flourished, yet a constitution must only refer to the genuine character of its people idealism (*volksgeist)*. The distinction between the two ideology is as followed:

NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS **Neoliberalism /Capitalism**	**EKONOMI RAKYAT** **Pasal 33 UUD 1945**
Based on the Principle of Personal Freedom / Liberalism	Based on the principle of Mutualism
Individualism	Fraternity/ Brotherhood
Competitiveness	Cooperativism
Market-sovereignty	People-sovereignty
Homo-Economicus	Homo-Humanus Homo- Socius Ho- mo-Ethicus Homo- Religious Homo-Magnificus
Self-Interest	Mutual- Interest
Capital-centered	People-centered, people-based
Maximum Individual Profits	Social Welfare
Exploitation Economics	Democracy Economics
Individual Business Ownership	Public Business Ownership
Social Ideology is considered as caritas and/or philanthropy	Social ideology embodied social civil rights

The Historical Background

Moreover, if we traced back the historical legislature in Indonesia, in fact many of economic laws does not adopt the philosophical value behind the origin Article 33. There is significant moment at the time of transformation rules was prevailed earlier in independence day which clearly explained on the Aturan Peralihan (*Transitional Provisions*) in the 1945 Constitution, which on its Article 1 stipulated: *"All existing laws and regulations shall remain valid until new ones under this Constitution come into effect"*. Due to such provision the economic legislation in Indonesia has been forked on two different rooted value, Ekonomi Rakyat and Capitalism.



Source: Sri Edi Swasono, Kembali ke Pasal 33 UUD 1945: Menolak Neo-Liberisme, 2010

Conclusion

1. The development of Ekonomi Rakyat will improve the national economy by maximizing the use of Indonesian endowment factors, meaning the development according to Ekonomi Rakyat must be rooted on people as central-substantial resource;
2. The deviations in many economic legislation nowadays are derived not only by historical transitional rules yet also caused by the absence of legislator and jurist's consideration of the ideological value of Ekonomi Rakyat;
3. Although the correlation between law and economics development is yet to precisely defined by any academic research, in fact the absence of ideological economic value system results impractical law products;
4. Moreover, the solution proposed by legal institution often not accurately cure the fundamental economic problem. This tangled chain then inflicts the abandonment of social economic rights in legistlation.

In order to correct such deviations in economic legislation and to anticipate other disparity between rules of law and ideology in economic sector, at first it is important for Indonesian jurist to understand the philosophical values and main goal of economic democracy in Indonesia which based on Ekonomi Rakyat. Secondly, it is also important for all jurist to nurture good ethics that prioritize the people's interest beyond individual profit.

Keywords: Cooperativism, Ekonomi Rakyat, Law for Economic Development.

Moral Credential and the Symptom of Leniency of Public Punishment toward Corruption Perpetrators in Indonesia

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Background

In Indonesia, the public's social reaction, and punishment toward corruption perpetrators with an honorable profession such as Police, Doctor, and Teacher are found to get weaker (Suara Pembaruan, 2015; Rastika, 2013). Corruption as extraordinary crime still results in very light punishment for the perpetrators (Wijayanto, 2009; Husodo, 2011). The public often sees corruptors as a meritorious person, and the perpetrator deserves leniency of criminal sanctions, and the mistakes are forgiven (Sinaga, 2017).

According to moral credential theory, someone does violations because they have good deeds saving. Moral surplus allows them to do the compensative behavior (Jordan, Mullen & Murnighan, 2011). The addition of moral saving does not always come from real kindness done by the said individuals (Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Schuldt & Schwarz, 2010). It may come from the feeling of being good without any good deeds, which is called *counterfactual transgressions* (Tiefenbeck et al., 2013).

Police, Doctor, and Teacher is considered as honorable professions in Indonesia. Consequently, the moral saving is perceived as multiplied as they are working, creating *multiple counterfactual transgressions* (Puteri, Muluk, & Aryanto, 2018). The research on moral credential proves how punishment by the observers will get weaker (leniency of punishment) when the observers know the good track record of the offenders (Braidley et al., 2013; Effron & Monnin, 2010).

Problems

The study explains how moral credential affects public punishment towards offender by testing the hypotheses:

1. In the offenses with the same domain, the moral credential condition affects the criminal sentencing (1a) and informal social reactions are lighter towards offenders who receive gratification with invisible victims (1b).
2. In the offenses with the different domain, the moral credential condition will not affect lighter informal social reaction towards speeding violators with the visible victim (2a), and in violations within different domains, the moral credential condition affects lighter informal social reaction towards speeding violators with the invisible victim (2b).
3. Observers both in moral credential and non-moral credential tends to punish Police heavier than other professions.

Theory

Research on moral credential of observers prove that offenses in the same domain will create heavier punishment, and vice versa (Effron, 2012). Study shows that victim has important role in sentencing (Orth, 2003). The presence of visible victims also adds aggressivity and violent behavior in the perpetrator (Ahmed, 1979). The visible victims make the harm apparent, affecting juries' cognitive process to give heavier punishment (Lanier & Henry, 2010; Nadler & Rose, 2003). Thus, in crimes with visible victims, moral credential is considered insignificant by the observers so they will give more severe punishment.

Over speeding behavior, vignette is used to describe the different domain of transgression. According to Douhou, Magnus, & Van Soest (2011), speeding is a light offense so this behavior will get light punishment. In this study we predict when speeding caused victims, the nature of violence will be real (Dhami, 2007), hence the perpetrator will get heavier punishment (Lanier & Henry, 2010).

Formal and informal reaction toward offenders may work in different way (Little, 1989). Corruption get high criminal sanction but the social reactions are weak as the perpetrator is still respected as moral and professional person (Baur & Nasiritousi, 2011). Study shows that Police that violates the rules tend to be punished heavier (Carter, 1985) than corruption by Doctor (UNDP, 2011) and teachers (Polack & Kubrin, 2007).

Methods

This research employed population-based survey experiments (Mutz, 2011) with 372 student participants. The design used two narratives of honorable work condition (*moral credential/MC)* vs. neutral narrative (*non-moral credential/Non-MC*) and two violations with the same domain (vignette gratification with invisible victims) vs. violations in different domain (vignette speeding with visible victims) *factorial design*. Statistical test used the analytical technique of *Independent Sample T-Test, One-Way ANOVA* and *Two-Way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance).*

Findings

Moral credential condition is proven to affect leniency of punishment by observers towards corruption behavior. T-test proves that there is a significant difference in punishment towards offenders with invisible victim, between the non-MC group (M=39.80, SD=13.05) and *MC* (M=36.85, SD=12.44), t(362)= 2.21, p=0.028. The differences between mean score show that participants with moral credential condition tends to give lighter punishment with mean M=36,85 compare to non-moral credential with mean M=39,80.

On the contrary, moral credential does not affect the lighter informal social reaction towards corruption offenses. Observers in MC and non-MC condition saw corruptors as someone professional with morality. T-test shows that there is no significant informal social reaction towards offender with invisible victim, between non-MC group (M=8.27, SD=2.44) and MC (M=7.93, SD=2.39), t(362)= 1.31, p=0.19).

This research proves that when honorable persons who did violations in different domain than their kindness do speeding with visible victim, the track record will not be counted for leniency of punishment. T-test shows that there is no difference in punishment by participants in non-MC condition (M=19.80, SD=3.14) and *MC* (M=20.00, SD=3.01), t(362)=2.21, p=0.549, both groups punish the perpetrators heavily.

Police is punished heavier than Doctor and Teacher in offenses where they receive gratification where the victims are invisible. One-way ANOVA test shows the significant result that the observers define corruptive behavior in the form of gratification is not an offense when correlated with offenders' profession that affects the punishment towards the offenders.

Discussion

Previous study on moral credential with lenient punishment by observers only happened in offenses within different domain (*moral credit*) (Effron, 2012). This research can prove that moral credential with weaker criminal sanction may happen in the same domain, as long as the victims are invisible. This finding confirmed the study on victims that proves the presence of victim is important in sentencing (Orth, 2003), to strengthen the harm caused by a crime (McAlinden, 2014).

Observers' moral credential situation did not affect lighter informal social reaction towards the offender who receives gratification with invisible victim. Observers stated that offenders who receive gratification with invisible victims are still seen as moral persons, and the reaction is not the result of moral credential. The situation might be explained with two possibilities, (1) the observers are confused because the inconsistent knowledge on corruption that should punish with heavy criminal sanctions (Nurdjana, 2005), while the courts' sentences are very light to the offenders (Husodo, 2011). Some corruptors even sit as public officials (Liauw, 2012). (2) The gratification case with invisible victim in vignette may have similarity with observers's experience that involve to give gratification to Police/Doctor/Teacher as a form of helping each other (Sartini, 2009). This situation according Rasmusen (1996) reflect that offender stigmatization relies on the expectation and level of crime in a society. It is possible that observer give a social reaction on contrary with criminal law that tends to be severe towards corruptor.

This research successfully proves how observers' moral credential will not affect more lenient punishment on offenses in a different domain (moral credit) if the victims are visible. This finding supports studies on the victim of violence, where the presence of victim strengthens the threat (Cernak, 2015; Gorris, 2015). Speeding with a victim is seen as a serious violation and the offender's track record is not considered to give a lighter social reaction. Therefore, speeding Police, Doctor, and Teacher with the visible victim will create a stronger informal social reaction, even criminal sanctions against the offender. In this study, we also confirmed that Police trangression broke their mandate to protect the society, hence they deserve to be punished heavily (Ivkovic, 2003).

Conclusion

This research contributed to the explanation that moral credential affects the weaker or stronger sentencing by observers, depending on the presence of victim variables (invisible vs. visible victim).

The Implementation of Community Policing in Preventing Vehicle Theft (Curanmor) in Sawah Besar Police Sector, Jakarta

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Introduction

Crime theft of motorized vehicles R-2 is the most dominant crime throughout the year. The dominant factor causing the crime of R-2 motor vehicle theft occurs is the human factor. This is because environmental safeguards are not optimal and lack of awareness of the environment. Here Police, as gatekeepers in the criminal justice system, not only law enforcement but also crime prevention. The area of Sawah Besar Subdistrict is one of the largest sub-districts in the center of the capital city and needs attention from the Indonesia National Police and the surrounding community so that the implementation of community policing is needed in accordance with the characteristics of the Sawah Besar area in the prevention of R-2 motorized crime. In Sawah Besar Subdistrict, 2016-2017 the crime of theft of two-wheeled vehicles increased sharply from 2015. So it can be seen that the people now begin to not care about what happened to the condition of their environment and began to be busy with their respective lives.

Method

Theories and concepts used in this study are the concepts of crime prevention strategies, communication theory, the concept of community policing, routine activity theory, and Management Theory. The approach used is a qualitative approach with descriptive methods. The research data was obtained by interviewing, observing and researching documents, then the data were analyzed by means of data reduction, categorization, synthesis and formulating working hypotheses.

Findings

The findings of this study are that the crime rate of motor vehicle theft is quite high. In the implementation of

community policing to prevent crime, the Binmas Unit carries out community policing activities in accordance with Perkap 3 in 2015. This has been carried out by establishing coordination and cooperation with related parties, namely Bhabinkamtibmas up to the community itself. Although the implementation of community policing has been carried out well, the number of crime of motor vehicle theft is still quite high. This is because the implementation of community policing has not been carried out thoroughly.

The exposure that the authors collected was exposure from January 2017 to December 2017. The author adapted a few snippets from the exposure that had been collected, so that it can be seen the characteristics of crime in the Sawah Besar District Police jurisdiction at the end of 2017. From the data obtained by the author, 31 types the crimes that occurred in the legal area of the Sawah Besar Police Sector, totaling 559 cases were reported. If averaged, every month, reports that enter the Sawah Besar Police Station every month for 2017 are about 50 cases. Theft of two-wheeled motorized vehicles became a very dominant crime in the legal area of the Sawah Besar police station, with a total of 206 cases which took up almost half of the total number of cases in 2017. If averaged, the number of incoming reports for theft of two-wheeled motorized vehicles every month in the area of the Sawah Besar Police Sector is almost 20 cases. Second and third place are cases of two-wheeled fraud and ordinary theft with a total of 64 incoming reports and 54 cases. Whereas at the bottom of the list are crimes of kidnapping, defamation, and seizing independence with each of the number only 1 case reported.

Sawah Besar Police Sector is one of the police sectors in Central Jakarta Metro Police, where there are many hotels, entertainment venues and national vital objects and have villages which are quite heterogeneous because many migrants from different regions of different tribes, races and religion so that it often causes crime. The area of Sawah Besar Subdistrict is the main area that needs attention from the security apparatus as well as the surrounding community so that the implementation of Community Policing is needed in accordance with the characteristics of the Sawah Besar area in crime prevention. Communities in the Sawah Besar Police Sector also need a police presence in maintaining their environmental security and orderliness.

Discussion

In Sawah Besar sub-district which has a narrow area and many flats/apartments and office buildings are built. But on the other hand it also has a negative impact, one of which is crime in the region due to population density. In Sawah Besar District, there are also many entertainment places such as discotheques, spas and hotels. It can also lead to potential crime can occur easily.

Community policing not only opens up opportunities for public aspirations and attention to be involved and participate in policing efforts (especially crime prevention), but also opens up opportunities to empower the community and work with the police as a system to control crime, overcome fear of crime (fear of crime), equating perceptions of disturbances to security and order, as well as improving the quality of life and environmental conditions

It appears that the Police and Community Communication Forum is still ineffective in not running optimally, causing a lot of crime. The condition of public ignorance towards the environment in their respective homes can be used by criminals to carry out their actions such as theft, robbery, and others. So that the application of community policing is needed in accordance with the characteristics of Sawah Besar sub-district in crime prevention. This research was conducted to exploit the implementation of community policing in the jurisdiction of the Metro Sawah Besar police sector.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this research is that the Sawah Besar Police Sector should invite all components in the community by implementing community policing and involving the community in order to prevent crime auto-theft in the jurisdiction of the Sawah Besar Police Sector.

The steps of implementing community policing in the prevention of crime in the jurisdiction of Sawah Besar police Sector based on the theory of communication must be considered a lot between the police and the community to establish good communication, because in principle the community policing emphasizes the partnership between the police and the community so that communication is prioritized in carrying out application of community policing. So that later the programs will be realized through routine coordination at

Komat Command Post, routine symbols for the community by Door to Door System and data supply of perpetrators through Kring Serse can run optimally.

Keywords: community policing, curanmor, vehicle theft, crime, prevention

Revisiting Empowerment: How Have the Rural Poor been Neglected in Centralised Rural Development Policies in Indonesia Between 1967 and 2015

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Introduction

The idea of 'empowerment' has been undergoing intense study in development narratives since the international development agenda experience the lost decade of development between 1960 and 1990. When the concept of "underdevelopment" introduced by western countries in 1950's, development agenda has been set to help the developing countries around the world to address their socio economy problems, notably poverty issue. However, the evidences in many developing countries show that the poverty remain exist. Many scholars, such as post-developmentalist, criticised the outcome of development that left behind the poor families. The critiques of development reached considerable levels that fundamentally questioned the international development agenda after the lost decade of development, which followed by efforts to improve development practices to be more pro poor through empowerment initiatives. Looking back to early rural development practices in Indonesia since 1960's, the rural development program also shared above similar experience, where the rural poor have been left behind, and continue until 2015 despite the adoption of empowerment approach.

In viewing the continuing high number of rural poverty rate despite the extensive adoption of empowerment in rural development policies, the idea of empowerment needs to be revisited. The empowerment is not only about teaching people skills and knowledge that will motivate them to take steps to improve their own lives. Moreover, promoting the state-society relations in favour of the beneficiaries of rural development, also the way of promoting empowerment in rural development. Conversely, I argue that the state-society relations that are not pro poor might disempower the poor families. This paper will provide evidences of above thinking by analysing early rural development policies in Indonesia. Highlighting the concept of "power" in empowerment, I will discuss how the poor have been disempowered because of the state-society relations were not pro poor. Within "empowerment" discourse, this paper will contribute to understanding comprehensively of the state-society relations, not only as the way of promoting empowerment in rural development, but also as the source of poor people's disempowerment.

This paper is part of my current Ph.D research project, and specific research questions in this paper are

- how did the early rural development in Indonesia disempower the small farmers, farm workers, and poor family?
- what were the factors during the early development policies in Indonesia that disempower the small farmers, farm workers, and poor family, thus negatively affected the outcome of rural development?

Method

Using literature review method, this paper analyses previous flagship rural development programs provided by the central government in Indonesia. Viewing Indonesia's rural development policies as part of international development agenda, I specifically address the main rural development program initiated by the central government since the centralistic era of 1967 to decentralisation era after 2001. The programs are the flagships of agricultural development program between 1967 and 1994 called BIMAS and Oil palm plantation, and the

subsequent three main poverty reduction programs between 1994 and 2015 referred to as IDT, PPK, and PNPM.

Drawing on sociologist Kabeer's concept of citizenship, this paper examines the state-society relations between the government and rural people. Extending previous view of the Sociologists that define citizenship as the institutional form of the right, Kabeer describes the citizenship as status and citizenship as practice. Status is how the existing constitutional/legal arrangements in society define the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, while practice is the different ways in which members of society seek to act on-and challenge-the citizenship definition. By using this concept, I will critically analyse how the neglected rights and resources disempowered the poor families, thus, resulting the subsequent increase in rural poverty rate.

Findings

Following the analysis, I found that between 1967 and 1994, the rural development programs disempower the poor families in rural areas by favouring the rich farmers, restricting the access of the government services, and neglecting equal land distribution. Subsequently, between 1994 and 2015, the rural development programs disempower the poor families in rural areas by failing to identify the poor families and lacking the poor families' participation. Moreover, influenced by the changing concepts of international development agenda, the approach of rural development in Indonesia in the period of 1967-1994 and 1994-2015 has changed from economic growth to empowerment respectively.

Discussion

The main agricultural development programs: BIMAS program and Oil palm plantation (1967-1994)

In agricultural development, BIMAS and Oil Palm Plantation are the flagships of the development program in the Suharto era to achieve rice sufficiency and economic growth respectively. However, the virtue of the agricultural development mainly enjoyed by the elite class in rural areas. Landless farmers had no access at all, and tenants had more restricted access than owner-cultivators. Moreover, the machinery adoption in BIMAS program caused landowners to cultivate their land by themselves and neglecting previous tenants.

The Nucleus Estate Smallholders program of oil palm plantation (1967-1994) replaced local farmers with farm workers from Java island, causing the shortage of job opportunities for local. Additionally, the plantation land arrangement neglected the customary-based control over land. The situation above justifies social structure and resources (control over land) as determinants for successful rural development.

In the context of associational life, the small farmers and workers were prevented from participating equally in rural organisations. The government banned the formation of farmers organisation for the political reason since 1965. Thus, the farmers were not able to articulate their interests through their professional bodies.

The main rural poverty reduction programs: IDT, PPK and PNPM (1994-2015)

Targeting the poor households that left-behind during 70's-80's economic growth, the government of Indonesia launched several empowerment-based programs to address rural poverty. The programs were the IDT or Village-based Development Program (1994-1998), PPK or Subdistrict Development Project (1998-2007), and PNPM or the National Program for Community Empowerment (2007-2015).

The cases of IDT, PPK and PNPM in Indonesia show how the lack of participation of the poor families hampered the identification of the poor, causing the failures of poverty reduction programs. In the design of IDT, PPK and PNPM, the poor families should be involved in the determining how the funds would be spent. However, the targeting has deteriorated over time since the decision-making at the village level was usually carried out in meetings attended by the village elite only. The village heads were responsible for selecting the beneficiaries; as a result, the standard of the beneficiaries of social assistance programs have varied.

Conclusion

Based on the analysis, I found that although the concept of rural development programs was adopting empowerment approach, the existed state-society relations caused the poor families lost their "power". Thus, they have been disempowered by the unfair state-society relations. Viewing citizenship as a form of the state-society relations, I argue that the small farmers and workers, and the rural poor hardly received the benefit of rural development because of the unfair existence of citizenship, consisting of the five factors of:

1. Social structure;
2. Associational life;
3. Resources;
4. Identifying the poor;
5. Participation.

In short, I found that changing rural development programs without promoting the state-society relations in favour of the beneficiaries of rural development program will disempower the poor families in rural areas. Moreover, early rural development in Indonesia was highly influenced by international development agenda through international aid, international organisation assistance, and international market, thus might contribute to the failure of development programs to address domestic poverty issues.

However, this paper has limitation since the focus of analysis is previous central government programs. Further study involving the analysis of current success stories of local government initiatives will provide a comprehensive explanation on how the five factors above have changed from hindering to promoting inclusive rural development.

Keywords: citizenship, empowerment, rural development, rural poverty, state-society relations

The Raising of Fundamentalist Islam: Identity Hatred and Deepening Neoliberalism in DKI Jakarta and Indonesia

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Introduction

Identity hatred became daily news on the mass media about DKI Jakarta Governor election in 2017. Identity hatred refer to identity group's anger towards other identity (race, religion, ethnic group, clan) because of culture misconception and the mode of resistance to other identity's economics or political domination. Demonstration, discrimination, verbal and non-verbal violence, stigmatization, and official or unofficial citizen's rights limitation to some identity are the mode of identity hatred. In Indonesia, Chinese often become the target of identity hatred by other race or Moslem, because they dominate economy resources in Indonesia, although they are a minority in Indonesia. Identity hatred targeted Christian and Chinese descent DKI Jakarta Governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok). Basically, identity hatred to Ahok had rised since Ahok was inaugurated as DKI Jakarta Governor. Islamic Defender Front inaugurated unofficial DKI Jakarta Governor with Moslem and Betawi descent identity. Unofficial DKI Jakarta Governor represented majority religion in Indonesia and native Jakarta ethnic group.

Jakarta people started to forget identity hatred to Ahok before Ahok was accused of insulting Islam by Indonesian Ulema Council. Ahok adjusted policy that profit middle class, middle-upper class, and upper class. According to Charta Politica, Jakarta citizen's satisfaction level of Ahok's policy reached 71% in April 2017 (Chotimah, 2017). However, Ahok's policy disserved urban poor that live in illegal slum settlements in DKI Jakarta. Ahok evicted illegal slum settlements massively. According to Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, throughout

2015-2016, DKI Jakarta Provincial Government evicted 306 illegal building in DKI Jakarta. Victim of eviction reached 13.871 family and 11.662 businesses unit (Januardy, Achmadi, & Fortuna, 2017, pp. 29-31).

Massive eviction caused hatred to Ahok start to spread among urban poor that live in slum settlements, mainly among eviction victims and targeted illegal slum settlements. Refusal to the government policy that disserved urban poor and workers was expressed in the form of identity hatred. Some urban poor group and worker union joined two big demonstrations named *Aksi Bela Islam 411* and *Aksi Bela Islam 212*. They participated the two demonstrations that insist court to jail Ahok because Ahok insult Islam.

Resistance to the Indonesia political-economy situation in the form of identity sentiment just cause a lot of new problem. Resistance in the form of identity sentiment to the Non-Moslem and Chinese will never solve the problem of urban poor and worker's welfare that getting worsened. The rise of identity politics will deteriorate urban poor and workers movement. They will be co-opted by Islamic fundamental or/and Indonesian racist elite that never stand up for workers and urban poor welfare issue. Furthermore, Neoliberalism and identity politics can unite themselves to do the deepening of neoliberalism. The deepening of neoliberalism is manifested in the form of land commercialization, local government-owned enterprise commercialization and privatization, austerity, and cheap worker policy. The deepening of neoliberalism can deteriorate urban poor and workers.

Methods

This research uses qualitative method. Qualitative method is used to explain the contextuallity of phenomena. Contextuality and explanation are needed to identify the problems (Ritchie, 2004, p.27). Contextuallity will explain how the Islamic group can mobilize workers union and urban poor group to stand up for Islamic issue. Then, this research will explain that the workers' union and urban poor union join the struggle of identity issue will not profit them. This strategy will deteriorate political-economy situation for workers and urban poor. Data will be searched by interview and literature study.

DKI Jakarta become good case because DKI Jakarta 2017 governor election become one bad moment in Indonesia politics post- 1998 reformation. Accusation of Islam blasphemy by Ahok make a lot of Moslem group get indignant. Moslem indignant does not take place only in DKI Jakarta but almost all of Indonesia. *Aksi Bela Islam 411* and *212* participants come from Bogor and other city in Java, some of them comes from outside Java island. In Aceh, Some of Moslem group make demonstration to press Ahok imprisonment. DKI Jakarta case has made intolerant Moslem movement group get stronger than before. They can make minimarket and other a new product that based on Islamism. This situation is very dangerous for Indonesian democracy and diversity. It will makes the destruction of democracy in Indonesia. Moreover, it make the mode of resistance to neoliberalism is expressed in mode of identity hatred to some or one identity that dominate the economy resources in Indonesia. This mode of resistance will not break the neoliberalism hegemony, but it will make the deepening of neoliberalism in the face of identity politics.

Findings

Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI) (labour union) created political contract with Anies Baswedan – Sandiaga Uno (Anies-Sandi), a couple of DKI Jakarta governor candidate. Some of this contract were: 1. Anies – Sandi will set the 2018 provincial minimum wage for DKI Jakarta higher than calculation according to Government Regulation The Republic Of Indonesia Number: 78 Year 2015 (*PP 78/2015*) concerning Manpower Wage. 2. Anies-Sandi will stop outsourcing system, contract labour system, and internship that violate employment act number 13 years 2003 (*UU 13/2003*) and Permenakertrans number 19 years 2013 (*Permenakertrans 19/2013*) (Manurung, 2017). In fact, Anies-Sandi set the 2018 provincial minimum wage according to *PP 78/2015*. Whereas, Ahok (former DKI Jakarta governor) set rise of provincial minimum wage at 14,8%, 4,5% higher than rise of provincial minimum wage according to *PP 78/2015* (Mediani, 2017a). It means, Anies-Sandi still impose cheap worker policy and violate the political contract with KSPI.

Anies-Sandi revoke DKI Jakarta provincial government capital for some local government-owned enterprise (BUMD). DKI Jakarta provincial government capital in Jakarta Tourisindo, PD. Dharmajaya, PT. Food Station Tjipinang Jaya, PT. Asuransi Bangun Askrida, and PD. Pembangunan Sarana Jaya was revoked, DKI Jakarta

provincial government capital in PT. Jakarta Propertindo (Jakpro) is cut (Mediani, 2017b). PT. Jakarta Tourisindo Rp. 23 billion, PD. Dharma Jaya Rp. 39 billion, PT. Food Station Tjipinang Rp. 125 billion, PT. Pembangunan Sarana Jaya Rp. 394 billion; PT Asuransi Bangun Askrida Rp. 100 billion. DKI Jakarta provincial government capital in Jakpro is cut Rp. 1,249 trillion (Hairani, 2017). Five of six BUMD manage fundamental aspect of DKI Jakarta citizens' welfare. They manage distribution of food, mass transportation, land bank, development of settlement, and collective infrastructure.

Discussion

Some worker union and urban poor group joined *Aksi Bela Islam 411* and *212* demonstrations. These two demonstrations were dominated by identity politics issue. These demonstrations contain some group of anger people because Islam was insulted by Ahok, some froup of people who denied Non-Muslim leader or/and Chinese leader, and some group of people who hated democracy and want to establish Khilafah. It means, *Aksi Bela Islam 411* and*212* were movement with Moslem identity.

The presence of workers and urban poor group in *Aksi Bela Islam 411* and *212* reflect hatred to the government that adjust deepening of neoliberalism. In Jakarta, Ahok evicted illegal slum settlement massively, Ahok also make Jakarta bay reclamation that disserve fishermen, Seribu archipelago citizens, and urban poor that live in Jakarta Bay. In the national scope, government created *PP 78/2015* that legalized cheap labour policy that profit capitalist but disserve workers. The two fact that I have explained is the form of deepening of neoliberalism.

Political contract among urban poor group and worker union to Anies-Sandi is the form of popular movement cooptation by elite, Islamic fundamental group, and Islamic fundamental party. I said that argument because Anies-Sandi was DKI Jakarta Governor candidate who was accepted by people group that created *Aksi Bela Islam 411* and *212* demonstrations. Anies-Sandi got a lot of advantage from *Aksi Bela Islam 411* and *212* demonstrations. This Urban Poor and worker union strategy show that there's no progressive organization that join electoral struggle in Indonesia, but neoliberalism still deepen its effect in Indonesia.

Ironically, some Worker union and urban poor group that create political contract with Anies-Sandi didn't get their hope. DKI Jakarta provincial government still adjust cheap labour policy. It also adjusts commercialization and privatization to important local government-owned enterprise that manage basic need of DKI Jakarta citizens. DKI Jakarta provincial government just defend some illegal slum settlements that have political contract with Anies-Sandi; It also create governor ordinance that give DKI Jakarta provincial government chance to continue Jakarta Bay reclamation. According to me, all policy will threaten urban poor and worker's welfare, especially in DKI Jakarta.

My thesis statement is DKI Jakarta case show that identity hatred doesn't an alternative to break neoliberalism hegemony in Indonesia. Identity hatred just make bad impact to Indonesian, especially for the minority. Identity hatred will make the destruction of democracy and diversity. Moreover, Identity hatred will collaborate with neoliberalism, they will make each other. get stronger. Unity of neoliberalism and identity hatred will destroy the progressive movement like labour union, urban poor group, peasant union, and the other progressive group. The Moslem intolerant group will beat up the progressive movement. So, Indonesian just get deepening of neoliberalism, deterioration of popular movement, and disintegration of nation.

Conclusion

Identity hatred and identity sentiment will never be the alternative from neoliberalism. Whereas, identity hatred and identity sentiment will deteriorate popular movement to get better welfare. Resistance in the form of identity politics just open the chance of Fundamentalist Islamic group to hijack worker, urban poor, peasant, and the other popular progressive movement. Piracy the popular movement by fundamental Islamic group, fundamental Islamic elite, and racist elite will not make progress in the social welfare struggle. It can deteriorate social welfare struggle, because fundamental Islamic group, fundamental Islamic elite, and racist elite are part of bourgeois who benefited from cheap wage, labor flexibility, and commercialization of state enterprises.

Keywords: Hatred, Identity, Neoliberalism, Urban Poor, Workers, Social-Welfare

Inheritance in Old Javanese Society (VIII – XV centuries CE): Based on Inscriptions

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Law of Inheritance has been known since the Old Javanese period, as seen in inscriptions and manuscripts from that period, such as Ágama and Manawadharmasastra manuscripts. Information regarding inheritance during the Old Javanese period has been mentioned since 8th in Kañjuruhan/Dinoyo inscription (760 CE). Information about inheritance on inscriptions can be identified through several words, namely *kaliliran, santāna prati santāna, tka ri dlaha ning dlaha.* The phrase "*Kaliliran de santāna prati santāna"* in an inscription means: inherited to his descendants. This research discusses the implementation of law of inheritance during the Old Javanese period.

The research method used in this investigation is comparative analysis to get a portrayal of data being studied objectively according to reality. This research is focused on inscriptions as primary data. Historiographic method will not be employed and there will be no rereading of inscription data. The phases are data collecting, data processing, and data explanation.

In the data collecting phase was found 25 inscriptions from the Old Javanese period (VIII – XV centuries CE), that mention information about inheritance. During the data processing phase, information about inheritance in the inscriptions were classified and placed according to their contexts. Then inheritance data in the inscriptions were linked to Ágama and Manawadharmasastra manuscripts, which provide us explanation regarding implementation of inheritance law during the Old Javanese period.

Inheritance during that period has three elements, which are legacy giver, inheritance (inherited goods), and heir(s). A legacy giver, according to inscriptions is a person who bequeaths, passes on, and hands down his/her wealth to his descendants or a chosen person. Based on data from inscriptions, legacy givers can be parents, son/daughter, family, and other person. Old Javanese inscriptions do not mention whether a legacy giver has to be a man or woman, likewise are the Manawadharmasastra and Ágama manuscripts.

Inheritance or inherited goods are the wealth owned by a legacy giver during his/her lifetime, which was bequeathed, passed on, or handed down to his/her descendants or chosen person. Inherited goods are divided into two types based on the physical form, namely tangible and intangible inheritances. Tangible inheritances in Old Javanese inscriptions include (*sīma*) land with its contents and crops. A *sīma* land is a piece of land that was designated by a king/ruler as tax-free land. *Sīma* lands as inheritance can also divided into two categories based on the use, which are *sīma* lands for religious buildings and those not for religious buildings. Crops of *sima* lands that are not for religious buildings can be used; in inscriptions they consist of *lmaḥ* or *bhumi* (land)*, kubwan* (field/garden), *sawah* (rice field). Some inscriptions mention that heirs have the right of land authority and the crops from the *sīma* land that they inherit.

Intangible inheritances are those that are not in forms of material things but contain value to the heirs, such as throne, title, position, debts and receivables, responsibilities and rights. Throne, which is intangible inheritance that is handed down to descendants, is usually mentioned in inscriptions that contain ruler's genealogy such as Kañjuruhan (760 CE), Śiwagrha (856 CE), Pucangan (1041 CE), and Kañcana/Buṅur B (1367 CE). Thrones during the Old Javanese period, as seen from inscriptions, are not limited by gender. Daughters have the same right to thrones from their parents.

According to data from inscriptions, debts and receivables in Old Javanese society are handed down to heirs. Debts (*hutaŋ*) are mentioned in Guntur (907 CE) and Dhaŋ Nawī (911 CE) inscriptions. Heirs have to pay the debts of the legacy givers, but debts do not have to be paid without evidences like written document (note) and witness that somebody owes money or something.

Another form of intangible inheritance is a right. The rights inherited during the Old Javanese period were called special rights. Special rights were only given to an individual or a group of people who rendered a service to a king or did something to fulfill the need of society so the king bestows the right. The special rights that were inherited to descendants or family are mentioned in a number of Old Javanese inscriptions, among

others Adan-adan (1301 CE), Tuhañaru (1323 CE), and Paluṅan (1330 CE) inscriptions. During the Old Javanese period, responsibilities can also be handed down, such as the responsibility of paying tax like mentioned in the inscription of Kaladi (909 CE).

The last element of inheritance is heir. An heir is someone who has the right to accept, has control over, and owns inheritance from a legacy giver before or after he/she passed away. According to Manawadharmasastra, book IX chapter 187 heirs consist of three levels, which are *sapinda*, *sakulya*, and his/her spiritual teacher or disciples.

Sapinda is the closest family of the legacy giver with blood relation three levels up and three levels down the family line. *Sakulya* is family with no blood relation like in laws or cousins. Most of the data from the inscriptions that were used in this research mention *sapinda* as heirs. *Sakulya* is mentioned in some inscriptions, among others Guntur (907 CE), Mantyasih II (907 CE), Adan-adan (1301 CE), Tuhañaru (1323 CE), and Paluṅan (1330 CE) inscriptions. Third-level heirs can be seen in Kaladi (909 CE) and Hara-hara (966 CE) inscriptions. In the Kaladi inscription, the heir is not the family but Bhaṭara, *muladharmma* (*sīma* caretaker), and *punta kaya*.

Results of analysis reveal that the inheritance system in effect during the Old Javanese period, based on data from inscriptions, is parental inheritance system, just like the system implemented today among the traditional Javanese society. The parental inheritance system does not distinguish the gender, like written in inscriptions as well as in Manawadharmasastra or Ágama manuscripts. Heirs are entitled to inheritance according to their respective shares.

The three textual data used in this research can explain that among the Old Javanese society, inheritance system does not distinguish daughters and sons. They had the right to inheritance regardless of their gender. This research has also proven that since the Old Javanese period there has been gender equality.

Keywords: law of inheritance, inheritance, Old Javanese, inscription

Fighting for Sexuality and Gender Equality: Social Marketing Strategy of Nonprofit Organization

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Introduction

People with sexual orientation outside the cisgender (gender according to the sex) and heterosexual are prone to violence in Indonesia. The label that is usually used is LGBT; which include lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex, and asexuality. LGBT community fights one prominent threat: self-acceptance; due to lack of sexuality education as well as state's and religion's regulations (Yulius, 2017). On the other hand, Indonesia society acceptance toward this group is really poor (SMRC, 2018). The LGBT community often faces discrimination, including in receiving their civil rights or even human rights (see Human Right Watch, 2016).

One of organization that focus on LGBT community civil rights is Suara Kita [Our Voice]. Established in 2009, this organization focus on politics of body and politics of identity through several activities. Using the case of Suara Kita, this research aims to (1) describe social marketing strategy of the organization to educate both community and public about sexuality and gender diversity, and (2) evaluate the strategy, taking into consideration that LGBT issue is still considered as controversial issue in Indonesia.

Methods

From the post positivist paradigm this research uses in-depth interview to collect the data. We use purposive sampling method to select informant with these criteria: (a) member of the organization that regularly involve in the meeting and activities, (b) has joint the organization for more than a year, or (c) responsible for the implementation of the organization programs.

Findings

There are 12 steps of social marketing strategy explained by Lee & Kotler (2015) and Kotler & Andreasen (2013), but this extended abstract will solely highlight the seventh step, namely *developing social marketing strategies (4Ps)*. These strategies are formulized to aim their two target audiences: LGBT people and public, which are treated equally.

Product

Product consists of three elements. The promoted *core products* are: (1) to feel comfortable and make peace with their sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE); and (2) to be more critical dan open minded in viewing various issues, not exclusively in viewing LGBT issue.

Actual product is what target audience should do to earn the promoted benefits promised by *core product*. The *actual products* are by participating in: (1) public education program. This program focuses in offline media; and (2) media and campaign program. This program is executed by producing readable and accessible online media contents along with giving training on journalistic skills and creative writing.

Augmented product refers to additional feature (in the form of either tangible products or services) provided by social marketing with the aim to help target audience adopt actual products. *Augmented products* of Suara Kita are: (1) SriKendes business unit which brings public closer to the issue of LGBT; and (2) its service that treating target audience like one of their own.

Price

According to Suara Kita, *prices* needed to be paid by target audience of Suara Kita to adopt actual product are time, money, and effort. *Price* strategy implemented by Suara Kita is as the following: (1) by not demanding payment at programs and events, either online or offline; and (2) to instill altruism among target audience.

Place

Programs and events of Suara Kita are held at their office (*sekretariat)* as well as venues of their partners'. Suara Kita also focuses their events on two big days of LGBT: Transgender Day on November 20th and International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia on May 11th.

Promotion

The strategy consists of four elements: message, messenger, creative strategy, and communication channel. *Message* strategy refers to topics based on trends and the urgency of said topic. *Messenger* strategy focuses on offline media messengers as speakers. The selection of messengers depends on track records of speakers. Suara Kita tends to collaborate with academics and other communities.

Suara Kita defines their *creative strategy* as follows: (1) Suara Kita represents counter narrative against mainstream media, with characteristics that are non-indoctrinating, open to discussion, critical, optimistic, readable, and written based on the general principle of journalism; (2) Suara Kita uses mandatory attributes on publication materials; and (3) Suara Kita intentionally publicizes incomplete information, which demands target audience to contact Suara Kita for further events information.

The fourth element is *communication channel*. The communication channels types of Suara Kita are personal,

mass, and selective; online and offline. Suara Kita tends to focus their events online (website and Blued). Suara Kita decreases their offline events intensity due to emerging contra-LGBT parties that threatening the security during the events.

Discussion

Instead of choosing an *undifferentiated marketing* approach, Suara Kita should has chosen *concentrated* or *differentiated marketing* to prioritize their resources because different target audience has different needs.

Product

Based on target audience responses, events of education on sexuality and gender diversity are deemed interesting when they teach hard-skill such as creative writing and photography training. This finding is in line with Muniroh's (2016) and Trimanah's (2004), both in agreement that life skill programs support the goal of the program itself.

Price

Based on audience cost reduction tactic, Suara Kita uses *decrease monetary costs for the desired behavior* tactic and based on altruism implementation tactic, Suara Kita uses *increases nonmonetary benefit for the desired behavior* (Lee & Kotler, 2015).

Place

The selection for time and place done by Suara Kita is deemed strategic enough.

Promotion

On message strategy, Suara Kita should create key messages that can be easily received so that the promoted behavior can be directly understood (instead of dabbling in various topics). On messenger strategy, Suara Kita's offline speakers' selection is based on expertise and trustworthiness. This is similar with Muniroh's (2016) and Trimanah's (2004) finding on VIV prevention education program that message should be is delivered by influential figures in society.

On creative strategy, the most prominent finding of this research is the way Suara Kita publicizes incomplete information on their events. Suara Kita realizes that there has been abrupt termination of such discussions by contradicting parties. On communication channel strategy, the research findings are in line with Kartika's (2002), in which Suara Kita uses selective communication (seminars, special events, publication) and personal communication (counseling and word of mouth).

Conclusion

This research concludes that: (1) The more sensitive and controversial the issue, the more complex the formulated strategy; and (2) in the context of sexuality and gender issue, a more specific marketing communication approach is needed, especially on place and promotion strategies.

Keywords: social marketing strategy, sexuality and gender diversity, LGBT, nonprofit organization, Suara Kita

The Phenomenon of Hate Crime Impacts on Chinese`s Ethnic by Pariaman City Community in West Sumatera

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In an effort to maintain the peace of life in the diversity of society is an important issue for Indonesia. This effort is facing serious challenges from the various social conflicts that occur between groups of people who tend to distinguish themselves primarily based on tribes, ethnicity and religion. Discriminatory treatment and intolerant attitude embodied in various forms of violence against different groups, especially minority groups, have recently occurred in communities in various parts of Indonesia. Some of these social conflicts result in a number of hate-based or prejudicial violence and directed against members of certain community groups. This group is a group that because certain traits (tribes, races, religions or others) are viewed differently from, and generally, because of those differences, are perceived as threat by members of dominant groups (or ruling groups) or other groups. The victim in this event is a part of a hated group. In such cases, the victim becomes a target of violence (regardless of the form of his crime) solely based on his membership to a hated group, not as an individual. Such crimes are known as hate crime. The qualitative methods is used in this research to describe the phenomenon of hate crime against the culture of Chinese`s ethnic by Pariaman society in Pariaman City, Padang, West Sumatera. The researcher did the direct interview with some interviewees such as the group of Pariaman society; the Chinese`s ethnic that stay in Padang, the historian, the public figure in Pariaman City and others that related to this research. The secondary data is collected and analyzed from the documents such as statistics data from the government, literatures from books, journals, online articles.

Previously, the Minangkabau community with Chinese`s ethnic actually have a good relationship, they worked together with each other. But after the VOC came in, they created the stratification of the society of the European group, the Eastern group of foreigners (India, the Chinese), and the Indigenous groups of stratification which led to a gap between indigenous and Chinese`s ethnic. So there is the social friction between Chinese`s ethnic and Pariaman society. The Chinese`s ethnic belonging to the Eastern group of foreigners occupy the Middle Class position while the Minangkabau people are in the lower class, the Chinese`s ethnic group is then given a special position by the VOC that makes the Chinese`s ethnic have their own governance structure. This is the beginning of social jealousy between ethnic Chinese and Minangkabau because the Minangkabau people as their indigenous people are full of difficulties while the Chinese`s ethnic whom as a group of migrants gain the privilege and are given protection by the VOC. After the VOC exit from Pariaman, the Japanese enter the occupation of Pariaman. The Minang Pariaman community expelled their hatred for the VOC by hammering and robbing the housing that the Netherlands had been living for so long. The Pariaman community also expects Japan to come as a freedom giver. This caused the Chinese ethnic group to become anxious, afraid of being targeted by the people's anger because they were the golden children of the Netherlands at that time.

During the Japanese occupation, some of the Chinese`s ethnic became spies by the Japanese. In addition to working as an agent, the Japanese then make this Chinese`s ethnic as spy (espionage) by the Japanese to Pariaman fighters who want the independence of Indonesia, ethnic Chinese also do so that they get protection back from invaders and also to get a special position in Japanese Government. Groups of Chinese`s ethnic who support the Japanese also spy (spying) to the freedom fighters in Pariaman. Then the suspicion of Pariaman society to ethnic Chinese happened because the Japanese invaders always know the plans that will be done by freedom fighters. The freedom fighters then sent the children to eavesdrop and spy on some individuals suspected of Japanese army talks where they used to take a break. The spy conspirators were all three. The three traitors were taken to a militant hideout. There they were interrogated and finally confessed to his actions. For their actions, their necks are slashed to near end with Kanso, the three bodies are then placed in front of the Tabuik Monument is now located. However, Kansas tragedy is only known by some of the Minangkabau community especially in Pariaman area and is not known by outside Minangkabau community. After the fighters in the city of Pariaman know the espionage action they execute people who do spies whom happened to come from Chinese`s ethnic. As a result, there was a negative label/stigmatization on Chinese`s

ethnic, the process of labeling for the Chinese`s ethnic by Pariaman society because it is considered to have deviation behavior that is not in accordance with the norms in the Pariaman society. Hate crimes can not be considered just an ordinary crime. Cases of hate crimes occur within the context of the interaction of a majority or dominant group with a minority. The reasons for this crime are also specific because of the backdrop of racial, ethnic, color, religion and sexual orientation. Hate-based malice arises in a number of forms. Usually appears to oppose the presence of other groups. The target of this crime is generally the weak group that can not take the fight. In the phenomenon of hate crime many factors affect the occurrence of such crimes as prejudice against certain groups as well as negative labeling to certain groups that are considered a threat to the dominant group so that certain groups are considered dangerous or classified as deviant by dominant groups. However, not all Pariaman people perceive a negative stigma towards the Chinese, there are also some people who can accept and respect each other between these differences. So the labeling occurs because of the characteristics of group identity by the majority community, whereas in their hate crimes they see first what an individual profession is, so that it can be seen whether or not a hate crime is the influence of a profession.

Keywords: Hate Crimes, culture, Chinese, ethnic, Pariaman society

Genealogy of Indonesian Criminology

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Introduction

The social, cultural, political, economic and social background of the society contributes to the development of science. Liberal-democratic societies tend to develop positivistic science, based on observation and empirical analysis, and aims to resolve the problems emerging from the operation of the free economy, social, cultural, and political systems. Although at the same time, the climate of freedom also encourages the emergence and development of critical and radical thoughts. Different conditions found in totalitarian societies where science devoted to power, justifying the performance of power. The development of critical and radical ideas will be difficult. Surely, there are many variations of how the development of science along with the economic, social, cultural, and political background of the community. It cannot be exemplified simply by contrasting the liberal -democracy with totalitarianism.

Colonialism is a political background that contributes to the development of science, including criminology. Postcolonial studies have made a cluster of knowledge generated by the historical experience of colonialism, namely the emergence and development of colonial discourse itself, and how the emergence and development of the discourse of resistance and substitution of colonial discourse. Indonesia as one of the Dutch colonies had a long experience of colonialism that affects various aspects of life including the development of science. Likewise with the discourse of resistance and substitute colonial discourse, both of which appear in the period of colonialism and post-colonial Indonesia in 1945. After independence, the writings of political leaders and intellectual also contribute to current discourse of postcolonial. The main question to be answered by this paper is, how is the development of criminology as a social science discipline when associated with the historical background of Indonesia itself as a nation?

Methods and Theory

This article is produced through historical research combined with the study of discourse. There is the impression that the study of history is only a study of the past which is then relegated, in which seeks to explain the origin of something. In the context of this article, historical research may be suspected as an attempt to discover the origins of criminology in Indonesia. This allegation is not entirely wrong, because

indeed the effort is to explain how the emergence and development of criminology in Indonesia from the beginning to the present. However, historical study used in current article, more accurately referred to as the archaeological / genealogical study described by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. History is no longer the past, but it is a discourse construct created by textual relations. Expected finding is the relationship of knowledge as well as power relations within the relationship of knowledge itself. Through this discourse can be concluded who is being oppressed, and who fought against oppression. This is the discovery of power relations in discourse. When it is associated with postcolonial discourse, the discourse analysis seeks two important things. First, to find the so-called colonial discourse, the discourse built to maintain the hegemony as well as the political dominance of colonial power against the colonies. Second, discourse analysis aims to find the discourse of resistance or substitute discourse of the colonial discourse itself. The discovery of this discourse of resistance or substitution can be done through a number of texts produced by writers who are the direct opposition to colonialism.

Theoretically, current article departs from the idea that history has the power to form the consciousness of the actor. This framework is in line with the social construction process of reality presented by Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The explanation from Berger and Luckman about the formation of reality is also called the process of social knowledge formation. Knowledge which is a subjective consciousness is formed from objective reality which experiences objectivation and internalization. For Berger and Luckmann (1966), that knowledge arises from the observable differences among various societies in terms of what has been taken for granted as 'knowledge' in these societies. The sociology of knowledge occupies not only empirical variation and knowledge in societies, but also the process by which each set of knowledge is ultimately defined socially as reality. The sociology of knowledge thus explores the relationship between human thought and the social context in which it arises. Furthermore, both explain that the root of this sociology of knowledge is Marx's idea that human consciousness is determined by its social existence. The common misconception is that the substructure of economic structure is the basis of the superstructure which is a reflection of the sub-structure. According to Berger and Luckmann, not just a reflection, but that human thought is based on human activity.

Temporary Findings

Text search shows that criminology in Indonesia has several features that can be explained as follows. First, the development of criminology as a discipline cannot be separated from Dutch influence, through the application of intellectual products of Dutch scholars. During the period of colonization and post-independence, there was a scientific interaction between scholars from Indonesia with scholars from the Netherlands. In colonial state relations with colonies, the assumption of dominant science is destined for the survival of colonialism itself, although in reality it is not completely so in the Indonesian context. Criminology as a discipline, both in colonial and post-independence times is relatively unknown, compared to the development of political, legal, or anthropological studies. All of Indonesia's independence figures contributed to the study as well as the political movement. Ultimately of all their writings seek to awaken consciousness as colonized peoples and nationalism, to achieve the goal of independence. Legal studies are also relatively emerging along with a number of colonial policies to create order and maintain power. One of the momentums is the enactment of the colonial code of law which is still valid in Indonesia, with some adjustments. Accordingly, Anthropological studies, especially in relation to the typical Indonesian legal studies, or known as customary law studies. However, this paper assumes that there is intertextuality between the disciplines of science and the development of criminology, especially in post-independence era. It’s safe to say that these sciences contribute indirectly to what can be called a criminology study manifesto in Indonesia. Nevertheless, Indonesian criminology manifesto is a postcolonial manifesto, a scientific response from a once colonized nation. Indonesian Criminology is a science that is part of decolonization of discourse, or involved in the resistance and replacement of colonial discourse. This assumption departs from the fact that colonialism is the most serious crime because it not only harms individuals but the nation as a whole, both in terms of welfare and the continuity of its social, cultural, and political existence. Criminology in Indonesia will be more sensitive to the principle of social justice. This assumption is not excessive when referring to the development of criminology studies in some developing countries that indicate the same response. At least this is what some studies by Biko Agozino, a criminologist from Nigeria have concluded.

The inaugural speech of Muhammad Mustofa as a criminology professor in 2004 under the title Criminology for Indonesian Social Welfare is one that forms the 'manifesto' of criminology in Indonesia. Mustofa said that

human rights violation and omission of social welfare (social welfare are also referred as human rights), is a harmful act towards society and therefore can be categorized as a crime. Furthermore, Mustofa explains in criminology's view that the realization of social welfare for all Indonesian people should be the most important effort prior to designing punishment programs. This was once formulated by the former Chairman of the Department of Criminology FISIP UI period of the 1970s, Dr. Arif Gosita, SH with the slogan "*we prevent crime based on social justice*".

One trail of thought that affect the perspective is from Paul Moedikdo. He is a criminologist who critically examines the meaning of evil, law, and punishment. According to him, criminal law is not held in a neutral political environment, but in a situation where there are strong state power imbalances against weak citizens (Reksodiputro, 2017). Mardjono Reksodiputro said Paul Moedikdo ideas including the introduction of various social criticism and theory inspired by the ideas of Karl Marx, in which the time of the Soeharto government is something risky. In the Netherlands itself, the thought that departed from Marx was encouraged by Willem Adriaan Bonger who was born on September 16, 1876, in his writings entitled Criminality and Economic Condition. The paper, which was his dissertation, was a monograph published later in the United States in 1916 in the English version, as a volume in the Modern Criminal Sciences Series, under the auspices of the American Law School Association. According to J.M. Van Bemmelen (1955) has also caused Bonger to be interested in the idealist movement of Socialism which carries the promise to solve all human problems, in the human way, through economic and social change. His analysis of Criminality and Economic Condition actually shows the element of the Marxist view in Bonger's view of evil. Changing economic and social circumstances is changing the ‘foundation’ in Marx's view. Basis is a material condition of society associated with the production process within the context of capitalist society. The foundation that will determine larger structures, such as law and state, to ideology.

Keywords: criminology, postcolonial, social justice

The Strategy of European Union in Human Security and Its Implementation in Three Northern Europe Countries to Maintain Social Justice and Social Well-Being of the Societies: Study on Finland, Denmark, and Sweden

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Introduction

The meaning of the term “security” has shifted in the context of the international world from the security of nation state, since World War I, World War II and Cold War, to individual security or human security. The term “security” from human security itself change from security in military and political issues to security from the problems experienced by individuals and communities. The term of human security was firstly initiated by United Nations Development Programme particularly in Human Development Report (1994). Based on the report, the term security has shifted from interstate war to interstate conflicts. The conflicts are able to produce humanitarian crises such as displacement, migration, and poverty. These issues cannot be ignored by international actors. The old concept of security referred to any traditional security issues such as war. This concept is not able to describe any security issues that threaten human life today, particularly the protection of individual’s security, instead of nation state security, such as the fundamental freedom of people, can be explained as a concept of security.

Barry Buzan argues in his paper titled *Human Security: What It Means, and What It Entails* that the concept of human security is very problematic. He says that security of nation state is connected to the survival of the citizen and national identity is the key of the understanding of security for nation state. From this point of view, the concept of human security has become broader. It means that the concept of security does not merely refer to a state/country, but it is applied to the public or society. The purpose of human security is to achieve

social justice and social well-being of the citizens. The relation between human security and social justice and social well-being is very close. As mentioned before, the issue of human security is not merely talking about the security of the nation but also about the security of the individuals. The threats that endanger the individual security are complex and shifting, along with the development of society, from military conflict to slavery, from conflict issues to social issues such as personal security, political security, environmental security, economical security, food security, health security, and community security. Threats in human security issues can be resolved by implementing human security strategy. By solving the problems, the society will be able to enjoy social justice in their life.

This problem, at present, is globally discussed by transnational organizations and institutions such as the European Union. They take an interest in the issue of human security as a strategic concept on a top priority issue for maintaining social justice and prosperity for their citizens. They realize that human security issues provide new security challenges. This issue is part of the European Security Strategy that was built in 2003. This strategy is applied to their country members. Northern European countries, especially Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, have a very high level of security where the states are able to overcome security threats including human security. The study was designed to test the implementation of human security policies in the three northern European countries to maintain social justice. The types of human security threats in northern European countries will be analyzed, as well as how human security policies are implemented in these countries and how they affect the condition of social justice of these countries. The focus of this study is on the EU as they have implemented their human security strategy in European Security Strategy since 2003. The EU has also implemented a strategy on three main reasons. The first reason is the moral reason which argue that everyone has "the right to live with dignity and security, and a concerted obligation to help each other when security is threatened." The second reason is with the Charter of the United Nations in Articles 55 and 56 on the promotion of respect for human rights. The third reason is based on the EU's personal interests. It is also believed that some of its member countries have implemented the strategy correctly. Meanwhile, this study specifically takes the three countries mentioned above as research objects. This is based on the consideration that the fairest society in Europe exists in Scandinavian countries. Finland, Denmark and Sweden are taken because they are members of the European Union.

Methods

The method undertaken by the author to examine this research is quantitative descriptive method. This research uses the concept of security proposed by constructivist in order to get a deep understanding on the meaning of security as well as human security.

Findings

I am of the opinion that the implementation of the Human Security Strategy in the EU member states has developed social justice and social welfare in its community. It is evident that most European countries, especially Scandinavian countries, have a just society.

Discussions

The study is divided into four sections. In the first section, the author talks about background research including why the authors chose this issue and research objectives. In the second part, the author will explain the concept of human security in the international context. The author will also explain the types of human security. The next section, the authors will describe the EU-led Human Security Strategy in the European Security Strategy and its implementation in three northern European countries: Finland, Denmark and Sweden. In the discussion, the authors will present data on human security strategies in countries and how they affect social justice and social welfare. In the last section, the authors will conclude the research results.

Conclusion

Based on the above explanation, this article aims to examine the European Security Strategy and its implementation in three northern European countries. The explanations include the concept of human security

and its relation to social justice and social welfare. It is believed that its application is done right with the result that most of the people in Northern European countries live prosperously.

Keywords: Human Security, European Union, Social Justice and Social Well-Being, Finland, Denmark, Sweden.

Rethinking the Indonesia Nationalism through the Improvement of the Paddy Insurance

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Nationalism is a political, social, and economic system characterized by the promotion of the interests of a particular nation, especially with the aim of gaining and maintaining sovereignty (self-governance) over the homeland. The Indonesia's agriculture sector to the Indonesian economy is small, as shown by the contribution of the agricultural sector to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the first Quarter of 2018 reached 13.26 percent, the second highest contributor after the manufacturing sector. The contribution of the agricultural sector in Indonesia has decreased from 30 percent in the 1970s and 23 percent in the 1980s. This is in line with the development economic theory that the share of the agricultural sector in the economy or national income will decrease over time as the structural transformation of agriculture leads to industry and services. However agriculture is very important for the national defense because the agricultural sector in Indonesia continues to play an important role in realizing food security, and this sector is a business that is mostly engaged in by the majority of the Indonesian population. Based on the agricultural census held by the Central Bureau of Statistics in 2013, the number of agricultural business households in Indonesia reached 26,135,469 million households.

The large contribution to the GDP does not necessarily bring prosperity to the business actors. Based on data from Statistical Bureau, the number of poor people in rural areas in September 2017 was 13.47, much higher than the urban poverty level of 7.2 percent. This shows that there are still many Indonesian farmers who fall into the category of the poor because most Indonesian farmers live in rural areas.

Based on the opening of the 1945 Constitution, it was stated that the vision of the Government of Indonesia was to protect the united, sovereign and prosperous Indonesian state by realizing general welfare for all Indonesian people. In order to realize this vision and provide protection to farmers for their business, in 2015, the Government of Indonesia initiated the Rice Farming Insurance called Asuransi Usaha Tani Padi (AUTP) program which is the implementation of Law Number 19 Year 2013 on Farmers Protection and Empowerment, because farming is a risky business, which can result in a decline in farmers' income which leads to a decrease in welfare. Through the insurance, farmers get reimbursement of working capital to try again in the next planting season after harvest failure caused by flood, drought and pest and plant diseases or plant pest organism (OPT). The subsidy given by the government is in the form of premium subsidy which reaches 70%, thus it is expected that the premium price becomes more affordable for the farmers.

Based on data realization of the AUTP implementation for 3 (three) years since the commencement of this program, there are indications that the government has difficulty in meeting the targets set for AUTP participants in each province that has been determined, so that the government adds AUTP distribution to the province previously not prioritized. In addition, there was a tendency for AUTP participants to decline in 2016 compared to 2017 in several provinces.

The successful implementation of the program to improve the welfare of farmers depends on the desire of farmers to join the insurance participants (in terms of demand), and also government intervention in guarding the success of the program (supply side). Based on previous studies, there are several factors that influence farmers' participation in agricultural insurance in several countries, including the level of education of farmers (Bharati et.al., 2014 in Singh 2017), the sensitivity of farmers to the risks of farming (Enjolras et.al., 2012), and the characteristics of an area dominated by agriculture (Malini, 2011). Meanwhile, according to Dick

(2010), government intervention, one of them through planning of agricultural insurance can allow a more structured and planned mechanism to anticipate and deal with agricultural loss.

This research is a quantitative research using panel data regression model with *cross section* in the form of provincial implementing and time series AUTP years since AUTP implemented in 2015 until 2017. The required data is in the form of target data and realization of the area of paddy fields covered by AUTP, data on the area of rice fields exposed to the risk of attacks by Plant, Flood and Drought Disrupting Organisms in 2015 to 2017 (data source from the Ministry of Agriculture); and Human Development Index (HDI) data and Gross Regional Agricultural sector and industrial sector data (data sources from BPS) .

This study aims to see the relationship between the area of paddy fields covered by AUTP as a dependent variable (Y), with independent variables, the target area of AUTP (X1), HDI (X2), area of pest, flood and drought in the previous year (X3), and comparison of agricultural GRDP with industrial GRDP (X4). Based on the results of the research, it is known that there is a very statistically significant effect between the area of paddy fields covered by AUTP and the Human Development Index which is the proxy of the education level of farmers. When the value of a province's human development index increases by 1 percent, there will be an additional land covered by AUTP in the province of 54.14 hectares. While for the area of rice field that was attacked by pests, floods and drought, there is a statistically significant effect on the area of paddy fields covered by AUTP with a significance level of 9 percent. Based on the analysis, it is known that if there is an increase in the area of paddy fields affected by pests, floods, and drought by 1 percent, then the area of paddy fields covered by AUTP in the following year will decrease by 0.64 Ha. While the planning and comparison variables of agricultural GRDP with industrial GRDP has no significant effect on the realization of AUTP. It is very sad, hence to gain and maintain sovereignty (self-governance) over the homeland the paddy insurance must be improved.

Keywords: Agricultural insurance, rice farming insurance, realization of agricultural insurance

Indigenous Repertoire in Contemporary East Borneo: A case study of villages adjacent to forest and plantation industries in East Kalimantan, Indonesia

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The development of timber and oil palm plantations in Indonesia has at least two different sides. They are needed for the country's economic income and that they open work opportunity for the local people. At the other side, in many cases, they have to deal with agrarian and social conflicts. Most of the area converted to plantation sites were forest areas which claimed by the local although constitutionally are under state control. The indigenous people often ask for their land back and that the struggle to regain it is sometimes colored by violence, complex scenario, and obscure and delusional schemes, that employ both traditional and modern knowledge of the parties involved.

This article describes the indigenous strategy to regain their land by developing a unique strategy. We would like to see the organization of people to claim and reclaim the natural resources that had been controlled by others through the lens of contentious repertoire or repertoire of contention (Tilly 1996, Rolfe 2005). This repertoire refers to some instruments, to include tools and actions, used to express disagreements or protests that leading to a movement (Rolfe 2005). Specifically, Tilly identifies the word of repertoire as "... a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate proces of choice... [hence repertoires] are learned cultural creations, but they do not descend from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of political propaganda; they emerge from struggle" (Tilly 1996:264).

Our observation found that the repertoire of contention that is seen in the context of the local in Paser, East Kalimantan, is rooted in the Paser Dayaks' interest to continue farming their lands that had been, in many

cases, turned into forest concessions or palm oil plantations. As an indigenous group in the area, the Paser Dayaks, experienced marginalization by the coming of modernization channeled through development programs. One of the main program formulated by the Indonesian government was to transform 'traditional life' of the people to modern styles. Systematically, they changed the hunting and gathering ways of life to a permanent simple agriculture. The forests they live in are then opened for plantation sites; and mostly left to investors to forest and plantation companies. Decades after, after the launching of the Law of Regional Autonomy, indigenous peoples began to demand forest lands controlled by companies to be returned to them.

While the term indigenous often correlates with the past and simplicity, the repertoire developed by the Paser Dayaks has been paradoxically incorporated to capital forces and political powers. As Hughes (2010) reveals the indigenous movement in Peru has connected to the political issues at the national level, we also saw the more or less similar situation in Paser. However, like Tilly (1996) has postulated, the repertoire built by the Paser Dayak is also part of their struggle to control their lands. Rather than to seek the main reasons for struggling, we focus our analysis on the process of networking and strategizing developed by the Paser Dayak that involve some parties from state institutions, private sectors, NGOs, and migrants in the area of Paser regency.

Traditionally, the Paser Dayak perform swidden agriculture combined with hunting for living. Those economic activities are closely related to the forest resources and was mainly done for subsistence needs. Beginning in the end of 1960s, the development era started by the Suharto's New Order. To fuel the programs, the government exploited natural resources like oil and gas and forest areas. Foreign investments came to finance natural resource exploitation. On the other hand, the exploitation need to a secured control of particular resource's areas, and it was through forest concessions that the security of land was then given to the investors. The indigenous Dayak was then slowly lost their land and resources and therefore marginalized by the development initiated by state or private sectors.

Having been disregarded for years, *adat* (customary law) and the indigenous people found their momentum to be taken into account in the post-Suharto era. In that moment, the case of AMAN (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat*) that assert cultural distinctiveness as the grounds rights to territories and resources threatened by forestry and mining interests backed by police and military (Li 2000) seemed relevant. *Adat* then emerges as key term on local political acts, as Affif and Lowe (2007) seen as part of entail acts of political representation and the conceptual articulation of forms of community empowered to make claims on resources.

Conjectural discourse between indigenous community and its customary law led to the creation of popular imagination of social justice redistribution over natural resources on localities. That is why claiming and reclaiming by invoked *adat* (customary rights) to struggle over natural resources (McCarthy, 2005) was emerging simultaneously over a country and successfully redefines their position in regulatory process (Bedneer and Huis, 2008). However, their struggle for more autonomy and resources, ironically, only remarked on drastically political and interest negotiation shifting over resources. As Li (2001), Afif and Lowe (2007) observed the struggle of indigenous communities over their claims on natural resources were problematic in practice.

In 2013 and 2018, we conducted short ethnographic observation in 10 villages adjacent to oil palm and forest companies in Paser and Penajam Paser Utara regencies. We came to five notions as follow:

1. The Law of Regional Autonomy has enable the Paser Dayaks to articulate claim on the basis of adat, therefore they reclaim the oil palm plantation around as part of their adat territory.
2. The nexus and alliance with AMAN has formulated a repertoire to face the private companies and state apparatus
3. The Paser Dayaks activists employed a combined strategies of land occupation, rally, boycott, and campaign of adat regulation as the basis of land concession for the companies.
4. Established some enterprises to supply local and indigenous workers for the companies as a way to make sure a company a good social relationship with the local.
5. Cooperate with the Sulawesi and Javanese migrants to deal with the companies, approach the local regency governments, and youth organizations to form a strategic alliance

At the end, we conclude that the repertoire of contention developed by the indigenous Paser Dayaks is a complex organization of *adat* law, *adat* organization, local-migrant's groups, a nation-wide indigenous movement, and the changing agrarian policy. It stimulates and serves as a unique strategy for the local to reclaim their land.

Keywords: repertoire of contention, indigenous, social movement, Dayak, East Kalimantan

Towards Demographic Dividend in Indonesia: Do Poor People Gain More from Education?

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Introduction

Fundamental nation-building has become the challenge for many parts of the world, recently. This includes how the country can take the significant role and create impactful policy in improving the social welfare of the citizens. Economic issues have been a priority for most of the country, especially in developing countries such as Indonesia. In the next two decades, Indonesia is foreseen to have a demographic dividend predominated over high productive age population. This so-called demographic dividend which may lead to the windows of opportunity. In that situation, the dependency ratio is at the lowest level. By definition, the low dependency ratio is the ratio means that the number of people who are not in the labour force (ages 0 to 14 and 65+ years-old) are less than the number of people who are in the labour force (productive ages 15 to 64 years old). As this becomes the advantage to create greater economic growth, productivity and improving people's welfare, Indonesia is currently in the phase of preparing the human resources with better education.

However, we currently observe the obstacle in preparing human resource is inevitable. To some extent, education could create high productive growth and increase social welfare in the community, but increasing return to education and experience lead to wage inequality (Lemieux (2006)). This has been supported by Borjas (2013) found that productivity and the return rate for skills are two main factors which affect income differential in labour market. Studies from Blackaby et al. (1997), Chinchui (2003), and Appleton (2014) supported the idea of working experience is significant as the primary factors affecting wage inequality in the society. However, in Indonesia context, Chongvilaivian (2015) argued that education had contributed 13% to the disparity between poor and rich. From here, we need further investigation on to what extent education level will help poor people.

This paper aims to see how much education affects household income, as the study conducted by Sicular et al. (2007) by computing the magnitude of education across household income in the period of pre-financial crisis (pre-1998) and post-financial crisis (post-1998).

From the policy perspective, this paper is expected to contribute to providing further analysis of education policy and social welfare. Furthermore, we are planning to take part in formulating research-based policy in Indonesia.

Methods

In analysing the influence of education for the households in a longitudinal data, this study uses the dataset from Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) wave 1 through 5. IFLS is widely used by policy maker, economists, and demographer to analyze the long term effect for certain program. This data representative for nearly 83% of the Indonesian population and investigates households change since 1993, 1998, 2000, 2007, and 2014. To know the effect on education for the poor, we used quantile regression method which allows us

to examine the return of education for each group of people (poor, middle, and rich class) in each year of observation. The analysis is based on their annual household income with controlling for age, gender, urban-rural living areas, and job sectors.

Findings

Below are highlighted findings from the regression results.

1. Education consistently has a significant role in increasing income, across the years of observation.
2. We found that years of education did not differ between socio groups such as urban-rural and gender in recent decades, but it varies sharply between socio groups during the pre-crisis era.
3. The return on education decline from the pre-crisis era compared to the post-crisis era. After the crisis period, for each quantile group of people, return on education varies from 10% to 14%. While before 1998, return on education for each quantile group of people ranges between 13% and 20% at most.
4. We did not see the consistent pattern of return on education for the bottom 25% impoverished and top 25% wealthiest across years during the post-crisis era.

As we control job characteristics, there is a significant difference in annual income between workers in agriculture, manufacture, and service sectors. Moreover, this difference contributes to income inequality between socioeconomic groups.

Discussion

Those findings indicated that focusing on education as demographic dividend preparation might not be the only option, especially for poor people. As drawn from the results, in 2000, for each 1-year additional education level, the poorest 25% of people earn 14.9% additional income while the wealthiest 25% people earn only 11.5%. This pattern is consistent in 2007 which are 11.2% and 10.4%, respectively. However, in 2014, the poorest 25% people earn 8.50% additional income whereas the richest 25% earn 9.69% additional income. Further regression analysis, the pattern is consistent for observations in 1993 and 1997 (pre-crisis era) in which poor people earn less additional income for each additional year of education compared to the rich ones.

The other exciting part of the findings is we see that job sector significantly affect annual income since after 1998. Before 1998, working in the agriculture sector seemed to be the excellent option for people. After 1998, workers in the manufacturing sector earn higher income compared to the agriculture ones. Unlike manufacturing, the service sector has seemed to be consistent in providing higher annual income compared to the agriculture sector.

In regards to education-related policy and how much education will contribute to the economic capability of poor people in the future, we refer to previous studies which have heavily discussed the role of working experiences. As the policy insight, this paper suggested that increasing their working experiences, improving their opportunities for vocational education, internship, and informal courses are among other ways to increase human resources quality and improve productivity between socioeconomic groups.

Conclusion

To sum up, we found it is necessary to rethink again about education as the only way to improve social welfare especially for poor people. Education does have significant role in improving social welfare of society, but there are other factors which are also considerable in fostering the development. In addition to that, as educational returns proven to be decreasing, it indicates the need for more comprehensive educational development strategy which covers extra working experiences or vocational education skills. In the future, we are hoping that strengthening the economic foundation of country by having right policy for nation-building, will help in creating social welfare in the society.

Keywords: demographic dividend, return on education, quantile regression

Implementation of Restorative Justice in Traffic Accidents

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Introduction

There are three main police functions: law enforcement, order maintenance, and service function. One part of the order maintenance function is to maintain order and security on the road, including the governance of the behaviours people while drive. Traffic accidents are often caused by the ignorance drivers who are not obedient to the rules of driving, so their action will endanger the lives of theirselves or other people on the road.

Based on research conducted by WHO, traffic accidents are a problem faced internationally by every country. In Indonesia traffic accidents averaged an increase of 9.5% per year since 2010-2014. The increase is followed by the increase in the number of injured, dead and the value of material losses. This data suggests that traffic accidents have considerable damage and a serious threat to the safety and health of individuals. While for the police, improving public safety is one indicator of the success of traffic management.

Method(s)

In this study, we used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative method is used to find out the significant factors and affect the occurrence of traffic accidents, using statistical analysis tools Logistic Regression. The results obtained from quantitative analysis will be equipped with a qualitative approach that is by doing Focus Group Discussion using Delphi Method.

Qualitative analysis uses primary data from the National Traffic Management Center, which is the number of incidents that occurred during the last 2 years. While the Focus Group Discussion was conducted by inviting several people as participants, such as accident victims, the police, traffic lawyers, and transportation departments as representatives of the government. From the results of the implementation of Focus Group Discussion is known how the Restorative Justice process should be done for traffic accidents that occur.

Findings

Based on data obtained from the Traffic Corps of the Republic of Indonesia at the Directorate of Law Enforcement, in 2016 there were 106,644 incidents of traffic accidents, with the death toll of 31,262 inhabitants. While the number of serious injuries were as many as 20,075 people and as many as 120,532 were slightly injured. While the total material loss of about 230 billion rupiah. The above figures show that on average about 85 people died from traffic accidents per day in Indonesia, with an average loss of material materill reaching two million rupiah more for each accident.

There are several factors that cause every traffic accidents incident, the first factor is Human Error or human factor. Some studies show that traffic accidents are generally caused by human factors that generally begin with violations. So that it can be said to be obedient to the traffic rules will suppress the traffic accident rate. In addition to the element of violation in the Human Error factor, other elements are the inability to drive also become an effect on the occurrence of traffic accidents. The Traffic Police Corps data of the Republic of Indonesia at the Directorate of Law Enforcement, in 2016 showed that the number of 106,644 road accidents by about 25% was caused by unsuspecting drivers of vehicles coming from the opposite direction, about 20% of accidents caused by failure the driver in maintaining the safe distance of

the vehicle, and about 15% of accidents caused by carelessness of the driver when through the road with the shape of the bend.

In addition to human error factors with some of the main elements above, other factors that also have the role of traffic accidents is a factor of road conditions. Road condition factors have a significant role in traffic accidents, based on road technical analysis, the probability of accidents on sharp cornering roads is 4 times greater than the probability of accidents occurring in straight road conditions. Hollow roads, poor lighting and inadequate beacons are a component of the road condition factor which is one of the causes of traffic accidents.

Discussion

In every accident that happens generally will be found elements of negligence made by the rider, unworthy vehicle factors will be charged to motorists for driving a vehicle that endanger others. If there is an accident on the road that is not feasible to pass then the driver will be declared as a careless rider, so whatever the cause of the accident factor, the rider will generally always be blamed.

The police generally still use the law enforcement approach to accidents that occur. Once the violation has occurred, the investigation and investigation process continues and is processed in accordance with applicable law. Not all offenders have the opportunity to go through the Restorative Justice process.

The implementation of Restorative Justice requires the participation of various parties, particularly the police, to know what types of accidents can be resolved using the Restorative Justice approach and what kind of accidents should be resolved using law enforcement. In addition, the implementation of Restorative Justice should also be supported by other parties to broaden the public in general know that there is another way that can be taken when facing a dispute, not merely have to use legal channels.

The biggest obstacles generally arise from the victim, especially to the families of the victims who died, the loss is felt will not be able to be treated with anything. Such a condition of loss sometimes makes the victim's family want the offender's family to feel the same, even though it is realized that it will not return the dead.

Conclusion

Implementation of Restorative Justice in Indonesia has not yet become a widely applied approach in policing action. A still-referenced approach in the handling of traffic accidents is law enforcement, by finding out who is at fault and punishing him based on his mistakes.

A well-run Restorative Justice process should result from agreements established between various stakeholders, in the event of a traffic accident the interested parties are the victim's family, the violator, and the police as a mediator.

Many things become obstacles in the enforcement of Restorative Justice in the handling of traffic accidents, among others is the officer's understanding of the concept of Restorative Justice, the sincerity of the victim's family to pursue the mediation path that became the central point of Restorative Justice, as well as the ability of the traffic violators to fulfill the wishes of the family accident victim.

Keywords: restorative justice, traffic accident, policing.

NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In much of the world, nationalism is currently identified with repressive regimes and backward-looking populist politics. What has become of the classic understandings of nationalism as a moral conscience that transforms society, or as a social movement that claims access to political institutions in the name of freedom and equal rights? In order to address this question, the panel aims to explore the role of the ideas, feelings and narratives of the nation in mobilizing social movements and publics in Indonesia and elsewhere. These movements and publics are not necessarily of national scale. Nationalism is also relevant as a framework of political action that focuses on local, provincial, or ethnic affairs. It provides a repertoire of skills, behaviors, and symbols that is useful for organizing work activities, student groups, public events and protest movements. In such contexts, nationalism (much like religion, ethnic culture and various global connections) helps people imagine a public world of belonging and participation.

We invite participants to approach nationalism as one element of the dynamics of modern society: not as a monolithic narrative or ideology, but as a horizon of meaning and a resource for engaging people in social movements. Underlying this approach is a theoretical question: what counts as a social movement? Recent debate has emphasized a processual view in which movements arise from "mobilizing structures" (social networks and formal organizations), but it is debated whether these structures pre-exist the movement, or are created by its organizers. If nationalism is a way of framing political events, movements, and identities, it is possible to see it as a source of agency – and not just a passive subjection to power.

The themes and case studies covered by the participants might include: (1) nationally aligned rhetorics and actions among movements for resource rights, fair labor conditions, or cultural autonomy; (2) political campaigns that appeal to nationalist sentiments; (3) corporatist social forms, such as workplace cooperatives, and the political actions they make possible; (3) celebration and contestation of the symbols of national history, such as monumental sites or national heroes; (4) gestures and language that express national virtues, such as civility, equality or tolerance; (5) the use of the national language in addressing a public in such contexts as education, religious observance, or public service.

This is not an exhaustive list of possible ethnographic topics for this panel. We welcome other ethnographic case-studies that reveal how nationalism intersects with local, ethnic, religious, and other concerns. What role does nationalism play in generating authority and in resolving conflicts and disputes? To what extent is nationalism tied with involvement with the state, and how does it manifest itself in peripheries and frontiers where state institutions are not directly present?

The Nation and State Awareness of Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia

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Introduction

This article examines Hadrami Arabs power in Indonesia in a way which shares several ideas with the concept of nation-state, as that concept is interpreted and understood as the citizenship duty. Ḥaḍramīs, meaning immigrants from Ḥaḍramawt and their descendants, have composed the vast majority of the Arabs in maritime Southeast Asia. The place is the region of Hadramawt in present-day Yemen (Engseng Ho 2006; Jacobsen 2009).

The Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia occupied a unique position in society, especially during the Dutch colonial

period. Based on racial division, the government of the Dutch East Indies categorized them, together with Chinese and other Asian minorities, as "Foreign Orientals" (*vreemde oosterlingen*). Each group was governed by different laws and separate systems, and prevented from having a common will, but the Arabs shared a common religion with the vast majority of "natives" (*inlanders*), locally called the *pribumi*. Their economic and legal superiority to pribumis, as well as their religiously noble origin, helped them to exercise considerable influence on the local Muslim population (Yamaguchi 2016).

The study of Hadrami Arabs, particularly on the nation-state building is important for several reasons. This article will seek to answer the following questions: (1) How did the existence of Hadrami come into being in Indonesia? What were the characteristics of the Hadrami? (2) What was the role of Hadrami in the Indonesian society? (3) What was the larger impact of the Hadrami on the nation-state in Indonesia?

This study attempts (1) to introduce Hadrami Arabs building nation-state as a part of Indonesian history; (2) to inject nation spirit from the charismatic Hadrami Arabs old generation's leader to people; (3) to encourage young generation in order to respect the history of nation and the struggle of the independence; and (4) to describe as a part of nation-building and nation character building by bridging understanding and respect among nation components to strengthen pluralism in Indonesia.

Method

This paper uses the particular perspective on history which are heuristic, critics of source (intern and extern), and historiography. My fieldwork takes place in Jakarta and in Tegal, Central Java. My interaction with Hadrami informants meant interaction both with male dan female informants.

Findings

Hadrami in the archipelago seems to have been ambivalent both in relation to how they have been viewed from the homeland of Hadramaut, and how they have been perceived by their various host societies. It is considered distinct from their homeland in the Middle East. We will not, of course, ignore local culture influences on Hadrami in the archipelago, but one should not assume that Hadrami contribution has little to do with people in Indonesia.

As the Hadrami are situated on the minority of the Indonesian Muslim, there is a tendency among people to exclude the Hadrami from any discussion of the nation-state. It is assumed that the Hadrami does not belong to Indonesian culture.

Discussion

The 1928 Youth Pledge which crossed ethnic and religious boundaries influenced the orientation of the Arab community of the Hadrami in the Dutch Indies. On October 4, 1934 a group of forty muwallad Hadramis met in the central Javanese coastal town of Semarang. After three days of vigorous debate they announced the establishment of a new organization, the Persatoean Arab Indonesia (Indonesian Arab Union; PAI). The PAI aimed to unite the muwallads, with membership open to any Arab who had been born in Indonesia. The Semarang meeting consisted of active members of al-Irshad as well as the pro-sayyid organization Al-Rabithah al-'Alawiyyah. All fourty participants agreed unanimously that the basis of the new organization would be the recogniztion that Indonesia, not Hadramawt, as their homeland (Kesheh 1999). *First*, the homeland of Hadrami is Indonesia; *second*, Hadrami is obligatory to leave isolated life; *third*, Hadrami has to fulfill their obligations to their homeland and the nation of Indonesia. According to Ernest Renan, nation is the culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice or devotion. A nation state was one in which the majority of its citizens and not only its rulers come to develop a sense of common identity and shared history.

The Hadramis became the others within, as they were gradually excluded from nationalist movements, such as the Sarekat Islam and other Indonesian political imaginations. These developments in turn provoked reactions from amongst the Indies-born Hadramis who felt more Indonesian than Arab. Among them, AR Baswedan called for a separate group of Indonesian-born Hadramis. He contended for the cessation of conflict between Ba 'Alawi and non-Ba 'Alawi Hadramis by opening another space of dissension, that between Hadramis born abroad and Indies-born Hadramis. Baswedan's appeals led to the formation of Persatuan Arab

Indonesia in 1934, which was transformed into a political party in 1940. The PAI fought for total integration with indigenous Indonesians and actively took part in national struggles. For the PAI, it was not enough to be Indonesian; one also had to be a nationalist Indonesian (Alatas 2011)

Conclusion

The existence of Hadrami in Indonesia is a neglected area of Islamic studies. There has not yet been any comprehensive study devoted to examining the nation-states ideas from them to their new homeland Indonesia. There are, of course, several studies on the history of Hadrami from one generation of early Hadrami to another by way of unbroken *sanad*. Understanding the processes of Hadrami's diaspora becomes more important in connection with the spread of Islam in Indonesia.

The choice of idealistic youth Hadrami descents who proclaimed Indonesia as their homeland, placed them as part of the community of nationalist fighters. That is why this radical idea was considered relevant to be understood in the present situation. Nowadays, the event of the unity of the Arabs in the frame of Indonesia, seems to have been forgotten. For this reason, the call back of the PAI becomes relevant in the midst of the emergence of the trans-national movement in the name of religion and in the emergence of group fanaticism.

Keywords: Hadrami Arabs, Partai Arab Indonesia (PAI), Indonesia, nation-state

The Dynamics between Jose Rizal's Ideas and the Phillipines Revolutionary Movement Group 1882 – 1898

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Introduction

The purpose of this writing is to explain about Jose Rizal's ideas which succeed inspired not only the Philippines reform group but also the revolutionary group of Philippines independence when this country still in the Spanish colonial period in the past 19th century. When he was in Europe he joined Philippines reform movement group. They worked together to plan propaganda movement so that Philippines got independence as a nation state later. Rizal then explained his ideas through his novels which are Noli me Tangere and El Filibusterismo that pictured Philippines condition under Spanish colonial rule. Rizal's ideas on those novels triggered the anger of Spanish colonial government because the novels criticize them. Afterwards the Spanish colonial government exiled Jose Rizal to Dapitan for four years since 1892. On December 30, 1896 he was executed by Spanish colonial government. After Jose Rizal's death the struggle against Spanish colonialist continues. In 1898 the Philippines revolutionary movement group conducted movement and they became succeed beating the colonialist in their country. There were different perceptions between Jose Rizal ideas and the revolutionary movement group about a way to gain independence because Jose Rizal chose a peaceful way meanwhile the revolutionary movement group wanted to conduct revolutionary movement in expelling the colonialist. This writing will describe and analyze the dynamics between Jose Rizal's ideas and the Philippines revolutionary movement group.

Philippines in the nineteenth century was in the Spanish colonial rule. The Spanish colonial system succeed change traditional system through hizpanization by degraded the local hierarchy and political structures since the sixteenth century. Spanish came to Philippines with gold, glory and gospel spirits. From the beginning when the Spanish settled in Philippines, the political structures were in the hands of friars that came from Spain. The friars divided by two, first the friars from Jesuit order and the other one is friars from Franciscan order, the Jesuit friars concern on education sector. The friars domination especially the Franciscan in colonial rule then became the main issue in Philippines colonial history because it worried the Filipinos elite since nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century in Philippines the awakening of its nationalism revealed

evolutionary. It growth gradually because there were two phase during that century. In the first phase, previous the 1872 there was the struggle from the native clergy to the Spanish friars that the native clergy wanted the equal status to Spanish friars. In the second phase, after the year 1872 the pattern of Filipinos struggle change because it dominated by the activities of native and mestizo elite. They came from the wealthy family so they had western education background. In other words, both native and mestizo elite was well connected to access education and power as well. Then, it was awakening national awareness to the Filipinos. The national movement group that consists of Jose Rizal that has mestizo's in his family background and Philippines revolution group. They protested the colonial structures which made friars on the ruler hierarchy. There was quarrel between nationalist group and the friars that were powerful kept the colonial system in Philippines standing still.

Method

This research is using historical method that consists of heuristic, critics, interpretation and historiography. These steps used by the author in this research. In the heuristic step is the process where the author finds and gets the sources such as literatures, documents and journals. Then the second step is critics which the author criticizing sources both external and internal. The third step is interpretation which the author interprets every source that has correlation to the theme of research. The last step is historiography which is the author elaborate all sources through step one to step three and the result is the writing that the author reconstructs or giving a new point of view according to previous studies by treating the source or new findings during the research.

Findings

There are some findings that become the strength of this writing. Firstly, during Philippines under the Spanish rule relationship between colonial state and religious issue was inseparable. It caused the colonial state administrative responsibility was become blurred. Secondly, the Spanish friars also participated in managing colonial state affairs. Thirdly, the Filipinos then became aware that they were consciously colonized by Spanish. The awareness of nationalism arose among the native and mestizo elite. Speaking about mestizo in Philippines it can be categorized by Chinese mestizo and Spanish mestizo. In the beginning the nationalism awareness revealed from this group that represented by Jose Rizal, he was also Chinese mestizo and some other Filipino nationalists at that time which struggled against the Spanish colonial rule. Jose Rizal and other nationalists formed into Filipino reformed group. They did their activities in Europe so the Spanish difficult to detect their activities.

Discussion

The member of Filipino reformed group movement including Jose Rizal gave the idea of nationalism by write and compiled their writings through magazine so that many people could read their writings that critized the Spanish colonial rule in Philippines. Jose Rizal was also writings some novels such as Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo that sharply criticized the Spanish colonial rule in Philippines in this case, especially the Spanish friars. The effect of it Jose Rizal had punishment from Spanish colonial government. Then Jose Rizal ideas of nationalism continued by revolutionary group. This article will explore the dynamics of Jose Rizal's ideas that use by the revolutionary group.

Conclusion

This article will explain about Jose Rizal's ideas about nationalism that continued by revolutionary group in Philippines. The period of this writing take from 1882 until 1898, this period became the peak of the struggle of nationalist group in Philippines battling the Spanish colonial rule. There is correlation between Jose Rizal's ideas and the members of revolutionary group and the result was the Philippines independence which became inspired the nationalism awareness of other countries because Philippines was the first republic state in Asia.

Keywords: Jose Rizal, reform group, revolutionary movement group, Spanish colonial

Nationalism and Social Movement: The IKEA Way

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The development of corporate social responsibility (CSR) varied, depending in which country it was developed. In Sweden, which is considered as one of the countries touted to have the most effective CSR program, it has become an inseparable part of Swedish national identity and nationalism campaign. Swedish government had been allocating large amount of their national funds into different programs in order to achieve this goal, becoming the most sustainable country in the world. Since the 1990s, European Union (EU) member states were known to be very active in promoting environmentally responsible businesses, especially Sweden. The Scandinavian state set up rules and regulations that required both state and private corporations to pay more attention to the environment and to report their CSR activities that they have done annually.

The environmental awareness movement in Sweden has emerged since the 1960s (The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Industrial and business development as well as infrastructure development that were done without regard of their impacts to the environment caused significant changes that were felt by the Swedish population. The main problem at that time was carbon dioxide emission, mercury pollution, and pulp production which rapidly decrease the total amount of Swedish forest. Because of this, an awareness of environmental preservation started to arise and became one of the Swedish national identities and the driving force of Swedish nationalism. Swedish government then made regulations to prevent water, air, and noise pollution resulted by industrial activities (The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). After that, the legislation regulating industrial waste kept increasing until in the late 1990s when Sweden ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In addition to the OECD convention, Sweden also make use of the UN Global Compact, UN Guiding Principles, and conventions issued by the ILO to govern CSR activities.

This study aims to show how the forms of social activities undertaken by companies assisted social and political movements that are possibly occur as a result of these activities by using IKEA as the research objects. The analysis is conducted on the CSR activities done by IKEA and the business code of conduct made by IKEA, IWAY. In this case, the Swedish government and IKEA perform their respective roles harmoniously. The Swedish government and IKEA have a mutually beneficial relationship which enabled them to achieve both political and economic agenda. The aim of the Swedish government to move into a more environmentally and socially responsible country is greatly helped by the efforts and social activities of multinational corporations such as IKEA. On the other hand, by complying with government policies and public demands, IKEA has succeeded in creating a more positive corporate image that has an excellent impact on the distribution and sale of IKEA products although some environmental and social issues still need to be resolved.

IKEA CSR programs have received praise from various groups both in their home countries well as in other countries. The reason why IKEA's CSR activities are different from other companies that also carry out CSR activities is because IKEA retains their principle of selling their products with more affordable price while other companies sell their products at a premium price on the grounds that they have many CSR programs. In addition to internal programs, IKEA also supports CSR programs conducted by other organizations. In relation to the enactment of regulations governing CSR activities for the first time in the 1990s, the focus of IKEA's activities is to optimize the product life cycle and reduce adverse environmental impacts such as waste management. More serious environmental and social impacts have not occurred at the time. It was not until the 1994-1995 that IKEA directed its CSR activities to social issues because of several incidents involving IKEA that had a bad effect of the company's reputation such as the use of large quantities of wood as raw materials and the use of hazardous materials to process the raw materials into finished products.

After experiencing incidents that badly affect the sales and the good corporate image, IKEA has finally created a code of ethics aimed at all parties who want to work with IKEA, especially for suppliers of raw materials. IWAY's code of ethics stands for "The IKEA Way on Purchasing Products, Materials and Services". IWAY is a guide and a collection of minimum requirements for suppliers who want to work with IKEA in relation to environmental responsibility, and the working and social conditions of workers. There are three principles on which IWAY is based on, which is to pay attention to what works best for the workers, children, and the

environment. Through these three principles, IKEA wants their companies and businesses to keep abreast of their sustainability business principles, "IKEA's business must have a positive impact on mankind and the environment" (IWAY Standard, 2008). The points contained in the IWAY follow the eight core conventions defined in the Fundamental Principles of Right at Work, the ILO declaration in June 1998, Rio's declaration on sustainable development in 1992, the Johannesburg UN Summit on Sustainable Development and the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact in 2000. IKEA also used the human rights principles set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and complied with UN decisions regarding boycott and trade embargo.

Since IWAY was implemented, IKEA's image in the public eye was improving and CSR activities became an important part of IKEA's management. By using IWAY, IKEA was not only finding and solving problems, but also continuously improving the quality of its business by implementing quality measures platform such as ISO 9000 and 14000. Cost savings can also be done by IKEA after having clear rules on the supply chain of raw materials which is also governed by IWAY. This IKEA code of ethics is seen as a very important tool for building the legitimacy of IKEA and public confidence in IKEA, especially when IKEA cooperates with suppliers from Asia and Eastern Europe who have views on environmental issues and working conditions slightly different from the IKEA principle (Gronvius, 2009).

IWAY's implementation also has a very good impact on the development of Sweden's political moves in its efforts to become a more environmentally friendly country. Because IKEA's corporate branding has a very close relationship with Swedish national identity, Sweden's image in the public eye has also increased, which in turn benefitted Sweden since their agendas are more easily implemented. The nationalism developed by the Swedish government evolved into the identity of the IKEA enterprise that is spread around the world through CSR programs undertaken and corporate culture. In this case, nationalism is no longer a show of state power or a form of submission of a company to their homeland, but it has been adapted into the identity of the company itself, and indirectly a part of the daily life of its employees.

Keyword: IKEA, Sweden, Nationalism, CSR, social movement

Ritual, Social Movement and State: A Cultural study of Kampong Bustaman in the City of Semarang

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Unlike most urban villages in Semarang, Kampong Bustaman is known as one of the villages that in the last 5 years has initiated a specific kind of ritual, and implemented it continuously. The spirit of reenacting spiritual values in the urban village is an anomaly in the midst of secular, individualistic and self-centered urban life. This study aims to capture the spirit of ritual conducted by residents of Kampung Bustaman, Semarang in the last 5 years since the implementation of Gebyuran Bustaman in 2013. The method that we use in studying this community is an ethnographical research with participant observation and in-depth interviewing as the techniques of collecting data.

In this study, we try to understand how this community successfully performed the above mentioned ritual called Gebyuran Bustaman, and transformed it from a community ritual into a public performance of the entire urban inhabitants, whilst attracting public attention on the significance of their community and kampong for urban life in the city of Semarang (Central Java, Indonesia). They invented elements of rite from site-artifacts in their kampong, such as places where youth hang around in the kampong to kill time, goat slaughter house, and open space walls, and bestowed significant values into them. And every year during the ritual performance they commemorate those sites as the emblem of their social well-being. Central to this commemoration is the relation of this settlement with the ancestor of the well-known pioneering romantic painter named Raden Saleh (his real name is Saleh Sjarif Boestaman). It is not unrelated that the name of the event, Gebyaran Bustaman, bears the name of the ancestor of Raden Saleh as the original owner of this kampong. So members of this community were successful in mobilizing any means and resources available around them to guarantee the

well-being of the entire community. The city government of Semarang began to mention this kampong as a good model for the development of thematic kampong in the city. "This unofficial recognition" they obtained from the city of Semarang as one of the models for the development of kampong in the city is a very significant major outcome resulted from the continuity of this ritual. And we took this as an indication of the desired effect of this ritual of Gebyaran Bustaman.

In analyzing this ritual, we owe many insightful ideas to Durkheim, Turner, Lefebvre and Silverstein. It is from Durkheimian perspective that we are able to draw a conclusion that this ritual serves to function as the totem of this community, while from Turner we can understand how contradictions, tensions and conflict existing between members of this community could be overcome by mean of ritual that they had performed.

Instead of merely muffling the conflict and tension as Victor Turner put it in relation to the ritual function, local residents furthermore use it to indirectly impose cultural resistance against a very likely original scenario of urban plan from the city of Semarang to evict their settlement as a part of the extension of business district in the city. Lefebvre coined this activity as part of the way citizens produce space, providing an alternative to the spatialisation of dominant classes that see space in utilitarian logic based on economic relations. Drawing our analysis from Silverstein's theory of sign, we attempt to comprehend that ritual of Gebyaran Bustaman might function as brand and cultural statement of the community of kampong Bustaman. In this ritual, or to put it in a better term, ritual speech, certain ritual actors with the support of audiences were able to render into discursive form material which start its life as speech. Writing dramatic statements and ritual prayers all require such a rendering. Silverstein calls this performance-activity as the "entextualization" process, which involves a dual process. First detaching the speech from its indexical surround, its natural home. Second repackaging the words in an appropriate textual form. By making this cultural statement from ritual Gebyaran Bustaman that they conduct every year this community was able to attract public attention (not only locally, but also nationally) on the significant of this community for the city of Semarang. And in doing so, they were able to sustain the very existence of this community amid the uproar and high densely populated urban life in the city of Semarang. By synthesizing all these insightful ideas into a single framework, we endeavor to contribute something new in the study of social movement.

Keywords: entextualization; ritual; social movement; state; urban village

Modernity and Its Christian Parallels: Reflection from National Consciousness among Syrian Miaphysite Christians

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Introduction

Much of the discussion on nationalism approaches the phenomenon as a consequence of modernity. Plenty of works on nationalism focus on European historical trajectory that are often laid out as beginning in the late middle age, thus tying it directly to the Enlightenment era and European experience of modernity. There have been attempts to shed this Eurocentric analysis by taking into accounts non-European experience in nationalism. In spite of that, even such interesting perspectives often lead us back to specific historical circumstances conditioned by modern historicity, taking decolonization and post-World War II political economy project as its turning point.

In an attempt to argue that nationalism is not a specifically modern phenomenon, this paper looks further back to the political process during 6th century (now known as) Syria. We agree with Anthony Smith that to understand nation as a long and complex process, we have to break free from making modern nation as the only starting point in conceptualizing the phenomenon. There have been a couple of works that attempt to analyze the concept of nation before the advent of modernity, however to our understanding most of those works fall short in understanding nation in terms of longue duree. They limit themselves in understanding the process of nation formation in terms of violent conflict and establishment of new governmental institution.

Such works, interesting that they may be, missed the opportunity to understand nation as a deep cultural process intertwined instead into the daily lives of the actors.

Syria in the 6th century is the locus of analysis in this paper. The reason the case is chosen is twofold. The first reason is that time period is late antique era, prior to European middle age and subsequent to ancient era, haven't received enough attention in social theories. Much focus has been put either in middle age feudalism or ancient Roman, but very few in between. This is despite the fact that late antique was a crucial period of economic and cultural transformation, not to mention the rise of political religious power such as of Islam.

This relates to the second reason, that is the dynamics that we commonly identify as modern phenomenon, which are interplay between religion and nation, and the role of colonialism, may have happened in 6th century Syria's case. Miaphysite Christianity became the source of Syrian consciousness in mapping their sense of selfhood in the world dominated by overarching narrative of Roman Empire. The Roman context is especially important in understanding Syrian manifestation of nationalism, as the Syrian Miaphysite Christianity identity stands in contrast with Roman identity and the orthodox form of Christianity they represent. Long historical consciousness of Syria being a fringe region under colonial subjugation of Roman Empire also formed a disjuncture Syrian identity from its colonial master.

Methods

This paper is based on library research. An investigation of primary sources of documents written in Roman Empire era was conducted to fully understand the way lives were experienced and articulated in the period. The primary sources mostly are translated in English, but when possible documents written in its original language (Latin) are also investigated, with the consultation from speaker familiar with the language. Secondary sources of books and journal articles written about the era are also utilized extensively, not only to better understand the situation but also to frame the historical circumstances in theoretical discussion.

Relevant sources are acquired through three different kind of libraries. The first are from libraries located in Universitas Indonesia, which are Miriam Budiardjo Research Center (MBRC) FISIP Universitas Indonesia and Universitas Indonesia Central Library. The second are from open digital libraries, which are Gutenberg Project and Internet Archive. Last are through the help of members from Hugoye-List Syriac Studies Group and Mr. Noorsena from Syriac Orthodox Studies in Malang.

Findings

Syrians in the 6th century were in the middle of religious difference. Unlike commonly recognized in middle age Europe centuries later, there was no single, all-encompassing political-religious authority like the one Europe had in Vatican.

In this paper the discussion is limited only to Miaphysite Christianity, which is adhered by most Syrians, and Chalcedonian--"orthodox" form--Christianity. The Syrian Miaphysites construct boundary markings to identify the separation between "us" and "others". For the Miaphysites, the adherence of Chalcedonian Christianity is designated as Melkite form of Christianity, which translates to "Imperial Christianity" for its close connection to the colonial Roman Empire. Miaphysite Christians consider their theological and practice of Christianity as the true one, while the Melkite as the misguided one, especially so since its close connection to imperial authorities who often persecute Syrians.

At the same time, the affirmation of being a "true Christian" is deeply intertwined with their conception of "being a Syrian". Christian myths were retold in fashion that connects the authenticity of Christianity to the identity of Syrian. The story is particularly popular in 6th century, when the importance of being Syrian Christian came to surface, vis-a-vis of being a Roman.

Discussion

The paper follows Anthony Smith's argument that to understand the complexity of nationalism as cultural process, we have to go beyond its modern nation imaginings. In order to achieve this, the paper develop on Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined community.

While Anderson has a very modernist tendency in theorizing nationalism, we argue that Anderson's framework can still be useful to investigate Syria's case without resorting to his modernist leaning. Anderson's crucial framework for imagined community is the possibility of experiencing simultaneous time. For Anderson it is made possible through the compressing of time into a homogenous empty time, however in Syria's case, time doesn't have to be emptied and desecularised like what happened with the coming of print capitalism. Time can be both experienced simultaneously and full. This is made possible with what Rudyansjah call as cultural landscape: instead of disconnected, time and space are heavily intertwined to each other.

For the Syrians, their myths of Christianity authenticity and its close connection to Syrian-ness is lived and can be seen in their daily lives. There were Christian relics which were re-imagined as of Syrian origin, ruins and historical religious sites inscribed with Aramaic--Syrian language which is also believed to be spoken by Jesus --and contemporary Roman Empire persecution of Syrian in varying issues. This is also combined with Syrian historical consciousness of Syria being the fringe area of Roman Empire--neither completely Roman, nor the neighboring Persian. Unlike many other Roman-colonized regions, Syria have a historical sense of belonging that is not fully Roman. This, eventually, results in the 6th century nationalism of Syrian Miaphysite Christian.

Conclusion

This paper tries to argue that nationalism is not an exclusively modern phenomenon. Looking back further to as early as 6th century, the paper argues that phenomenon we commonly associate with modernity, such as the dynamics between nation and religion, and subjugation by colonial power, may have analogously happened back in late antiquity era, if not similarly. The intertwining between the notion of being Syrian and being Christian play important role in Syrian Miaphysite Christian nationalism in 6th century. Conducting a thorough investigation on this late antique period, which is not as frequently studied as the middle age or ancient period, may bring something useful in the development of social theories.

Keywords: nationalism, modernity, late antiquity, Christianity, Roman Empire

The Emergence of Nationalist Movements in Footstep

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This paper attempts to expose the emergence of nationalist movements in Netherlands Indies as written in a novel---Footsteps by Pramoedya Ananta Toer. In this novel, Pramoedya narrates the characters based on the repressive colonial policies within the plural society of the Netherlands Indies. The historical setting of Footsteps depicts the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of the society under Dutch colonial rule in early twentieth century in the Netherlands Indies. Interestingly, all aspects of society under Dutch colonial rule in the Netherlands Indies are embodied as a type of society called by Furnivall a plural society---a society in which distinct social orders live side by side, but separately, within the same political unit (Furnivall, 1967: xv). The obvious feature of this kind of society is that the ruler and the ruled are of different races. Dutch and other Europeans such as British, German and Portuguese were in the upper level; the Chinese and Arabs occupied the middle level; and the Natives consisting of many kinds of ethnic groups such as Acehnese, Bataknese, Minangkabaunese, Javanese, Sundanese, Balinese, and Buginese were suppressed in the lowest level.

Thus, the social stratification of the plural society in theNetherlands Indies was based on the racial lines. Since the pluralistic society of Netherlands Indies comprised of diverse ethnic and racial communities, the emergence of nationalist sentiments was varied into three kinds of nationalism: ethnic, religious and secular nationalisms. The rise of Japan as a strong nation-state in the early twentieth century incited the awakening of nationalist sentiments from several ethnic or racial groups in the Netherlands Indies. The first ethnic or racial group united into a national organization was the Chinese who founded Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan in 1900; then the Arabs established a similar organization called the Jamiatul Khair in 1902. Both nationalist organizations

had registered as a legal body that made the Chinese and the Arabs had the same status under the law as a Pure -Blood European.

In addition, they had a similar goal that emphasized education to bring their people in the Netherlands Indies into the modern era. In search of nationalism for mobilizing anti-colonial movement in Netherlands Indies, Pramoedya indicates through the main character, Minke, who had substantial experience in his engagement within a few organizations that makes him aware of the repressive rule conducted by Dutch Colonial Administration in the Netherlands Indies. Inspired by his late wife, Ang San Mei, a young political activist from China, sent to the Netherlands Indies in order to encounter the old Chinese generation here which supported the Ching dynasty---Minke founded an organization called Syarikat Priyayi with several priyayis who worked in Dutch Colonial Administration in Batavia. The main goals of Syarikat Priyayi are to educate and increase the social welfare of native. Syarikat Priyayi initiated the first weekly-paper owned by native in the Netherlands Indies.

This weekly-paper named Medan. Since Medan used "Melayu pasar" (market-Malay} as its language, its subscribers were not only priyayis but also non-priyayis. In the beginning, the content of Medan was only about laws or regulations needed by Native administrators or traders for their works. Later Medan began to expose the social and economic injustices that occurred in the Netherlands Indies. Hence, Medan gradually became the medium of Natives to voice their sufferings in the Netherlands Indies. Due to the role of Medan as a medium to criticize Dutch policies, Dutch colonial administration intimidated leaders of Syarikat Priyayi who worked within this administration to exit from Syarikat Priyayi. Beside this, Minke thought of Syarikat Priyayi could not reach the voice of other native elements especially the poor. Accordingly, Syarikat Priyayi dwindled and its followers left the organization, but Minke still maintained Medan the weekly-paper. The educated native inspired by "semangat zaman" (modern era) was concerned with the backwardness of their people. When Boedi Oetomo (BO) was founded by medical students of STOVIA, Minke joined this new organization because as a student of STOVIA he did not want to disappoint his colleagues. Since BO aimed only to promote Javanese culture and social welfare, Minke considered that BO excluded other ethnic and social groups in the Indies. Seeing that BO had been domesticated by Dutch colonial administration, Minke withdrew from this Javanese priyayi organization.

In search of a Natives' organization that could embrace various social elements in the Netherlands Indies, Minke was encountered by Douwager to discuss the idea of building such an organization called Indisch which means of the Indies. This idea is an interesting one since it allowed to embrace all citizens of the Indies, including Indo, no matter what their racial, ethnical, and religious origins. But the problem was that the organization will use Dutch instead of Malayas language. And above all, this organization had recruited only educated people, so Indisch could not represent all kind of native's social elements. Thus, though Indisch served as a secular nationalist movement, this organization had isolated itself from other Native's social groups. Indeed, Indisch was an elitist organization for educated people with Dutch as its official language.

When Minke saw that Chinese entrepreneurs began to take over the Native industry of batik, he agreed with other Native batik traders to build Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah. Minke perceived that Islam could unite more people in the Netherlands Indies since most people in the Indies believed it; and more than that, Islam could become an ideology that rallies Moslems against colonial power. Furthermore, Minke explains that it was Islam that had always fought and opposed the Europeans since they came to the Indies, and that would continue fighting as long as the colonialists held power; the softest form of this opposition ever took was the refusal to work for the Dutch, and so the Moslems became traders.

Keywords: Plural Society, diverse nationalist movements, Dutch Colonial Administration, Islam, Melayu pasar.

Social Participation of Youth on Optimizing the Status & Role in Society and Implications for Nationalism

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One of the problems facing the nation of Indonesia nowadays is a waning spirit of nationalism among the younger generation. This is due to a large number of foreign cultural influences in our country, as a result, many young people who forget their own culture because it considers that foreign culture is a culture that is more modern than the culture of the nation itself. This leads to the lofty values of the nation much ignored almost happened in most of the younger generation. Since in the past and present as well as the future role of the youth or the younger generation as a pillar, movers, and guards the course of national development is highly expected. Through an extensive network of schools and organizations, youth and the younger generation can play a greater role to control the course of national development. A variety of problems that arise due to a sense of nationalism and nationhood are fading a lot going on lately, a lot of young people or youth experiencing disorientation, dislocation and engage in an interest that's just selflessness private or a group of people on behalf of certain as a reason in its activities.

History of Indonesia noted that youth have participated in this nation of liberty and growing nationalism to the community. Youth as one of the groups that exist in the community have a strategic role and status as citizens. Physically the human group is a young man full of zeal and energy in performing the activity continues, always keen to learn about new things, and wishes to do an innovation and change is good.

In respect of such matters, the younger generation as the pillars of the nation's expected run status and role with optimal and has the soul of nationalism still survives on the cultural values of the nation of Indonesia although many foreign cultures in the country Indonesian. With based on the strengthening of the status and the role of youth as the next generation of the nation's expected foreign cultural influences can be filtered so that the young generation can be a generation that really loves the motherland Indonesia any style.

Associated with it, this paper will explore how youth optimize status and its own role in fostering a sense of nationalism among the younger generation of Indonesia. This paper aims to analyse the problems reflected due to a loss of a sense of nationalism and the younger generation; knowing the extent of the importance of the role and status of youth in fostering a sense of nationalism; identify forms of social participation of youth in society; analyse the role of Government in fostering a sense of nationalism among the younger generation of today; and gives an overview to the young generation the importance of a sense of nationalism in the life of nation and State.

This research is qualitative research with exposure are descriptive. The research approach used, namely the study on a problem to occur in the community. Engineering data collection is done by observation, in-depth interviews, and the study of the literature. The process of analysis in this study i.e., data collection, data presentation, data reduction, and the withdrawal of the conclusion.

Some research results inform that the youth has committed a variety of roles for the community. First, regarding the role of the youth in the area of managing ecotourism in Semarang city. In quantity, the number of youth involved in the management of the ecotourism area number is very few, the overall number of youth in Kandri village, who participated in the Working Group for youth only 16 youths from less more 900 youth. Then about youth organizations in building the character of the youth in Sukoharjo Regency on the leadership of the Movement's youth Branch Anshor suggests that his role has not been fullest because there were several obstacles, namely finance, coordination of Executive Board still less, still fewer administrators, the liveliness of a vacancy of Office, and personal interests. It would then have an impact on the characters that formed in youth organizations.

Of the two samples of such research can be the subject of discussions that the social participation of youth is still low in both individual and group. So, the need for research conducted in depth as well as connect it with the attitude of nationalism which became Indonesia's hope for all the people to the youth. The findings will be a benefit when these problems can contribute positively impact as part of a policy to manage youth and his movement.

The participation of youth in social status and to optimize its role is still not optimal. This is found on the role of the youth who move individually and in an affiliated youth organization. The low participation of youth in optimizing their status and role in society implies low nationalism against anyway. In fact, the young man has a good track record in the knitting of this nation. Required the presence of the reinforcement of social participation of youth in order to be able to optimize its status and role. Here some of the parties responsible for taking policy, in particular, the Ministry of youth and sports can more actively to manage the youth to be the nation's best asset.

Keywords: Youth, Social Participation, Movement, Nationalism

Curriculum System Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah, Cirebon, West Java

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Education is one of the most important pillars for the advancement of a nation and state. Without education, a nation and a state cannot compete with other countries. In Indonesia, education is divided into two systems, formal education and informal education. Formal and informal education methods in Indonesia can be applied properly. This is evidenced by the formal education under the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, and informal education run by pondok pesantren in Indonesia. Formal education is run by the government through public schools, such as primary schools, junior high schools, and high schools. Informal education is run by pondok pesantren by using artificial curriculum of pesantren and not yet use formal education from government. The focus of this discussion is the method of education applied in one of the pesantren in Cirebon, West Java, namely Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah.

In the beginning, this boarding school is a taklim assembly that goes around the city of Cirebon, West Java. The Assembly was led by a young kiyai named Yahya Zainul Ma'arif. Kiyai Yahya Zainul Ma'arif is often referred to as Buya Yahya is a graduate of Al-Ahgaff University, Yemen. In 2006 he came to the city of Cirebon to preach in the source district. He preached in the area based on orders from his teacher, namely Al-Habib Abdullah bin Muhammad Baharun. Several years living in the source area, he has several disciples who faithfully study Islamic religion to him. So in 2009 he bought a piece of land measuring 7500 meters, then used as a mosque and several buildings for his students. In 2010, Buya Yahya and his students built a pondok pesantren on the land. Pondok Pesantren is called "Al-Bahjah" which means shining or radiant. The naming of Al-Bahjah is meant to make this boarding school able to give impact to the people around Cirebon and Indonesia. in the same year the leadership of Al-Bahjah boarding school got input from the community around Cirebon to establish a formal educational institution in pesantren environment. So in 2013, this boarding school built elementary school and then followed by junior high school, and high school.

This article was conducted with qualitative research using interview method as primary data, observation by visiting field directly, literature study, and using books, as well as documents belonging to pondok pesantren Al-Bahjah. This research also uses pesantren's theories of definition, categorization, purpose, function, and role, as well as main elements of pesantren. Based on research conducted at Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah. It can be said that Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah is Pondok Pesantren which uses several education systems. Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah combines the two educational systems, namely the system of formal, and informal education. The formal education taught by Al-Bahjah uses the curriculum of 2013. The curriculum is implemented in elementary, junior and senior high schools.

The curriculum in this pondok pesantren is affiliated to the Ministry of Education and Culture, and not to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is evident that Al-Bahjah pesantren booths use the formal education system in Indonesia. Not only using the formal education system, this boarding school also has its own curriculum, the curriculum pesantren. The curriculum of pesantren, among others, is the curriculum about memorizing the Qur'an called Tashili method. This method is a method created by the founders of pesantren Al-Bahjah. Tashili method which means easy method, hopefully this method can be easily digested by readers. In addition to the application of Tashili method, this boarding school also implements the curriculum system of pesantren, this

system is a system of learning santri during the boarding school, its application such as the schedule of the assembly together Buya Yahya and assemblies held every Sunday morning. Pondok Pesantren is also implementing boarding school system which means the students live in pesantren environment and follow all the activities of pondok pesantren. With the implementation of the formal system of Islamic boarding school Al-Bahjah has a formal education level, namely Elementary School, Junior High School, and High School which is wrapped with the curriculum system 2013. The formal school is coupled with the curriculum system of the Qur'an that uses the Tashili method. So that the formal school in boarding school Al-Bahjah plus the word Islam Qur'ani, like Qur'anic Islamic Elementary School, Qur'ani Islamic High School and Qur'ani Islamic High School. In addition, the implementation of the informal system is passed by opening a boarding school Tafaqquh boarding school and boarding Tahfid Al-Qur'an. Pondok Pesantren tafaqquh is a boarding school that studies the classic books and focuses on printing the da'i or ulama. Pondok Pesantren is studying the books of jurisprudence, Arabic language, and the hadiths of Prophet Muhammad SAW. Then boarding Tahfid Al-Qur'an boarding school is a boarding school that focuses on printing the memorizers of Al-Qur'an. Pondok Pesantren Tahfidz Al-Qur'an uses Tashili method in teaching so that the students more quickly memorize the verses of Al-Qur'an. In addition to the application of curriculum, this pesantren also has a uniqueness, namely how to dress that is used everyday. How to dress the santri at pesantren Al-Bahjah using robe for male students and abaya for the santri women. This is influenced by Buya Yahya who is a graduate of Al-Ahgaff University, Yemen. The use of clothing in Yemen is one of practice in accordance with Islamic Shari'a. In addition to the use of clothing, Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah also apply ideology system, ideology system applied is Tarekat Alawiyah. Tariqa is a way or way of worship to Allah Subhanahu wa ta'ala and Alawiyah is to the descendants of Sayyidina Ali bin Abi Talib. This tarekat is widely spread in Indonesia, especially on the island of Java. The Alawiyah order is brought by habaibs who are descendants of Sayyidina Ali ibn Abi Talib and also preachers who once studied in Yemen. The conclusion of this article is Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah is a modern pondok pesantren that combines boarding school that uses informal education system with informal education. In addition, the application of ideology in Al-Bahjah boarding school is very thick with middle-eastern culture, evidenced by the use of clothing in everyday life.

Keywords: Education, Pesantren, Al-Bahjah

Fashioning the Nationalism: Study on Kebaya Community in Indonesia

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Introduction

Recently, the government of Indonesia often doing the campaign about ‘cinta NKRI’, ‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’ and ‘Pancasila’ through their speeches, formal government events, cultural seminars and so forth. Nationalism is a phrase that being part of the nation's campaign. Base on modern life society, nationalism is driven not only by the government through their political campaigns but also the components of society that are implemented through social movements as well. In this capacity, social movements which doing by people don’t have to be national scale and structured movements but making it possible through the capacity of agencies within the realm of cultural autonomy.

Components of society that helped moving the nation campaign are consist of diversity, from public figures, companies and communities. Those that become media campaigns are also diverse, such as dance, music, culinary and handicraft products. One of those communities that participated in making nation campaign is a community of kebaya. This community was born in Jakarta late 2014 who’s bring the mission to invite people preserving the tradition with the kebaya as a tool.

According to conversation with the initiators of this community, there is a trigger behind founding of their community called the occurrence of identity crisis in the traditional clothing, especially kebaya which has been

known as a national dress. We are beginning to lose the identity of Indonesia even though we have kebaya and other regional clothes. The influences that come from modernization and another culture playing role to threat the existence of kebaya which can be seen by the rarely frequency of women wearing kebaya except in certain occasions such as wedding or graduation. Among cultural heterogeneity in Indonesia, kebaya as a national dress has represented many regional clothes because it is impossible to bring all regional clothes as a national dress.

This study examines about some problems that observed through the social phenomenon of urban communities in Jakarta as starting point of the dynamics in kebaya community which they are wanting to arouse community concern about kebaya as a unifying media of the nation. Fashioning the values of nationalism embodied by this community through inviting people to love wearing kebaya in various model and interpretation as loving Indonesian culture.

Methods

Research methodology is participant-observation in my field work, daily observation of the subject, and interviews of initiators and members of the kebaya community, kebaya observers and fashion designers. I use qualitative methods. And as secondary data, I use online method in social media and online media. I have started doing this research in kebaya community since March 2017 with research subjects that covering urban women, middle class, age 30 years and over, located in Jakarta and surrounding areas.

Studies support the literature as a theoretical basis. Fashioning the values of nationalism through social movement becomes the basic concept of this article that focus of the main issues on the phenomenon of kebaya community who want to arouse public awareness about the importance of maintaining kebaya as the identity of nation as well.

Findings

This research is emphasized on the phenomenon of the social movement of kebaya community that spreading the knowledge about kebaya as a national dress which indicates the occurrence of national identity crisis among the values from outside country that have the potential causing something to be lost the existence of kebaya. Social media became the main tool used by the kebaya community to spread its knowledge about their mission. In addition to social media, they also organize events, such as cloth-wearing workshops, fashion shows, attending seminars and talk shows on radio and television. In this case, this community members act as agents of change through their social movement.

According to my observation, the social movements that doing by these communities could be small activities and local level area, not on simultaneous and national scale. This community does not organize large national events and so the impact from what they do has not been significant in years. From what I got in fieldwork, I found different dynamic that is ideally kebaya as a national dress of Indonesia, but at the other side I find the rejection from people who their background come from non-Javanese ethnicity. Maybe that’s why some of collective action of this community are more located in the territory of Java, except on special celebrations such as Kartini day and Indonesia Independence which requires the use of kebaya dress code that includes not only people in Java but spread outside Java.

Another dynamic aspect is the community bringing the expectation to be able helping the rise of small industries through kebaya products, such as batik cloth, garment, accessories, which is expected in the future will encourage the independence of the nation's economic sector. I assume those spirits can be attributed to the meaning of Mahatma Gandhi's teachings through *swadeshi* (using about produced by the country itself) which encourages love of the use of domestically produced goods and does not buy imported goods in order to rely on its own strength self-reliance).

Discussion

The idea of nationalism on kebaya is actually not about something new because it has been used since the early of independence Indonesia, then continuing the new order era until this day. The issue of nationalism is linked

to the conceptualized politics of attributing clothing as a political symbol. The meaning of 'fashioning' is a depiction of the dynamics kebaya worn by women in this community from the point of fashion, no longer kebaya as traditional fashion that 'anti-fashion' but continues. Kebaya worn by women through this community drawing the values of dynamic society as well as celebrated as the identity of Indonesian women that kebaya which worn by members of community consist various models and its interpretations are liquid and personal point of view.

Base on my research, the vision and mission of this kebaya community still needs to be measured for their effectiveness through their collective action. To what extent is this community able to arouse public awareness to preserve kebaya as Indonesian national dress? What is the background of those issues that gave rising to the kebaya community movement? What do they want to represent through this community? With the connection between the concept of ethnicity and nationalism, need further exposure on the process of ethnic concepts on kebaya which later widened into the concept of nationalism. When we talk about nationalism, it is about how kebaya is represented through the activities of this community.

The government present here in the form of kebaya recognition as a national dress, such as entering kebaya as a dress code in state events in the scope of government both national and international (abroad). But the collective role of society is needed to maintain kebaya as a national cultural heritage where people are expected to no longer see kebaya as a product of Javanese cultural heritage hegemony from the previous era.

Conclusion

Social movement through kebaya community is still doing in small scale and not significant yet. It needs some well-planned road-maps from related communities, society participation and of course the role of the government. Raising up kebaya is a collective work so that this social movement can rise to a national scale that can lift not only the value of nationalism but also how to caring the values of tradition.

Keywords: Kebaya, women, community, nationalism, identity

Ethnographical Study of Crime: Merarik Tradition at Nusa Tenggara Barat

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Introduction

Crime and culture are things that we can find in our daily life. We can see both of in any form; but now, crime and culture are not concepts that only stand on their own. The correlation between crime and culture is illustrated on how criminal act is considered to be a form of cultures for some community. Just the opposite, in a multicultural society, culture—which can be considered to has characteristics of crime becomes an endless discussion prompting both pro and cons reaction and make a stigma to its adherents.

Culture is formed by the ancestor who has the ability to use symbol as an instrument to give meaning to one thing or event so it has value and has more significance over other ordinary things. Culture is a result of people's mind process on society in order to fill their needs, ranging from physical need, and the abstract things, for example, spiritual needs that help people to go through life. Not only as a way to fulfil human needs, for certain community culture is also used to give meaning to symbol and as a mean of adjustment to their natural condition.

Because culture is the result of social construction by member of society, the nature of its prominence is relative. In cultural relativity every culture or ethnical group must be seen from their basic value and norm to control behavior, not from others. There is a reason why cultural relativity gives an idea that the absolute truth never existed. It is because values and norms in every culture are formed by society's interaction and

consensus to fulfilling their own needs of behavior rules. In cultural relativity, a culture is not positioned as a stratification, but an equal thing and limited to its diversity. Culture has no universal indicator about which one is good or better. Thus, cultural relativity is contradictive to ethnocentrism that tends to use a single perspective to see a phenomenon in other group.

The relation between crime and culture will be analyzed further in Cultural Criminology which explains about crime as culture and culture as crime. Crime as culture defined as a set of deviant or criminal behavior that becomes a symbol or identity and has deep meaning for the members. Whereas culture as crime is defined as an element of culture as deviant or criminal behavior.

In Indonesia, there are many cultures that that falls under the category of crime by society in general, such as killing, sexual harassment or deviance, gambling, arts, and belief in supranatural things. One of the example that will be explained is eloping tradition or Merarik from Sasak Tribe. Furthermore, this research is an ethnographical study of crime that describe and explain about meanings and values which existed in Merarik marriages. The meanings and values, which sometimes can not be understood by most society, also can not be explained from legal perspective in Indonesian law. However, those meanings and values are now slowly shifting in its implementation and give a new problem which are related to crime and culture.

Methods

This research uses literature study to get the deep information about Merarik tradition and theoritical concept that can explain this phenomenon. The point of this research is to analyze Merarik tradition in culture and criminology perspective to explain the "crime behavior" in Merarik tradition.

Findings

As a way to get married, Merarik is considered by most people outside of Sasak tribe as a deviant and criminal behavior. Merarik is an act when a man who wants to marry woman have to kidnap her without getting caught by her parents or family. If her parents or family know about this plan, they have the right to not grant permission for the wedding, but if he succeeds, the woman will be placed at one of his relatives for 2 to 3 nights. In this process, the woman's parent or family will report to headman when they realize that their daughter has been kidnapped. After that, the groom will delegate one of his relative to explain his purpose to marry the woman.

Discussions

As mentioned before, each rules and act in Merarik has it own meaning and function, including for the man, woman, and their family. Eventhough in Indonesia's Law eloping defined as crime, things that make Merarik different from another eloping case is rules to control the process before and when they do Merarik. Each rules and act has its own meaning and function to protect and to respect person who are involved in Merarik. The eloping elements within this culture are often misunderstood. For a man, Merarik is a symbol of bravery, responsibility and capability to protect the woman he loves; for woman, Merarik give her a pride for being someone special for a man who is trying hard to marry her; and for the family it's a pride and also a threat for other, because once they commit Merarik, the marriage must be held even when they don't like the groom/ bride. This phenomenon proves that Merarik has a different aim and value with common eloping case, indicating a cultural relativity. There is significant difference of value between common community and Sasak tribe regarding eloping in marriage. The cultural relativity is presented on how they look at the meaning of eloping from man as offender, woman as a victim and social reaction of that act. Sellin mentioned that this example conflict of conduct norm is a result of a process of group's differentiation within cultural system and areas or and a result of contact between norms drawn from different cultural system or area. In this case, Sasak tribe's cultural system has a contradiction to definition of crime by Indonesian Legal Law, and the community who take Indonesian Legal Law as a basic law trying to distinguishing this cultural system.

Since there is a shift in values regarding Merarik process, there are some differences in how Merarik is perceived. The change in value system and culture is caused by social movement and reaction to globalization and it affected the implementation, and also the value in every act and rules of Merarik as cultural system. At

first, Merarik is a tradition which has a deep meaning change into an example of Culture as Crime. It because means and values shifting give the new problem and impact in implementation and their afterlife married, such as violence, divorce, etc.

Conclusions

In multicultural country like Indonesia, understanding cultural relativity concept is important, so process of defining which culture is good, bad, or even contains crime doesn't happen haphazardly. Understanding the meanings and values of culture can help us keep the original meaning and values so the cultural act can be done the right way by its adherents.

Keywords: Ethnography, Culture, Crime, Merarik, Culture as Crime

GENDER AND NATIONALISM

How does gender matter in nationalism? Literature on the subject of nationalism has largely ignored gender as an analytical category. This theme - gender and nationalism - will be analysed through feminist lenses and by feminist scholars with various backgrounds in social sciences and gender studies.

This theme highlights the central role of women in nationalism and nationalist movements and debates whether nationalism as an ideology that domesticates or emancipates women. Other topics on gender and nationalism include the ways the discourse on nationalism intersects with those of femininity and masculinity and how an identity as a man or women takes form through nationalist discourse and (re)produces national identity.

The expected topics of discussion on gender and nationalism are: (1) the role of women and nationalism and nationalist movements for independence in Indonesia or other countries(as a comparison); (2) gender identity, national identity and modernization: does nationalism domesticate or emancipate women? (3) Relations between nation, culture and gender; and (4) how masculinity is relevant for understanding the discourse on nationalism.

Is This Indonesian #MeToo? Women's Movement Against Sexual Harassment on Social Media (Case Study of #MulaiBicara Campaign on Instagram)

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Introduction

In 2017, the world has made one thing clear: sexual harassment is everywhere (Senthilingam, 2017). Most of the world's women have experienced sexual harassment. It is estimated that no less than 75 percent of the world's 2.7 billion women aged 18 years and older, or at least 2 billion women, have been sexually harassed (Inter Press Service, 2018; World Health Organization, 2017). The estimated proportion varies across countries from 50 to 90 percent. The broad range of sexual harassment among nations reflects an extent differences in interpretation, policies, reporting, and culture (Inter Press Service, 2018).

Although definitions of sexual harassment towards women vary globally, they generally center on unwelcome behavior, unwanted coercion and conduct of a sexual nature that violates a woman's dignity and personal wellbeing and creates an intimidating, humiliating or hostile environment (Human Rights Library, 2003). Sexual harassment includes many things: sexual assault, unwanted pressure for sexual favors and dates, unwanted deliberate touching, leaning over, cornering, stalking, sexually lewd comments and unwanted communication of a sexual nature (United Nations, 2008).

Addressing the vulnerable conditions of sexual harassment, women do not remain silent. They unite and fight through a massive movement. The groundbreaking anti-sexual harassment movement #MeToo began the public conversation about women's issues around the world and increased the global consciousness about the obstacles women encounter in everyday lives, both personal and professional. The #MeToo movement has become a worldwide phenomenon, searched for on Google in 196 countries in the past year (Langone, 2018).

It started with a detail countless allegations against reputable Hollywood producer Harvey Winstein. But soon, personal stories began pouring in from women in all industries across the world, and the hashtag #MeToo

became a rallying cry against sexual harassment (Khomami, 2017). Within days, millions of women used Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram to unfold the harassment they have faced in their own lives. It spread all over the world, the #MeToo hashtag has been used more than 1 million in the United States, Europe, the Middle East and beyond (Burke, 2018). The French used #BalanceTonPorc, the Spanish #YoTambien, the Chinese #WoYeShi, also in South Korea and India.

Similar to other countries, sexual harassment against women continues to rise in Indonesia. A study by the National Commission on Violence against Women revealed that violence against women increased by 25 percent in Indonesia in 2017. The commission recorded a total of 348.446 cases of gender-based violence that year, including sexual harassment. The report also noted that 71 percent of the reported cases of harassment against women took place in private or domestic environments, followed by cases of public harassment, which accounted for 26 percent of incidents (Sarahtika, 2017). According to the data, only 268 street harassment reports were filed last year to the police, non-governmental organizations or the commission itself across a nation of more than 260 million people (Cochrane, 2017).

In the wake of #MeToo movement across the globe, women activists in Indonesia have been campaigning against sexual harassment. Thousands of women showed up at 2018 Women's March in 13 cities in Indonesia, demonstrating a significant improvement in awareness of sexual harassment (Badudu, 2018). Going by the mainstream media, we might imagine that #MeToo is not seen as a big issue in Indonesia. But if we turn to the social media, the story is very different. There are a lot of voices expressed through #MulaiBicara hashtag which are similar to #MeToo movement.

Therefore, this research asks questions about (1) how do women resist sexual harassment praxis in Indonesia and (2) how does social media play roles in the resistance? This research aims to explain Indonesian anti-sexual harassment #MulaiBicara campaign which relates to the phenomenal #MeToo movement and understand the mechanism of women's resistance against sexual harassment by optimizing the use of social media.

Method

This research is built on qualitative approach and constructivist paradigm. The researcher collects data from 3.827 Instagram posts which includes hashtag #MulaiBicara from June 2016 to June 2018.The research uses content analysis to capture main discourse about Indonesian anti-sexual harassment movement which is so vigorous in Instagram. The concept about sexual harassment, muted group theory, activism and social media are used to help the researcher in analyzing and answering the research questions.

Findings & Discussion

As the results, this research finds that Indonesian women express their voices and attitudes against sexual harassment through #MulaiBicara campaign. Indonesian anti-sexual harassment movement has its own uniqueness compared to #MeToo movement in other countries. First, the movement has been started one year before the fame of American #MeToo. A sexual harassment survivors support group Lentera ID, Campaign.com and Magdalene jointly launched the #MulaiBicara campaign on June 2016. The campaign is aimed to raise public awareness on the issue of sexual harassment in Indonesia and discuss ways to end the pervasive problems. Second, there have been no specific accusations against offenders that underlie the movement. Women have stated they were abused but have seldom named names. Most of them just telling their stories and encourage other women to speak about their sexual harassment experiences. Third, there are more than one hashtag enclose with #MulaiBicara campaign, such as #BergerakBersama and #LawanBersama. Every hashtag has specific purpose in sexual harassment issue such as #MulaiBicara to encourage sexual harassment survivors speaking up their experiences, #BergerakBersama to solicit support from other women to be the front guard who refused any kind of sexual harassment forms, and #LawanBersama to take real actions in various fields for preventing sexual harassment practices. One of the actions is advocating the legalization of anti-sexual harassment law. Although presented in different words or taglines, the hashtag is the unity of Indonesian women's voice and attitude against sexual harassment.

From muted group perspectives, sexual harassment survivors can be categorized as a muted group. The power dynamics performed in sexual harassment, the dominance by a perpetrator over a survivor, often relates to

gender inequalities between men and women. Women are often silenced because they are unable to properly articulate their experiences while the cultural norms and barriers associated with language serve men as the dominant group. This research reveals the importance of sexual harassment survivors to reclaim aspects of their voice and power through various communicative channels, including social media.

With the advent of social media as a part of daily discourse, the culture of social media is often reflecting the dominant culture. Nevertheless, social media provides places and spaces for women to build community, convey their resistance, spark movement and empower others. This research argue that survivors of sexual harassment are mobilizing from traumatic victims to online social justice advocates.

Conclusion

An emergency call against sexual harassment resonates across the globe, alarming women to dare to speak about their experiences and concerns. Sexual harassment survivors discouraged to report the incidents and keep their voice all the time in the name of fear and trauma. The #MulaiBicara movement exists to encourage the survivors to share their stories online and gather collective support from others, not just women but also men. Through #MulaiBicara hashtag on Instagram, we can see that sexual harassment becomes a national pervasive problem, but at the same time there is also tons of courage fulfilling our hearts to be a part of this movement. Therefore, this research admits that our bold #MulaiBicara movement is Indonesian #MeToo.

In the past, women's nationalism was filled with motherhood tasks like producing and arising nation's next generation. Today, nationalism is realized by expressing aspirations in public space and fighting for women's rights. Women unite to create a better nation which respects the rights of every citizen, making the country as a viable safe place to live in.

Keywords: women's movement, sexual harassment, #MeToo, #MulaiBicara, social media

Women in Nationalism Movement, Forgotten Subject in Post Secularism

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Position of women in nationalism movement in Third World have been a supporting subject for the grow of the free nation. Women also plays important role in the development project and they support democratic movement through their involvement in politics. Theoretically, Yuval Davies that it women as a social group that develop modern society, in her word "However, it is women—and not Gust?) the bureaucracy and intelligentsia who reproduce nations—biologically, culturally and symbolically" (Davis, 21). This article uses Davis's typology's (Davis, 23), to depict Indonesia women problem as below:

The problem not only on the macro level of patriarchal construction but also in messo and micro level, where the contestation exists, especially for the Third World women; in Davies word"...'third world' women acutely experienced being part of a subjugated collectivity and often did not see autonomous space for themselves to organize as feminists" (Davis, 28). In fact this is a challenging social situation that women doesn't realizes that the world is changing very fast and mostly women are left behind; again in Davies word: "To a large extent, however, it was due to the growing realization of women in the liberation or post-liberation movements that 'national liberation' usually not only did not guarantee women's rights in the nation but also that women were often confronted with new oppressions in the name of 'custom and tradition' (Davies, 29).

The other important subject for gender and nationalism is the question of multiculturalism. This situation has to face the group right. In the First World, this situation cause by the increase of migration from the Third World, that take with them cultural and religious norm and value. This norms and values is different and in term of the social relation in the host countries, these norms and values are detrimental for women. In our context too, the raise of group right made happen by the process of religious revitalization. A well known

religious preacher married his son before he was 17, a case of child marriage that legitimated by the Adat, are some of the cases in society that left untouched by the gender's objection.

Staatnation	*Kulturnation*	*Volknation*
nationalist ideologies which focus on citizenship of specific states (in specific territories)	specific cultures (or religions);	constructed around the specific origin of the people (or their 'race')
Marriages, state influences toward the construction of women and women position in justice institution	Femininity, food, culture, symbol such as the concept of motherland	Kewarganegaraan perempuan dan posisi kerentanannya Women postition in citizenship and their vulnerability
dualistic nature. On the one hand women are always included, at least to some extent, in the general body of citizens of the state and its social, political and legal policies; on the other—there is always, at least to a certain extent, a separate body of legislation which relates to them specifically as women	symbolic 'border guards', which identify people as members or non-members of a specific collectivity. They are closely linked to specific cultural codes of style of dress and behaviour as well as to more elaborate bodies of customs, literary and artistic modes of production and, of course, language. Gender symbols play a particularly significant role in this	the membership of a child in a national collectivity might depend exclusively on the father's membership, the mother's membership, or it might be open for a dual, or voluntary choice membership

The landscapes of gender and nationalism in Third world has been changed, in the day of revolutions, women worked alongside men to support the freedom movement. At that time there was little discussion on the base of feminism, but there had been a description of the problem of women such as polygamy, child marriage, poverty, education. On the contemporary situation, similar situation happened as cases above showed, therefore there is one again to question gender and nationalism, that was once together but at this time it is separated by the interest of gender bias right.

Using Davies theoretical context and multiculturalism, and this context in Third World, this article argues that women in Indonesia faced the contemporary question of nationalism. This question is important as the world, including Indonesia is in the age of post secularism, showed by the increase of religiosity and religious commodification. People are being more piety in their performance such as the fashion, food and community activities, but on the other hand people are also in fear of the increase radicalism. Women are part of it, her story in 1928, they support nationalist movement, and to large extent their position is being question in contemporary social situation. On the other side, the gender and nationalism has put culture as contestation toward groups right and F (feminism) question.

Exclusive Imaginings:
Adat Women and Nationalism in Post New Order Indonesia

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Introduction

Adat communities (*masyarakat adat*) in many rural areas in Indonesia, whose homelands and customary territories are categorized as state forest zone, have been struggling to get recognition. Their recognition struggles include recognition of their existence as well as recognition of their human rights, rights as citizen,

and rights as adat peoples. In many cases their homelands are considered as empty lands and claimed as state forest lands. They have been labelled as forest encroachers although they have been living in their own customary territories for generations. Rural adat women, particularly those of marginal groups within their own communities, have been facing more complex recognition struggles. Their recognition struggles started from their family and community levels into the state and global levels.

After the New Order Government collapsed in May 1998, adat communities began to be included in the discourse of Post New Order nationalism. This discourse focuses on "imagined communities" that should be part of the post New Order Indonesia, which should include marginalized groups that had been politically ignored during the New Order era. To some extent, this discourse is still in line with Ben Anderson's classical concept of "imagined community" (Anderson 1993). To put it in Chandra Mohanty's statement, "imagined not because it is not "real" but because it suggests potential alliances and collaboration across divisive boundaries, and "community" because in spite of internal hierarchies within Third World contexts, it nevertheless suggest a significant, deep commitment to what Benedict Anderson calls "horizontal comradeship" (Mohanty 2003).

Adat communities has been considered as one of the marginalized groups that needs to be included in above discourse of Post-New Order nationalism. One of significant steps that could be considered as efforts to include masyarakat adat in this discourse is the recognition of masyarakat adat and their certain human rights in the amendment of the Indonesian Constitution. The second step is the judicial review of the forestry law of 1999 submitted to the Constitutional Court by the Alliance of Adat Peoples of the Archipelago (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN). This judicial review focuses on certain articles that AMAN considers violating the constitutional rights of masyarakat adat. Responding to the judicial review petition submitted by, the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled in May 2013 that customary forest (hutan adat) is no longer be classed as part of the state owned forest, but as part of the forest subject to rights (hutan hak). This Constitutional Court Ruling fundamentally undoes the existing discriminatory categorization that invalidates the position of masyarakat adat as the owners of their lands and territories. It also provides an opportunity to fix the citizenship status of Indonesian customary communities as rights-bearing subjects.

However, rural adat women have been very limitedly involved in the whole process of advocating the existence of adat communities as well as in articulating their rights. During the process of judicial review process at the Constitutional Court, rural adat women were also not included. Their voices have not been considered significant in this process and the following steps. In other words, adat women have been facing certain ways of exclusion within the discourse of Post New Order nationalism.

This paper examines how the discourse of Post New Order nationalism exclude rural adat women. In particular, it explores how certain parties who have been working with adat communities to support their efforts to get political, social and legal recognition develop the "exclusive imaginings" of masyarakat adat and Post New Order nationalism that exclude adat women. In applying the concept of "exclusive imaginings," I refer to Rebekah Stewart's paper that explore exclusive imaginings, nationalism and indigenous women in Chile and Peru. Steward asserts that the exclusive imaginings of the nation and the perceived "Indian problem" in Peru have had lasting effects on the way in which indigenous people, and especially indigenous women, have been ignored by the Peruvian government and overlooked in state policies and programs (Stewart 2011).

Methods

This paper is written based on a series of qualitative research conducted during period of 2014 - 2017. Methods applied in this research include literature review, participant observation, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, life histories of certain key figures as well as life her stories of key adat women who have been involved in the process to include adat communities into the discourse of post-new order nationalism.

Findings

In May 1993, environmental activists and leaders of grassroots people's movements held a meeting in Tana Toraja. One of the organizers of the meeting was the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi). The meeting resulted in an agreement on the term "masyarakat adat" and its definition, that is, "a group in a society that has inherited (over generations) a certain geographic area, and holds a system of values, ideology, politics, economics, and social and cultural systems that are tied to that area" (Moniaga 2010; Sangaji 2010). Although

several adat women who were leaders of grassroots movements attended the meeting in Toraja, the issue of adat women did not receive special attention at the meeting. The main focus was on views to promote the rights of "adat communities". The follow up of this meeting was the first congress of masyarakat adat in Jakarta in March 1999, which also resulted in the establishment of the Alliance of Masyarakat Adat of the Archipelago (AMAN).

The majority of participants at the congress were men, and most of them were leaders, either formal or informal. Adat women were also present at the meeting. A group of activists, made up of representatives from agrarian, environmental and women's movements with a focus on adat women's issues joined the congress committee and continually strove to ensure that adat women would be present and able to actively participate in the meeting. In the congress, adat women that did attend articulated various issues that they faced in the takeover of control over land in their area. The presence and voices of this small group of adat women in the congress formed part of the struggle for adat women to be seen and included in the adat people's movement. However, the main issues and problems faced by adat women were not fully understood and considered important by many actors and supporters of masyarakat adat movement at the time.

Efforts of adat women to form their own organization during the first congress of masyarakat adat was not successful. After a long and complicated process, representatives of adat women from communities that belong to AMAN and participated in AMAN's 4th National Congress in 2012 declared the establishment of AMAN Women (Perempuan AMAN). This organization is based on individual membership and is open to all adat women from member's communities of AMAN.

However, when AMAN submitted judicial review of Forestry Law No. 41 of 1999 to the Constitutional Court, articulating that certain articles of this law violate the constitutional rights of masyarakat adat, no adat women were involved in the process of submitting the judicial review as well as during the trial process at the Constitutional Court. All of the witnesses presented by AMAN were men. The male witnesses who represented various adat communities did not speak about the various forms of inequality faced by adat women and other marginalized groups in their communities. The narratives of problems of adat women did not appear in any of the material included in the Constitutional Court trial regarding the claim for reconsideration made by AMAN. No expert female witnesses were asked by AMAN to attend the trial. The narrative and arguments put forward by all expert witnesses tended to place adat communities as homogeneous entities without gender.

On 16 May 2013, in the Constitutional Court Ruling No. 35/PUU-X/2012, also known as the Constitutional Court Ruling No. 35, the Constitutional Court stated that customary forests would no longer be classified as state forests. This ruling became a legal reference for adat communities and, at the same time, opened a Pandora's box. The ruling gave legal recognition to customary forests that were previously claimed by the state. For AMAN and supporters of the adat communities' movement, the ruling was a victory.

After the Constitutional Court Ruling No. 35, the actions that have been initiated by various groups representing adat communities have still prioritized the importance of "adat communities" in general and have not yet put priority on the interests of adat women. Aside from this, the involvement of adat women in the abovementioned actions in several regions has been limited. In a time when Constitutional Court Ruling No. 35 is accepted as a state policy that recognizes adat peoples as "rights bearers" and as legal subjects over customary lands as well as full citizens (Rachman and Siscawati 2017), adat women have still not yet obtained full recognition as bearers of additional rights, namely the basic rights of women and other rights that relate to adat women in particular.

Discussion

According to Ben Anderson, "communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined" (Anderson 1993). Anderson's definition of the nation has provided a critical contribution to the study of nationalism. The nation, Anderson explains, "is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." The nation is conceived as limited by Anderson because national identities depend on boundaries. He also identifies an important relationship between the nation and the state. I apply Anderson's definition of the nation as a limited, imagined community in this paper. That the nation is a social construction that relies upon perceptions of boundaries and belonging is critical to my analysis of the discourse of nationalism in post New Order Indonesia. Although this discourse

has been trying to include *masyarakat adat* who were marginalized by the New Order administration, it still relies upon notions of a community that does not fully include adat women.

Rural adat women have limited representation and involvement in the struggles of adat communities in reclaiming their rights, including the rights over customary land and territories. A series of process of advocating and articulating the political, social and legal existence of masyarakat adat have not fully included *adat* women. This process shows the "exclusive imaginings" of masyarakat adat by key actors and supporters of masyarakat adat movement. Meanwhile, during the judicial review of the Forestry Law no. 41 of 1999 performed by the Constitutional Court judges, these judges did not pay attention on the absence of adat women at the judicial review process at the Constitutional Court. Their act represents the legacy of gendered "exclusive imaginings" of the nation.

In a period when Constitutional Court Ruling No.35/PUU-X/2012 is referred to as a state policy that recognizes adat communities as rights bearers, and as legal subjects of customary territory, adat women are still not receiving full recognition and attention from their own communities, social movements as well as the state. This process shows the continuation of the "exclusive imagines" of masyarakat adat as well as the nation within the boundaries of the state.

Adat women in Indonesia have been negatively affected by the gendered national discourses constructed since the New Order Period. The government of Indonesia has been applying exclusive national imaginings in their contemporary policies and practices, including the ones related to customary lands and territories of adat communities. The state has the responsibility to ensure that those living within their borders can access their full rights as citizens. Nevertheless, hegemonic notions of who could live within certain territorial boundaries often contribute to the restriction of the recognition and protection of the rights of adat communities. In this case, adat women face double restriction of their rights. Adat women are left out of the national imaginings because of their gendered identities as member of adat communities as well as their low social, economic and cultural position.

Conclusion

Rural adat women have experienced marginalization throughout the history of Indonesia because they are not perceived as belonging to the exclusive national community. Throughout this paper, I have demonstrated the way in which notions of gender, ethnicity and class have played a critical role in the discourses of nationalism during Post New Order era. The discrimination that rural adat women have experienced, especially in exercising their rights over lands and natural resources, is a result of their exclusion from communities that are considered belong to the nation.

Keywords: gender, nationalism, exclusive imaginings, adat community, adat women

Gender Social Wellbeing and Quality of Life

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Discourses on gender and nationalism mainly deal with the involvement of women in the national movements and discuss about the sexual division of labour between men and women. Gender roles are constructed to support the nation state to work, and this ideology is exercised through various state's institutions. Discussion about the relations between nationalism and quality of life is still limited, although the quality of life can be used to examine the state's performance in providing gender welfare. This paper seeks to examine social well being as the subjective indicator for the quality of life and employ gender perspective. This paper uses the dataset of Social Well Being survey in Indonesia. The survey was conducted by the International Consortium for Social Wellbeing Studies. This study defines social wellbeing as the composite of the individual perception of their life conditions, quality of relationships with others at

the community level, and the perception of conditions of the society. This definition is elaborated in three dimensions i.e. personal, relational and societal. The findings show that gender affects social well being. The survey results demonstrate that there is a gap in the relational well being scores between men and women. This indicates the presence of gender gaps in the community level. Meanwhile, the gap in societal wellbeing scores is relatively low. There is no difference in personal wellbeing scores between male and female.

Introduction

The paper aims at examining the relationships between nationalism, citizenship and welfare. The relationships indicate the quality of life as an indicator of the state's performance to provide welfare for its citizens. By intersectional approach and welfare nationalism as the main concept, the discussion focusses on the way ethnic and religious identities, gender and social class affect the relational wellbeing.

The studies on nationalism generally focus on civic culture and/or ethnicity (Suszycki, 2011), particularly, the discussion underlines issues concerning national sentiments and the construction of ideology of the nation (Anderson, 1993; Smith, 2000; Gellner, 1999). Nationalism is rarely associated with the discourse of welfare state, although some studies points out the importance of the relationship between national identity and the provision and implementation of welfare (Seda et. al; K.S, Jomo, 2004; Teik, 2012). In this context, the discussion concerning nationalism is suggested to not only cover political issues, but also societal issues, including issues of wellbeing among the citizens. The concerns about such a complexity of issues of nationalism recently developed in Western Europe. This is to respond to the effects of globalization, regional integration and transnational migration and the citizenship status of individuals (Suszycki, 2011; Siim et.al., 2015). The Critical reviews are developing concerning the phenomena i.e the ideas of citizenship, that is framed by the the discourse of nation-state, potentially exclude minority groups, especially migrants, to live a decent life. In multi-ethnic states such as Indonesia, this discussion is also relevant. The critical questions are how do multicultural elements in the nation-building process manifest through the idea of citizenship and welfare? Whether welfare state discourse and practices merely focuses on the issue of social class inequality, or also recognizes gender gaps between men and women, and ethnic and religious minority groups. This paper borrows the concept of welfare nationalism proposed by Siim et.al (2015) and Suszycky, 2011), to answer some of these questions. Welfare nationalism is defined as a form of nationalism.

In relation to the concept of citizenship, this paper discusses the social rights of citizens through individual perceptions of social wellbeing. Gender based individual subjective perceptions of social wellbeing are important to reflect their understanding and response to the ways welfare experienced in their daily life. These subjective perceptions include the conditions of their personal life, the perception and quality of inter-group relationships in their community. These subjective perceptions are used as an indicator of quality of life. Quality of life is a concept to understand social issues that are currently getting attention among social scientists. In this case, we need to understand the subjective experiences of women and men and also of various social and cultural groups since these experiences take place in contexts where the state's ideology of gender as well as nationalism work to influence the individuals' perceptions as citizens (Eckermann, 2000).

Theoretical Framework

Welfare nationalism and Citizenship

As a form of nationalism, Suszycki (2011) states that welfare nationalism work at micro, messo and macro levels. At the micro level, welfare nationalism is an automatic categorization of individuals (individual's auto-categorization) and xeno-categorization (categorization) in terms of national differences based on "the national grand narrative" related to welfare. At this level, welfare nationalism refers to the self-categorization of individuals as members of a welfare nation. The word "prosperity" is the most important "membership category". Such self-categorization leads to individuals who are more supportive of their own in-group and discriminate against outside group members: "We" as an in-group identity for welfare implies the word "them" which is contrasted and is considered not part of in-group for welfare.

Welfare nationalism at the meso level can be defined as a discursive commitment from non-government actors for the benefit of national welfare or national ideas related to welfare. At this level, welfare nationalism

includes various narrative meanings that refer to national interests and ideas, the construction and reconstruction of the narrative, and the conflict between competing visions of these narratives, because they are identified and maintained by different political and social groups. At the macro level, welfare nationalism refers to the political actions of the national government through various policies and institutions.

Gender and Nationalism

Nationalism is a conception that is constructed based on gender discourse. This is reflected in the historical depiction of the nation state and institutionalization practices that strengthen gender identity (McClintock, 1993). Therefore, McClintock states that all nations depend on "the powerful of gender construction" (1993: 61). Gender is the foundation for state ideology that significantly penetrates to all sectors of peoples life including the domestic domain. The discourse of nationalism generally discusses the roles of citizens towards nation-state. Women in this context act as state supporters elaborated in the following 5 (five) points: as biological producers of national collective members; as a reproducer of national group boundaries (through female sexual and marital restrictions), as a producer and agents of national cultural transmission; as a national symbolic marker; and as active participants in the national struggle (Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, 1989). Therefore, the concept of nationalism is limited to reflect and measure the state functions in ensuring the welfare and quality of life of its citizens.

To review the status and condition of women, the UN developed objective indicators to measure gender disparity through GDI and Gender Empowerment Measure. This measurement function is to monitor the state in eliminating gender gaps. This measurement, however, does not reflect individual subjective perceptions obtained based on his life experience as his social reality using a gender lens. In this case, quality of life provides an indication of the relationship between objective and subjective wellbeing, so that it can describe the elements of an individual's life experience (Eckermann, 2000).

Social wellbeing in this paper is defined as a combination of individual perceptions of the conditions of their lives, the quality of relationships with other people at the community level, and individual perceptions of the condition of the community. This definition was elaborated through 3 (three) dimensions namely personal wellbeing, relational wellbeing, and societal wellbeing (Hearan Koo, et.al., 2016).

Research Methods

This study refers to SWB survey data sets as the main data. The data is the result of a survey conducted by the International Consortium for Social Wellbeing Studies in Indonesia in 2017. Data processing used a composite index to show the Social Wellbeing conditions in Indonesia which consist of three (3) dimensions 1) personal wellbeing; 2) relational wellbeing; and 3) societal wellbeing. We also use a correlation analysis to review the relations between each dimension to gender and religion identity. This is to describe the way gender nationalism works in the relational wellbeing.

To support the data from, we also conducted in-depth interviews in Jakarta. The in-depth interviews cover selected informants from survey. In-depth interviews were conducted to obtain comprehensive information covering social wellbeing and the daily lives of informants. Following are the characteristics of the informants.

Findings and Discussion

Wellbeing Condition by gender

- Social Wellbeing among men are higher than women, both in overall social wellbeing (SWB) variables and in each dimension of social wellbeing (SWB).
- The highest gap between men and women is found in relational well being

Relational Well Being Based on Religious Group

- Relational wellbeing is higher among Muslim respondents, compared to non-Muslims
- Similar figure also indicated based on the relational wellbeing indicators (Perception, Interaction, Participation), that is the conditions of wellbeing in these indicators are higher among Muslim respondents than non-Muslims.

	Mean	Man	Women
Personal	7.43	7.45	7.40
Relational	6.89	7.36	6.42
Societal	6.4	6.43	6.37
SWB	6.91	7.08	6.73



Relational Well Being Based on Religious Groups and Gender

- Relational Social Wellbeing among men are higher than women, as well as among Muslim compared to non-Muslim respondents.



- Similar figure also indicated based on the relational wellbeing indicators (Perception, Interaction, Participation), that is the conditions of wellbeing in these indicators are higher among men compared to women; and among Muslim respondents than non- Muslim





Conclusion

This paper aims to discuss the welfare nationalism and quality of life to analyze the state's performance in executing its function to ensure the welfare of citizens by using the intersectional approach (gender, ethnic/ religious and social classes differences). The concepts are offered as alternative analysis tools to examine the relationship between the state and its citizens. Welfare nationalism in this paper help us to examine the way nationalism works in the execution and practices of welfare among citizens from different religious and gender identities.



This paper uses social wellbeing as an indicator of quality of life and is measured through 3 (three) dimensions of wellbeing, namely personal, relational and societal. This paper refers to the results of the Social Wellbeing survey conducted by the International Consortium for Social Wellbeing Studies. The results of the study showed that gender and religious identities significantly affected the status of the respondents 'relational wellbeing, which was indicated by a higher level of man and Muslim respondents' satisfaction than women and non-Muslim respondents.